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Abstract:
This dissertation examines how German-American and German-Canadian
Lutherans in St. Louis, Missouri, and Waterloo County, Ontario, constructed their ethnic
identities from the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 to 1970. Did German
Lutherans understand their ethnicity as an identity to overcome, or as an identity worth
preserving? What role did religion and race play in how they constructed their ethnic
identities? It argues that German Lutherans in the Missouri and Canada Synods
constructed a hybrid identity that sought to balance their competing ethnic, religious,
racial, and national identities. It charts their experiences negotiating discrimination during
the Second World War, their efforts to bring German immigrants to North America
through lobbying for immigration policy changes, and their struggles to resist pressures to
assimilate throughout the postwar period. Contrary to popular assumptions, German
Lutherans did not abandon their ethnic identities during the twentieth century, but rather
continued to practice a German ethnic identity within the ethnic boundary zones of their
churches. They continued to justify speaking German as a theological necessity, formed
alliances with new German refugees and displaced persons to continue their ethnic
traditions, and resisted exclusionary mainstream Anglo-Canadian and American
nationalisms by advocating for a pluralistic understanding of their past through cultural
and commemorative events.
By drawing on developments in critical race theory and whiteness studies, this
dissertation argues that “whiteness” or a white racial identity is essential for
understanding how German Lutherans constructed an ethnic identity. While it was
controversial during and after the Second World War to openly identify as German,
German Lutherans successfully mitigated these stigmas through their white privilege and
ability to form political alliances with white government officials. Moreover, German
Lutherans maintained an ethnic identity because they excluded other immigrants and
racialized North Americans from attending their congregations by supporting Jim Crow
segregation. By keeping their churches white, they were also able to keep their churches
“German.” This study urges immigration historians to look more closely at how
whiteness and ethnicity in the twentieth century reinforce, rather than replace, one
another.

Keywords: German Canadians, German Americans, St. Louis, Waterloo County,
Whiteness, Race, Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, Canada Synod, North American
Lutheranism, Transnationalism, Second World War, Cold War Immigration, Displaced
Persons
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A Note on Terminology
Scholarly terms used to define ethnicity and race are often problematic due to the
imprecise and subjective nature of both identities. Many racial and ethnic labels fail to
capture the fluidity of each of these identities. This study discusses German-speaking
Lutherans in Canada, the United States, and Germany. Generally, I use the term “German
Lutherans” as an all-encompassing and less cumbersome term to refer to the GermanAmerican and German-Canadian Lutherans that lived in St. Louis and Waterloo County.
When referring to only one of these communities, I specify their nationality with the
hyphenated term. “German Lutherans” does not refer to people living in Europe unless
otherwise specified in the text.
Critical race theorists employ a wide swath of terms to refer to the different
“races” they study. In his critical examination of white culture, Richard Dyer describes
how many of these terms, such as “nonwhite” or “people of colour,” are problematic
because they reinforce troubling power relations wherein “white” is normalized and those
outside of this category are othered.i As a result, I use the term “racialized” Canadians
and Americans to refer to nonwhite people, out of recognition that white people are not
yet racialized in North American society. I have also elected not to capitalize racial labels
such as “white” or “black” to better reflect the descriptive nature of these terms and
reflect their artificiality.ii

i

Richard Dyer, White (London: Routledge, 1997), 11.
Other scholars have decided to capitalize “White” alongside other racial categories such as “Black” or
“Asian.” Respectfully, I have chosen the opposite approach as I feel it better conveys the artificial nature of
racial categories, whereas capitalization makes them more concrete. See Sharron A. Fitzgerald and Alicja
Muszynski, “Negotiating Female Morality: Place, Ideology and Agency in Red River Colony,” Women’s
History Review 16, no. 5 (2007): 677.
ii
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Introduction: Race, Religion, and Ethnicity in St. Louis and Waterloo County, 19391970
The outbreak of yet another world war in September 1939 generated significant
anxiety among North America’s German immigrant communities. Those of German
heritage recalled the discrimination and harassment the Great War created in their
communities and they worried that another war would place their safety in jeopardy once
again. C.H. Little, a Lutheran professor of theology in Waterloo County, Ontario, grimly
greeted the news of the Second World War’s beginning: “The die has been cast, hell has
broken loose, and we are in a world war again.” The outbreak of war was not a time of
patriotism for Little and his peers. Instead, he believed the war was “a tragedy beyond all
calculation…undoubtedly dark days are ahead of us here in Canada.”1 A few weeks later,
German-American Lutherans in St. Louis, Missouri, echoed Little’s concerns. The
Reverend Rudolph Meyer, pastor of St. Louis’s oldest Lutheran church, prayed “that our
beloved country will enact a neutrality law that will not entangle us in the European War.
We have not forgotten the heartaches of the [last] World War.”2 Although separated by
the Canadian-American border, German Lutherans in both Waterloo County and St.
Louis worried that another war with Germany would make them feel like outsiders in
their communities once again.
A fear that they would become strangers in their new North American homes
characterized much of German immigrant experience in the mid-twentieth century.
Described by one historian as a period of Anglo-conformity, German immigrants worried

1

Laurier Archives (hereafter LA), Carroll Herman Little fonds (hereafter CLF), C.H. Little to Candace
Little, 27 August 1939.
2
Concordia Historical Institute (hereafter CHI), Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Trinity
Lutheran Church Bulletin Box, Bulletins Folder, Trinity Bulletin, 17 September 1939.
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that their culture, language, and ethnicity would make them outcasts in Canada and the
United States.3 The Second World War prompted North Americans to associate German
culture with Nazism and opened German immigrants to accusations of disloyalty. Even
after the war concluded in 1945, Canadians and Americans still connected the German
people with Nazi war crimes and favoured restricting the number of German refugees
who could migrate to North America.4 These stigmas and negative associations
disproportionately impacted German immigrants of the Lutheran faith. Many Canadians
and Americans considered Lutheranism an inherently Germanic religion due to its
historic ties to Martin Luther and its traditional popularity in modern Germany. Although
North American Lutheran groups had few, if any, direct political ties to Germany,
nativists worried German Lutherans harbored a secret loyalty to Germany instead of their
Canadian and American communities.
How did German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans combat these
negative stereotypes surrounding their ethnicity and faith? Did German Lutherans
understand their ethnicity as an identity to overcome, or as an identity worth preserving?
What role did religion and race play in how they constructed their ethnic identities? This
dissertation aims to answer these questions by drawing on two case studies. It examines
how the German Lutheran communities in St. Louis, Missouri, and Waterloo County,
Ontario, debated their ethnic identity from the beginning of the Second World War in
1939 to 1970. It argues that German Lutherans in these two communities maintained a
German ethnic identity despite the challenges that controversies such as the Second
3

Howard Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta (McClelland and Stewart
Limited, 1982), 8-11.
4
Angelika Sauer, “A Matter of Domestic Policy?: Canadian Immigration Policy and the Admission of
Germans, 1945-50,” Canadian Historical Review LXXIV, no. 2 (1993): 251; Alexander Freund, “Troubling
Memories in Nation-building: World War II Memories and Germans’ Inter-ethnic Encounters in Canada
after 1945,” Histoire sociale/Social History 77 (2006): 145-147.
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World War and postwar associations with Nazism posed. German Lutherans did not
“lose” their ethnic identities during the mid-twentieth century, nor did they completely
assimilate into mainstream Canadian and American society. This dissertation contends
that German Lutherans created a hybrid ethnic identity that attempted to reconcile their
German heritage with their nationality and religion. They crafted an ethnicity that
acknowledged both their German roots as well as their new status as citizens of Canada
and the United States. While German Lutherans closely identified with their ethnicity and
faith privately within their communities and churches, they found that appealing to
broader racial and religious identities as white Protestants and Christians helped them to
mitigate the discrimination they faced in the public sphere. By performing this careful
balancing act, German Lutherans were able to maintain a distinct ethnic identity during a
period that stressed Anglo-Canadian and American conformity.

Debating Assimilation, Hybridity, and the German Ethnic Identity

This dissertation is not the first historical study to examine the extent to which
German immigrants in North America maintained a distinct ethnic identity. The search
for a German ethnic identity sits at the crux of the literature on German immigrants in
Canada and the United States. The majority of historians who have examined the
experiences of German immigrants in North America generally conclude that they
assimilated into mainstream Canadian and American society during the twentieth century.
It would be repetitive to describe in detail every historical study that makes this argument,
but it is important to recognize the pervasive nature of this interpretation of German-

4
Canadian and German-American history.5 Historian Angelika Sauer remarked upon this
interpretation in 1998, arguing that previous German-Canadian scholars imposed a “very
specific yardstick against which to measure” the assimilation of German immigrants. This
tendency to emphasize German assimilation, she argued, dominated the literature to such
an extent that it appeared as though historians seemed motivated exclusively by their
search for the “Ideal German” immigrant that always fell short of their expectations.6
Historians often found that German immigrants had little attachment to their homeland in
Germany; they rarely promoted the German language among their children; they were
largely invisible when compared with other North American ethnic groups.7 By
measuring German immigrants against the broader pattern of ethnicity in twentiethcentury North America, historians concluded that German immigrants abandoned their
former ethnic identities and embraced assimilation into mainstream culture.
The First World War featured prominently within the scholarly discussions of
German immigrant assimilation. Historians focused disproportionately on mainstream
hostility in Canada and the United States towards German immigrants. They argued that
this hostility caused German immigrant groups to abandon their German ethic identity.
5

There are many case studies that explore communities of German immigrants at the city, state, or
provincial level that make these claims from the 1970s to the 1990s. See Frederick C. Luebke, Bonds of
Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974); Peter
Hessel, Destination: Ottawa Valley (Ottawa: Runge Press, 1984), 117,127-128; Brenda Lee-Whiting,
Harvest of Stones: The German Settlement in Renfrew County (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1985), 258-261; David W. Detjen, The Germans in Missouri, 1900-1918: Prohibition, Neutrality, and
Assimilation (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 184; Heinz Lehmann, The German
Canadians, 1750-1937: Immigration, Settlement & Culture, trans. Gerhard P. Bassler (St. John’s,
Newfoundland: Jesperson Press, 1986); Werner Bausenhart, German Immigration and Assimilation in
Ontario, 1783-1918 (Toronto: Legas, 1989), 37. Leslie V. Tischauser, The Burden of Ethnicity: The
German Question in Chicago, 1914-1941 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990); Gerhard P. Bassler, The
German Canadian Mosaic: Today and Yesterday: Identities, Roots and Heritage (Ottawa: GermanCanadian Congress, 1991); Arthur Grenke, The German Community in Winnipeg, 1872 to 1919 (New York:
AMS Press, 1991).
6
Angelika E. Sauer, “The ‘Ideal German Canadian’: Politics, Academics and the Historiographical
Construction of German-Canadian Identity,” in A Chorus of Different Voices: German-Canadian Identities,
ed. Angelika E. Sauer and Matthias Zimmer (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 227-233.
7
Sauer, “The ‘Ideal German Canadian’,” 227-288.
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Historians Leslie Tischauser and Frederick C. Luebke, for example, described the
hardships that German Americans encountered during the Great War. They explain how
Germans continued to speak their language at their clubs and churches, and kept German
flags throughout cities with large German-immigrant populations.8 The entry of the
United States into the war in 1917, however, transformed these earlier displays of ethnic
identity into signs of their “disloyalty.”9 As a result, historians argued that the war
resulted in the “disappearance” of the German language and culture in American life.10
Canadian historians have echoed this narrative of cultural loss. The decision of Berlin,
Ontario, to change its name to Kitchener, after the famous British military commander, in
1916 is one of the most frequently cited examples of identity loss among German
Canadians. Historians concluded that Berlin/Kitchener’s German identity “thus died”
symbolically and practically after the name change.11 These historians also pointed to the
closure of German ethnic clubs, the elimination of the German language press, and the
public assaults on the German language as evidence for the disappearance of a German
ethnic identity. According to these historians, German immigrants wanted to avoid
discrimination in the future and therefore assimilated into Canadian and American
society. According to Sauer, the historiography of 1970s to 1990s led to the “image of
German Canadians as permanent victims.”12

8

Tischauser, The Burden of Ethnicity, 6, 17, 36-37; Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 157-159, 225.
Tischauser, 39, 45-46.
10
Luebke, 309-311, chapter ten more generally.
11
John English and Kenneth McLaughlin, Kitchener: An Illustrated History (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 1983), 110-117, 130.
12
Sauer, 232. Although less prominent than in previous decades, historians still occasionally portray the
two world wars as destructive, despite several calls within the field to move away from the singular
importance placed on the wars. See for example LaVern J. Rippley, “Wisconsin German-Americans and
World War I: Wisconsin ‘The German-American Homefront’,” Yearbook of German-American Studies 50
(2015): 129-150; Gregory Kupsky, “‘We, Too, Are Still Here’: German Americans in St. Louis, 19051941,” Missouri Historical Review 103, no. 4 (2009).
9
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The victimization thesis Sauer identified remains resilient within the
historiography, despite recent advancements in the field that no longer focus
disproportionately on the world wars.13 By the early 2000s, historians focused less on the
wars and instead explored the social and cultural lives of German immigrants by using
oral histories, transnationalism, and whiteness studies.14 This emphasis shifted the
literature towards discussions of immigrant agency and away from identity loss. When
historians did discuss German ethnic identity, however, they remained focused on an
immigrant group that lost its distinct identity. Historian Russell Kazal argued that German
Americans in Philadelphia articulated a white racial identity during the interwar years in
place of a German ethnic identity. His work highlights the informal alliances that formed
between German and Irish Americans to “protect” their neighbourhoods from black
newcomers purchasing or renting homes near theirs. In doing so, Germans responded to
these new arrivals by moving to other parts of the city, thereby dissolving their ethnically-

13

Several scholars should receive credit for revising the previous emphasis on the wars. See Matthew D.
Tippens, Turning Germans into Texans: World War I and the Assimilation and Survival of German Culture
in Texas, 1900-1930 (Austin: Kleingarten Press, 2010); Barbara Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity:
Listening to German North America, 1850-1914 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010); Petra
DeWitt, Degrees of Allegiance: Harassment and Loyalty in Missouri’s German-American Community
during World War I (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012). Lorenzkowski’s arguments, in particular, are
expanded upon in Benjamin Bryce, “Linguistic Ideology and State Power: German and English Education
in Ontario, 1880-1912,” The Canadian Historical Review 94, no. 2 (2013): 207; Mario Nathan Coschi, “‘Be
British or be d-d’: Primary Education in Berlin-Kitchener, Ontario, during the First World War,” Histoire
sociale/Social History 47, no. 94 (2014): 330-332.
14
The edited collection A Chorus of Different Voices did a great deal in shifting the literature towards an
exploration of German immigrants rooted in their social experiences. See the various essays in Angelika E.
Sauer and Matthias Zimmer eds., A Chorus of Different Voices: German-Canadian Identities (New York:
Peter Lang Publishing, 1998). For other studies more concerned with social experience of ethnic identity
retention see, Russell A. Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Alexander Freund, “Troubling Memories in Nation-building:
World War II Memories and Germans’ Inter-ethnic Encounters in Canada after 1945,” Histoire
sociale/Social History 77 (2006): 129-155; Hans Werner, Imagined Homes: Soviet German Immigrants in
Two Cities (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2007); Pascal Maeder, Forging a New Heimat:
Expellees in Post-War West Germany and Canada (Göttigen: V&R unipress, 2011); Alexander Freund ed.,
Beyond the Nation?: Immigrants’ Local Lives in Transnational Cultures (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2012).
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homogenous neighbourhoods.15 Kazal described how German newspapers and
organizations decried these losses and legitimized their entitlement to these areas as
“white” or “old stock” Americans. Germans joined a broader community of “white
Americans” instead of reverting back to their traditional ethnic ties.16 Historian Pascal
Maeder argued that German refugees and displaced persons gradually lost their German
ethnic identities after the Second World War. Maeder examined how postwar associations
with Nazism deterred German immigrants from actively maintaining a German identity.
Instead, they “adopted a Eurocentric immigrant identity” with other European immigrants
on the basis of their shared status as displaced persons.17 Historian Hans Werner
described a similar scenario in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Postwar German immigrants in
Winnipeg benefitted from Canada’s “history of accommodating itself to a diversity of
ethnic groups” and eventually “came to feel at home” as “Canadians.”18 Although
historians on both sides of the border do not focus on the “destructive” nature of the
world wars as their predecessors did, the emphasis on assimilation continues to perpetuate
the notion that German immigrants assimilated or lost their ethnic identities throughout
the twentieth century. These scholars do not demonstrate how adopting new “old stock”
or “displaced person” identities reshaped their German ethnicities. Although they succeed
in demonstrating that German immigrants adopted these new identities, they do not
demonstrate that these identities completely eclipsed their old German ethnic identities..
Historians of German immigrants are also some of the staunchest advocates for a
history of immigration that focuses on assimilation. Although assimilation has fallen out

15

Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 248-250; 223-226.
Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 3, 6.
17
Maeder, Forging a New Heimat, 220-222, 232.
18
Hans Werner, Imagined Homes, 223-227
16
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of favour among immigration and ethnic scholars since the 1980s, historians of German
immigrants continue to argue for the importance of assimilation in North American life.
In 1995, Kazal defined assimilation as:
processes that result in greater homogeneity within a society…They may operate within different
arenas, with groups, for example, drawn together in terms of culture, or intermarriage, or shared
political institutions, or shared elements of identity, such as class consciousness. And they may
operate to varying degrees within and across different arenas…I find it most useful to define
assimilation in the immigrant context as referring to processes that generate homogeneity beyond the
ethnic-group level. Such processes bring different immigrant ethnic groups, or their members,
together in any number of arenas, creating common ground among them, or between them and a
socially dominant group. Thus understanding assimilation requires understanding how ethnic groups
relate to one another within the larger society.19

Unlike the social historians of the 1980s and 1990s that focused on closely-knit
immigrant groups preserving their language and identities, Kazal believed assimilation
still offered a valuable framework through which to understand immigrant life in the
United States. He argued that social historians too often “neglect, deny, or minimize
assimilation’s role in eroding” ethnic identities.20 Historians of German immigrants in
Canada have since echoed Kazal’s assertion to renew the emphasis on assimilation in
their work. In the Canadian context, Werner argued that while the notion of a culturallyconstructed ethnic identity helps explain the attitudes of third and later generation
immigrations, “the concept of assimilation still offers explanatory power for firstgeneration immigrant behaviour.”21 Thus, the idea of the “assimilated German
immigrant” remains a powerful narrative within the current literature.
This dissertation rejects the assimilation model in favour of a definition of
ethnicity that is flexible and constantly changing. I demonstrate that adopting new
Russell A. Kazal, “Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American
Ethnic History,” American Historical Review 100, no. 2 (1995): 438-439.
20
Kazal, “Revisiting Assimilation,” 437.
21
Werner, 9-10. Werner defines “integration” somewhat more liberally, stating that integration includes
“adjustments made by both the host society and an immigrant group that reduce the tensions of difference
to make these tensions no longer distinguishable from other processes of social and cultural change in that
society.”
19

9
identities as “old stock” or “Canadian” identities reshaped German ethnicities, rather than
erasing them. Sociologist Milton Gordon defined an ethnic group as “a group with a
shared feeling of peoplehood.”22 While perfunctory, this simple definition masks the
complex processes that shape and mold ethnic identities. In an influential 1992 article,
Kathleen Neils Conzen and others argued against “ethnicity as primordial (ancient,
unchanging, inherent in a group’s blood, soul, or misty past).” They argued instead that
ethnicity functions as “a process of construction or invention” that could change and
adapt over time. Although rooted in lived experience, ethnicity is “reinvented in response
to changing realities both within the group and the host society.”23 This framework
acknowledges that ethnic identities occasionally weaken, but can later recover and
become more pronounced as social and cultural contexts change.24 The definition of
ethnicity as a mutable identity in flux provides this study’s methodological foundation.
Historian Barbara Lorenzkowski’s scholarship on German-Canadian and GermanAmerican identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries builds on the idea of
an “invented” or “performed” ethnic identity. By examining German communities in
Waterloo County, Ontario, and Buffalo, New York, Lorenzkowski reveals the “invented”
nature of her subjects’ ethnic identities by employing the concept of hybridity. She often
describes her subjects with a hyphenated “German-Canadian” or “German-American”
label. In contrast to other historians, however, she does not use the hyphen as an indicator
of loss or a compromised ethnic identity. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s observation that
hybrid cultures “must learn to inhabit at least two identities, to speak two cultural
22
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languages, to translate and negotiate between them,” Lorenzkowski suggests that the
hyphen denotes “a space of cultural interaction” between German immigrants and their
host society that produced a new hybrid identity. This hybrid or hyphenated identity
reflected both their ethnic and national identities.25 Lorenzkowski applies this framework
most clearly to her discussion of the German language. She describes how German
immigrants in late nineteenth century Waterloo County and Buffalo spoke a “local
German” dialect that combined English phrases and syntax with the German language.26
While previous historians viewed the lack of “pure” German as a sign of assimilation,
Lorenzkowski argued that hybridity better encapsulates how German immigrants
perceived their linguistic abilities as a valid compromise that recognized their ethnic
heritage and North American circumstances. In this sense, Lorenzkowski’s hybrid
German-Canadian and German-American communities align with what Homi K. Bhabha
calls “partial culture” or “culture’s in-between,” wherein the “connective tissue between
cultures…[is] bafflingly both alike and different.”27 This study builds on Lorenzkowski’s
analysis of hybrid identities in German immigrant communities, albeit later in the
twentieth century. Against the backdrop of another world war, the Cold War consensus,
and an American and Canadian nationalism that stressed Anglo-conformity, German
Lutherans had to craft an “in-between culture.” This dissertation examines the process
whereby German Lutherans constructed a hybrid ethnic identity during a time when
identifying as both “German” and “Canadian” or “American” seemed incompatible.
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In order to better understand how German Lutherans constructed a hybrid identity
in the mid-twentieth century, I look at Lutheran churches as an “ethnic boundary zone.”
In his influential 1969 essay, anthropologist Fredrik Barth described how ethnic groups
maintained distinct identities by constructing “boundaries” in which to separate
themselves from mainstream society and practice their unique culture. Ethnic groups, he
argued, should be recognized by “a membership which defines itself, and is identified by
others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other(s).”28 Lutheran churches
functioned as important ethnic boundaries where German immigrants defined both their
ethnicity and faith. Physical markers as well as cultural practices demarcated the church
as an ethnic boundary, both in the eyes of German Lutherans as well as Anglo-Canadians
and Americans. For the first half of the twentieth century, Lutheran churches in Missouri
and Ontario generally consisted of German immigrants and their descendants. These
“immigrant churches” bore several markers of difference that distinguished them from
their Anglo-Canadian and American neighbors. Most churches had German-language
signs displayed in their yard, and Lutheran pastors routinely preached in German.29
Examining Lutheran congregations as an ethnic boundary creates the possibility of
locating the voices and perspectives of German immigrants. As historians Royden
Loewen and Gerald Friesen suggest, looking at ethnic boundaries “probes [the immigrant]
imagination, seeks to understand their vocabularies, retells their stories. And it subverts
the notion of hapless victim of assimilation.”30 In this sense, examining ethnic boundaries

28

Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 11.
29
On Lutheran churches as immigrant churches, see Carol K. Coburn, Life At Four Corners: Religion,
Gender, and Education in a German Lutheran Community, 1868-1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of
Kansas Press, 1992).
30
Royden Loewen and Gerald Friesen, Immigrants in Prairie Cities: Ethnic Diversity in Twentieth-Century
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 4.

12
are vitally important for the history of German immigrants who have thus far been
characterized as assimilated. For many immigrant communities, places of worship
“provided the immigrants not only with a focal point of social interaction, but a world
view, a cosmology that explained the costly migration, a belief system that ordered their
worlds.”31 Churches operated as sites where German Lutherans gave meaning to their
lives in North America, and their records provide a way in which to understand how they
constructed a hybrid ethnicity in the company of their fellow coreligionists and ethnic
community.
By placing the Lutheran church and its institutions at the center of this study, the
voices and perspectives of Lutheran pastors appear most frequently. For German
Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, pastors operated as religious, ethnic, and
community leaders.32 My focus on pastors as “ethnic elites” or “ethnic brokers” follows
the methodological approach of other Canadian immigrant historians who have
increasingly returned to the study of so-called immigrant leaders. Historians Lisa Rose
Mar and Aya Fujiwara both argue for the importance of studying ethnic elites as a way to
examine immigrant history from “the middle, from neither top-down nor a bottom-up
perspective.”33 Examining history from “the middle” allows historians to examine “the
constant interplay between mainstream and ethnic communities.”34 By looking
specifically at Chinese-Canadian elites who “brokered” labour contracts between poor
Chinese workers and Anglo-Canadian businessmen, Mar suggested that “a new view of
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the boundaries between the Chinese and Anglo worlds and the political interactions
between them” emerges.35 I employ the term “ethnic broker” to refer to German Lutheran
pastors who acted as cultural intermediaries between their ethnic followers and Anglodominated host society. As Fujiwara notes, “ethnic elites were groups of people who
discovered their role as intermediaries between Canadians and their ethnic people.” These
elites “knew about the histories, politics, and languages of both Canada and their
respective homelands” and used their influence so to help their followers “maintain their
in-between identity and comfortably live in Canada.”36 Born primarily between 1880 and
1910, the German Lutherans in this study consisted of a mix of individuals born in
Germany who later migrated to North America, as well those born in Canada and the
United States whose parents or grandparents migrated during the mid-nineteenth
century.37 This generation of Lutheran pastors not only acted as spiritual leaders in their
communities, but also emerged as ethnic elites that tried to reconcile their immigrant
status with their Canadian and American realities.
My usage of Lutheran churches as an ethnic boundary and Lutheran pastors as
ethnic brokers unfortunately replicates some of the power structures of these institutions
throughout this work. Lutheran archival records tend to favour the voices of pastors and
all-male church councils at the expense of Lutheran laypeople and women. I am
conscious of historian Mary Todd’s assertion that it is both “remarkable and tragic” that
Lutheran women appear so infrequently in historical studies. This has wrongly
perpetuated the assumption that “women’s roles have been marginal at best” within the
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church.38 Yet, this study hopes to show that Lutheran women are not as unrepresented in
the archive as is often assumed. I have endeavored to highlight when the viewpoints of
Lutheran women and laypeople diverged from those of their ethnic elites in an effort to
create a more complete portrait of how German Lutherans discussed their ethnicity. I
have therefore attempted to display the diversity of opinion within these German
Lutheran communities, even if the voices of ethnic elites still dominate.
Moreover, the ethnic elites examined in this dissertation held beliefs that modern
readers will both approve and disapprove of. The pastors profiled in this study often
emerge as early advocates of a “multicultural” nation wherein linguistic and ethnic
differences are not only tolerated, but also celebrated and encouraged by all North
American citizens. A desire to be accepted by mainstream Anglo-Canadian and AngloAmerican society motivated ethnic elites to support pluralistic ideas of belonging and
acceptance. Yet, many Lutheran pastors also supported the unequal status-quo facing
North American women and racialized people. Male pastors maintained patriarchal
gender norms within their congregations and often made sexist comments or assumptions
about Lutheran women, and downplayed their essential contributions to the church.
Certain pastors also openly supported Jim Crow segregation, disparaged black activists,
or ignored the unequal living conditions of many of North America’s racialized
communities. Rather than interpreting German Lutheran support for ethnic diversity and
support for patriarchal and racist norms as contrary behaviour, this study interrogates
these differences to demonstrate how these ideologies worked in concert. Celebrations of
ethnic and religious diversity did not necessarily extend to an acceptance of racialized

38

Mary Todd, Authority Vested: A Story of Identity and Change in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 6.

15
others, and male ethnic elites predicated their authority on subservient and agreeable
followers. These pastors were complex figures, and this dissertation aims to untangle and
explain their seemingly contradictory behaviour.
This dissertation argues that this particular generation of German Lutherans
crafted a different ethnic identity than the nineteenth century German “pioneers” and the
post-1945 German displaced persons. This generation actively grappled with the hybrid
identities highlighted by Lorenzkowski. I argue that they constructed an ethnic identity
that sought to reconcile their competing ethnic, national, and religious identities
throughout the mid-twentieth century. German Lutherans expressed their ethnicity in
several ways. First, the German language remained an important marker of identity for
many practicing Lutherans in this study. Language emerges as an important subject of
discussion in this dissertation more broadly, as scholars in ethnic studies have affirmed
that language consists of “societally linked human codes, as well as the attitudes,
behaviors, functions, and usage conventions” that define a community. In particular,
ethnic studies scholars pay attention not just to the standardization of immigrant
languages, but also the “internal within-group evaluation of varieties” of syntax, word
choice, and frequency of use. Through observing how and when immigrants speak their
native language, scholars can gain better insight into how immigrants dialogued with their
ethnicity.39 In this sense, I examine the pastors that preached sermons in both English and
German, and the congregants that maintained a strong belief in conducting important
worship services and celebrating holidays in the German language. Lutherans placed a
particularly high importance on speaking German at church, as they believed that in order
Joshua A. Fishman, “Sociolinguistics: Language and Ethnic Identity in Context,” in Handbook of
Language & Ethnic Identity, ed. Joshua A. Fishman and Ofelia Garcia (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), xxiii-xxiv.
39
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to truly practice Martin Luther’s teachings, they needed to speak, write, and read,
religious writings in the same language Luther used. Situated in a North American
context, speaking German developed an ethnic importance as community elites used it as
a way to retain markers of ethnic difference. While speaking German may have lost its
practical conversational usage in the public sphere by the early twentieth century,
Lutherans continued to speak German as an integral component of their religious lives.40
Moreover, Lutheran churches provided German Lutherans with a private space to
voice their ethnic sympathies with Germans in Europe outside of the purview of the state
and Canadian and American society. They expressed their ethnicity by resisting Canadian
and American attempts to vilify the German people, both during and after the Second
World War. Within their churches German Lutherans could articulate their fears
surrounding the Second World War and lament the hardships postwar German refugees
faced without being labeled as Nazi sympathizers. They also resisted Canadian and
American nationalisms that often alienated them as a result of national emphases on
Anglo-pioneers, British traditions, or “American” founders that rarely recognized North
America’s immigrant populations. By the mid-twentieth century, German Lutherans in St.
Louis and Waterloo County tried to expand these cultural narratives by incorporating
their experiences as immigrants into the pre-existing national mythologies. Their
expressions of ethnicity were not rooted in political connections to the “homeland,” as
with other North American ethnic groups.41 Ultimately, they constructed a hybrid
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ethnicity rooted in flexibility. It allowed members of the community to be openly
“German” at church, but to argue for their status as “Canadian” or “American” when in
contact with government officials or nativists in times of uncertainty. Thus, German
Lutherans sought to construct an ethnicity that gave voice to their unique experiences as
immigrants as well as recognizing their “new” homes in Canada and the United States. Its
flexibility helped German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County create a single
hybrid identity out of their varied ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds.
In suggesting that German Lutherans maintained distinct ethnic identities, this
study is not implying that these immigrant communities did not also identify as
Canadians and Americans. However, identifying with national labels defined by
citizenship does not mean German Lutherans assimilated or stopped practicing their
ethnic identities. As Lorenzkowski reminds us, German immigrants have a history of
wearing their ethnicity or nationality “as a mantle to don when it fit the occasion.”42 Nor
does this dissertation suggest that German Lutherans practiced the same ethnic identities
as the German immigrants of the mid-to-late nineteenth century. It is not advocating for a
long unbroken pattern of ethnic identity and behaviour. Instead, it suggests that a sense of
being German remained important to Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, even
when their ethnicity acted as a barrier that separated them from mainstream North
American society. Moreover, this study does not explore how German-Canadian and
German-American Lutherans maintained their ethnicities through cultural and symbolic
expressions, such as food, dress, parades, and other manifestations of “folk” or “festive”
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culture.43 It is not overly concerned with how ethnicity manifested via the home, clubs, or
labour, as many of these themes have been addressed elsewhere.44 Instead, it looks at the
ways in which ethnicity informed how German Lutherans responded to issues such as
wartime discrimination, immigration policy, Lutheran theology, and other debates of both
national and local importance. In this sense, I follow Royden Loewen’s footsteps in an
attempt to understand how immigrants understood their ethnicity “not of a statically
conceived way of life…but rather a constantly renewed experience that was recreated
every day and every year.”45 By looking at these prominent debates in St. Louis and
Waterloo County’s German Lutheran communities, it sheds light on how these groups
made sense of their ethnic identities and the resulting “cultures they created.”46 My goal
is to highlight how ethnicity continued to inform the worldview and perspectives of
German Lutherans living in St. Louis and Waterloo County.

Transnational Histories of St. Louis and Waterloo County

North American historians of ethnicity and immigration have frequently employed
a transnational approach in their scholarship. Although “transnationalism” has several,
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occasionally competing, definitions, migration historians Benjamin Bryce and Alexander
Freund define transnational approaches as examining “the flow and circulation of people,
ideas, and objects within a region that is not contained by national boundaries and
national historiographies.”47 A transnational approach better reflects how their subjects,
primarily immigrants and their descendants, maintained global ties and connections that
expanded beyond national borders.48 Transnationalism remains a useful framework for
this reason, and holds particular promise for the study of German immigrants. Because
the literature on German immigrants continues to stress assimilation and the formation of
national identities, a comparative approach allows me to examine whether Canadians and
Americans of German heritage continued to interact with one another on the basis of their
ethnicity across the forty-ninth parallel.49
Comparative studies are most effective when symmetry exists between the two
points of comparison.50 To this end, I focus specifically on German Lutherans in
Waterloo County, Ontario, and St. Louis, Missouri. Both immigrant communities trace
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their origins back to philanthropic groups in eighteenth and nineteenth century
Pennsylvania. The German Company and the Deutsche Ansiedlungs-Gesellschaft each
sponsored German immigration and purchased lands in what became known as Waterloo
County and St. Louis respectively.51 These small German settlements later expanded
significantly in the 1830s and 1840s, as Lutherans fled religious persecution in the
various German states and made new homes in North America. By the mid-nineteenth
century, both Waterloo County and St. Louis had reputations as German settlements and
the two communities continued to grow as a result of family and chain migration. They
developed cultural institutions such as German-language newspapers and clubs that
articulated and enhanced their reputation as centers of German culture.52 By the early to
mid-twentieth century, Germans constituted the largest ethnic group in both St. Louis and
Waterloo County. Germans composed nearly twelve percent of Missouri’s population,
and twenty percent of all St. Louis residents identified as either first or second-generation
German immigrants. Kitchener established itself as the German capital of both Ontario
and Waterloo County, with almost half of its residents claiming German ancestry by the
Second World War.53 Their reputations as German cultural centers continued to attract
German immigrants to settle in St. Louis and Waterloo County throughout the postwar
period.54
St. Louis and Waterloo County also emerged as important centers for Lutheranism
in the American Midwest and central Canada. Both communities acted as the official
headquarters of a major Lutheran synod. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod,
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headquartered in St. Louis, was founded in 1847 due to the efforts of C.F.W. Walther, a
“Saxon Lutheran” immigrant who arrived in St. Louis in the 1830s. Walther cooperated
with other Lutherans in the Midwest to establish conservative Lutherans into a single
organizing body, or “synod.” As its first president, Walther opened a “log cabin” school
that later became the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis.55 Likewise, the Canada Synod
made its headquarters in Waterloo County as a result of the high concentration of
Lutherans in the area in 1925. The Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, established in 1911, was
the first of its kind in Canada and trained the majority of the Canada Synod’s pastors. The
important roles these two seminaries played in developing North American Lutheranism
ensured that many Lutherans had some connection with St. Louis and Waterloo County
even if they were not born and raised in the cities.56
The German Lutheran populations of St. Louis and Waterloo County both
experienced periods of anti-German discrimination during the First World War. Shortly
after the war began in 1914, nativists in each community attacked public displays of
German heritage in the cities. Under the guise of patriotism, civic leaders in St. Louis
embarked on a campaign to “make St. Louis 100 percent American.” These leaders
renamed various German-language streets and buildings with more suitable AngloAmerican ones.57 The process of eliminating such obvious markers of ethnicity also
occurred in Waterloo County. In 1916 the city of “Berlin” voted to rename the city
“Kitchener” in order to demonstrate their loyalty to Canada. German Canadians who
55
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opposed the patriotic name change had their homes vandalized by members of the local
militia and other nativists.58
Incidents of violence occurred in St. Louis and Waterloo County throughout the
First World War. Shortly after 1914, members of the local militia in Waterloo County
toppled a small statue of Kaiser Wilhelm I and threw it into the nearby lake. The police
recovered the bust and placed it in the Concordia Club, one of Waterloo County’s largest
German ethnic associations. In 1916, however, another group of soldiers broke into the
building and stole the statue once again. Soldiers ransacked the Concordia Club and
burned its contents in an open fire in the street. Military officials did not publicly blame
the soldiers for their vandalism. Instead, they accused local German residents of inciting
the soldiers’ anger.59 Although German-Americans avoided such acts of discrimination
early in the war thanks to American neutrality, they too experienced harassment once the
United States formally entered the war in 1917. Local police in St. Louis acted with force
against German-American clubs that they suspected acted as meeting grounds for enemy
activity. Police raided prominent German ethnic clubs and investigated the loyalty of club
leaders.60
Strong anti-German sentiment in Canada and the United States often manifested
in religious forms. German immigrants saw clear links between their ethnicity and faith,
and Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-Americans did as well. Even though Lutheranism in
North America did not share political connections with Germany, anti-German “patriots”
rarely made this distinction. They singled Lutherans out in particular because their
58
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religious texts were recorded in German and the majority of Lutheran churches offered
their services in German. They saw Lutheran churches as threatening places of
subterfuge. Since Lutheran pastors preached in German to people of German ancestry, the
general public feared that pastors encouraged their congregants to carry out acts of
sabotage against the war effort by hiding pro-German messages within their sermons.61
The German ethnicity of St. Louis and Waterloo County residents placed their loyalties in
doubt; their Lutheran faith exacerbated such concerns.
Although the war threatened the use of the German language in both communities,
efforts to completely eliminate it failed at both the congregational and state/provincial
level. In 1919, Missouri was one of many American states to attempt to ban German
language education in public, private, and parochial schools. Theodore Graebner, a
professor at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, responded by joining a coalition of other
German-American leaders to lobby Missouri’s state committee on education to allow
religious instruction in German. Graebner and his colleagues succeeded and the bill was
defeated. As a result, Missouri did not follow the example of other states where German
instruction was banned in public and private schools following the war.62 Waterloo
County’s German language programs also recovered from the war. By the 1930s, several
ethnic clubs sponsored a German school in Kitchener where young people could continue
to learn the German language.63
Despite the resilience of these German-speaking communities, historians continue
to cite the increased use of English among German immigrants as an example of their
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assimilation during and after the First World War. The number of German services
conducted within the Missouri Synod as a whole dropped from sixty-two percent prior to
the First World War to forty-six percent in 1926.64 While a noticeable decrease, these
statistics imply that almost half of the Missouri Synod still used German regularly. This
hardly suggests the destruction or elimination of a German language and identity as a
result of the war. Pastors in particular played a key role in encouraging their congregants
to continue speaking German.65 Perhaps more significantly, the Sunday schools at these
churches also offered their services in German, providing congregants an opportunity for
their children to speak and learn the German language. Moreover, radio stations
sponsored by the Missouri and Canada Synod broadcasted German language sermons and
programs in St. Louis and Waterloo County well into the 1930s.66 While the First World
War left its mark on these German communities, Lutheran churches were still preserved
as German institutions that reinforced their pre-war ethnic identities.
Although separated by the Canadian-American border, the German Lutheran
communities in St. Louis and Waterloo County experienced similar political, social, and
cultural conditions that make them worthy of comparison. Each community formed as a
part of the migration from Protestant religious groups fleeing the German states to new
ethnic and religious enclaves in North America. They faced similar levels of
discrimination during the First World War on the basis of their ethnicity, and proved
determined to recover from these losses during the interwar years.
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Lutheranism as a “Lived Religion”

This dissertation draws upon a “lived religion” framework in order to recognize
the ways Lutheranism constituted an important component of the German-Canadian and
German-American ethnic identity by the mid-twentieth century.67 Scholars of “lived
religion” eschew a religious history that focuses exclusively on high-ranking church
leaders and theological developments in favour of focusing more on how religion
informed the daily lives and lived experiences of religious people. They maintain that
religion has historically shaped people and their discourses not only inside places of
worship, but also in in social, cultural, and political spheres.68 The lived religion model
builds on anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s understanding of religion as source for groups
and individuals to gain “conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations between
them.” Geertz argues that “religious concepts spread beyond their specifically
metaphysical contexts to provide a framework of general ideas.”69 It is therefore
important to have a close understanding of Lutheran theology, as it inevitably shaped the
social and cultural experiences of its practitioners outside the explicit confines of the
church.
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Lutherans are Christian Protestants that trace their origins back to Martin Luther
and the Reformation in 1517. Luther advocated for reforms of the Christian church in the
16th century that remain essential components of twentieth century Lutheranism. First, the
concept of “justification by grace alone” was and continues to be a distinguishing marker
of Lutheranism. Luther believed God offers humanity salvation freely through faith. This
concept stands in contrast to Catholic or Anabaptist faiths, which teach that salvation can
be achieved through performing good deeds and acts.70 Lutherans also place great
emphasis on “Word and Sacrament,” essentially a belief that God reveals himself to
humankind through the Bible, baptism, and communion.71 Lutherans recognize the
Augsburg Confession (1530) and the Book of Concord (1580) as their primary
theological texts. While the interpretation of these core beliefs continues to be debated
between conservative and liberal members of the North American Lutheran community, a
shared agreement in the importance of these beliefs unites them under the “Lutheran”
label.
This dissertation seeks to use the lived religion perspective in order to demonstrate
how Lutheran theology often shaped how Germans in St. Louis and Waterloo County
constructed their ethnic identities. While many aspects of Lutheran theology played a role
in shaping these communities, several specific components played a particular role in
determining how German Lutherans negotiated their ethnicity. Luther’s concept of the
“two kingdoms” or “Romans 13” was one of the most important theological tenants for
Lutherans in Waterloo County and St. Louis. Based on Christ’s teachings that Christians
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should “render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are
God’s,” Luther believed that church and state should be kept separate. As Romans 13
stated that “every soul be subject to the governing authorities,” Luther argued that God
granted the church the right to rule over spiritual affairs while the state ruled over civil
and legal affairs.72 Disagreements over how strictly Lutherans should enforce this
theological belief became a key point of contention between pastors and their congregants
in the mid-twentieth century. Discussions of Romans 13 and the separation of church and
state appear frequently in this study, because German Lutherans often interpreted state
intervention in religious affairs as a threat to their German ethnicity. The debate
surrounding “unionism” or “unity” in the Missouri Synod is another instance of theology
shaping ethnicity. Unionism became an effective shorthand in Missouri Synod circles to
refer to the official merger or cooperation with other Lutheran bodies that did not practice
the same conservative Lutheranism. The Missouri Synod believed that, unlike their liberal
peers, they practiced a “true Lutheranism” that worshiped the inerrant Bible, a belief that
the Bible was undisputedly God’s word. Cooperation (or “union”) with liberal Lutherans
threatened to dilute their conservative doctrine. Throughout most of the twentieth century,
synod leaders believed they could not unite with other Lutherans if they did not first
achieve doctrinal unity. This emphasis on keeping “pure doctrine,” or Lehre, helped
shape their German ethnicity. In order to ensure that their doctrine remained unaltered,
theological works and sermons needed to be conducted in German, the same language
used by Martin Luther. Speaking and writing in German proved the most effective way to
ensure that theology was not diluted or altered through translation.73 This study focuses
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on Lutheran theology as expressed through Romans 13, unionism, and Lehre in order to
understand the relationship between ethnicity and faith.
The emphasis on lived religion holds particular promise for the study of North
American Lutheranism. Few professional historians have examined the history of North
American Lutheranism, especially when compared to the thriving historiographies of
other ethnic and religious groups such as Irish Catholics or Mennonites.74 The standard
works on North American Lutheranism were published mainly in the 1960s and 1970s in
what historian Mark Granquist called the “golden age” of Lutheran history. These
histories, often published by synod-sponsored publishing houses and written by men
associated with the church, produced a teleological narrative of church growth and synod
mergers. Historians have criticized the Missouri Synod, in particular, for its synodsanctioned histories that frame Lutheranism’s history as “celebratory” and “triumphalist.”
As recently as 2000, historian Mary Todd commented that the Missouri Synod’s tendency
to support a version of its past free of conflict or theological debate has created a vacuum
wherein “no scholarly, holistic history of the Missouri Synod” exists.75 These histories
focused largely on prominent Lutheran synods and institutions, and did little to reflect the
social and cultural attitudes of Lutheranism’s practitioners.76 As many of these histories

74

On the Irish, see for example Mark G. McGowan, The Waning of the Green: Catholics, the Irish, and
Identity in Toronto, 1887-1922 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998); Kevin Kenny, the
American Irish: A History (Harlow, England: Longman, 2000). Aside from the aforementioned works by
Loewen and Werner, on Mennonites see Frank Epp, Mennonites in Canada, 1786-1920: The History of a
Separate People (Toronto: Macmillian of Canada, 1974); Theron F. Schlabach, Peace, Faith, Nation:
Mennonites and Amish in Nineteenth-Century America (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1988); T.D. Regehr,
Mennonites in Canada, 1939-1970: A People Transformed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996);
Fred Kniss, Disquiet in the Land: Cultural Conflict in American Mennonite Communities (New Brunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997); Marlene Epp, Mennonite Women in Canada: A History (Winnipeg:
University of Manitoba Press, 2008).
75
Mary Todd, Authority Vested, 1, 13-14.
76
Granquist, Lutherans in America, 2.

29
were originally published to coincide with anniversaries and centennial events, they often
took a celebratory and uncritical tone.77
Few scholars have challenged or revised these standards texts from the 1960s. In
Canada, Lutheran history has been written by religious scholars who briefly contextualize
the history of Lutheranism in Canada before moving onto an analysis of contemporary
Lutheranism.78 In the United States, however, a small body of scholarship in the last
fifteen years has started to examine the social and cultural histories of American
Lutheranism that often critique their subjects. Mary Todd and James Burkee both criticize
the Missouri Synod’s conservative theology and politics, thereby challenging the
Missouri Synod’s oft-repeated claims that their theology is untouched by modern
influences.79 In a biography of a Missouri Synod pastor, Kathryn Galchutt critiques the
ambiguous or hostile responses of the Missouri Synod towards the Civil Rights
Movement in the 1960s.80 These works shift the historiography on the Missouri Synod
away from whiggish celebrations of the synod’s past towards a more critical examination
of its history. The few other works by professional historians that examine German
Lutherans tend to do so alongside German Mennonites and Baptists. These historians
inadvertently portray the religious identities and theological differences among their
subjects as incidental to their German ethnicities, rather than demonstrating the central
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connection between faith and ethnicity.81 This dissertation only examines the experiences
of Lutherans in order to best capture the important links between ethnicity and faith, and
recognizes that Germans of different faiths may have constructed different ethnic German
identities than Lutherans. It represents one of the first social and cultural histories of
Lutheranism in Canada and seeks to continue the revisionist efforts of American scholars
of the Missouri Synod.

The Importance of Whiteness

Race also shaped how German Lutherans constructed their ethnic identities in the
mid-twentieth century. This dissertation is indebted to the field of “whiteness studies”
that emerged as a result of the belief that, like ethnic identities, race is a social construct.
As sociologist Vic Satzewich states, race “is not something that is, but rather something
that is socially created, negotiated, and reproduced.”82 At its core, race does not reflect a
biological or epistemological truth, but is rather a “social category into which people are
sorted.”83
American historians in the 1990s began employing this approach in order to
demonstrate “how diverse groups in the United States came to identify, and be identified
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by others, as white – and what that has meant for the social order.”84 Pioneering works by
David Roediger, Noel Ignatiev, and Matthew Frye Jacobson suggested that immigrant
groups such as the Irish arrived in the nineteenth century as racialized others and
gradually fought to become recognized as white.85 Other immigrants from Southern and
Eastern Europe, meanwhile, migrated to the United States later in the nineteenth century
and occupied an “in-between” or “not quite white” status in the American racial
hierarchy.86 These immigrants, including Greeks, Italians, and Poles later found
acceptance as “white” during the Second World War. Historians emphasize that a broad
range of forces during the war coalesced to ensure that European immigrants across North
America viewed “World War II as a watershed in their acceptance as Americans.”87 Nazi
Germany’s racism shook American faith in scientific racism and subsequently prompted
Americans to view tolerance as a key component of their national identity.88 These “white
ethnics” remained content to simply identify as “American” until the mid-1960s and early
1970s. Jacobson argues that the Civil Rights Movement, alongside “the emergence of
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multiculturalism,” created a “white ethnic revival” that caused Americans to once again
identify with their ethnic heritage.89
Although often praised for forcing historians to recognize race as a social
construction, these foundational texts have since been critiqued by other scholars who
believe that transformation from ethnic to white identities “was a more complex process”
than historians of whiteness might indicate.90 Thomas Guglielmo, for instance, has argued
that Italian immigrants arrived in the United States as “securely white” and did not go
through the ethnic-to-white process that the 1990s scholarship often assumed.91 Other
critics suggest that historians like Ignatiev and Jacobson occasionally conflate American
perceptions of the Irish constituting a distinct race with also being “nonwhite.” Just
because the Irish faced hostility, does not necessarily mean Americans perceived them as
racial outsiders.92 These critics do not dispute that American nativists discriminated
against European immigrants. They are not, however, convinced that they faced
discrimination on the basis of their race. Peter Kolchin and Eric Arnesen, for example,
point out that whiteness studies generally neglect the role religion played in forming
racial identities.93 As a result, historians examining ethnic groups like the Irish may
conflate anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States with the assumption that the Irish
were not white.94
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I address some of these concerns in this dissertation by paying particular attention
to the way the ethnic and religious identities of German Lutherans interacted with broader
ideas of race and whiteness. Although German Lutherans faced discrimination as a result
of their ethnicity and religion, it does not mean that they were somehow “not white.” If
the transformation from ethnic-to-white is more complicated than historians previously
thought, then subsequent works on whiteness must consider whether “after World War II,
did a white identity dominate or did the prevalence of national identities persist and, if so,
for how long?”95 This study aims to answer this question by looking at how a German
ethnic identity continued in St. Louis and Waterloo County alongside their racial
identities as white. The two identities co-existed, and they did not practice either “ethnic”
or “racial” identities exclusively. German Lutherans actively maintained German ethnic
and white racial identities simultaneously throughout the mid-twentieth century, even
during the “ethnic reverie” of World War II and the 1950s and 1960s.96
The study of whiteness in Canada is underdeveloped relative to the large body of
American scholarship.97 Historians James Walker and Constance Backhouse provide
several explanations as to why this is the case. Walker suggests that Canadians perceive
themselves as “tolerant of racial and cultural diversity” and believe they “possess a
history of equal treatment towards all” in contrast to their American neighbours.98
Backhouse agrees, suggesting that Canada’s proximity to the United States allows
Canadians to portray themselves as “raceless” in contrast to the Black-white racial
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animosity in the United States. This “ideology of racelessness,” is a part of the Canadian
national mythology that has been unwittingly replicated within Canadian
historiography.99 The limited scholarly discussion of whiteness in Canadian history has
thus far focused on the nineteenth century.100 When Canadian historians discuss “race” in
the twentieth century, they often refer to Canada’s indigenous, black, and asian
populations rather than white Canadians. Race in the Canadian context, Backhouse
argues, “is generally understood as something that affixes itself only to marginalized
groups.”101 However, the “whiteness” of Canadian nativists and politicians discussed in
these studies has not yet faced the same level of scrutiny.102 In short, Canadian historians
have yet to racialize white Canadians. Migration scholars occasionally make note that
certain immigrant groups benefitted from their racial status as white, but such sentiments
are generally applied as self-evident adjectives rather than as fully analyzed.103
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While whiteness and white supremacy had practical and tangible effects on the
daily lives of North Americans through systems like segregation, this dissertation also
examines how whiteness was expressed at an ideological and cultural level. Whiteness
encompassed more than simply “a location of structural advantage, of race privilege.” As
Ruth Frankenberg makes clear, whiteness is also “a ‘standpoint,’ a place from which
white people look at ourselves, at others, and at society” as well as “a set of cultural
practices that are usually unmarked and unnamed.”104 This last definition is particularly
important, as German Lutherans in St Louis and especially Waterloo County rarely
explicitly articulated a “white” racial identity. By the mid-twentieth century, whiteness
achieved such a normative status that it rarely needed to be directly articulated.105 Daniel
Coleman refers to this as the “paradox of white normativity,” wherein whiteness is
paradoxically “so obvious that it remains unexamined” in literary and historical texts.106
In his survey of Canadian literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Coleman
locates several allegorical figures upon which Canadian authors relied to personify the
Canadian nation. He notes that the “Loyalist” and “British Settler” are two of the most
common symbols used in Canadian literature and culture. The arrival of the Loyalists in
Ontario (then Upper Canada) after the American Revolution later functioned as the
province’s foundational myth. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
Loyalists occupied a place of cultural, historical, and literary prominence in Ontario that
scholars have since referred to as the “Loyalist Tradition.” This tradition praised the
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Loyalist “pioneers” for creating a society in Ontario that was devoted “to the British
Crown and Empire,” alongside their “elite social origins, and a conservative social
vision.”107 Coleman argues that through repeatedly using the image of the Loyalist,
Anglo-Canadians “gradually reified the privileged, normative status of British whiteness
in English Canada.”108 These narratives had a political purpose for their Anglo-Canadian
authors. As the Loyalists and their descendants were not native to the land they occupied,
stories of Loyalists and other settlers “pioneering” an “untamed wilderness” helped
settlers feel entitled to land that actually belonged to the area’s indigenous peoples. By
coding this process as a peaceful, nation-building, and a sign of progress, settlers could
ignore their own history of violently displacing indigenous people.109
While this cultural analysis of the Loyalist Tradition through a racial lens may
seem tangential, it illustrates the way in which whiteness often operated invisibly within
the social and cultural lives of North Americans. The story of the Loyalists is an
inherently white narrative, even if it never directly states so.110 This dissertation argues
that German Lutherans in both St. Louis and Waterloo County engaged with national
mythologies like the Loyalist Tradition as a result of their whiteness. A clear example of
the inherent whiteness contained in settler stories is the so-called “pioneer myth” in
Waterloo County. Labeled as such by historian Geoffrey Hayes, the “pioneer myth”
emerged in Waterloo County in the early 1920s. Hayes describes how the pioneer myth
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started as a result of the discrimination Waterloo County’s German population faced
during the First World War and the wave of Canadian nationalism that the war produced.
After the war concluded, Anglo-Canadians across the country erected monuments and
memorials to honour soldiers who died during the war. These memorials portrayed fallen
Canadian soldiers as heroic figures, who sacrificed their lives for a just Christian cause
that helped establish Canada as a nation.111 German Canadians in Waterloo County could
not participate in this process because their wartime experience was not categorized by
unity and patriotism, but rather by ethnic tension and discrimination. Yet, local German
Canadians could also no longer publicly celebrate the German traditions of “Berlin”
without reliving the discrimination they endured during the war. German Canadians could
no longer “be loyal to both Germany and Canada,” and therefore needed to craft a new
public identity in which to help their community recover.112
The pioneer myth helped German Canadians accomplish this goal by creating a
new origin story that focused on the community’s immigrant origins instead of its modern
industrious German identity. William Breithaupt, a prominent German-Canadian
businessman who opposed the Berlin name-change during the war, initiated a series of
commemorative events during the late 1910s and 1920s that tried to integrate Waterloo
County’s foundation within the broader narrative of Ontario’s history. Breithaupt used
the pre-existing mythology surrounding the Loyalists in Ontario to his own advantage. He
sought to shift Waterloo County’s identity away from its strict German reputation by
emphasizing the community’s own pioneers, just like other Ontario communities, through
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novels, plays, and other commemorative acts.113 Breithaupt illustrated these themes most
obviously with the erection of the Waterloo Pioneers Memorial Tower in 1926. He
erected the large nineteen-meter high tower alongside the graveyard of Waterloo
County’s first European settlers in order to commemorate their role in “settling” and
“pioneering” the community. The many speeches at the tower’s unveiling sought to
elevate Waterloo County’s original German settlers to the same important level as the
Loyalists by similarly praising them as honest, thrifty, and for their ability to overcome
the “the forces of nature.”114 While speakers compared their pioneers with the Loyalists,
Breithaupt ensured that the audience never lost sight that these original pioneers consisted
of German settlers. Breithaupt reminded listeners that their Germanic origins was no
cause for concern, however, as these pioneers were peaceful agriculturalists absolutely
loyal to Britain just like the other Loyalists.115 One speaker commented that “we often
hear the expression ‘The builders of Canada,’ referring to the statesmen who laid the
foundation of Government…but let us not forget the men and women who left their
homes in other lands to come to Canada. They were just as truly entitled to the name
‘builders of Canada.’”116 By situating Waterloo County’s history in the context of the
Loyalists, Breithaupt hoped to normalize his community’s German origins within the
broader culture of the province. Breithaupt advanced the “pioneer myth” so that German
Canadians in Waterloo County could express a form of ethnic pride that EnglishCanadian society found acceptable. Their ancestors may have been German, but they
were also the “nation-building pioneers” that Anglo-Canada celebrated as well.
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A similar pioneer myth existed in St. Louis, albeit with American terms
substituted for the more Canadian-British “Loyalist” figure. In 1938-39, the Missouri
Synod celebrated the centennial of the original German Lutheran settlers who traveled
from Europe and settled in Perry County, located just outside St. Louis.117 The pending
centennial prompted a flurry of retrospective “histories” produced by prominent pastors
within the synod.118 These publications constructed a founding myth centered on the
original generation of Saxon settlers and their religious leader, C.F.W. Walther. Although
they recognized that the “entire background of the people was European, German,
Saxon,” they often described the group as religious “pilgrims” to better liken their own
origin story to that of the United States more broadly.119 When they discussed the
Missouri Synod’s founding, synod leaders stressed the “democratic” origins of the Saxon
immigrants. To one commenter, the Saxon immigrants embodied “the Missouri ‘showme’ spirit which they had imbibed” after living in the region for only a short time.120 Just
like Waterloo County’s pioneer myth, the story of the Saxon Lutherans in St. Louis
allowed the modern German Lutheran community to stress its immigrant character within
an American or Missourian framework.
While stories about the Loyalists and other “nation builders” do “not overtly call
for the subordination of people of colour,” they still convey a narrative “about the
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triumph of the white races” in North America.121 These state-sanctioned narratives are
“not politically neutral” and contain important racial implications, even if those who
produced the narratives did not explicitly state so.122 If settler stories had the impact of
normalizing the presence of white colonizers on indigenous lands, Breithaupt’s pioneer
myth helped normalize the presence of German-speaking people in Waterloo County.
Rather than an “other” feared during wartime, the pioneer myth helped explain the
presence of German immigrants by using a language Anglo-Canadians clearly understood
and accepted: pioneering and nation building. Even the very notion of the “pioneer” was
coded as white, and typically male, in the early and mid-twentieth century. While German
people could be “pioneers,” Anglo-Canadians often portrayed asian immigrants as
temporary “sojourners” and not “settlers,” despite living in Canada for several
generations.123 Thus, racialized immigrants could not access the same coded terms and
mythologies available to German Canadians on account of their whiteness.
By examining the implicit racial implications of mythologies like the pioneer
myth, this dissertation argues that whiteness played an integral role in allowing St. Louis
and Waterloo County’s German Lutheran communities to maintain their German
ethnicities in the mid-twentieth century. While their German ethnicity and Lutheran
religion placed German Lutherans as outsiders due to their associations with Nazism and
the enemy, whiteness provided a powerful social currency that allowed German
Lutherans to appear as nonthreatening. Whiteness allowed German Lutherans to establish
common cultural bonds with Anglo-Americans and Canadians by stressing their own

121

Ian McKay and Robin Bates, In the Province of History: The Making of the Public Past in TwentiethCentury Nova Scotia (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 311-313.
122
McKay and Bates, In the Province of History, 311-313.
123
Fujiwara, Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity, 47.

41
histories of settlement, pioneering, and civic duty that were unavailable to racialized
peoples. Religion played an equally important role in this process. While Lutheranism’s
German associations and theological peculiarities created distance between them and
other North American Protestants, German Lutherans used a broad based “Christian”
identity to advocate for their membership in Anglo-American and Canadian communities.
This dissertation builds on previous critiques in the field of whiteness studies by looking
at how ethnicity, race, and religion intersected and helped German Lutherans maintain
their ethnic and religious traditions as a result of their race. It is not a study of how
Germans “became” white, but rather how whiteness helped create the conditions for their
ethnicity to survive and thrive.

Organization and Format

This study begins just prior to the Second World War in 1939 and ends in the
early 1970s. I have selected these dates for two reasons. First, previous histories of
German immigrants generally frame their studies around either nineteenth century
German immigrants or post-1945 German refugees, but rarely both.124 The pre-1945
studies generally end in the 1930s under the assumption that the German ethnicities of
their subjects had by that point faded. The post-1945 studies typically focus exclusively
on the postwar immigrants without detailing their interaction with German immigrants
from an earlier timeframe. Beginning this study in the mid-twentieth century allows a
better exploration of how this particular generation of German Lutherans maintained their
Alexander Freund, “Heavy Baggage: Memory and Generation in Ethnic History,” in Alexander Freund
ed., History, Memory, and Generation: German-Canadian Experiences in the Twentieth Century
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ethnic identities beyond the Second World War and subsequently interacted with a new
generation of immigrants. Second, this study ends in the 1970s primarily because of the
cultural and religious changes that occurred in that decade. Historians generally
conceptualize the 1970s as a period of “ethnic revival” in the United States and as period
of official multiculturalism in Canada. The rise of both trends likely changed how
German Lutherans discussed or “performed” their ethnic identities. For North American
Lutheranism, the 1970s saw a rise in the ecumenical movement in the Canada Synod, and
a return to conservative rather than moderate leadership in the Missouri Synod. This study
does not end in the 1970s under the premise that the German ethnicity of its subjects has
faded, but rather out of recognition that enough changes within St. Louis, Waterloo
County, and Lutheranism occurred that its subjects probably began to conceptualize their
German ethnicity in different ways.
This dissertation argues that this generation of German Lutherans maintained a
German ethnic identity in seven main chapters. The first two chapters examine how
German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County responded to the rise of Nazism in
Germany in the 1930s and negotiated their way through the Second World War. By using
records produced by Lutheran congregations, chapter one argues that the Lutheran
churches emerged as spaces of intense debate during the war where pastors, the church
elite, laymen, and Lutheran women debated how to reconcile their German ethnicity
during yet another war that associated their ethnicity with “the enemy.” Chapter two
draws on the diaries and letters produced by Lutheran pastors to chart the numerous
strategies ethnic elites employed to downplay their German ethnic identities in favour of a
common Protestant and white identity that mainstream North American society deemed
acceptable. Both chapters examine how congregants disagreed with their pastors and
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remained steadfast in their belief that the church should continue functioning as an ethnic
space or boundary.
Chapters three and four both examine how German Lutherans reengaged with
their ethnicities following the war by showing a renewed interest in Germany. The
devastating impact of six years of war left Germany in shambles, and German Lutherans
in St. Louis and Waterloo County felt compelled to help their “fellow” Germans recover
from the war. Chapter three examines the extensive relief campaigns initiated by the
Missouri and Canada Synods to raise money, food, and clothing, for their German
coreligionists across the seas, all while pastors lobbied the Canadian and American
government to admit thousands of German displaced persons and refugees. Chapter four
follows several ethnic elites in the Missouri and Canada Synods to West Germany on
their “missionary” endeavors to provide relief to impoverished German Lutherans. These
visits “home” provided an opportunity for German Lutherans to reengage with their
ethnic identities as Germans after having to downplay them during the Second World
War. Both chapters demonstrate that a German ethnic identity continued in these
communities by examining their renewed interest in Germany as the birthplace of their
heritage and faith, as well as their ongoing obligation to help those of the same ethnicity
and religion overseas.
Chapter five and six examine how German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo
County responded to the new waves of German and Lutheran displaced persons (DPs)
and refugees following the war. Chapter five in particular looks at how the German
culture of Lutheran congregations and St. Louis and Waterloo County more broadly
provided an inclusive atmosphere for German DPs to maintain their own ethnic identities.
German DPs benefitted from the established German-English traditions in their
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congregations that still functioned as ethnic spaces. Although Anglo-Canadian and
American segments of St. Louis and Waterloo County tried to assimilate these
newcomers, the hybrid traditions that existed in both communities complicated their
ability to integrate DPs. Chapter six looks at how Lutheran DPs from Latvia, Estonia, and
Finland challenged the German traditions of Lutheran congregations by advocating for
their own linguistic and ethnic traditions. Lastly, chapter seven examines several cultural
and commemorative activities in the postwar decades where German Lutherans mediated
their ethnic and religious identities to the Canadian and American public. Rather than
showing signs of assimilation, these commemorative events once again highlighted the
hybrid German-Canadian and German-American identities of St. Louis and Waterloo
County.
These seven chapters revise and build upon two portions of American and
Canadian historiography. First, this dissertation shifts the scholarship on twentieth
century German ethnic identity away from an emphasis on assimilation. It challenges the
contention that German immigrants in the twentieth century abandoned their ethnic
identity or assimilated into mainstream North America. Ethnicity played an important role
in determining how German Lutherans responded to questions of war, immigration,
religion, and national belonging. Secondly, the ability of German Lutherans to maintain
an ethnic identity during the mid-twentieth century should cause historians to think
closely about the relationship between ethnicity and whiteness. For German Lutherans in
St. Louis and Waterloo County, there was no “ethnic revival” in the 1970s, for they never
ceased practicing a German ethnic identity. German Lutherans maintained their at times
controversial ethnic identities as Germans precisely due to their racial status as whites.
German Lutherans did not “become” white and shed their ethnic identities. The legacies
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of white privilege and supremacy in North America ensured that their whiteness provided
enough social and cultural currency to negotiate and maintain a German ethnic identity
during a period of intense Anglo-Canadian and American conformity. In exploring this
process, I urge historians to look more closely at how whiteness and ethnicity in the
twentieth century reinforce, rather than replace, one another.
German Lutherans in North America faced many challenges throughout the
twentieth century that threatened their ability to maintain German ethnic identities. Wars
with Germany and associations with Nazism often placed German Lutherans at odds with
their Canadian and American host societies. Yet, German Lutherans demonstrated
remarkable flexibility in adapting to these crises. Historians, however, have not always
shown the same flexibility in studying these German immigrants. Although they may not
have continued the exact same ethnic and religious traditions of their nineteenth century
forebears, German Lutherans in Waterloo County and St. Louis continued to practice
their German ethnicities within the ethnic boundary of the Lutheran church. Their ability
to appeal to a broad Protestant identity and their membership in the white race allowed
them to navigate potential conflicts with their host societies and ensured that ethnicity
remained a potent force in the lives of German Lutherans well into the 1970s.
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Chapter 1: The Language of Loyalty: Lutheran Churches as Ethnic and Patriotic
Spaces during the Second World War
As another world war approached, German-Canadian and German-American
Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County were once again concerned with how the
public perceived their communities. Pastors and congregants of a certain age recalled
memories of the First World War when “patriotic” Canadians and Americans targeted
them as a result of their German ethnicity and similarities to “the enemy.” These
memories sparked anxieties about another war with Germany generating discrimination
that would target their communities and make them outsiders once again. By 1938,
German Lutherans on both sides of the Canadian-American border had to prepare
strategies to respond to waging another war with Germany. They had to convince the
public that they were loyal to Canada and the United States or risk discrimination once
more.
The onset of the Second World War provoked intense debates within Lutheran
congregations on how Germans could reconcile their ethnic, religious, and national
identities during a war that made these identities seemingly incompatible. Should the
ethnic traditions of their church be sacrificed in order to appear “loyal” and “patriotic” to
the Canadian and American publics? To what extent should the separation of church and
state be temporarily blurred to demonstrate cooperation and loyalty during wartime?
German Lutherans answered these questions differently depending on their gender and
status within the church. Pastors and their church councils, often composed of elite men
from the community, believed they needed to transform the ethnic culture and space of
their congregations to avoid discrimination. This chapter describes how ethnic elites
initiated a number of reforms in the late 1930s and early 1940s that sought to construct an
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image of German Lutherans as loyal. They supported eliminating German-language
services at their churches; they used patriotic symbols like flags; they emphasized their
national American and Canadian identities over their local German ethnic identities.
However, this chapter also examines how laypeople resisted these patriotic reforms.
Rejecting the patriarchal leadership of their elites, they opposed efforts to remove the
German traditions from their churches. German Lutheran women contested what they
perceived as the militarization of their churches by hosting social events that advocated
for peace. They defended their right to protest the war on the basis of Lutheran theology.
As a result, the Second World War divided these communities into two camps consisting
of cautiously pro-war pastors and anti-war laypeople.
The wartime debates between pastors and their congregants provide a window
through which to view how German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans in St.
Louis and Waterloo County constructed their ethnicity in the mid-twentieth century. This
chapter argues that German Lutherans expressed their ethnicity by voicing anti-war
sentiments. They resented mainstream Canadian and American attempts to vilify
Germany and, consequently, the German people. Once the war began, however, pastors
and other elite members of the community quickly sought to suppress these sentiments
and instead viewed their ethnicity as a possible target for anti-German discrimination.
Their ethnicity became a liability that made them vulnerable to the same attacks that
occurred during the Great War. If not suppressed, it could provide grounds for internment
on the suspicion of disloyalty. It would hamper the larger project of the German
community being accepted into the North American world. Laypeople, however, viewed
their religious traditions as explicitly tied to the German language and fought to preserve
them within the church, even during the dangers of wartime. The German language was
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integral to their faith and they would not let the dangers of wartime prevent them from
speaking their language.
This chapter argues that the divisions and debates within these two German
communities over wartime accommodation reveals how Lutheran congregations
functioned as important ethnic boundary zones. As historians Royden Loewen and Gerald
Friesen suggest, ethnic boundaries can reflect “the inner workings of ethnic community
adjustment” and “their shared symbols and systems of meaning.”125 The war prompted
German Lutherans to confront whether symbols like the Canadian and American flags
truly “belonged” within the ethnic boundary of the church, and whether the German
language hindered their ability to live peacefully in North America. Lutheran churches
became contested space during the war, as ethnic elites sought to regulate their ethnicity
while laypeople fought to preserve it. Rather than fitting neatly into narratives of
assimilation or cultural maintenance, I suggest that these wartime debates highlight the
dynamic hybrid identities of German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans. They
struggled to reconcile their ethnic, religious, and national identities. The resulting contest
between pastors and laypeople helped solidify a hybrid culture wherein Lutheran
churches came to embody the hyphenated German-Canadian and German-American
backgrounds of their inhabitants.

Anti-War Sentiment and the Response to Another Conflict

German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County watched anxiously as the
Nazis rose to power in Germany during the 1930s. There was little sympathy for the
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extremist fascist response that elevated Adolf Hitler to power. Nazi Germany was not
necessarily “their” Germany and therefore the rise of Nazism did little to inspire diasporic
feelings of belonging. Many German Lutherans did, however, worry that they might
become the targets of anti-German rhetoric or violence. This shared German ethnicity
meant that those in St. Louis and Waterloo County initially resisted mainstream media
attempts to vilify Hitler and the German people. Their Germany ethnicity shaped their
sense of solidarity with the German people, even as their Canadian and American
nationalities prevented them from embracing Hitler or Nazi policies throughout the
1930s.
German Lutherans in the Missouri and Canada Synods responded differently than
other Americans and Canadians to the rise of fascism in Germany: they expressed an
instinctual sympathy towards Germany’s economic and political plight. The Treaty of
Versailles unfairly punished Germany and they attributed many of the country’s problems
to the British, French, and American desire to punish Germany following the Great War.
C.H. Little, a professor of theology at Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, wrote that he was “so
disgusted with the propaganda that is going on” that portrayed Germany as power-hungry
and militaristic. He believed Germany’s current dilemmas were “the result and offshoot
of the unfair treaty of Versailles,” and not the German people.126 Lutheran periodicals like
the Canada Lutheran and Lutheran Witness, both controlled by the Canada and Missouri
Synod’s leadership respectively, reported positively on Hitler’s initial economic reforms
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in Germany in the early to mid-1930s. They hoped to see Germany continue its recovery
from the harsh dictates of the 1919 peace.127
These cultural sympathies with the German people rarely translated into direct
political action. Attempts by the Third Reich to establish pro-Nazi organizations
disguised as ethnic clubs within St. Louis and Waterloo County failed throughout the
1930s. The Nazi-led Deutsche Bund Canada tried to organize cultural events alongside
Waterloo County’s German-Canadian ethnic clubs, but most of the clubs refused to
participate if the Bund was in any way involved.128 A subsequent pro-Nazi rally in August
1933 on Kitchener’s King Street was met with an organized counter-protest. The crowd
booed and insulted the pro-Nazi transplants until the police finally escorted the Bund
members away.129 German Americans in St. Louis, meanwhile, ignored Nazi agitators in
their community. By the mid-1930s, the vast majority of Third Reich sponsored clubs had
already left St. Louis due to an obvious lack of support from the local German-American
population.130 Open displays of sympathy towards Germany and the Nazi regime faded as
news of Kristallnacht and other anti-Semitic atrocities reached North America in 1938.
The Missouri Synod’s flagship newsletter, the Lutheran Witness, stopped reporting on
Germany entirely.131 While initially sympathetic towards Germany, both communities
recognized the dangers with being associated with Nazis in North America.
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Although few German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County politically
supported Nazi Germany, their German ethnicities did lead them to adopt anti-war
positions in the late 1930s. German Lutherans largely viewed the outbreak of war in 1939
as a result of British and European policies, rather than a result of Nazi Germany’s
militarism. Little believed that the “British policy of interference in European continental
affairs” and its desire to “dominate or police” German affairs was the primary reason why
the world was once again at war.132 John Behnken, the president of the Missouri Synod,
agreed and pointedly blamed Britain going to war with Germany. Britain and its allies, he
believed, did not want to stop Nazi aggression. Instead, the war resulted from the
competing political ideologies in Europe that provoked governments to “constantly fly at
each other’s throats.”133 These sentiments existed among laypeople in each synod as well.
One laymen in St. Louis claimed that President Franklin D. Roosevelt “connived with
England and they grabbed up all of the gold undoubtedly so Germany couldn’t
trade…Churchill said that Germany should be crushed as she was getting too strong
commercially.” Europe’s general hostility towards Germany meant the United States had
“no business getting into the war.”134 While not motivated to directly participate in proGerman or pro-Nazi political activity, elites and laypeople in the Canada and Missouri
Synods expressed German sympathies as a result of their ethnic identities at the beginning
of the war.
The outbreak of war in 1939 was a major blow to members of the German
Lutheran communities that previously witnessed discrimination during the Great War.
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With the world at war with Germany again, it seemed logical that their communities
would again face discrimination. Memories of the Great War loomed large in Little’s
approach to the new conflict. He worried that Canada would undergo another
conscription crisis that would force his four sons to go fight overseas and become
“cannon fodder.”135 Shortly after the war began, he promised to make few comments on
the conflict, because “censorship of all letters will again occur” and any criticism of the
war effort was liable to place him in a “concentration camp.” He decided that keeping
“mum” on wartime issues was the best policy.136 Little had good reason to fear the revival
of anti-German discrimination. Pastors throughout the Missouri Synod feared that “war
hysteria and [a] false notion of patriotism” already made them outsiders in their
communities. One St. Louis pastor recalled that nativists burned down his church and
eventually forced him to leave town due to his German heritage during the Great War. “I
see it all coming again,” he confided to synod-president John Behnken.137
It did not take long for Little and Behnken’s concerns to become reality. Behnken
received several threatening anonymous messages delivered directly to his home during
the war’s early years. One note stated ominously that “WE UNDERSTAND YOUR
ORGANIZATION UPHOLDS GERMAN SERVICES. YOU THEREBY FURTHER
GERMAN PRINCIPLES. WE DO NOT CARE FOR THEM.”138 Such threats led the
editors of the Lutheran Witness to respond that “during the first World War the most
shameful outrages were suffered by law-abiding citizens of the United States. These
insults and outrages were committed not by foreigners but by their fellow-citizens.
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Churches were painted yellow, pastors were driven out of their parsonages, innocent
citizens were maligned…And the same species of intolerance and tyranny is raising its
head even now.”139 Members of the Canada Synod agreed. One pastor wrote that the war
stimulated Anglo-Canadian “suspicion, greed, [and] injustice” that promoted “racial
hatred” towards Germans and their culture.140 The generation of German Lutherans who
witnessed discrimination during the Great War feared anti-German attacks would happen
again.
Lutheran pastors generally worried about wartime discrimination more than
laypeople. During the First World War, anti-German Canadians and Americans
deliberately targeted Lutheran pastors and churches as “enemy” institutions. They
believed that Lutheran churches essentially acted as a space for Germans to meet and plan
acts of sabotage against Canada and the United States. They often singled out pastors as
community leaders who allegedly hid pro-German sentiments in their German-language
sermons. Some of the most publicized acts of discrimination in St. Louis and Waterloo
County involved physical attacks on Lutheran pastors. These pastors faced imprisonment,
internment, and occasionally had to flee the city or face further assault.141 With the onset
of another war, pastors recognized that they would once again be vulnerable to antiGerman “patriots.”
As they perceived themselves to be particularly vulnerable, pastors and synod
leaders made the decision to downplay their German heritage and the ethnic traditions
associated with their church for the duration of the war. The German sympathies Behnken
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once voiced, for instance, dissipated once the United States declared war on Germany in
December 1941. Behnken sent a telegram to Roosevelt stating that he wanted to “assure
you of our prayers in this hour of national emergency” and to “pledge to you the loyal
support of our people in the defense of our country.”142 Likewise, John Reble, the
president of the Canada Synod, sent telegrams to Prime Minister Mackenzie King and
other government officials to stress the Canada Synod’s “willingness to share in the
sacrifices and demands that may be required of us as loyal British subjects.”143 Unlike the
Great War, Behnken and Reble did not intend to give the government any ground upon
which to accuse them of disloyalty. Behnken published a copy of the telegram in the next
edition of The Lutheran Witness and Reble published a copy in The Canada Lutheran to
quickly spread news of the synod’s new position on the war. Both synod leaders
published their telegrams largely as a political strategy to deflect any criticisms that the
Missouri and Canada Synods were unpatriotic. During the First World War, the Missouri
Synod’s leadership made few public comments on the war effort, which only served to
heighten nativist accusations that Lutherans were not patriotic. Behnken and Reble
published their telegrams so as to not make the same mistake again.
Privately, Behnken confessed that he also published the telegram in order to “set
some of our people to thinking along those [patriotic] lines.”144 Pro-German sentiments
among the synod’s laity could jeopardize the loyal image he wished to cultivate for his
community. He and other synod leaders combined their efforts in order to dissuade
members of the synod from expressing pro-German sentiments and to encourage them to
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embrace wartime patriotism. The editors at The Lutheran Witness scolded their GermanAmerican readership for constituting “the [most] severe critics” of the war. With the
United States officially at war by the end of 1941, the editors warned their readers that
“the time for such utterances is now past.” They urged all members of the synod to either
enlist in the armed forces or purchase war bonds in order to demonstrate their loyalty to
the government.145 Behnken agreed, and hoped that the warning would set “people’s
thinking aright.”146 Anti-war sentiments based on their German ethnicities could not be
tolerated if the Missouri and Canada Synods hoped to avoid nativist discrimination.
Declarations of patriotic sentiments would not, however, be enough. In January
1942, Behnken met with other synod leaders at the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis to
underscore the need to eliminate the pro-German sentiments within the synod. The
meeting allowed St. Louis’s ethnic elites to ask Behnken for advice on how to deal with
community members who expressed pro-German and anti-war sentiments. Behnken
replied that laymen would likely disagree with their pastors, but that the church leadership
still needed to be seen participating in the war effort. He encouraged pastors to give sound
advice and encouragement to their congregants, but also to reprimand and admonish them
if the situation called for it.147 Professors at Concordia Seminary agreed with Behnken’s
stance. P.E. Kretzmann encouraged pastors “to eliminate the ‘conscientious objector’
with his weak and erring conscience” from the congregation.148 Behnken and Kretzmann
believed that pastors needed to maintain their authority in these situations so as to not
jeopardize their loyal image.
The Editors, “War – A Duty and an Opportunity,” Lutheran Witness, 23 December 1941, p. 437.
CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 34, Folder 439, Behnken to Martin Graebner, 23 December 1941.
147
CHI, LMC, Box 26, Folder 111, Address at College of Presidents Meeting, 20 January 1942; CHI, LMC,
Box 9, Folder 53, The Preacher in a World at War, n.d. 1942.
148
CHI, Emergency Planning Council Collection (hereafter EPCC), Box 2, Folder 14, Our Task in the
Present Emergency, 1942.
145
146

56
The outbreak of war led Lutheran pastors to manipulate and control expressions of
their German ethnic identity. With war officially declared, pastors and congregants alike
could no longer express their previous pro-German sympathies. They needed to engage
with Allied patriotism, not ethnic solidarities. The outbreak of war presented Lutheran
pastors with a decision on how to best mediate their ethnic identities. Although pastors
and laypeople alike initially felt comfortable voicing their anti-war and pro-German
sentiments in their letters and publications, the eventual outbreak of war in 1939 and 1941
caused pastors and other German Lutheran elites to stop articulating these views. As
ethnic elites, they could not risk appearing as outsiders in the eyes of patriotic AngloCanadian and Americans once again.

Fighting for the German Language

The reputation of the Lutheran church as an ethnic boundary zone or a German
organization caused anti-German patriots to target them as “enemy” institutions during
the Great War. Critics cited the Lutheran tradition of preaching in German as the primary
reasons why they believed German Lutherans were disloyal.149 Language therefore
emerged as the primary contentious issue in most congregations in St. Louis and
Waterloo. As one of the most obvious markers of their ethnicity, German-language
services were often the first ethnic tradition eliminated from Lutheran congregations.
Pastors collectively decided to censor and eliminate the German language from their
institutions and periodicals at the start of the war. During its 1939 annual convention, the
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Canada Synod passed a resolution to stop producing its records in German, even though
thirty-nine out of the synod’s fifty-four congregations ordered its yearly records in
German.150 The St. Louis Pastoral Conference took similar action in late September 1939,
even before the United States entered the war. St. Louis pastors decided to cancel German
broadcasts on their radio station, KFUO. War, pastors argued, created “emotional
thinking” among Americans and they feared their radio station would be forced to shut
down. They stopped German language broadcasts on account of “the seriousness of the
days ahead, the forces working against anything which bears the Germanic imprint,”
thereby making “it imperative that we avoid any possibility of difficultly when it can be
avoided.”151 Elites in both synods united behind the common cause of demonstrating their
loyalty to the Canadian and American publics.
Pastors who experienced discrimination during the Great War were particularly
eager to eliminate German-language services from their churches. The police in Waterloo
County had arrested the Reverend Herman Sperling of St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran
Church during the previous war after several Anglo-Canadians falsely accused him of
sending money overseas to help the German military effort. They never found any
evidence that these rumors were true, but Sperling spent several days in jail until Little
paid for his release.152 The Reverend Otto Stockmann, of Trinity Evangelical Lutheran
Church, similarly faced incarceration at an internment camp in northern Ontario after the
local Member of Parliament called for his arrest on the basis that he preached to a large
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body of “Germans” in the language of “the enemy.”153 Sperling and Stockmann did not
want to risk imprisonment again. Both pastors therefore eliminated German services from
their churches early in the war. Sperling suspended German sermons and Sunday school
lessons at St. Peter’s owing to the “unsettled condition” in Europe. Likewise, Stockmann
converted Trinity’s religious services to English in order to avoid “possible offence or
provocation” from the outside community.154 They did not make this choice easily.
Stockmann worried that his language reforms would discourage congregants from
attending weekly sermons. He publicly recognized that while the transition to English
was not ideal, it was essential that congregants not resist these changes and appear
disloyal. He pleaded with congregants to remain dedicated to the church during this
“difficult time.”155 Breaking with the ethnic traditions of the church did truly threaten the
possibility of losing congregants.156 Although pastors were anxious over breaking
Lutheran traditions, they considered sacrificing their language as a necessary strategy to
pre-empt anti-German attacks.
Pastors in St. Louis were also willing to eliminate German services once the
United States officially entered the war. The Missouri Synod’s adherence to conservative
Lutheranism, however, ensured that the decision to switch from English to German did
not occur as abruptly as their neighbors in the Canada Synod. Missouri Synod
congregations placed more emphasis on congregational autonomy than those in the
The local MP provided these reasons for Stockmann’s internment after Trinity’s congregants demanded
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Canada Synod. Thus, the decision to switch to English services first required that pastors
obtain the consent, or at least consult with, members of their church councils. The church
council at St. Matthew’s Lutheran Church, for instance, advised the Reverend Paul
Streufert to eliminate German services due to “the present emergency and because the
community may misinterpret the holding of German services as indicating a sympathetic
feeling” towards Germany. They feared that “such uncharitable judging on the part of the
community may do great harm” to their congregation. Streufert promised to meet with
those who attended German services and explain to them the necessity of speaking
English in order to avoid possible nativist attacks.157
The efforts of pastors and other elites threatened a radical break with the ethnic
traditions practiced in Lutheran churches. While pastors proved willing to downplay their
ethnicity in order to stress their loyalty, members of their congregations rejected making
their churches indistinguishable from other Canadian and American churches.
Congregants did not have the same fears of internment as their pastors. More importantly,
they resisted what they saw as a broader effort to transform the cultural space of their
churches. As cultural theorist Henri Lefebvre notes, “(social) space is a (social) product”
and is accordingly shaped by human actors. The human influence on space establishes
unspoken norms, and therefore transforms space to take on a “reality on its own.” These
unspoken social norms influence those who enter the space and can shape the actions and
attitudes of the people that occupy it.158 Since their inception, Lutheran churches
functioned as ethnic boundaries in which the German language thrived. Throughout the
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early decades of the twentieth century, Lutheran churches took on a particular importance
for German immigrants wishing to speak their language. Historian Barbara Lorenzkowski
recounts how German immigrant communities in North America spoke a hybrid language
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that combined both English and
German, particularly when in public. While ethnic elites decried the loss of a “pure”
German language, ordinary German immigrant families largely embraced their new
hybrid language and spoke a mix of English and German comfortably. The public use of
the German language decreased without protest from most German immigrant
communities.159 While true of the public sphere, German immigrants of Lutheran faith
could still attend church, and speak and hear German spoken regularly. Their pastors
regularly preached in German and social clubs often conducted their business in German.
Thus, many German Lutherans became accustomed to speaking English in the public
sphere and German in the private sphere or ethnic boundary of their churches by the midtwentieth century.
Wartime hysteria put these ethnic traditions in jeopardy. The elimination of
German services in Lutheran congregations may have appeared as a patriotic necessity for
pastors, but it threatened the ethnic identity of congregants who attended weekly sermons.
It forced congregants to sacrifice one of their main forms of preserving their ethnicity via
the German language. Congregants did not passively accept this sacrifice. By March
1940, members of St. Peter’s congregation organized to protest the Reverend Sperling’s
decision to switch entirely to English services. Led by layman John Schell, the protestors
circulated a petition to determine if the congregation still desired to worship in German.
Schell’s petition gained traction amongst the congregation at large and emboldened him
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to take his demands to the church council. Schell and his supporters requested that
Sperling preach at least one or two German sermons a month, and offer at least one
German language communion per year. Schell also wrote to the church council detailing
his demands and requested to personally meet with them to express his opposition to
Sperling’s language reforms. St. Peter’s church council proved hesitant to meet with a
congregant so vocally opposed to its wartime actions. They rejected his offer to discuss
his opposition in person. Instead, the church council wrote to Schell reminding him of the
reasons German language services were suspended at the beginning of the war. Although
the church council did not risk association with someone as vocal as Schell, they
organized a committee to meet with the more moderate members of the congregation who
signed Schell’s petition to reinforce the importance of not speaking German while Canada
was at war.160 Schell’s protest was exactly the type of behaviour Sperling and the church
council wished to avoid. His protest threatened to revive nativist concerns and the church
council therefore worked to quell his opposition in order to maintain the image of loyalty.
To make matters worse, Sperling’s health declined in 1940 just as the debate over
speaking German divided St. Peter’s. Without Sperling’s assistance, the church council
had to confront Schell and his supporters without the authority of their pastor. Schell’s
convictions, however, did not waver and he continued to campaign for his cause at St.
Peter’s congregational meetings throughout 1940. In a May meeting, Schell once again
advocated for reintroducing German services and asked that the church council reconsider
its earlier decision. Schell’s efforts occurred at an inopportune period in the war. In the
previous weeks, the Nazis had invaded northern Europe. Nazi expansion fueled EnglishCanadian fears that Canada was subject to internal threats. Rumours circulated that the
160
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Nazis benefitted from the support of “fifth columnists,” citizens who willingly
collaborated with the Nazis against their own country. These rumours played on EnglishCanadian fears that German Canadians were loyal to Germany.161 As Schell’s demands
coincided with a peak period in the fear over German-Canadian saboteurs, the church
council proved even less willing to grant Schell’s wishes. Still, the congregation debated
Schell’s demands and only stopped when the church received a phone call from the
nearby hospital. The call notified the congregation that Sperling had just passed away due
to complications during kidney surgery. The symbolism of their pastor dying during a
discussion of reviving the German language was not lost on the congregation. The church
council interpreted the omen as sufficient grounds to end the meeting and table other
discussions for future review.162 For the remainder of the year, St. Peter’s church council
remained preoccupied with finding a suitable replacement for Sperling and had little time
to address the concerns of individual congregants. Thus Schell’s efforts to bring the
German language back to St. Peter’s failed due to internal and external factors alike.
In contrast, Trinity’s congregation did enjoy one small victory. Several
congregants approached the Reverend Otto Stockmann during the winter of 1940 in an
attempt to reinstate German language services. Specifically, congregants wished to create
an exception to Stockmann’s language reform in order to allow a German Easter service.
While Stockmann did not record the exact number, enough congregants approached him
with complaints that he felt it necessary to give a public explanation. Stockmann
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addressed the issue at the annual congregational meeting in January 1941. Standing
before his congregation, Stockmann argued that it was necessary for him to speak English
if Trinity hoped to avoid possible anti-German attacks, at least for the duration of the war.
He urged them to accept his decision lest he face internment once again.163 The
congregation, however, remained unmoved by Stockmann’s plea for loyalty. They urged
him to call a vote on whether to include a German service on Easter. Stockmann had little
choice but to oblige. A record forty-three members of the congregation attended the vote,
when the average attendance to congregational meetings hovered around twenty to
twenty-five.164 The resolution to hold an Easter service in German received
overwhelming support from the congregation and was subsequently passed by the church
council. Of the forty-three members present, four congregants voted against bringing
German-language services back to Trinity. Stockmann recorded the names of those who
voted “no.” The abstainers were members of prominent families in the church who had
close ties to the church council.165 As Stockmann and the church council had originally
suspended use of the German language, the family members of the church council
supported their initial decision. The congregation received its wish at Easter in 1943,
when Stockmann conducted a morning Easter service in German and another service later
that day in English for those who were not comfortable attending it in German.166 In the
minds of Trinity’s more elite members, the risk of appearing and speaking German was
not one worth taking. While the vote to conduct an Easter service in German appears to
have had the general support of the congregation, there still remained a divide between
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the desires of the laity and Stockmann’s wishes. Elite church members were not willing to
risk their status in the community by appearing disloyal by speaking German.
St. Louis pastors also had to make certain conciliatory gestures in order to avoid
the protests over language that engulfed congregations like St. Peter’s. The church
council at St. Paul’s Lutheran Church recommended that the Reverend Rothe consult with
laymen who might take issue with their decision to cancel German services in January
1942. Rothe consulted prominent families at St. Paul’s and tried to convince them of the
wartime necessity to preach exclusively in English. They agreed, but only on the
condition that Rothe continue to discreetly administer communion in German in private
ceremonies.167 Louis Sieck, the pastor at Zion Lutheran Church, agreed to privately offer
“spiritual care” in the German language in exchange for the congregation’s public support
of his decision to preach Sunday sermons in English. The pro-German lobbies at these
congregations therefore extended thanks for “the tactful way the Pastor is handling this
delicate matter.”168
The disagreement over language in these congregations reveals how central
language was to the ways that laypeople in St. Louis and Waterloo County conceptualized
their German ethnic identity. Congregants proved unwilling to let the war alter their
ethnic traditions because they believed their Lutheranism was intertwined with their
ethnicity. Laypeople in Waterloo County and St. Louis petitioned primarily for the
opportunity to speak German on days with a specific religious importance or at
significant religious rituals, such as confirmation ceremonies, communion, and Easter.
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Language debates demonstrate the degree to which the church evolved into an important
German space during the interwar years. Congregants conceptualized their German and
Lutheran identities as two halves of a single whole, wherein they needed to speak German
on days of religious importance. German immigrants may have allowed English to eclipse
German in the public sphere, but they proved unwilling to let this happen at their
churches. Rather than treating the switch to English with ambivalence, as German
immigrants did in the public sphere, congregants fought vigorously to maintain their
church as an ethnic boundary zone immune from the influence of their host society. This
difference reveals an important aspect of the development of the German language in
immigrant communities. The German language in 1940s St. Louis and Waterloo County
became imbedded with religious and cultural importance. The spirited protests that
occurred within these three Lutheran churches remains a testament to the cultural
significance congregants placed on speaking the language of their ancestors during times
of religious importance. To speak German at church contained more than religious
meaning or a mere functional use; it also provided an opportunity to practice and
commune with one’s ethnic identity. While language in the public sphere was fluid and
allowed for change, congregants resisted language reforms that violated their perception
of the church as an ethnic boundary zone.

Protesting Patriotic Space

The fight to keep Lutheran churches German spaces did not begin and end with
the question of German-language services. Many congregants felt that their pastors were
too accommodating to wartime patriotism more generally. They were also concerned by
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their pastor’s willingness to allow their religious and ethnic spaces to be marked by
patriotic symbols such as flags. These efforts to remake their churches into landscapes of
loyalty and patriotism align with Lefebvre’s concept of “representational space.”
Representational spaces employ “complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes
not” that provide its inhabitants with meaning. These symbols can overlay “physical
space, making symbolic use of its objects” that would otherwise be meaningless.169
Pastors who brought Canadian and American national symbols into their churches sought
to demonstrate their loyalty, but at the expense of preserving their congregations as
German spaces outside the purview of the state. These symbols provided a clear meaning
to both insiders and outsiders as to how their pastors felt about the war. Pastors hoped that
such changes would demonstrate their loyalty as Canadians and Americans, even if it
meant further downplaying their German ethnicities.
Eliminating German services helped pastors avoid accusations of loyalty to
Germany, but did little to show their host societies that they were loyal to Canada and the
United States. During the Great War, nativists often criticized Lutheran pastors for not
upholding Canadian and American norms such as singing “God Save the King” or
saluting the flag. Pastors sought to rectify this image by including explicitly patriotic
customs and symbols in their churches. Sperling and the St. Peter’s church council
realized that they could no longer advertise their church as a “German” church if they
hoped to demonstrate their loyalty. As of 1939, the congregation still had its public sign
on the church lot written in the German language. By 1941, the church council replaced
the old German sign with a new English one accompanied by a Canadian flag.170 With a
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Canadian flag and an English sign directly outside the church, there were few visible
markers to distinguish St. Peter’s from the nearby Presbyterian churches. Other
congregations adopted a similar approach. Both Trinity and “Old Trinity” in St. Louis
raised flags during the early stages of the war in order to demonstrate to the broader
community that they were loyal to Canada and the United States respectively. 171
Pastors and the church elite monitored the behaviour of their congregations
outside as well as inside the space of the church. St. Peter’s in Kitchener rescheduled its
weekly sermon so as to not conflict with a 1939 Remembrance Day ceremony. The
church council advised the congregation to take part in the civic ceremony that was held
at the community cenotaph in Kitchener.172 Congregations in St. Louis engaged in
displays of patriotism as well. Zion’s congregational newsletter published the names of its
congregants who had already joined the armed forces as early as July 1941.173 It would be
difficult, the church council hoped, for “patriots” to attack German Lutheran loyalty when
they so proudly displayed the names of members of their congregation who served in the
military.
St. Matthew’s in St. Louis implemented one of the clearest threats to the
traditional German spaces of Lutheran churches during the early stages of the war. In
October 1941, the church newsletter advertised a new initiative pioneered by Erwin
Rodenburg, the congregation’s Sunday school teacher. As the congregation’s teacher,
Rodenburg had considerable authority within the congregation. Yet, he also had the most
to lose as a result of wartime discrimination. Since Rodenburg taught the congregation’s
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children in German, he was more susceptible to anti-German attacks than other members
of the congregation. In an attempt to demonstrate his patriotism, Rodenburg proposed to
host soldiers stationed at the nearby Jefferson Barracks at the church for dinner,
entertainment, and a brief respite from military life. Elite members of the church saw an
obvious benefit in implementing such a patriotic program. Rodenburg recognized that
during “this critical time, we should do all we can to aid our boys and thus help promote
national unity.”174 For the German Lutheran members of St. Matthew’s who supported
the program, national unity naturally meant avoiding anti-German discrimination and
working cooperatively with American patriots during the impending war.
Rodenburg’s idea, however, militarized church space and brought the
congregation closer to the war effort. Rodenburg knew this, and the elite members of the
church realized they had to convince the congregation of the program’s necessity. The
church council told the congregation that the soldiers in the program were typically
Lutheran, but acknowledged that soldiers of varying religious backgrounds would also
participate. In an attempt to justify the presence of non-Lutherans, the church council
claimed that hosting non-Lutherans constituted “an excellent missionary opportunity” to
attempt to convert these non-Lutheran soldiers to the Missouri Synod.175 Thus, they tried
to portray a patriotic activity as a religious one. In doing so, Rodenburg and his
supporters attempted to reconcile the congregants’ perception of their church as a
distinctly German Lutheran space with the demands of patriotism.
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Pastors increasingly tried to connect the wartime accommodation of their churches
with a general expression of Christian spirit. The language debates made them realize that
appealing to their congregation’s sense of patriotic duty or nationality would generate
opposition to, rather than participation in, the war effort. Pastors therefore had to
somehow confront the attitudes of their congregants that treated patriotism and their
ethnicity as incompatible forces. They subsequently worked carefully to encourage
participation in the war effort by appealing to their congregation’s identities as Lutherans,
rather than as Americans or Canadians. Reverend Lewis Niemoeller at Faith Lutheran
Church in St. Louis encouraged his congregation to support St. Louis’s wartime
fundraisers because of their faith, not out of patriotic sentiment. He told his congregation
that “this work is one way of showing our Christianity to the world” and emphasized that
the city’s wartime fundraisers supported Lutheran charities as well as secular ones.176 St.
Matthew’s in St. Louis adopted a similar approach. It encouraged its congregation to buy
war bonds, for as “Christian citizens we want to come to the assistance of our country in
its hour of dire need.”177 In 1943, Zion started its campaign for war bonds by appealing to
the congregation’s religious identity. They titled the campaign “For Church and for
Country,” in attempt to reconcile an obviously patriotic fundraiser with the Lutheran
faith. Sieck, Zion’s pastor, argued that congregants should purchase war bonds and use a
portion of their savings to donate it to the church. He told Zion’s members that
purchasing war bonds “proves our loyalty to both of these divine institutions, church and
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government.”178 Sieck argued that “in this way you will be serving both your nation and
your church.”179 The German identities of their congregants ensured that pastors had to
find a motivation outside of patriotism to encourage their congregants to support wartime
fundraisers. War with Germany did not provide enough impetus for German Lutheran
congregants to donate their time and money. By turning wartime fundraisers into church
fundraisers, however, pastors hoped to accomplish their goal of appearing loyal without
generating opposition among their congregants.
Congregants, however, still did not support their pastors and attempts to combine
church and state. They resented their pastors taking such strong patriotic stances on the
war as it clearly violated their Biblical understanding Romans 13, which dictated that the
state not exert its influence over spiritual affairs. Congregants rejected the demands of
patriotism and, unlike their pastors and church councils, often proved reluctant to
embrace the war’s impact on their churches. The divide that emerged during the early
years of the war between laymen and elite church councils continued to generate conflict
within local congregations. One congregant in St. Louis criticized their pastor for
preaching “about war every Sunday from the pulpit” and for placing an emphasis on how
it “was a privilege to serve.” The congregant complained that “he is a good preacher and
his sermons used to be fine before but he sort of detracted from the Gospel by doing
that.”180 Unlike their pastors and the church elite, congregants did not celebrate the
wartime “achievements” that their pastors often cited in order to demonstrate their
loyalty.
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German Lutheran women put up the strongest resistance to elite attempts to gain
acceptance through patriotism. Their protests, however, differed from those of their male
peers, as Lutheran women had very few outlets in which to express their opposition to the
patriotic reforms initiated by the church’s male elite. Both the Missouri and Canada
Synods did not allow women the right to vote in congregational meetings. Nor could
women sit on church councils or other advisory boards. While men like Schell could
voice their protest via the official channels of congregational meetings, German Lutheran
women had to voice their opposition to the war within their own organizations or by
refusing to comply with the patriotic directives of their pastors. Their protests reveal the
extent to which German Lutheran women voiced anti-war sentiments despite elite
attempts to regulate their ethnicity. They conceptualized their churches as a site outside of
the purview of the state, and resented attempts by their pastors to bring wartime
patriotism into a religious institution.
For women in the Canada Synod, the annual conferences of the Women’s
Missionary Society (WMS) provided a space wherein German Lutheran women could
articulate their own thoughts on the war. During the early war years, the annual themes of
their conferences contained explicit anti-war messages. In 1939, the WMS met at St.
James in Waterloo County under the banner “Ambassadors of Peace.” Unlike their male
pastors, the WMS did not conceptualize church space as one that needed to support the
war effort. They understood their churches as places of refuge where they could practice
their religion outside of state influence. They believed that their role in church was to
follow “the example of our Lord Jesus Christ” and “solemnly pledge ourselves for further
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the realization of peace by bringing the Gospel to bear upon the hearts of men.”181 The
WMS’s 1940 convention met under the theme of “Love.” Margaret Kalbfleisch, the
conference organizer, wrote that “surely the Convention theme, Love, is most fitting,
particularly, in these times of world tragedy, when many nations are engaged in a terrific
conflict which is shaking the very foundations of our Christian civilization. The world is
in need of more love.”182 Denied official recognition by their congregations, German
Lutheran women critiqued the war effort in the few spaces they could control.
As the war continued, German Lutheran women became increasingly vocal about
their anti-war views. Women, even outside of Lutheran congregations, were expected to
volunteer in the war effort due to their “naturally self-sacrificing” disposition. Men saw
tasks such as sewing, cooking, and canvassing for funds as extensions of women’s
domestic duties, and expected women to complete this work in order to help the war
effort.183 These gendered expectations also existed in the German Lutheran communities
of St. Louis and Waterloo County, where pastors expected women to carry out their
patriotic wartime efforts in order to stress their loyalty to the state. By cooperating with
their pastor’s plans for patriotic fundraisers, women maintained the role of “ancillary
partners” that did not challenge the pastor’s authority and leadership in the church.184 But
while pastors expected their congregation’s women to carry out their patriotic fundraisers,
they became some of the most chief opponents of their pastors’ patriotic reforms during
the latter stages of the war.
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German Lutheran women resented bearing the burden of patriotic war work. In
early 1942, Faith Lutheran Church in St. Louis publicized the few women who were
“taking the lead” in fundraising activities in hopes that other women would notice and
help. However, patriotic fundraisers within the church failed to generate a significant
attendance from the congregation’s women. The church leadership pleaded for “all the
ladies of the congregation” to attend the patriotic fundraisers, instead of the same handful
of women each time.185 By refusing to participate in patriotic fundraisers, German
Lutheran women conveyed their anti-war beliefs to their pastors and the church elite.
They rejected the ways that their pastors and church councils transformed their churches
from places of worship and ethnicity into patriotic national spaces. As women could not
vote or participate in congregational meetings in both the Missouri and Canada Synods,
they did not have an official venue in which to voice their protests as with their male
counterparts. Remaining silent and ignoring their pastor’s pleas emerged as one of the
most effective ways German Lutheran women could express their opposition to the war.
If their pastors proved intent on transforming church space, German Lutheran women at
Faith Lutheran Church simply stopped attending a space that no longer spoke to their
religious and ethnic identities. Denied a voice within their congregation, the women at
Faith Lutheran Church let their silence speak for them.
Even the women who did seem to support wartime fundraisers eventually became
disillusioned over the theological contradictions of their pastors. In late 1942, a Ladies
Aid Society raised enough money from fundraising efforts to purchase a war bond.
Purchased under the name of the congregation, some of the women involved with the
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initial fundraiser expressed concern that the congregation should not use the bond as it
was “blood money.” They believed the government would use their money for “bad
purposes” and felt uncomfortable attaching the name of their congregation to money that
would support the government’s war.186 Although instructed to purchase war bonds by
their pastors, German Lutheran women could not ignore that this money could be used to
bomb German civilians, including mothers and children overseas.187 In 1943, another
Ladies Aid Society resisted their pastor’s request to cook free meals for American
soldiers. The pastor expected his congregation’s women to purchase food for these meals,
and subsequently cook and serve them to visiting American soldiers. The women were
dismayed to find out, however, “that hardly 10% of the visiting boys are Lutheran” and
many of the soldiers they fed were in fact “Catholics and others [taking] undue
advantage” of their generosity. They subsequently protested their pastor’s decision over
the “waste of money” to the synod’s leadership.188
Their protests, however, found little sympathy among the synod’s male
leadership. Conflict between German Lutheran women and their pastors proved so
common throughout the war that The Lutheran Witness eventually commented on the
issue. The magazine’s editor, Theodore Graebner, took issue with women who refused to
purchase war bonds. Graebner reported that certain women claimed “they had been taught
that the Church and State are separate” and that “it was wrong to make such a purchase of
bonds.” Rather than acknowledge the valid theological claims made by German Lutheran
women, Graebner dismissed them and slandered their reputation. He warned that such
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protests meant that their pastor may not uphold their reputation as loyal citizens should
these women ever come into conflict with the government or hostile community
members. Whereas male objections to synod policy were treated seriously, Graebner
believed that women protested the war not “for righteousness’ sake, but as a result of their
ignorance of what their Church teaches.”189 Behnken dismissed women’s theological
challenges with equal arrogance. He challenged one Ladies Aid Society “to prove their
assertion” that war bonds were blood money.190 Unlike male congregants who could
voice their protests through official channels and hope for their desired results, pastors
generally ignored women’s protests. One pastor refused to cancel his patriotic programs,
despite protest from the congregation’s women, because it would “be difficult to
discontinue the project now without getting a black eye.”191
Whereas pastors relied on the elite men in their church councils to support their
patriotic reforms, synod leaders believed German Lutheran women were a problem
throughout the war. Specifically, synod leaders saw the tendency for German Lutheran
women to view involvement with the military as a violation of Romans 13 as a major
impediment to their war effort. If the clearest way for synod leaders to demonstrate their
loyalty was to ensure a large number of Lutheran youth enlisted in the armed forces, then
Lutheran mothers acted as a significant barrier to their ultimate goal of promoting loyalty.
Women had good cause to fear that the military opposed their religious and ethnic
identities. After all, wartime propaganda from the American government often portrayed
military training camps as a place where Americans of diverse ethnic and religious
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backgrounds mixed and merged into one “team.”192 Many German Lutheran women grew
up within a Missouri Synod that often stressed the dangers of interfaith unions and
discouraged relationships with other ethnicities and religions outside the synod.193 They
saw military training camps as places of assimilation where their sons would stray from
their Lutheran faith. As a result, Missouri Synod leaders worried that Lutheran mothers
prevented, or discouraged, their sons from enlisting in the military due to their anti-war
beliefs. The editors of The Lutheran Witness specifically targeted Lutheran mothers in
their editorials in an effort to convince them that the military was harmless to their faith.
They emphasized the services available to Lutheran soldiers at training camps, ranging
from Lutheran chaplains to hymn books. The Lutheran Witness editors recognized that
few Lutheran mothers ever thought their sons would undertake a career in the military,
but still chastised mothers for clinging “to our hopes and dreams of yesterday” during a
time “when our Government calls for defense.”194
While Lutheran mothers emerged as objects of scorn during the war, certain
younger Lutheran women in St. Louis achieved a new measure of authority in their
congregations. During the war, a select few young women achieved prominent positions
within mixed gender social clubs like the Walther League for the first time. The Walther
League lost many of its senior members during the war due to the pressure on its male
members to enlist in the armed forces. During the 1942 election of Walther League
positions, five women from St. Louis were elected as a result of the absence of men.
These young women filled certain positions, such as vice-president and treasurer, which
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had previously always been occupied by men.195 However, these women were not elected
as a result of gender equality within the Walther League. Its membership suffered as a
result of the war and the club needed Lutheran women to participate more actively if the
club wished to survive the war years. A newsletter from Holy Cross in St. Louis made the
attitude of male Walther League members all too clear. The young men appealed
“especially to the young women of our congregation to come and join our…Walther
League” throughout the war. However, they told the new female members that their
participation in the club was only to “help us ‘keep the home fires burning’ until our boys
return home again.”196 Much like wartime gains for women more generally, German
Lutheran men expected that women would only temporarily participate in “male”
pursuits.
Historians of North American Lutheranism routinely comment on the absence of
German Lutheran women’s voices from the official record.197 In her feminist critique of
the Missouri Synod, historian Mary Todd comments that Lutheran history is
“remarkable” for to its “absence of women, both from the discussion forum and from any
position of advocacy on their own behalf.” As a result, she states that “women’s roles
have been marginal at best” within the church.198 Yet, pastors could not ignore the
important role played by German Lutheran women during the war. Their unwillingness to
support patriotic activities threatened the loyal image the church leadership wished to
project throughout the conflict. German Lutheran women participated in theological
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debates in their congregations via their protests, thereby attracting the attention of
Behnken and the church elite. They challenged their pastors’ authority, either overtly or
through their silence, in order to communicate that they opposed the war measures
imposed on them by their pastors on both religious and ethnic grounds.
The apparent inability of their congregants to understand and embrace the
importance of wartime patriotism frustrated pastors. The war split congregations along
lay/clerical and gendered lines, causing pastors anxiety over how to unite their
congregations behind their need to appear loyal. Reble, for instance, noted that the war
split his congregation into those he considered “problems” and those he believed worked
towards providing solutions for issues facing the church. The congregants Reble labeled
as “problems” included those “who are loudest in their critiques” of the church’s conduct
“to the present world situation.”199 The editors of The Lutheran Witness commented on
these congregational divides, and lamented the development of “families living in feuds
with church officers and the pastors, dissension between older and younger groups,” and
believed that “these do more to hinder the growth of the church than the devil himself.”200
The unsympathetic attitudes of pastors and church elites only enhanced the divide within
congregations.
By transforming Lutheran churches into patriotic spaces, pastors tried to dispel the
rumours that Lutherans held secret “pro-German” meetings. By using the same patriotic
symbols and customs as Anglo-Americans and Canadians, German Lutherans hoped to
avoid accusations of disloyalty while simultaneously highlighting their own dedication to
the war effort in ways readily understandable to their American and Canadian audiences.
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Pastors took no chances risking internment or discrimination once again. Just like their
language reforms, however, congregants protested such overt changes. German Lutheran
women put forward a message of peace in the face of their pastors’ patriotic calls to
support the war, and resisted clerical efforts to blur the line between church and state.
They intended for their churches to be a refuge from the war, not a willing participant in
it.

Relations Between St. Louis and Waterloo County

Examining cross-border collaboration between pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo
County highlights how pastors tried to use their national identities as Americans and
Canadians to their advantage. This strategy angered their congregants who wished to keep
their churches as German spaces, but helped provide pastors with a way to appear loyal
when negotiating with government officials. The war, however, initially threatened the
transnational relationship between St. Louis and Waterloo County. Prior to the war, the
Ontario District of the Missouri Synod cooperated easily with their parent body in St.
Louis. Charity drives and synod conventions ignored the Canadian-American border as
Lutherans in both countries collaborated towards a common cause. The Second World
War placed this dynamic in jeopardy due to Canada’s involvement in the war while the
United States stayed neutral. Initially, it appeared as though Waterloo County’s
relationship with Lutherans in St. Louis would cause problems for the community.
American neutrality during the opening stages of the war seemingly placed St. Louis
Lutherans at odds with Missouri Synod congregations in Waterloo County. As they were
officially affiliated with an American, or “foreign,” entity, Missouri Synod Lutherans in
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Waterloo County were placed in an even more precarious situation than their Canada
Synod neighbours. Frank Malinsky, the president of the Ontario District of the Missouri
Synod headquartered in Waterloo County, wrote to Behnken to make him aware of the
problems American neutrality caused for his congregants. He told Behnken that the antiwar messages contained in Missouri Synod periodicals read in Waterloo County may
“seem quite harmless to the ears of people living in a neutral country but they offend in a
country at war and may cause embarrassment” for his community. Missouri Synod
advocates for neutrality could easily provoke accusations of disloyalty if associated with
their congregations in Waterloo County due to the image of the Missouri Synod as a
“foreign” institution.201
American neutrality posed further problems in Waterloo County. In 1940,
Waterloo County Lutherans petitioned the Department of National Defense to obtain a
Missouri Synod chaplain to serve in the army. Traditionally, Behnken and the synod’s
leadership in St. Louis handled any interaction with the federal government. War
disrupted this tradition. A Waterloo County pastor informed Behnken that “because of the
strong nationalistic tendency of the Canadians, we deem it wise that a committee of
resident Canadian citizens should be appointed to look after Lutheran chaplaincy work in
the present war.” He felt that the “Department of National Defense would not entertain
such a request were it to come from outside of Canada. Of that I feel quite certain.” The
Ontario District concurred, and asked Behnken to formally establish “a Canadian military
and navy Board” of the Missouri Synod so they could collaborate with Canada’s military
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uninterrupted.202 Behnken agreed. He appointed three pastors from Ontario to act as the
Missouri Synod’s representatives for Canada. He deliberately did not choose pastors
either born in the United States or Germany. Instead, he selected Alfred Dashner, a
Canadian-born pastor. He also selected M.J. Michael as another representative because he
was a Canadian citizen. Behnken told Michael that “since you were born in Denmark,
your status in the eyes of the government should cause no difficulty whatsoever.”203 None
of these men had obvious ties to Germany and were therefore prime candidates to
demonstrate German Lutheran loyalty to the government.
Despite these early issues surrounding American neutrality, German Lutheran
leaders in both St. Louis and Waterloo County eventually used their national identities as
a way to moderate problems with the Canadian federal government. Pastors readily
emphasized whichever portion of their hyphenated identities as German-Canadian and
German-American Lutherans suited them at the time. Much as they did during the debates
on language and church space, pastors consciously emphasized their national identities as
a way to mitigate their ethnicity. This strategy proved particularly effective when, during
the opening stages of the war, the Canadian federal government passed an order-incouncil that forced aliens (or non-citizens) who had arrived in Canada since 1929 to
register with the federal government if their father or grandfather was born in Germany.
Malinsky wrote to Behnken for assistance regarding the order-in-council, which he
considered to be nothing more than “war hysteria” on behalf of the government. Malinsky
worried that government authorities would abuse this law and “may cause our church
much embarrassment” by forcing Lutherans to register. According to Malinsky’s records,
202

CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, Harold Merklinger to Behnken, 10 April 1040; CHI,
Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, H. Huth to Behnken, 21 May 1940.
203
CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, Behnken to M.J. Michael, 28 October 1940.

82
there were six pastors in the Canadian districts of the Missouri Synod who fell under this
category. As these pastors were all born in the United States with German ancestors, the
order-in-council would force them to register with the Canadian government as aliens.204
Protests to the government proved difficult under the strict conditions of wartime.
If Behnken, Malinsky, and their Canadian colleagues protested the order-in-council too
vigorously, they risked being misunderstood as disloyal or pro-German. Thus, GermanCanadian Lutherans carefully constructed their criticism of the order-in-council as an
“American” instead of “ethnic” problem. Traugott Herzer, a Canadian Missouri Synod
Lutheran, told government officials that the order-in-council wrongly included “American
citizens whose fathers or grandfathers had been born in Germany.” To further point out
the absurdity of the law, he declared that if Wendell L. Willkie, the presidential candidate
for the Republican Party in 1940, lived in Canada, he would also be affected by the law.
In order to voice their opposition, Malinsky enlisted Behnken’s aid. He implored
Behnken to travel to Ottawa to meet with government officials and use his prestige as the
leader of the synod to protect those affected by the order-in-council. After Behnken
agreed to meet with Canadian government officials, Herzer made sure to stress Behnken’s
American, not German, roots by reminding the government that Behnken “is a native of
Houston, Texas.”205 As a result, German Canadians portrayed Behnken’s intervention as
an American interested in the treatment of his countrymen, instead of pro-German and
disloyal. Ultimately, Canadian Lutherans needlessly worried about the order-in-council.
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The final law did not include any stipulations about ancestors from Germany, thereby
eliminating the formerly affected pastors from having to register as enemy aliens.206
The early stages of the war had ambiguous effects on the relationship between
German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Although American neutrality
created the potential for nativists to accuse Waterloo County Lutherans of disloyalty,
Behnken’s willingness to let Canadians operate independently seemed to mitigate this
possibility. However, ties with St. Louis became beneficial when German-Canadian
Lutherans used the guise of American concern to help protest discriminatory legislation.
Wartime issues ultimately prompted Behnken to recognize the national character of
Missouri Synod congregations in Canada. He wrote that Americans “are often apt to write
and act as though, because they are our fellow Lutherans, they are also Americans. The
truth of the matter is that all these folks are Canadians” and encountered different
challenges than Lutherans in the United States.207 Although war generated a greater
awareness of national difference between St. Louis and Waterloo County, it could not
overcome the shared bonds of ethnicity and religion. Behnken, Malinsky, and their
colleagues successfully collaborated to overcome the challenges that the nation placed on
their German and Lutheran identities.
Although Canadian congregations affiliated with the Missouri Synod relied on its
support early in the war, St. Louis quickly realized there were several problems with
running a national war effort in a transnational church. The symbols and rhetoric that
motivated German-American Lutherans did not always resonate with Canadian Lutherans
in the same way. Many Canadian Lutherans read the Missouri Synod’s primary
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periodical, The Lutheran Witness, and Canadian pastors complained that it offered very
little use for Canadian congregations. One pastor objected to the photos of American
soldiers and flags, and noted that it did little to inspire Canadians to enlist. He hoped that
the synod would stress the international character of their war work, and perhaps even
include a Union Jack flag on its cover. Another pastor noted that he could not use The
Lutheran Witness in his patriotic fundraising campaign because “it was ‘all Stars and
Stripes’.”208 While not entirely unsympathetic, the Witness editorial staff defended their
decisions by noting the lack of Canadian material available to them.209
The wartime patriotism in Canada and the United States strained the transnational
ties that existed between German Lutherans in Waterloo County and St. Louis. Patriotism
inevitably included embracing national symbols that alienated German Lutherans in the
neighboring country. Despite sharing similar goals, wartime patriotism ensured that
German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County had to express these aims with
nationalist symbols and language instead of ethnic ones. Although German Lutherans in
St. Louis and Waterloo County shared an ethnic and religious heritage, the war made
them recognize their distinct national identities whether they wished to or not.

Conclusion

German Lutheran pastors and elite laymen in St. Louis and Waterloo County
worried that the onset of war would provoke attacks against them. Their memories of the
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First World War, coupled with some signs of discrimination, motivated these ethnic elites
to implement patriotic reforms in their churches. They worked cooperatively to eliminate
German language services and transform their churches into patriotic spaces. For ethnic
elites, their German ethnicity acted as a handicap that needed to be downplayed and
overcome. Their efforts do not indicate that these individuals were either victims or fully
assimilated. Rather, the very fact that these pastors and elite laymen took such an active
role in demonstrating their patriotism and downplaying their ethnicity shows that a
German consciousness still remained strong within these communities. The actions of
pastors and their church councils should not be seen as agents of assimilation, but rather
as individuals attempting to reconcile their ethnic and national identities to avoid
discrimination. The partnership between synod leaders in St. Louis and Waterloo County
showcases their ability to simultaneously use their ethnic and national identities to their
advantage. They collaborated and used their national identities as Americans and
Canadians as a way to negotiate ethnic issues. Wartime cooperation shows that the ethnic
and religious bonds between these two communities remained strong during the 1940s.
They deliberately used their nationalities as a vehicle for ethnic maintenance, not
disappearance.
Congregants, especially women, were less willing to embrace the national and
patriotic symbols sanctioned by their pastors and the state. Although the strategies
implemented by pastors and elite laymen tried to alter the physical and ideological space
of Lutheran churches, the strong protests on behalf of the congregants demonstrated a
continued German ethnicity during the early stages of war. The willingness of
congregants to protest elite reforms ensured that Lutheran churches did not fully
transform from German to patriotic spaces. Their resistance shows that they
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conceptualized their ethnicity as intimately connected to their Lutheranism during their
struggle to maintain German language services at their churches. Furthermore, German
Lutheran women rejected the militarization of their churches, as it did not resonate with
their own perception of what it meant to be a German Lutheran. They could not support a
Lutheranism or church space that called for war, when they believed strongly in working
towards peace. Pastors ultimately advocated a wartime patriotism that did not reflect the
ethnic identities of their congregants. Lutheran churches functioned as important places to
perform their ethnic and religious identities, and congregants were unwilling to silently
accept the reforms implemented by their pastors and church councils.
The Second World War strained the church’s historic function as an ethnic
boundary zone. The war made being both “German” and “American” or “Canadian”
appear incompatible, thereby forcing pastors to emphasize their nationality while
congregants fought to keep their ethnic traditions intact. The war therefore prompted
German Lutherans at all levels of the congregation to confront, and, for some, to defend
their ethnic identity. Far from victims or seamlessly integrated Canadians and Americans,
pastors and congregants alike took the steps they felt necessary in negotiating their ethnic
identities in wartime. Regardless of how they felt about the war, another war with
Germany ensured they were acutely aware of their German heritage. Pastors saw their
ethnicity as a source of anxiety whereas congregants saw their German ethnic identity as
closely related to faith and as a vehicle for expressing anti-war and pro-peace sentiments.
German Lutherans did not assimilate during the early stages of the war, but rather tried to
balance their hybrid German, Canadian, American, and Lutheran identities.
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Chapter 2: Between Church and State: Race and Religion during the Second World
War
Lutheran pastors and synod leaders in St. Louis and Waterloo County had their
authority challenged not only from within their congregations, but also from outside.
While the previous chapter examined the internal debates and controversies that divided
Lutheran churches, this chapter examines how the German Lutheran elite mediated their
ethnicity in the public sphere. As ethnic elites and leaders in their communities, pastors
vocally advocated support for the war through speeches, publications, and
correspondence with government officials to prove their loyalty. Government officials
ultimately determined whether or not pastors would face incarceration or internment, and
leaders in the Missouri and Canada Synods eagerly cultivated political alliances to ensure
they endured the war unscathed. The Missouri Synod cooperated with several government
agencies throughout the war to highlight their patriotism. They worked alongside the
Office of Civilian Defense to produce propaganda booklets, such as People Come First,
and also reported to the Office of War Information (OWI) about how ethnic and racial
tensions impeded the war effort. Canada Synod leaders, meanwhile, established
connections with some of Canada’s leading politicians such as Prime Minister Mackenzie
King over shared notions of citizenship and history by discussing their loyalty in the
context of Waterloo County’s pioneer myth. This chapter examines these points of
contact between ethnic elites and government agencies in order to examine how German
Lutherans mediated their ethnicity and faith in these interactions.
German Lutheran elites on both sides of the border worried that their governments
doubted their loyalty as a result of their German ethnicity and Lutheran faith. This chapter
argues that although their ethnicity and religion may have placed their loyalty in doubt,
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German Lutheran appeals to a shared Protestantism and whiteness provided valuable
strategies to negotiate wartime hostility. Critics both inside and outside the Missouri and
Canada Synods often viewed Lutheran theology as a barrier to participation in the war
effort, and synod leaders worked consciously to portray Lutherans as part of North
America’s broader community of Protestants. They depicted Lutherans as the “original”
Protestants and utilized the patriotic discourse of Canada and the United States as
Christian nations to integrate their Lutheranism into the fabric of Protestant North
America. Similarly, synod leaders mitigated the negative associations with their German
ethnicity by appealing to a shared whiteness with government officials. Although
government officials associated their German ethnicity with Nazism, synod leaders
proclaimed the common bonds of whiteness, a privilege that nonwhite Americans and
Canadians could not access. Synod leaders successfully avoided the same level of
discrimination that nativists inflicted upon their communities during the First World War
by consistently invoking the Protestant and white backgrounds of their churches and
communities.
The ability of German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County to maintain
both ethnic and racial identities challenges the standard depiction of the Second World
War as a period when European immigrants adopted uniform “white” identities. David
Roediger, one of the leading historians of whiteness, notes that “scholars have most often
seen World War II as such a turning point” when immigrants from Eastern and Southern
Europe joined “old stock” immigrants, such as the Irish, in a community of “white
Americans.”210 Historians generally claim that a broad range of forces during the war
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coalesced to ensure that European immigrants across North America viewed “World War
II as a watershed in their acceptance as Americans.”211 Most notably, historians argue that
the overt racism of Nazi Germany shook American and Canadian faith in scientific
racism and subsequently prompted them to view tolerance as a key component of their
national identities. The armed forces, and the war effort more generally, functioned as a
“melting pot” wherein Americans and Canadians of all backgrounds overcame their
ethnic and religious differences in order to achieve the common goal of defeating Nazi
Germany.212 In his history of whiteness in the United States, Matthew Frye Jacobson
describes the Second World War as a moment when European ethnic groups achieved
acceptance as whites in contrast to the “colored races.” He argues that “not only did these
[European] groups now belong to a unified Caucasian race, but race was deemed so
irrelevant to who they were that it became something possessed only by ‘other’
peoples.”213 Historian Gary Gerstle agrees, describing the Second World War as a period
when “Euro-Americans achieved a unity and a sense of common Americanness greater
than what they had previously known. Full acceptance into American life finally seemed
within” their grasp.214 Several case studies subsequently confirmed these assertions.
Historian Thomas Guglielmo describes how Italians during the Second World War
increased their likelihood “to identify as whites” in public, while Eric Goldstein states the
Immigration and Naturalization Service started recording Jews as “white” instead of
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“Hebrew” during the war.215 The Canadian scholarship supports similar conclusions,
albeit less explicitly about race. Historians Aya Fujiwara and Ivana Caccia both describe
how successful participation in the war effort ensured that “ethnic groups took a critical
step in the pursuit of full partnership in Canadian society.”216
The German Lutheran case complicates the previous emphasis on a coalition of
white ethnic groups working cooperatively during the war under a banner of acceptance.
Although not completely shunned by Anglo-American and Canadian political leaders, the
ethnic elite in St. Louis and Waterloo County did not feel welcomed as “100 percent
Americans” or Canadians. The coercive nature of wartime patriotism alienated German
Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County from their national communities because of
their German ethnicity. Ethnicity and religion prevented German Lutherans from
participating in the coalition of accepted white ethnics during the Second World War.
Yet, whiteness, and the ability of German Lutherans to portray themselves as Protestants,
remained important in St. Louis and Waterloo County. White and Protestant identities
helped create common links with Anglo-Canadians and Americans in instances where
their ethnicity and religion would have “othered” their communities. The German
Lutheran wartime experience therefore characteristically positioned these communities as
“in-between” group. They did not face the same racial discrimination as black or Japanese
citizens, nor did they obtain the same level of acceptance that other European groups
received. Their ethnicity and faith made them outsiders while their race and Christianity
prevented their complete exclusion.
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The Protestant Appeal
Fear over discrimination against German Lutherans motivated John Behnken,
president of the Missouri Synod, and John Reble, president of the Canada Synod,
throughout the war. Both leaders realized that public declarations of loyalty would not be
enough to guarantee their status as good citizens. In order to ensure their wellbeing, they
needed to explicitly work with their national governments to demonstrate that they
deserved the reputation of loyal citizens. Although government agents primarily targeted
recently arrived German immigrants with ties to fascist clubs and not established
German-Canadian and German-American communities, pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo
County were unaware of such sentiments in the 1940s.217 Behnken and Reble worried
about “this new era that is upon us” and wondered whether their churches would “occupy
the place [it] should, or will [it] perchance be left our in the cold, or shoved back into the
corner.”218 They made cooperation with the government one of their most important
wartime goals in the hopes of gaining the prestige and respectability granted to other
Protestant groups. As ethnic elites, they believed Lutherans could not be second-class
citizens in the eyes of the government.219 Rather than the suspicion and discrimination
that German Lutherans faced during the Great War, synod leaders hoped that
collaboration with the government would alleviate any doubt in the public perception
over German Lutheran loyalty.
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This proved to be a difficult task given the public associations between
Lutheranism and German culture and Nazism. Canadians and Americans hostile to
Lutherans often pointed to Romans 13 and Luther’s concept of the two kingdoms to
question German Lutheran loyalty. Since Lutherans were loyal to both church and state as
separate institutions, some critics worried that Lutherans could profess their loyalty to
Canada and the United States while also secretly holding a religious obligation to support
Nazi Germany. Lutheranism had no political connections to Nazi Germany, and yet
critics in The Canadian Baptist distorted Lutheranism as a religion “well adapted to
German nature.” One article stated that German Lutherans were not inherently bad
people, but rather “they are only too German and too Lutheran” to be trusted.220 Other
editorials condemned Lutherans for perpetuating a “German institution” in North
America. These critiques believed that Hitler was “the spiritual successor of Luther”
because of their shared history of anti-Semitism. It concluded that if the Allies wished “to
undo the work of Hitler, it is necessary first to undo the work of Luther.”221
Reble and Behnken needed to combat the popular perception that Lutheranism
and Nazism were synonymous if they hoped to make a case for their loyalty. Pastors
started to downplay their “Lutheran” identity in favour of a vague “Protestant” or
“Christian” identity in order to disassociate themselves from the negative associations
between Lutheranism and Nazism. In a 1941 article, Canada Lutheran editor Douglas
Conrad tried to create a different association in the minds of his readers: namely, that
Canadian citizenship and Christianity were inherently linked: “Because Canadians are
free, they have always treasured the Christian religion…The Christian people of Canada
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realize that the only hope of the world is Christianity, and not in any manmade doctrines.”
As Lutherans were Christians, Conrad suggested that they too belonged to “a Christian
nation and be an example of right and justice to all the other nations of the world.”222 The
fact that Lutherans could portray themselves as the “original Protestants” helped pastors
argue that their religion should be connected to Christianity instead of Nazism. The
Missouri Synod’s Lutheran Witness echoed Conrad’s sentiments in its editorials
throughout the war that also sought to construct the idea of Lutherans as loyal Christian
citizens. It suggested that “our greatest statesmen, like Lincoln, Washington, and Grant,
have testified to the liberating and purifying power which proceeds from this Holy Book.”
These men gained their insights from the Bible, a text Lutherans shared with other
Protestant Americans. Unlike Baptists or Anglicans, however, Lutherans had particular
claim to the modern Bible because it could be traced back to “the foundation which
Luther had laid.”223 Instead of the whiggish narrative of Luther’s anti-Semitism
influencing Hitler, Lutherans hoped their Canadian and American peers would see
Luther’s important religious contributions to modern Christian North America. As
Christian citizens, they too belonged to their national communities.
These discourses had practical applications for Lutheran pastors throughout the
duration of the war. Pastors used their Christian and Protestant identities as discursive
tools in which to advocate for their loyalty. In 1942, the police arrested a young German
war worker in St. Louis for committing an act of sabotage at the factory that employed
him. The police alleged that this German immigrant deliberately caused the factory’s
machinery to malfunction so as to slow production and stall the American war effort. The
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episode troubled St. Louis’s German Lutheran population. They worried this act of
sabotage would reflect poorly on their community and further embolden their antiGerman neighbours. In an effort to defuse the situation, the Reverend Louis Sieck argued
that the act of sabotage never would have happened if the young man was a Christian. He
argued that “the Christian is indeed a nation’s best citizen,” who “will cooperate even
though his government’s policies are not entirely to his liking.”224 Sieck hoped his
congregation’s Christianity would overcome any negative associations their German
heritage created.
A broad Christian, instead of Lutheran or German, label became even more
important when dealing with government officials. Behnken and Reble both worried that
their Lutheran faith would cause government agencies to look upon them with suspicion
and mistrust. As a result, they both created wartime organizations that aimed to establish
political connections with the government as Christian rather than Lutheran
organizations. In April 1940, Reble met with other synod leaders across Canada to form
the Commission for Wartime Services (CWS) so that Lutherans across Canada “prove
[the synod’s] vitality and determination” to the Canadian public in waging a patriotic war
effort.225 The CWS aimed to promote Lutheran loyalty in Canada and act as an
intermediary between the various synods and the Canadian government.226 They
publicized their wartime fundraising campaigns to demonstrate that they were loyal
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citizens.227 Operating under much the same pressures, Behnken established the
Emergency Planning Council (EPC) in 1942.
The CWS and EPC both petitioned their respective governments to help assist
German prisoners of war held in North America as Christian, rather than Lutheran,
organizations. Synod leaders expressed sympathy with the interned Nazi prisoners
throughout the duration of the war. They believed that many of these soldiers should be
granted access to spiritual assistance during what was surely a lonely and foreign
experience. Both synods proposed programs that sought to alleviate what they perceived
as German suffering in these prisoner of war camps. The CWS and EPC contacted pastors
stationed nearby these camps and prompted them to visit prisoners weekly and deliver
sermons, as well as distribute Bibles and hymn books so that prisoners could worship
even when the pastors were absent. They furthermore intended to send relief packages
containing small gifts, food, and other means to make their imprisonment less isolating.228
As Germans, synod leaders believed they had a “distinct obligation” to provide for the
spiritual needs of prisoners while other religious groups would merely forget about
them.229
Helping German prisoners, however, threatened to dismantle the “loyal” image
synod leaders attempted to cultivate throughout the war. Such efforts would inevitably
lead them to form relationships with Nazi prisoners, a group that their governments
considered dangerous. After trying to downplay their ethnicity throughout the war,
contact with German prisoners threatened to raise government suspicion. Harvey H.
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Budny, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, expressed concerns over the Missouri
Synod’s increased contact with imprisoned Germans. He asked synod representatives if
distributing German-language hymns could “in any way be used by German political
organizations of Gestapo character” to undermine the American war effort. He questioned
if Missouri Synod efforts would allow a pro-Nazi German to “spy on the activities” of the
synod and pass these secrets back to Germany.230 In order to overcome Budny’s
suspicion, synod leaders relied on portraying their support for German prisoners as a
religious rather than ethnic duty. In outlining their reasons for helping prisoners of war,
members of the Missouri Synod stated they felt “a distinct obligation to bring them a
spiritual ministry which is in harmony with their convictions.”231 Their job was “to supply
appropriate hymnals, prayer books, and devotional literature for the spiritual care of war
prisoners” and “to foster general welfare of prisoners of war,” and nothing that might give
reason to suspect the synod of disloyalty.232
Internally, the EPC reminded pastors who preached to prisoners of war to “be
discreet in your public utterances by speaking objectively in terms of spiritual values.”233
Government officials needed to feel secure that they ministered to prisoners out of a
religious desire, and not because of their ethnicity or pro-German attitudes. “Do not allow
your sympathy to run away with better judgment,” one pastor reiterated. “Your mission is
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purely spiritual.”234 By framing their desire as a religious over ethnic obligation, German
Lutherans tried to avoid raising the old wartime suspicions that they preached to “the
enemy” in their own language. While the Protestant label did not fully shield Lutherans
from suspicion, it provided a strong enough argument that they could carry out their work
with permission from the government.

The People Come First Controversy

The separation of church and state, or Romans 13, complicated the Missouri
Synod’s attempt to cultivate a public Protestant identity. Because Romans 13 stated that
political and religious affairs must be kept separate, many members of the Missouri
Synod were more hesitant to explicitly cooperate with the federal government than other
religious groups. This proved particularly problematic, because the American government
had little interest in working individually with each religious denomination to ensure
cooperation on the home front. They preferred to work with large interfaith groups
composed of different Protestant denominations. This tactic, however, sparked fear of
“unionism” within the Missouri Synod. They worried that cooperation or “union” with
these other liberal Protestant denominations would dilute their conservative theological
convictions and understanding of the Bible. Cooperation might have the unintended
consequence of weakening the Missouri Synod’s doctrine and dilute their “pure doctrine”
or Lehre that synod officials fought to preserve since the synod’s nineteenth century
foundation. Concerns that contact with liberal religious groups would furthermore
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weaken their use of the German language, which proved insight into Luther’s
understanding of the Bible, often went hand-in-hand with these fears.235
Anxieties over Romans 13 and unionism shaped the Missouri Synod’s initial
meetings with government officials in 1942. In late November, the Office of Civilian
Defense (OCD) contacted the EPC and asked them to send a representative to a meeting
in Washington to advise the government on how to best promote wartime patriotism and
cooperation on the home front with other American religious leaders. Lawrence Meyer,
the EPC’s executive director, attended the meeting as the synod’s representative. Meyer
discovered that the OCD planned on creating a pamphlet to be disseminated to
congregations of all faiths in order to promote patriotism on the home front and justify
controversial government policies such as food and fuel rationing. This plan, however,
violated the Missouri Synod’s conservative stance on Romans 13 and unionism by
encouraging both cooperation with the state and other religious groups. The OCD’s
proposed pamphlet promoted a general and theologically unspecific text meant to appeal
to all Christians, regardless of how closely they followed the Bible. It seemed to promote
what Meyer conceived as a bland “social gospel” rather than a religious view centered on
the Bible and Christ’s teaching. Meyer made his disdain clearly known at the meeting and
promised that the Missouri Synod could not work alongside other religious groups with
such a loose understanding of the Bible. He voiced his displeasure and left the meeting
before it even concluded.236
Meyer realized the poor impression he had made during the meeting with the
OCD and other government officials. He remained true to his theological convictions but
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these same convictions threatened the loyal image he and other synod leaders wished to
cultivate. Concerned that the government would question his loyalty, Meyer apologized
and admitted he was “rather ashamed of my outspoken suggestions and criticism” but that
“such topics as ‘Inter-faith’…are too controversial at the moment to foster a spirit of unity
in the nation.” Meyer worried his criticism reflected poorly on the synod’s loyalty and
took pains to remind the OCD of the Missouri Synod’s allegiance to the government. He
told Maynard Cassady, the OCD’s representative on religious matters, that “wherever we
can be of service we are at your command.”237
Meyer could not risk the government thinking he was disloyal or uncooperative.
He ultimately decided to suppress his theological concerns and promised to work with
Cassady and the OCD in the future. Cassady subsequently made Meyer one of the lead
writers of a propaganda pamphlet titled People Come First, a booklet intended for
American pastors. The booklet provided pastors of all different faiths with advice on how
to discuss the war with their congregation. It recognized Americans might have a difficult
time adjusting to new wartime policies such as food and fuel rationing, and provided
short explanations on how pastors could convince their congregation to support these
government policies. Meyer worked alongside Cassady to ensure that the pamphlet
emphasized the government’s aims of promoting a united war effort on the home front.238
While Meyer recognized that his involvement with the government could
emphasize the synod’s loyalty, he also knew that such a blatant display of interfaith
cooperation with other Protestants exposed him to criticisms within the synod of
advocating for unionism. When the OCD released People Come First in mid-1943, Meyer
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sent out a press release to all Missouri Synod pastors explaining his rationale for
endorsing the book. He explained that the war made him more aware of his “duties to
community and State from which we derive the benefits of life, liberty, and freedom of
worship.” In his defense of People Come First, Meyer encouraged German Lutheran
critics of war not to view the state as a threat to their ethnicity and faith. Instead, he
claimed that the American government protected religious freedom and therefore
deserved to be respected. He encouraged pastors to read People Come First and
implement its recommendations as a way to demonstrate that they too were good citizens.
More significantly, Meyer believed that the synod needed to increase its involvement in
the war effort as a “lack of cooperation, inefficiency, and low-geared work is labeled
‘sabotage’” in American society.239 Meyer’s message was clear. If pastors wanted to
avoid wartime discrimination, they needed to follow the patriotic steps outlined in the
booklet. In publishing People Come First, Meyer hoped that the government would no
longer see German Lutherans as saboteurs, but as loyal American Protestants.
People Come First provoked a strong reaction among synod members who did not
agree with the Missouri Synod leadership’s emphasis on government cooperation. Critics
objected to the pamphlet’s interfaith character. The OCD distributed the pamphlet to all
Protestant congregations in the United States and People Come First accordingly
emphasized cooperation among all Americans without consideration of religious doctrine.
To many, it triggered fears that the Missouri Synod was heading towards a violation of
their position on “unionism” that encouraged religious cooperation without due
consideration of the Bible. Several pastors wrote to synod leaders, like Behnken and
Meyer, in St. Louis to voice their disgust over what was clearly one of the “sinister
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tactics” employed by synod leaders “to bring our beloved Synod into fellowship with
another church body with which we are not yet in doctrinal agreement.” Opponents
believed that in a time of crisis such as war, the synod should focus its attention on
“purity of doctrine instead of social gospel.”240 Critics also believed that the booklet’s
emphasis on participating in public life through wartime charities violated the Missouri
Synod’s traditional stance on Romans 13. By encouraging Lutherans to participate in
state sanctioned wartime activities, critics argued that the church moved beyond the realm
of spiritual care. Many critics accused Meyer of “distorted doctrine” that “commits the
church to a political philosophy” thereby violating Romans 13.241 The clearest indication
that the booklet violated scripture was contained on the first page of the booklet, which
contained a message that stated the booklet had the approval of the OCD. One pastor
expressed shock that “what the church teaches & does must be submitted to government
censorship!”242 The strict adherence to Romans 13 and policy on union that synod leaders
stressed prior to the war became a significant source of tension as synod leaders violated
these theological positions in an effort to gain government approval.
The booklet also angered Missouri Synod members on the basis of their ethnicity.
People Come First contained several political cartoons and illustrations within the
booklet. While many tried to depict amusing observations on the American home front,
others ridiculed Germans and Germany. The illustrations often featured Germans dressed
in Gestapo uniforms or as personified by Hitler. These cartoons upset many members of
the synod who felt it attacked their own ethnic identities as Germans. One district of the
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synod protested to the leadership in St. Louis that a cartoon featured within People Come
First “expresses an improper contempt for the enemy.” Other pastors went further and
stated that the portrayal of Germans within the booklet was “grotesque and hideous.”243
Critics similarly objected to attempts to justify war with Germany. On the opening page
of the booklet, Meyer described how “the messy business of the world” required the
church to take a leading role in the war effort. J. Franklin Yount, a pastor from Ohio and
Meyer’s most vocal critic, referenced this passage and questioned why, instead of
preparing for war, the church did not instead work towards peace.244 Meyer replied that
Americans who did good Christian deeds during the war were doing the charitable work
of Christ. Because all good deeds could be considered Christian, Meyer told Yount that
helping win the war ultimately helped create a peaceful world. The irony of this statement
did not escape Yount. He wryly asked Meyer that if participating in the war was to do
Christ’s work, “what about the Germans?”245 In a passage describing the importance of
rationing so that American farms could help feed the British, Yount quoted the Biblical
passage “If thine enemy hunger, feed him” to demonstrate the hypocrisy of Meyer’s
statements. Yount went so far as to comment that American soldiers were overseas to
“bomb, blast, and butcher the innocent victims” of Germany.246
The Missouri Synod’s pro-German attitude influenced their opposition to
American militarization of the home front. One section of the booklet discussed local
Defense Councils in glowing and positive terms. Meyer encouraged Christians to work
alongside their Defense Councils so that they could be seen as loyal members of their
243
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community. Once again, critics rejected this overt patriotism by questioning the
practicalities of Defense Councils that were surely run by “ungodly men.”247 Another
section of People Come First encouraged young people to engage in war work, to which
one critic replied that these workers only helped “to make hell in [the] world.”248 Such
critiques of war industries were common. Yount, for instance, rejected all portrayals of
heroic women war workers who, as Meyer portrayed them, should still have time to spend
looking after their children. Yount replied that Meyer “forgot one picture” of the
American family, namely the mother who works all day to create bombs that kill “the
children of other mothers!”249 To critics, People Come First was just another instance of
the Missouri Synod becoming “a mere adjunct to a military machine in an all-out war
program.”250 Yount commented that virtually every pastor he spoke to objected to the
booklet’s publication, but that “few of any will have the courage under present conditions
to write to you.”251 Fear of appearing disloyal over not supporting a government
publication motivated pastors to stay silent in fear of anti-German reprisals.
The People Come First controversy highlighted the precarious position the war
created for ethnic elites such as Lawrence Meyer. Even in instances where Lutherans
could successfully portray themselves as Protestants and mitigate wartime discrimination,
they faced internal critics that felt the synod’s position on the war violated their Lutheran
faith. Lutheran theology problematized the Missouri Synod’s ability to participate in the
war effort, both in the eyes of nativists who did not trust their faith and among their peers
who believed that it violated Romans 13. Synod leaders and pastors seemed increasingly
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caught in the middle between church and state. Regardless of what strategies they
engaged in to appear loyal, it seemed to officials like Meyer that German Lutherans
would not be able to unite behind the war effort without theological reservations.

Whiteness and Race Relations in St. Louis

Unlike their attempts to appeal to a Protestant identity, efforts on behalf of synod
leaders to benefit from their racial status as whites proved less controversial and far more
effective. While their German ethnicity and Lutheran theology may have placed their
loyalty in doubt, the ability of synod leaders to appeal to a shared whiteness with
government officials proved effective in negotiating wartime tensions. While government
officials sometimes expressed doubts about German Lutheran loyalty, they also saw
synod leaders such as Behnken as possible allies due to their shared racial attitudes
towards racialized Americans. Although their German ethnicity kept them outside of the
coalition of “white ethnics” during the war, their whiteness prevented their complete
exclusion from North American society.
Created in June 1942 by President Roosevelt, the Office of War Information
(OWI) sought to provide Americans with an authoritative voice on the war. The OWI
encouraged Americans to unite behind the war effort in order to defeat fascism abroad
and reached the American public through an extensive propaganda campaign that utilized
films and posters.252 The OWI often viewed any home front tensions as possibly
detrimental to the war effort, and therefore sought to promote an American identity based
on tolerance and democratic values. In arguing against the necessity to defeat a Nazi
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Germany fuelled on hatred and militarism, the OWI crafted a narrative of a United States
founded on acceptance and freedom. Their propaganda efforts often targeted American
ethnic and religious groups like Jewish, Catholic, Polish, and Greek Americans who
previously had not felt fully embraced as “100% Americans.”253 The image of an
American platoon featuring soldiers from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds
helped cultivate an image of a country where all white ethnics could find acceptance due
to their shared belief in defeating fascism overseas.254 As whiteness historians have
demonstrated, the OWI’s attempts to promote equality throughout the nation gave white
ethnic groups an unprecedented level of acceptance as unhyphenated “Americans”
throughout the war.255
German Americans, however, were left out of the newfound state-sanctioned
definitions of tolerance and respect towards ethnic communities. While other ethnic
groups saw themselves represented in Hollywood films and propaganda posters
contributing to the war effort, portrayals of Germans were limited to menacing depictions
of the enemy. Yet, the OWI was interested in working with German Americans as part of
their outreach program to monitor how various American ethnic groups participated in the
war effort. As part of their study to see the effects of their propaganda campaign, the OWI
contacted various ethnic leaders “in key situations throughout the country” to ask them
questions on how they could improve their propaganda efforts. In the summer of 1942,
Keith Kane, Chief of the Bureau of Intelligence, contacted Behnken under the pretense of
accomplishing this goal. Kane explained to Behnken that the OWI chose to correspond
with him as they often selected individuals who they felt were able to best represent
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“members of the group with which they are best acquainted.”256 Without explicitly stating
so, Kane referred to Behnken’s connection with German Lutherans, particularly in St.
Louis. Kane hoped that Behnken would provide the OWI with information on how
German Lutherans in St. Louis responded to the war effort. After a few relatively noncontroversial questions on food rationing, Kane and the OWI’s employees started to
pressure Behnken to answer questions relating to German-American loyalty. In March
1943, an OWI employee bluntly asked Behnken to tell him about “the present attitude of
the people with whom you come in contact toward the Germans.” Specifically, the OWI
wanted to know whether German Americans distinguished between the various groups in
Germany, ranging from German students to members of the Schutzstaffel, commonly
referred to as the “SS.” The OWI also asked Behnken whether any of these groups “could
be relied upon to support a democratic” government after the war and what measures
Behnken’s “people” believe should be adopted “toward the Germans” after the war
ended.257
The OWI’s questions placed Behnken in a difficult position. The synod leader
knew that many members of the Missouri Synod had ambivalent or outright hostile
responses to the war and did have sympathies for Germany. Instead of lying to the
government or exposing German-American hostility, Behnken embraced his role as an
ethnic elite. He tried to broker a better understanding between the OWI and his GermanAmerican followers by contextualizing German-American responses to the war. Behnken
had to provide the opinions of his community while ensuring they did not appear as proNazi. Behnken began his response by noting there were “divergent opinions” regarding
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Germany. Although the OWI expected Behnken to describe how German-Americans felt
about Nazism, he subverted their expectations by describing the uncritical and biased
view of most American nativists. Alluding to the discrimination he previously faced,
Behnken reported how Americans “whom I have heard from even without making any
inquiry have expressed themselves in sharpest terms about all the people of Germany.”
Behnken recounted how many Americans believed all Germans blindly supported and
idolized Hitler. This lack of nuance led Americans to believe that the German people
willingly allowed Hitler to come to power because “they all favor his policies.”258
Behnken contrasted these opinions with his own views. He reported that unlike nativists,
his “people” differentiated “between the ordinary [Germans] and the party in power.”
Behnken stated that he personally believed ordinary Germans were not responsible for the
war and “have gotten into evil hands and are not able to remove the shackles which have
been placed upon them.” In adopting this more critical approach, Behnken still made sure
to sufficiently critique the Nazis so that no reader could question his loyalty. He labeled
Hitler an “unprincipled demagogue” and said that he had “heard no one attempt to defend
the present party in power.” Behnken concluded his assessment on Germany by
describing his hope that Germany could be reformed as a democracy once the war
ended.259 As an ethnic elite, Behnken sought to broker a better understanding between his
German-American community and his Anglo-American hosts. Behnken demonstrated his
fluency in both German and American worlds by describing both nativist and GermanAmerican responses to the war. Most importantly, providing the OWI with the nativist
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reaction allowed Behnken to insinuate that it was the nativists who had an extreme
opinion, not German Americans.
The OWI responded with a lukewarm letter that, despite Behnken’s best efforts,
situated him exclusively as a “German.” An OWI official replied that Behnken and “the
people with whom you have talked” considered German politics much more than most
Americans. The employee lectured Behnken on the “correct” and “American” stance on
the German question. He informed Behnken that most Americans believed “the German
people, not alone their leaders, are responsible for the war.” The Nazi-indoctrinated
German youth ensured there was “relatively little hope” in finding a group in Germany to
support democracy.260 The OWI’s hostile anti-German response to Behnken stands out in
contrast to their treatment of other American ethnic groups. Although historians have
singled the OWI out for wartime achievement in combating nativism on the home front
through their pluralistic films and propaganda posters, Behnken’s sympathetic
interpretation of Germany received little of this charity.261 The OWI’s traditional
portrayal as an organization that accepted a broad coalition of immigrant groups into
white mainstream America had little resonance with Behnken. Germany’s status as an
enemy combatant country meant OWI employees treated any signs of German sympathy
with mistrust. The OWI listened to Behnken’s point of view on rationing and other
wartime issues, but admonished him for his “un-American” stance on Nazi Germany.
While Behnken tried to advocate on behalf of his German-American community, the
OWI’s responses indicate that his ethnicity continued to place his loyalty in doubt. Their
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German ethnicity prevented German Lutherans from joining other white ethnics in the
OWI’s coalition.
The OWI’s vision of a tolerant and united America that could overcome ethnic
and religious difference furthermore could not incorporate racialized Americans. The
OWI hoped to portray a united American populace working harmoniously to support the
war effort via war production on the home front. Racial tensions and Jim Crow
segregation in the work place, however, complicated their ability to incorporate black
Americans into their idealized vision of a unified America.262 Several cities in the
Midwest enforced strict segregation practices that excluded black workers from working
in the war industry, or gave them the most dangerous and undesirable jobs. A 1942 study,
for instance, found that over seventy percent of employers refused to hire black workers
in the war industry.263 Black activists calling for an end to segregation or equal pay in the
work place brought attention to the inequalities racialized Americans faced and
challenged the OWI’s propaganda efforts to portray their nation as founded on tolerance
and equality.
If Behnken’s ethnicity placed him outside the patriotic mainstream, his whiteness
and hostility towards black workers granted him the respectability his ethnicity denied
him. The OWI corresponded with Behnken not just over issues relating to German
Americans, but also over racial tensions in the Midwest. These opportunities provided
Behnken with the chance to firmly support the war effort by condemning striking black
labourers alongside OWI officials. Black labor unrest throughout the country and in St.
Louis prompted the OWI to ask Behnken about the “tension(s) between Negroes and
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whites” in St. Louis in 1943. Race riots between white and black Americans made
national headlines throughout the war and repeatedly called attention to the racial
inequalities faced by many Americans.264 Several protests over the poor working
conditions black Americans faced in St. Louis occurred throughout the war. Black
labourers staged peaceful protests to call attention to segregation in the city throughout
1943 and 1944. Black workers employed in segregated factories found they were often
refused service at the local lunch counters throughout the downtown core. The Citizens
Civil Rights Committee of St. Louis organized several “sit-ins” at local restaurants
throughout the war in order to demonstrate the racial disparities that existed within the
city.265 Although minor compared to the race riots that occurred in Harlem and Detroit,
such protests showed the growing tension between white and black workers in St. Louis
and jeopardized the OWI’s ability to portray the United States as a nation of freedom and
equality.
The OWI was not interested in how black workers felt about labor unrest, nor
whether the government provided them with enough assistance. Instead, the OWI wanted
to learn how white Americans responded to these racial conflicts. For once, Behnken
easily met the OWI’s expectations. Behnken told the OWI “there can be no doubt that
[hostility] between Negroes and whites” existed throughout St. Louis. Personally, he
believed that “the white man” should generally follow a policy of “live and let live” with
his black neighbors. However, he joined other Americans in condemning “the colored
people” when they became “too bold…as soon as social equality is demanded you notice
the tension.” He told the OWI that he and other Americans believed the government
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should intervene only if “the Negro became too forward” in demanding equality.266
Behnken’s critical response towards black protestors echoed the fears of many white
workers and union leaders who rejected racial equality in the workplace. Black workers
entered war industries such as shipbuilding in greater numbers in the 1940s and wanted
membership in preexisting unions. Unions resisted these efforts as they felt black workers
would take this as a sign of racial equality. They argued that allowing both white and
black workers in the same union threatened the superiority of the white worker.267
Behnken’s statements echoed arguments in the mainstream press that viewed blacks who
made demands for workplace equality as “troublemakers” and “uppity” more
generally.268 He believed the government should not force the issue of equality and let
time ease the nation’s racial tensions. Behnken believed race riots occurred during the
war because of “pushy” black workers, not because white employers denied them
equality. He told the OWI that the more black activists “insist upon their privileges [the]
longer we will have these problems before us.”269
Condemning labor unrest provided Behnken with a rare opportunity to
demonstrate his support for the war effort. Government officials and branches such as the
OWI placed the highest importance on achieving unity on the home front. Racial and
labor unrest therefore emerged as one of the main obstacles to maintaining wartime unity.
The Labor Department emphasized throughout the war that each strike represented hours
or days wasted in wartime production. Many politicians, especially those from the
southern states, condemned black protests on the basis that they hampered both wartime
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unity and war work simultaneously.270 Although Behnken’s ethnicity and religion put him
at odds with the war effort, his race and hostility towards black issues allowed him to join
mainstream America. Behnken’s whiteness positioned him firmly on the side of capital
and elite whites, over labor and nonwhite workers. In doing so, Behnken allied himself
firmly with the war effort.
Behnken’s precarious relationship with the OWI highlights the complex interplay
between race and ethnicity that emerged during the war. Ethnicity and race operated in
tandem for German Lutherans during the war and played an integral role in how OWI
employees interpreted Behnken’s comments. Behnken’s German ethnicity created
tensions with the OWI and effectively placed him on the “wrong side” of the government
and its positions on Germany. However, Behnken’s whiteness created an avenue for him
to bond with and voice the “agreeable” wartime positions on matters relating to labour
and race relations. Unlike the black labourers he so readily condemned, Behnken
managed to advocate for tolerance during the war without facing possible incarceration as
result of his white skin. In this instance, Behnken’s whiteness made his advocacy work on
behalf of a stigmatized ethnic group possible.

Whiteness and the Pioneer Myth

Race played an equally important role in determining loyalty at the cultural and
ideological level. In particular, German-Canadian Lutherans most often drew on their
whiteness through the covert language surrounding their Canadian citizenship and
through the pioneer myth that emerged during the interwar years. The story of German
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immigrants and “Loyalists” arriving in early nineteenth century Waterloo County
followed a narrative typical in many settler societies. Historian Lorenzo Veracini
describes “settler colonial narratives” as linear stories of “progress,” wherein settlers
narrate their arrival on unoccupied land where they built new homes or nations.271 By
focusing on establishing new communities on the “frontier,” these narratives convey the
idea that settlers are entitled to or deserving of the land they occupy. They help settlers
imagine themselves as the “natural” or even “indigenous” inhabitants of their land.272 By
describing the process of settlement as “peaceful” and “nation-building,” these stories tap
into broader racialized discourses that often associate governance and leadership with
whiteness. As cultural theorist Richard Dyer notes, centuries of imperial and colonial rule
convinced Europeans that the white race had a natural aptitude to constructing and ruling
new nations.273 Portraying the settlement process as “peaceful” furthermore allows
settlers to ignore their own role in deliberately and violently displacing the region’s
indigenous inhabitants. In doing so, these narratives help craft the idea of the “innocent
settler” that disavows their complicity in marginalizing indigenous peoples in favour of
crafting an image that portrays them as the legitimate owners of the land.274 The pioneer
myth, with its emphasis on peaceful German immigrants “taming” the “wilderness,” very
much fits the settler colonial narrative, with German settlers joining the ranks of AngloAmerican settlers. The pioneer myth functioned as a coded narrative only available to
white Canadians that allowed German Canadians to argue for their loyalty throughout the
war.
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German Canadians risked being portrayed as “enemy aliens” or “foreigners” by
discriminatory Anglo-Canadians and therefore needed a way to demonstrate that they
belonged in Canada. The pioneer myth served this function during the early years of the
war. Carl Klinck, a professor of English at Waterloo College and Waterloo Lutheran
Seminary, drew explicitly on the pioneer myth in a 1939 article titled “Waterloo College
and the Nazi Issue.” Klinck intended the article to act as an early argument against the
possible attacks he and German Lutherans in Waterloo County could face on account of
their ethnicity and faith. He wrote that that the Second World War once again revived the
“falsehood, perpetuated since the Great War by…mistakenly patriotic enthusiasts, that
Lutheranism and Pro-Germanism (now known as Nazi-ism) are synonymous.”275
Klinck’s paper combatted these public perceptions by using historical and contemporary
references framed in the pioneer myth. He noted that the 1931 census stated only six
percent of Canada Synod members were born in Germany. He argued that even this
minority was not cause for concern, as most of this group “are old people” who came to
Canada as “youthful pioneers,” long before Hitler’s rise to power.276 Reble drew on
similar themes in a 1939 speech that connected the synod’s current membership with their
“Loyalist” ancestors. He described how many Lutheran churches in Ontario and Quebec
originally formed as a result of the Loyalist migration to Canada and were “at all times
loyal and faithful citizens of King and country.” The long history of Lutheranism in
Canada demonstrated, according to Reble, that the church “is native to [Canadian] soil”
and could therefore work in cooperation with the Canadian state.277 St. Louis-based
pastors drew on similar themes as well. Paul Koenig, the pastor at Holy Cross Lutheran
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Church, preached that “the Saxon Immigrants who settled in our country one hundred
years ago were patriotic Americans.” He quoted C.F.W. Walther’s positive thoughts on
the Declaration of Independence extensively to show the unbroken link of loyalty that
existed from the initial generation of pioneers to present day. Koenig urged his
congregation to “follow in the footsteps of the fathers…and let us prove by our actions
that true Lutherans are patriotic Americans.”278
The pioneer myth proved particularly potent when paired with the Lutheran
strategy of appealing to religious or Protestant-based identities. H.T. Lehmann, the
president of Waterloo College and Seminary, gave a speech during the war that tried to
insert Lutherans into Canada’s national mythology by drawing on the pioneer myth. He
argued that they, like their other Anglican and Presbyterian peers, also helped contribute
to the Canadian nation. Lehmann deliberately downplayed the church’s German heritage
by eschewing “the custom in Canada to evaluate the contribution of an individual or a
group of individuals to Canadian national life…largely on a racial basis.” Lehmann
proposed that Canadian society examine the accomplishments of religious groups,
wherein Lutherans played an important role. He went on to emphasize the role of
“Lutheran Loyalists” who “contributed to the prosperous development of this section of
Canada through thrift and industry” alongside the current generation of Lutheran soldiers
“paying the greatest price anyone can pay” overseas. He believed that the Lutheran
sacrifice, both in the past and present, ensured that future Canadians would evaluate their
“contributions to Canadian Culture…from a religious rather than a racial point of
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view.”279 Lehmann described the ancestors of his church not as foreign German
immigrants, but as dedicated Lutheran Loyalists who contributed to the nation alongside
Loyalists of other religious denominations.
Reble, Klinck, and Lehmann’s use of the pioneer myth contained many
contradictions. While all three men mythologized the original wave of Lutheran
“Loyalists,” very few members of the Canada Synod could trace their own ancestry to the
Loyalist migrations.280 In fact, most of the synod leaders and pastors praising the socalled “Lutheran Loyalists” were first or second-generation immigrants. Reble, for
instance, was born in Germany and only migrated to Canada shortly before the First
World War. Moreover, their attempt to demonstrate the “indigenous” or “Canadian”
character of Lutheranism was particularly dubious given Lutheranism’s historic
connections to the German states and Protestant Reformation. Yet, this is precisely why
the pioneer myth resonated so strongly in Waterloo County. Unlike other narratives used
by settlers, German-Canadians did not deliberately use the pioneer myth to displace
indigenous people, even if it did implicitly do so by ignoring and erasing their presence.
Instead, German Canadians used the pioneer myth because it deployed Anglo-Canadian
narratives of colonization against nativist assertions of German disloyalty, even as it also
provided a sense of belonging for German Lutherans and normalized their presence in
Canada. Transforming “foreign immigrants” into “indigenous inhabitants” with legal and
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social rights was the primary function of settler colonial narratives.281 By using a settler
colonial narrative like the pioneer myth, German Lutherans normalized their existence in
Waterloo County as loyal citizens rather than “dangerous foreigners.” The pioneer myth
recounted German-Canadian Lutheran history in a language readily understandable to
Anglo-Canadians. Thus, the pioneer myth did not try to disrupt the Canadian racial
hierarchy or challenge Canadian supremacy. It merely sought to broaden the definition of
who could be considered Canadian by framing German Lutheran history in a manner that
resonated with Canadians who might otherwise demonize them on the basis of their
ethnicity.
The inherent whiteness built into the pioneer myth helped German-Canadian
Lutherans cultivate alliances with certain members of the Anglo-Canadian political elite.
Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King emerged as a staunch ally to
German Canadians in Waterloo County during the early years of the war as a result of his
long history with the region. King was born and raised in Waterloo County as a part of
the community’s minority Scottish and English population. Yet, as German culture
dominated the community, King grew up learning German in school and studied abroad
in Germany during his university career. During the 1908 federal election, King
campaigned in Waterloo County by giving speeches in German that emphasized the
cooperative bonds that existed between German and English Canadians in the area.282
King’s belief in a “cultural partnership” between Germans and Anglos did not wane
during the interwar period. King embraced the county’s pioneer myth and continued to
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remember his hometown in idealized and romantic ways throughout his lifetime.283 King
knew of the ethnic antagonism that occurred in Waterloo County during the war, but did
not let it deter his positive associations with the area and with German Canadians more
generally. King expressed regret that Berlin changed its name to Kitchener during the
Great War, and as late as 1939 still conceptualized the area as “a portion of Germany
transplanted in this distant land.”284 The prime minister still felt a strong connection to the
region as Canada edged closer to war with Germany. Passing by Waterloo County on a
train in the summer of 1939, he thought of “Berlin” as his place of birth and “the place
ordained” for him.285 Thanks to his ties to the community, King rejected any ethnic
antagonism towards German culture or Waterloo County, even as other Canadians
expressed mistrust of German Canadians during the two world wars.
As a result, German Canadians found an ally in their prime minister when Canada
went to war with Germany once again in 1939. In the days proceeding Canada’s official
declaration of war, various members of the House of Commons gave patriotic speeches
that called upon Canada to do its duty and fight alongside Great Britain. Caught in the
spirit of nationalism, several Members of Parliament (MPs) extolled the virtues of
Canada’s “two great races,” namely the French and English, and how it was their duty to
defeat fascism abroad. This was precisely the same type of jingoism that generated
xenophobic attitudes in “Berlin” during the previous war. On 8 September, King gave a
speech in the House of Commons that called “for toleration and moderation” and
cautioned MPs against saying “many bitter things and express words the like of which
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they would never express save under the provocation of the hour.” While King did not
directly ask other MPs to stop praising the virtues of English and French Canada, he
interrupted the proceedings by asking if he could “go a step further…and make a plea for
the toleration on behalf of the German people themselves?”286 King recognized that
German Canadians would be disproportionately impacted by the war. As such, he took
pains to emphasize their loyalty in the House of Commons.
King defended German Canadians in two ways. First, he argued for German
Canadian loyalty based on region. Just like Reble and Klinck, King drew upon the
pioneer myth to demonstrate German Canadian innocence and loyalty. He told the House
of Commons that he knew “something of the German people” and described both his time
abroad and the first sixteen years of his life he spent living in Waterloo County. He
rearticulated the pioneer myth by telling the House of Commons that Waterloo County
consisted of “many other communities made up very largely of German settlers, some of
whom came to this country to get away from forms of oppression” in Europe.287 In doing
so, King restated one of the pioneer myth’s most integral components. German-Canadian
leaders specifically emphasized the pacifist origins of Waterloo County’s German settlers
to disassociate their community with accusations of disloyalty during the First World
War.288 The emphasis on “peace” contained in the pioneer myth and other settler colonial
narratives provided a useful counterpoint to nativist fears of German saboteurs lurking in
Canada. Although the German Canadians’ use of the pioneer myth was designed to help

286

House of Commons Debates, 18th Parliament, 5th Session, vol. 1, p. 19.
House of Commons Debates, 18th Parliament, 5th Session, vol. 1, p. 19.
288
Geoffrey Hayes, “From Berlin to the Trek of the Conestoga: A Revisionist Approach to Waterloo
County’s German Identity,” Ontario History, 91, no. 2 (Autumn 1999).
287

120
mitigate discrimination during the Great War, its themes continued to resonate as King
and German Canadians fought for a loyal reputation once again in the 1940s.
Secondly, King argued for German-Canadian loyalty broadly based on
citizenship. Throughout his speech, King reminded the House of Commons that his
political career actually started in Waterloo County. He reminisced about the 1908 federal
election and believed that he won the election as a young MP as a result of Waterloo
County’s German constituency. King believed that “if the votes could have been
separately identified it might have been found that there were more votes cast from those
of German descent than from those of the English or any other race, to send me to this
parliament.”289 King’s status as prime minister lent significance to this example. By
crafting a narrative of his career that intrinsically included Waterloo County and its
German inhabitants, King made it difficult to critique German-Canadian loyalty in
Waterloo County without simultaneously critiquing him and his hometown. King’s
defense situated German Canadians as upstanding citizens who deserved the reputation of
loyalty during a period where their ethnicity might suggest otherwise.
Without explicitly stating so, King based both of his arguments for German
Canadian loyalty on a common and shared whiteness. Nonwhite Canadians could not
articulate their presence in Canada the same way, as Anglo-Canadian conceptions of race
framed them in the exact opposite light. Japanese Canadians, for instance, could not craft
a similar pioneer myth that focused on Anglo-conformity and loyalty because many
English Canadians saw the Japanese as inherently “unassimilable.” Regardless of how
long the Japanese lived in Canada, English Canadians believed them too racially distinct
and tied to their homeland to ever fully become “Canadian.” Even though Japanese
289
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Canadian families may have lived in Canada for several generations, English-Canadian
society largely saw the Japanese as temporary “sojourners,” not permanent “settlers.”290
As the pioneer myth was tied explicitly to settlement, Japanese Canadians could not
cultivate a similar myth that tied their community to Canada’s founding. Other nonwhite
Canadians, such as Canada’s black and indigenous populations, were presented as illsuited to Canada’s environment and as a premodern or dying race, respectively.291 With
such popular and dominant discourses on race, racialized Canadians could not access the
same Anglo-Canadian narratives of loyalty and conformity as easily as the white German
immigrants in Waterloo County. The success of the pioneer myth ultimately hinged on
Germans’ ability to claim a settler colonial narrative due to their whiteness.
The pioneer myth normalized the presence of German settlers to such a degree
that King, a Canadian of Scottish and English heritage, purported it himself. By
portraying the German settlers as the definitive story for Waterloo County, the pioneer
myth and other symbols allowed white Canadians to “ignore the oppressive conditions
suffered by racial and ethnic minorities.”292 The ultimate impact of symbols like the
pioneer myth implicitly suggested that racialized people never actually belonged in
Canada.293 Furthermore, King’s defense of German-Canadian loyalty on the basis of their
voting record also shows how German-Canadian Lutherans benefitted from their white
privilege. The ability for German Canadians in Waterloo County to vote for King was a
privilege few racialized Canadians had in the early to mid-twentieth century. The vast
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majority of Japanese Canadians were barred from voting in both provincial and federal
elections at the start of the Second World War. Most did not have the ability to vote until
1949, after a long campaign to receive civil rights in the name of postwar democracy.294
Japanese Canadians lacked other basic rights and opportunities that were available to
white Canadians. For example, King “exempted” Japanese Canadians from serving in the
armed forces in January 1941, long before Pearl Harbor.295 German Canadians, despite
also sharing an ancestry connected to an enemy nation, faced no such restrictions and
were expected to enlist in the armed forces alongside other white Canadians. If members
of the government like King viewed fulfilling the duties of citizenship, such as voting or
enlisting in the army, as a condition to be considered loyal, Japanese Canadians could not
prove that they were good citizens. As Germans belonged to the same white race as
Canada’s “two founding” French and English populations, they could easily demonstrate
their value as citizens to Canada as “pioneers” or as members of the electorate. By
portraying German immigrants as “pioneers,” King’s advocacy did not appear overtly
radical and posed little risk at alienating his primarily Anglo-Canadian audience.
The racial implications of King’s defense are further clarified when contrasted
with his attitude towards Japanese Canadians and their eventual relocation and
incarceration during the war. King defended German Canadian loyalty, even though he
recognized that such a direct appeal for tolerance towards “the enemy” could be
considered controversial by some members of parliament. Although no MPs voiced their
opposition to King’s claims, the prime minister’s defensive attitude suggests he knew
other MPs disagreed with his plea for tolerance. To his critics, King responded that “I am
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not going to be false to my whole inheritance by refraining to take any step that may be
necessary to preserve freedom.”296 If Canada was going to war to protect democracy and
“freedom,” this democracy needed to be extended towards the people of Waterloo
County.
King’s charitable attitude, however, did not extend to Japanese Canadians. King
based his advocacy for German Canadians largely on his familiarity with living among
them in Waterloo County. Yet, as historian Stephanie Bangarth points out, King had a
great deal of familiarity with Japanese Canadians compared to most other Canadian
politicians.297 King had considerable experience dealing with British Columbia’s Asian
population following the 1907 Vancouver Riots. King witnessed firsthand the destruction
white Canadian nativists caused on Japanese and Chinese businesses and properties. King
saw Canada’s Japanese population as a clear threat within Canada, even if he never fully
joined the type of wartime hysteria that shaped British Columbia’s politicians. Just a few
days prior to his speech defending German-Canadian loyalty, King stated that he believed
the Japanese would indeed bomb Canada’s west coast or participate in “hit and run”
tactics.298 While King situated Germans as loyal pioneers, he still associated Canada’s
Japanese population with the actions of their country of origin.
King and the Canadian federal government more generally recreated racial
assumptions about the white and “Asiatic” races in their treatment of German and
Japanese Canadians. Historian Aya Fujiwara notes that government officials viewed
Japanese Canadians “collectively and monolithically” and paid little to no attention to the
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differences in politics and generation that existed within British Columbia’s JapaneseCanadian community. She suggests that Canadian politicians saw the Japanese “as a
single dangerous ethnic community.”299 Yet, as King’s House of Commons speech made
clear, he did not view Germans in the same monolithic light. Both in the House of
Commons and within the Department of External Affairs, King encouraged members of
the government to view Germans in a nuanced manner. King described how the current
war did not reflect the attitudes of Germans, both “in this country and in the old world.”
He encouraged his peers to blame Hitler and his government for the current conflict.300
Under King’s guidance, the Department of External Affairs and the RCMP did not
suspect all German Canadians of disloyalty arbitrarily. Instead, government officials
largely saw German Canadians as either “good Germans” or “bad Nazis.” The
government constructed the latter category as German immigrants who explicitly had
membership in fascist organizations, recently migrated to Canada, or lived in large urban
centers where they could potentially disrupt war work.301 Thus, the vast majority of
Waterloo County’s German population avoided government persecution as a result of the
“good versus bad German” binary that King and the Liberal government enforced. This
nuanced approach to German Canadians ensured that only around 850 Germans were
interned during the war, compared to the 22,000 Japanese Canadians who were forcibly
relocated during the war.302 Leaders in the Canada Synod advocated for such a nuanced
approach in their speeches and writing. Klinck, for example, argued that if the Canadian
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public had to associate Canadian Lutherans with any movement in Nazi Germany, they
should think of the anti-Nazi movement of Martin Niemöller, a German Lutheran
clergyman who was imprisoned in a concentration camp for opposing Hitler.303 By using
Niemöller as an example, Klinck hoped to demonstrate that “Germans” and “Lutherans”
were a diverse group that did not all share the same views and opinions. Thankfully for
Klinck, King and other government leaders largely saw the German-Canadian community
in the nuanced and multifaceted way he suggested. Membership in the white race allowed
German Canadians to be treated as individuals, whereas the attitudes of government
officials towards the Japanese reinforced racist ideas that they constituted a single
monolithic race.
As pioneer stories are predicated on creating an ideology for white settlers to
“become indigenous,” German-Canadian Lutherans could argue that they had just as
much a claim to Canadian citizenship and belonging as other Anglo-Canadians who
celebrated their Loyalist ancestors. Even though some Japanese-Canadian families lived
in Canada longer than German Lutherans like John Reble, racialized communities could
not successfully advocate for their belonging on the basis of being “pioneers.” Within this
context, Waterloo County’s white image proved an even greater marker of belonging than
any flag or patriotic fundraiser could provide.

Conclusion

Debates over church, state, and patriotism waned as the war came to a close. The
tensions between pastors and laypeople began to dissipate with the successful Allied
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invasion of Normandy in June 1944. Military victories overseas signaled to German
Lutherans that the war, and their need to appear loyal, was soon coming to an end. Pastors
and congregants alike largely stopped the contentious debates that occurred in St. Louis
and Waterloo County as the need for wartime fundraising, chaplaincies, and declarations
of loyalty started to come to an end. Instead, synod leaders shifted their attention to the
rise of “broken families,” juvenile delinquency, and “newly orphaned children” that
increased casualties in Normandy inevitably created.304 Organizations such as the Canada
Synod’s CWS and the Missouri Synod’s EPC adjusted their mandates accordingly, and
shifted their goals from one of wartime patriotism to general humanitarian aid. The
tensions between pastors, congregants, and synods slowly started to dissipate as these
various groups started to once again collaborate over Europe’s pending refugee crisis.
Germany’s formal military defeat in May 1945 prompted many congregations to
slowly reintroduce German language services to their churches. In St. Louis, the vestry at
St. Paul’s passed a resolution petitioning that the Reverend Rothe reintroduce German
language services in the fall of 1945. The Board of Elders approved the congregation’s
desire and Rothe preached his first German language service since Pearl Harbor in
December 1945. In Waterloo County, Stockmann started preaching predominantly in
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German again at Trinity in January 1946.305 Other congregations in both St. Louis and
Waterloo County followed suit as it became clear the war was finally over.306
The German Lutheran communities in St. Louis and Waterloo County did not
assimilate during the war. They perceived of themselves as Germans and were also
perceived as such by Anglo-Americans and Canadians. Both before and during the war,
certain members of the community resented mainstream attempts to vilify the German
people and the Lutheran faith. Pastors and congregants alike opposed projects such as
People Come First for their negative portrayal of Germans in a war that they felt
demonized their ethnic identities. Members of the government, most notably Mackenzie
King, still strongly associated Waterloo County with its German ethnicity. Neither the
host society nor the German Lutheran communities themselves responded as though this
group had lost their German ethnicity. Although the war prompted pastors and synod
leaders to express their national identities more frequently, their German ethnicity and
that of their congregations continued once the need to demonstrate their loyalty passed.
As a result, government officials and members of the public occasionally expressed
uncertainty about whether German Lutherans could truly be loyal to the Allied cause
throughout the war.
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These fears, however, never manifested via the extreme acts of discrimination that
occurred during the First World War. The ability of German Lutherans to portray
themselves as Protestant and white help explain why they were able to negotiate their way
through the Second World War while still maintaining their ethnic identities. By
emphasizing a shared Christian heritage, racial views, and a common history, German
Lutherans established enough links with Anglo-American and Canadian political elites to
avoid the widespread discrimination many pastors endured during the previous war.
Although their German ethnicity and Lutheran faith were undesirable during the war,
their whiteness and Christianity prevented them from facing the same racial persecution
as racialized communities like the Japanese Canadians and Americans. Whiteness and
Protestantism allowed their ethnic identities to survive, even if their German ethnicity
occasionally placed them at odds with mainstream society. Their wartime experiences
therefore do not lend themselves to the story of assimilation or complete acceptance into
white North America, but a complex middle ground. Their race allowed them to avoid the
same fates as other racialized groups, but their ethnic associations with “the enemy” kept
them outside the coalition of “white ethnics” that found inclusion within a larger,
unmarked “white” category in Canada and the United States. Their wartime experience
was characterized by debate and contention, not assimilation or destruction. The war
provoked a struggle in which German Lutheran ethnic elites, congregants, and women
had to balance their racial, ethnic, national, and religious identities. Although the war did
not destroy the ethnic identities of Germans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, the
tensions it generated had lasting consequences. With the war officially over, community
leaders now needed to figure out how they would put their communities back together.
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Chapter 3: “I Was A Stranger”: Confronting Europe’s Refugee Crisis Through
Transnational Ties
“World War II left in its swirling wake the most tremendous population dislocation in all recorded history.
Some of the movement was in a sense voluntary; the greatest portion was forced. Large groups of people
were forced to move as an element of the Nazi program of slave labor, other groups were swept before
invading armies, others [fled] to escape hostile occupying forces, still others are fugitives from political
oppression and religious persecution. Most of these people found themselves, at the end of the war, in
Germany, Austria, or Italy...After VE-day, the Allied armies were faced with the grave problem of these
millions of homeless persons.”307
– The Reverend Louis Sieck, President of Concordia Seminary

The devastating impact of the Second World War on Europe troubled GermanCanadian and German-American Lutherans after 1945. Reports of poverty and starvation
along with images of displaced persons (DPs) living in makeshift camps featured
prominently in the secular and Lutheran press. Pastors and laypeople agreed that they
needed to work together to help alleviate German poverty, hunger, and suffering
overseas. North America’s German Lutheran communities were not alone in this regard.
Jewish, Catholic, and Mennonite communities also worried about their coreligionists in
Europe and formed organizations following the war that sought to provide aid for their
European brethren.308 The Missouri Synod’s Emergency Planning Council (EPC) and the
Canada Synod’s Commission for War Services (CWS) transitioned from handling
wartime crises to confronting a global humanitarian emergency. Although both
organizations had humble beginnings, they quickly grew to meet the task of providing
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food and clothing to Europe’s most desperate while trying to solve the problem of
homeless DPs and refugees.309
This chapter examines how the Missouri and Canada Synods organized campaigns
to provide relief to postwar Germany and advocated for liberalized immigration laws to
allow more German immigrants entry to Canada and the United States. It describes how
Lutherans created several organizations, such as the Canadian Lutheran World Relief, in
order to meet the needs of impoverished German civilians, refugees, and displaced
persons. Germany’s humanitarian crisis motivated Lutheran organizations in both St.
Louis and Waterloo County to collaborate and form a transnational relationship that
spanned across the Canadian-American border. Drawing on their shared religious and
ethnic backgrounds, pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo County combined their financial
resources in an attempt to provide for Germany’s poor. Moreover, the two groups used
their transnational relationship to mitigate the restrictive immigration policies of their
respective nations. American immigration policy placed greater restrictions on DPs
arriving in the United States and enforced small quotas in contrast to Canada’s
comparatively liberal postwar immigration policy.310 St. Louis Lutherans had little
success lobbying their government for policy changes, whereas Waterloo County
Lutherans succeeded in changing immigration policy to admit more German DPs to
Canada. St. Louis Lutherans worked alongside their counterparts in Waterloo County to
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encourage German immigration to Canada in an effort to save their Lutheran brethren
overseas from poverty and hardship.
The transnational relationship that formed between St. Louis and Waterloo
County following the Second World War helped reignite the ethnic identities of German
Lutheran pastors. After years of downplaying their German ethnicity during the war,
pastors once again embraced their role as ethnic elites in an effort to mobilize their North
American followers to help the German “homeland.” As ethnic elites, pastors “knew
about the histories, politics, and languages of both [North America] and their respective
homelands,” thereby making them ideally suited to act as brokers between their Lutheran
followers and Germans abroad. Their ethnicity ensured they resisted Canadian and
American attempts to vilify the German people and brand them all as “Nazis”
undeserving of North American aid. By arguing against the popular perception of
Germans as Nazis, pastors simultaneously hoped to shed the negative associations North
Americans projected onto their ethnic identities. They were not Nazis, but rather informed
experts who could help address the unique needs of German Lutherans abroad. Moreover,
pastors found a new utility for their ethnic identities following the war. They appealed to
their congregants’ German ethnicities in an effort to mobilize the financial and charitable
resources necessary to assist impoverished DPs. They discursively drew upon their ethnic
identities to motivate their followers to help the “homeland,” while also combating
negative stereotypes associated with their ethnicity and place of birth. This newfound
emphasis on ethnicity at the elite level follows Kathleen Conzen’s observations about the
malleable nature of ethnicity. She argues that “ethnicity is continuously being reinvented
in response to changing realities both within the group and the host society.” Ethnic
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identities can appear, disappear, and reappear as historical circumstances change.311
Pastors downplayed their ethnicity during the war in order to avoid possible internment or
discrimination. With the war concluded, pastors remobilized their ethnic identity in order
to combat anti-German stereotypes and alter immigration policy in the hopes of bringing
more German migrants to North America.
Race, gender, and theology also shaped German Lutheran efforts to help German
DPs and relief work. This chapter argues that German-Canadian Lutherans succeeded in
changing Canadian immigration policy to allow for greater German migration as a result
of their whiteness. Canadian government officials initially limited immigration from
Germany following the war because they subscribed to the belief that former “Nazis”
should not be admitted to Canada. Pastors, however, argued for the acceptance of
Germans, regardless of their former political ties, by arguing that they were “racially
suited” to migrate to Canada as whites. Germans, they reminded the House of Commons,
were pioneers, farmers, and had a history of “settling” the land. German Lutheran women
helped their male peers with all aspects of immigration and relief work, although they
received little credit due to the patriarchal gender norms in the Lutheran Church. These
customs ensured that pastors continually portrayed themselves as the leaders of
immigration work and discredited the important role Lutheran women played in admitting
DPs and conducting charity work for Germany. Theology played a similar role in
determining how Lutherans engaged with relief work. The Missouri Synod’s conservative
Lutheranism caused the synod to be less engaged with immigration work than their
colleagues in the Canada Synod due to their fear of union with other Lutherans. Because
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the Canada Synod held more liberal beliefs on unionism, they cooperated with other
Lutheran groups and became the de facto champions of Lutheran immigration to North
America. This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive discussion of the
intricacies and bureaucratic implementation of postwar immigration policy.312 Rather, it
looks at the ethnic motivations behind these policies and examines how racial,
theological, and gender relations in St. Louis and Waterloo County influenced relief and
immigration work.

Ethnic and Religious Motivations for Assisting Germany

Six years of war created dire economic and social conditions in Germany. Aerial
and land warfare destroyed German cities, industry, agriculture, and left thousands of
Germans homeless. In an effort to cripple German war production, the Allied air force
conducted bombing raids on German cities with large industrial factories that supported
the Nazi war effort. Aerial raids inevitably harmed civilians who worked in factories and
destroyed residential areas where workers lived. From 1943 to 1945, the Allies dropped
over one million tons of bombs on Germany. By the end of the war, roughly half a
million Germans had died as a result of the bombing campaign.313 In Hamburg, the site of
one of the most devastating bombing campaigns, nearly fifty thousand civilians died from
1940 to 1945 as a result of bombing-related injuries.314 The city of Kassel fared even
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worse. Records after the war suggest that only sixteen thousand of the city’s original
sixty-five thousand inhabitants survived the Allied the bombing campaign.315 Yet even
these statistics fail to convey how thoroughly the Allied bombing campaign impacted all
aspects of German life. Bombing not only destroyed Germany’s war production, but also
its food stores, drinking water, and residential areas. This destruction of German
infrastructure led to starvation and homelessness for those who survived the bombings.316
Thousands of refugees and displaced people, made homeless from the war, fled
into Germany’s borders following the war and accentuated the severity of the nation’s
broken infrastructure. Germans living in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern
European countries fled west into Germany beginning in 1944. These “German
expellees” fled for several reasons. Some voluntarily left their homes in order to avoid the
invading Soviet Army. They feared that Soviet occupation of their homes would result in
harm or possible death. Reports of the Soviet Army taking “revenge” on German civilians
for their wartime complicity caused refugees to flee to Germany for safety from Soviet
aggression.317 Others had no choice but to leave their homes due to the rising nationalism
in newly formed Eastern European states. In July 1945, the leaders of the Allied powers
met near Berlin to discuss how to govern postwar Europe. The meeting resulted in the
Potsdam Agreement, which gave considerable control to recently formed governments in
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. These nations requested that the Allies give them
power over their national borders and the ability to determine who would be included in
their nations. They argued that their states must be ethnically homogenous and claimed
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that they could not risk maintaining sizeable German minorities in their borders. Thus,
they proposed to “transfer” or forcibly remove ethnic Germans residing in their territorial
boundaries.318 The Soviet Union supported these requests because they provided useful
“buffer states” between the USSR and their old German enemies. With Soviet backing,
Eastern European governments successfully convinced the lukewarm United States and
Great Britain to support the expulsion of ethnic Germans. Although the Allies requested
these governments transfer Germans in an “orderly and humane” manner, the subsequent
Potsdam Agreement gave European governments free reign to render its German
inhabitants homeless, poor, and vulnerable to expulsion.319 The resulting deportation led
to one of the largest forced migrations in European history. A total of twelve million
people arrived at Germany’s borders between 1944 and 1950. The brutal conditions led to
approximately half a million to two million deaths along the way from malnourishment,
hypothermia, and neglect. Those fortunate enough to survive the journey to Germany
arrived in a devastated country unable to provide them with shelter and care.320 The
arrival of millions of desperate refugees accentuated Germany’s housing and food crisis.
The Allied powers felt little sympathy for the homeless and impoverished German
refugees. High-ranking politicians and military officials believed that Germany bore
“collective guilt” for the war: all Germans, regardless of their civilian or military status,
held some responsibility for Nazi Germany’s crimes.321 There was little sentiment in
favour of aiding a population recover from a war that “they” had started. This lack of
sympathy extended to an indifference regarding the fate of refugees and displaced people.
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Canadians and Americans alike generally opposed liberalizing their restrictive
immigration policy from the 1930s. Some politicians pushed President Henry Truman to
organize a committee to examine Germany’s DP problem, but Truman formally denied
their request in June 1945.322 Governments and labour groups worried that an influx of
refugees would provoke a crisis in unemployment or unduly burden the state as “public
charges.” Memories of the economic recession that followed the First World War
provided nativist politicians with the proof they needed to oppose admitting refugees on
economic grounds.323 The Canadian Congress of Labour, for example, told the federal
government that “we cannot afford to expose Canadian workers to the constant threat of
having their standards undercut by immigrants.”324 Instead, Canada and the United States
prioritized repatriating their soldiers stationed overseas. Only immigrant groups with
direct ties to the military received state approval. Canada admitted Polish veterans who
fought alongside their military and both countries allowed “war brides” married to
servicemen to immigrate.325
Civilians shared their government’s indifference towards Germany’s humanitarian
crisis. A December 1945 Gallup poll found that approximately seventy percent of all
Americans wanted no changes to the country’s immigration policy, or favoured greater
restrictions.326 A 1946 Gallup poll in Canada concluded that thirty-four percent of
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Canadians supported completely banning future immigration from Germany.327 Other
polls reflected these sentiments, as a majority of citizens in Allied countries stated they
“hated the Germans” and supported the Allied bombing campaign throughout the war.328
Even witnessing German poverty firsthand did not change the prejudiced opinions some
had towards refugees. While stationed in West Germany, General George S. Patton Jr.
opposed those who believed “the Displaced Person is a human being, which he is not.”329
Although Patton’s comment represented an extreme view, many Americans and
Canadians had difficulty sympathizing with a populace that they had spent the last several
years fighting.
North America’s German Lutherans, however, mobilized to help Germany
recover from the war. As ethnic elites, pastors believed they had a unique ability to
“explain” or “interpret” their German homeland to Canadians and Americans of all
backgrounds. As predominantly first and second-generation immigrants, they assumed
that they possessed specialized knowledge on how to help German and Lutheran people.
The editors of the Canada Lutheran, for example, called upon its readers to “extend the
hand of practical compassion and encouragement” to suffering Germans. Published just
one month after the war ended, they told their audience to ignore the wartime patriotism
that vilified the German people. “We have had enough of harsh accusations and lofty
criticism springing from sheer prejudice,” they concluded. “The people of Europe crave
our understanding.”330 John Reble made the Canada Synod’s religious obligations to
Germany clear during his presidential speech at the 1946 synod convention. He told the
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pastors and laymen in attendance that the “YOUNG CHURCH in America must save the
OLD CHURCH in Europe, so desolate, so shamefully weak and tired, bleeding out of
many wounds.”331 The Missouri Synod’s publicity campaigns reflected the ethnic bonds
pastors believed existed between themselves and Germany. Hugo Bloedel, a St. Louis
pastor in charge of the synod’s relief program, wrote that “through the Relief Program of
our Church our people have become the fathers and mothers, sisters and brothers of
thousands of orphans across the sea.”332 Although separated by an ocean and several
generations of immigration, the relief campaign demonstrated that those in St. Louis had
not forgotten their “family” across the sea. Lutherans had a special debt to their brethren
overseas that North America’s Lutheran community needed to fulfill due to their shared
ethnicity and faith.
Sympathetic attitudes towards Germany caused some St. Louis and Waterloo
County Lutherans to express anti-American and anti-British sentiments. The mainstream
and secular presses often ignored the fact that Germany required relief primarily as a
result of destruction caused by the Allied armies. Pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo
County, however, put the blame solely on the devastating Allied bombing campaigns.
Paul Eydt, a Waterloo County pastor, described DPs as “the 12 million people of various
countries in Europe [that] have been uprooted due to POST WAR ALLIED ACTION.”333
Bloedel expressed anti-Allied sentiments in even harsher terms. He described the
devastating impact of the Allied bombing campaign as “appalling. Hundreds of cities
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were a twisted mass of rubble and ruin.”334 Bloedel accused the American government of
pursuing a policy “motivated by an evil spirit of revenge” following the war in contrast to
the Missouri Synod, which “harbored no hate.”335 Pastors such as Eydt and Bloedel did
not call on their followers to help Europeans on a humanitarian basis. Their identities as
Germans provided them unique insight into the plight facing Germans overseas. Unlike
their Anglo-American and Canadian counterparts, they did not see German refugees as
members of a former “enemy nation,” but rather as people deserving help and acceptance.
They resented any vilification of the German people, and encouraged their followers to
ignore popular images of the German “enemy” in favour of a more sympatric image of a
people recovering from a cruel war made worse by Allied involvement.
The hybrid German and Canadian/American backgrounds of the Lutheran
leadership led them to believe that they could occupy a place of importance among relief
campaigns. Although pastors faced suspicion during the war as a result of their ethnicity
and faith, they hoped that their knowledge of European affairs would now prove a
valuable asset in North American society. As news of Europe’s humanitarian crisis
spread, Anglo-Canadian and American charities such as the YMCA and Salvation Army
started to canvass for funds to provide food, clothing, and shelter for those suffering
overseas. They felt compelled to help the poor as a way to demonstrate their “true
Christian charity.”336 Initially, Lutherans offered their assistance to these charities. As
Germans and Lutherans, they believed they were “experts” who could assist charities in
meeting the specific needs of their brethren. While they expected to take on leadership
positions at these gatherings, they found Anglo-Canadians and Americans hesitant to
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accept their role as cultural brokers. Outsiders continued to stigmatize German Lutherans
as peculiar and largely rejected their offers to help. After attending a 1949 Canadian
Council of Churches meeting, Eydt reported to the synod that he “found a great lack of
knowledge in inter-church circles about the Lutheran Church. Indeed, I was amazed at
what a strange phenomenon we Lutherans appear to be upon the religious horizon.”337
Eydt had cause to worry. A YWCA meeting reported that they did not require Lutheran
assistance because “there are deep divisions in the Lutheran Church” due to the ethnic
and theological diversity within North American Lutheran groups. The YWCA had no
interest in hearing the perspectives of “niche” conservative, liberal, German, Finnish, and
other Lutherans spread out across the continent.338 Pastors worried that misguided
perceptions of Lutherans would marginalize them from conducting relief work with DPs.
This violated their own self-perception as ethnic elites with a special mission to mobilize
North American wealth to help impoverished Germany. Pastors believed that AngloCanadians and Americans could not adequately help suffering Lutheran DPs overseas
because they did not have the same sympathy that they had towards their coreligionists.
Eydt told his Canada Synod colleagues that “there is reason to believe that some
communions are not prepared to recognize that our church has priority towards [the
DPs]…If there is no Lutheran representation made at all, the other groups will proceed to
take action as though we did not exist.”339 Helping DPs therefore took on the added
importance of ensuring pastors kept their authority as religious and ethnic experts. Nils
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Willison noted that “other church denominations are organized to help
immigrants…Surely we Lutherans must not – we dare not – leave it to them to look after
our Lutheran people.”340 Lutheran pastors recognized shortly after the war that they could
not rely on others to look after the needs of German and Lutheran DPs. They would need
to create their own organizations and charities if they wished to help their brethren
overseas and preserve their authority as ethnic experts.

Creating an Infrastructure for Relief Work

Members of the Missouri and Canada Synods had the motivation to help Germany
recover from the war, although it remained unclear just how they would accomplish this
lofty goal. A single congregation had little hope of solving hunger and homelessness in
Germany. If German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County wanted to make a
tangible impact on relief and immigration work, they needed to initiate fundraising
campaigns at the synod, national, and continental levels. The years following the Second
World War prompted an unprecedented level of collaboration and discussion between
Lutheran synods throughout North America. From 1945 to 1947, Canadian and American
Lutherans created several transnational organizations in an effort to come to Germany’s
aid. Germany’s crisis served as a catalyst for cross-border connection and a reassertion of
the German identities of Lutheran leaders in St. Louis and Waterloo County.
Theology shaped how Lutherans across North America formed relief
organizations. As liberal Lutherans, the Canada Synod had few qualms about unionism or
cooperating with other religious bodies. They demonstrated this during the war, when
they included synods based in Western Canada in the CWS. In January 1946, the Canada
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Synod hosted a meeting at St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Kitchener open to
all Lutherans interested in providing relief and aid to Germany. The meeting helped “to
continue efforts towards reopening the channels for relief to Germany and other nations.”
Their shared goal helped ensure collaboration and they decided to continue to “find ways
and means for cooperating in sending food and clothing to Europe.”341 This initial
partnership led to a subsequent meeting with all members of the CWS in Ottawa in March
1946 to discuss “relief work in Europe, particularly on behalf of sufferers in former
enemy countries.”342 As fellow Germans, they expressed a natural affiliation towards
helping Germany, even if Canadians still considered it an “enemy country.” The various
Lutheran representatives discussed how their organization’s name no longer seemed
relevant since the war ended. They decided to abandon their former title and establish a
new organization with a new name: the Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) with
Lloyd Schaus, a Waterloo Lutheran Seminary graduate, as its first executive director. The
CLWR was created with the mandate to help Germany recover from the war by sending
food, clothing, and other resources overseas. During the first several months of his tenure
as executive director, Schaus established shipping warehouses in Winnipeg, Montreal,
and Kitchener to help process and ship donations made by Canadian Lutherans.343 In
December, the CLWR decided to expand its mandate to include immigration reform as
well as relief work “due to the widespread interest of European peoples to move to
Canada, and due to the fact that many of these are Lutheran, it was decided that a
Canadian Lutheran body or committee should undertake to look into the matter of
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immigration.”344 The CLWR’s formation provided Canadian Lutherans with the
beginning of a bureaucratic organization that would allow them to conduct nation-wide
level fundraisers in order to provide relief for Germany. The Canada Synod’s liberal
theology allowed it to justify cooperation with other Canadian Lutherans, even if their
doctrines did not perfectly align.
In contrast, the Missouri Synod’s conservative theology prevented them from
engaging in the close partnerships the Canada Synod formed via the CLWR. Although the
synod also shifted their EPC from war-related work to immigration and relief campaigns,
their stance on unionism kept the Missouri Synod on the margins. The Missouri Synod’s
resistance to cooperation with other Lutheran bodies dated back to its founding in the
mid-nineteenth century. The synod’s founders disparaged other Lutheran bodies in North
America for what they perceived as shallow and liberal interpretations of the Book of
Concord and other religious texts. They rejected cooperation with other synods on the
basis that collaboration would dilute their own theology. Subsequent synod presidents,
including John Behnken, held this attitude and maintained that there could be no
organizational union without doctrinal unity.345 In September 1947, Lutherans from
various American synods met in Chicago to discuss how to best approach “the care and
resettlement of Lutheran Displaced Persons and Refugees.” Most of those present were
already members of the National Lutheran Council (NLC), an organization of American
Lutherans that formed in the interwar years. The NLC was largely a product of the United
Lutheran Church of America (ULCA) and fulfilled a similar function to the Canada
Synod’s CWS during the Second World War. Just like their Canadian counterparts, the
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NLC switched from focusing on war work to relief campaigns following the war’s
conclusion. The Missouri Synod, citing its adherence to conservative Lutheranism,
refused to participate with the NLC during the war and instead formed the EPC.346 The
1947 meeting threatened to cause further divisions between the NLC and Missouri Synod,
because it was not clear to either group whether ethnic solidarity would be enough to
overcome theological differences. Louis Sieck, the EPC’s director and a professor at
Concordia Seminary, worried that the meeting would “reopen several of the old gripes.”
He was pleasantly surprised, however, when all pastors found common ground and
sought to work together.347 While Sieck did not make any formal commitment to unite
with the NLC, he agreed to create a “Joint Committee” of Missouri and NLC pastors to
collaborate over future DP work. The Joint Committee consisted of four pastors total,
with two representing each group. Sieck subsequently appointed Lawrence Meyer and
E.T. Bernthal as Missouri’s representatives.348 A desire to help their fellow Germans
appeared to allow both sides to worry less about their theological positions, at least
initially.
Sieck and the EPC maintained an ambiguous relationship with the NLC until
Congress passed the Displaced Person Act in April 1948. After persistent pressure from
President Truman, Congress finally created a law that would allow the American
government to admit DPs in addition to its preexisting immigration quotas. Congress
estimated that the new legislation would permit one hundred thousand DPs entry into the
United States over the next four years.349 DPs, however, had to demonstrate that they
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would not become “public charges” if admitted to the United States. Despite this
requirement, the 1948 act did little to provide financial assistance to DPs who wished to
migrate. Thus, financial responsibility for newcomers largely fell upon voluntary agencies
led by American citizens, which promised the federal government that their sponsored
DPs would not become burdens on the state.350 After the act passed, the NLC discussed
how they could help DPs offset required financial commitments such as passage to the
United States. If the Missouri Synod wished to partake in this work, the NLC needed a
formal commitment from Sieck and the EPC to help them address the large financial
commitment DP work entailed.351 Yet, the synod’s tradition of avoiding Lutheran
cooperative ventures in the name of guarding against unionism prevented the EPC from
finding a consensus over aligning with the NLC. Ethnicity provided an impetus to help
Germany, but the Missouri Synod’s theology posed a barrier to completing this goal.
E.B. Glabe, a Lutheran philanthropist and pastor from Minnesota, emerged as a
staunch advocate for working cooperatively with the NLC. As Glabe was interested
mainly in charity work, he placed little emphasis on maintaining “pure doctrine” and
instead sought solutions that would provide the most relief for DPs. “The resettlement of
the D.P.’s is going to cost considerable money,” he advised members of the EPC, “and it
is for this reason that I believe it should be handled on an all Lutheran basis.”352 Glabe
repeatedly wrote to Sieck throughout 1947 and 1948 in an effort to force the EPC to
clarify its position on unionism and DP work more generally: “The [NLC] has proceeded
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with its program on the international, national and local levels. Where do we fit in?”353
The EPC’s delayed response to working with the NLC prompted Missouri Synod
Lutherans in other states to address the question on their own terms. Werner Kuntz, a
Michigan pastor, notified the St. Louis leadership that their lethargy prompted him to
align his DP work with the NLC. “When we waited painfully long without any word of
plans that might be under consideration,” he wrote, “some of us initiated a program of our
own and, having no better resource, we connected our program with the channel of the
National Lutheran Council.”354 Not surprisingly, Glabe aligned his efforts to help DPs
with the NLC in Minnesota as well. Glabe believed Sieck was unwilling to engage with
his critiques of the synod’s stance on unionism and believed that the EPC could not
possibly hope to conduct a nation-wide relief campaign isolated in St. Louis. “I cannot
see how you intend to function only on a national level without working through some
local agencies,” he wrote.355 Kuntz agreed, stating that he could not “understand how it is
possible for you to do this on a National level” without NLC assistance.356 Exasperated
by the EPC’s slow response, both men aligned their local work with the NLC without
consulting St. Louis. Both Glabe and Kuntz decided that their theological convictions
were ultimately less important than their ethnic obligation to help German DPs. Their
loyalty was to their homeless and starving German coreligionists, not to the synod’s
theological peculiarities.
The St. Louis leadership, however, proved more conservative than their brethren
in other states. During a January 1949 meeting with the NLC, the EPC decided “not to
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join the NLC and its Displaced Persons Program.”357 Unlike Glabe and Kuntz, who both
had backgrounds in social work, the EPC’s members consisted of pastors and professors
deeply entrenched in the Missouri Synod’s conservative doctrine. While Glabe and Kuntz
willingly sacrificed possible theological traditions to support their social mission, Sieck
and the rest of the EPC members in St. Louis were steeped in a culture that prioritized
maintaining their conservative theology. Although unwilling to align with the NLC
formally, the EPC did acknowledge that many of its local branches already collaborated
with the NLC regardless of their decision. As a result, they promised to “support up to
40% of all DP work which our recognized Lutheran Welfare Agencies expend on actual
regional DP work” so as to not leave DP work completely unsupported.358 In doing so,
the EPC formalized its position as the quiet financial backer to local and national
organizations, rather than a direct participant in the process of DP work. Unlike the
CLWR, the conservative theology of the synod’s St. Louis leadership prevented them for
participating as freely in relief and DP work as their coreligionists in Canada.
Aside from their financial assistance, the EPC published several pamphlets in the
late 1940s and early 1950s that advised congregations on how to partake in DP work at
the local level. These publications stressed that laypeople interested in helping DPs
should cooperate with their local pastor rather than the EPC. Any DPs that Missouri
Synod members assisted would ultimately be their responsibility rather than the synod’s.
One EPC member wrote that “as soon as a DP enters the midst of a congregation that
congregation and that pastor becomes, in a general way, responsible for the social,
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religious and economical adjustment of the DP.”359 Thus, DP work in the Missouri Synod
took a decentralized and local approach that varied from district to district. While the
EPC’s hands-off approach and unwillingness to work with the NLC continued to generate
criticism, its members reiterated that “we have no animosity with [the NLC] and feel that
they are doing a very excellent job as far as the DP program is concerned.” Instead, the
EPC “preferred to be independent in our program and are confident that we have also
accomplished a great deal, however, on a much less expensive basis.”360 The St. Louis
leadership was content to provide advice for local situations while letting the NLC
conduct DP work at the national level as a result of their conservative theology.
The different theological positions of the Missouri and Canada Synods directly
shaped the ways in which the two synods approached immigration. The Canada Synod’s
liberal theology created a highly centralized approach to immigration that operated on a
national scale, while the Missouri Synod’s conservatism directed it towards a
decentralized and local approach. Far from being insular and academic, theological
debates played a key role in determining how each synod responded to the arrival of
postwar DPs. Although they worked towards a common goal of helping their fellow
Germans, each synod strove to meet the demands of DP work in accordance with their
own theological traditions.

Transnational Ties and Early Immigration Schemes, 1946-1950

The Canadian and American federal governments responded much more slowly to
the DP crisis than the Missouri and Canada Synods wished. The EPC and CLWR
359
360

CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 50, Gebauer to Louis Wickham, 27 February 1950.
CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 50, Gebauer to Wickham, 27 February 1950.

149
discovered that their respective governments often proved unable or unwilling to help
them bring German Lutheran DPs to North America. As a result, Canadian and American
Lutherans relied upon one another to help meet their common goal of helping Lutheran
DPs. United by a mutual desire to help Germany recover, Lutheran organizations
collaborated to navigate national restrictions in an effort to address an international crisis.
Canadian and American Lutherans tended to ignore the Canadian-American
border if it meant they could better help their German Lutheran coreligionists overseas.
Prior to 1946, for instance, Canada and the United States monitored and controlled the
extent to which civilians could gain access to Germany. Both countries enacted
legislation that prohibited civilians from trading and shipping supplies to so-called enemy
nations, thereby significantly hampering early Lutheran attempts to conduct relief work.
As of early 1946, it appeared that the American government had no immediate plans to
amend their Trading with the Enemy Act to allow Americans contact with Germany.
Legally barred from sending relief supplies such as food and clothing to Germany,
American Lutherans looked to Canada to overcome their government’s restrictive policy.
Unlike the United States, the Canadian government granted permission to the CLWR “to
send relief supplies to Europe, including ex-enemy countries such as Germany and
Finland,” as of March 1946.361 Franklin Clark Fry, the president of the ULCA, contacted
pastors in the Canada Synod for assistance. He initially planned on opening “a second
warehouse on the Canadian side of the international border” that Americans could use to
ship food and clothing overseas. Since the Canadian government permitted the CLWR
access to Germany, Fry hoped the Canada Synod could act as an intermediary that would
allow American Lutherans to help Germany as well. “We had made up our minds to
361
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attempt to ship to the British Zone through your nation,” Fry wrote.362 The plan, however,
proved unnecessary. The American government amended its Trading with the Enemy act
in the following weeks to allow the ULCA and other charitable organizations to start
sending relief to European nations.
The early willingness of Canadian and American Lutherans to collaborate proved
essential during the immediate aftermath of the war. As both Canadian and American
governments clarified their positions on Germany and the DP crisis, Lutherans on both
sides of the border worked towards their shared goal of providing aid for as many
Germans and Lutheran DPs as possible. Differences in governmental policy, however,
complicated their efforts. In these situations, the transnational connections between St.
Louis and Waterloo County Lutherans proved essential in overcoming national policies.
In the summer of 1947, a small fishing vessel carrying twenty-four Estonian and Latvian
Lutheran DPs arrived illegally in the southern United States. American immigration
officials detained the Baltic refugees and moved them to Ellis Island to await deportation.
The Baltic DPs contacted the Missouri Synod and the EPC, who later tried to advocate for
their formal entry into the United States. Without the proper immigration visas, however,
the American government proved unwilling to admit the Baltic DPs.
The EPC reached out to the CLWR in the hopes that the Canadian government
might allow the Baltic refugees to enter Canada. The EPC’s faith in their transnational
connection with Canadian Lutherans proved well founded. Traugott Herzer, a prominent
member of the CLWR, pitched the dilemma to his peers in the CLWR and the Reverend
John Schmieder, the pastor at St. Matthew’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Kitchener,
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agreed to take action.363 In the following months, Schmieder contacted Arthur Jolliffe, the
Director of Immigration of the Department of Mines and Resources, about possibly
admitting the detained Baltic DPs. Schmieder portrayed the DPs as “truly political
refugees” who “have a real fear of returning to their former homeland which is now
occupied by Soviet Russia.” The Balts, he noted, wished to live “in a country built on the
democratic principles in which they believe and for which they stand.”364 Knowing full
well that Jolliffe and the Canadian government viewed immigrants in terms of their
labour potential, Schmieder lauded their capacity to join Canada’s work force. “As we
have learned from our United States Representative, who has had direct contact with
these people, they are an exceedingly fine group of young people, very sturdy physically
and very anxious to work.”365 Schmieder’s lobbying proved successful. When Canadian
authorities received word in December 1947 that the Board of Special Inquiry of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service still refused to accept the refugees, they granted
the CLWR’s request. They admitted the DPs “providing that Canadian Lutheran World
Relief guarantees that the refugees will not become public charges during the next five
years.” Schmieder agreed to these terms and subsequently arranged for their arrival in
Kitchener.366 By drawing on the transnational relationship between Canadian and
American Lutherans, Schmieder saved these Lutheran DPs from eventual deportation.
St. Louis and the EPC continued to play an important financial as well as moral
role during the CLWR’s early years. Unhappy with the minimal changes to American
immigration policy in the late 1940s, the St. Louis leadership took advantage of Canada’s
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comparatively liberal immigration laws to encourage German immigration to Canada. In
early 1948, the EPC’s Lawrence Meyer met with Herzer to discuss how to help young
children stuck in Germany’s DP camps. They discussed the possibility of sending young
Lutheran DP children to reformatory schools in England and Canada to escape the
poverty and hardship commonly found in the camps. Meyer proposed that the EPC grant
the CLWR twenty-five thousand dollars as a revolving fund to help these children travel
out of the DP camps and subsequently pay for their upkeep.367 The plan represented a
compromise to both parties. Without the EPC’s financial backing, the CLWR had little
hope of operating a program of this size. St. Louis’s support therefore allowed them to
assist Lutheran DP children find new homes in Canada and the United Kingdom. The
plan also satisfied the Missouri Synod. The few quotas available for DPs under the 1948
Displaced Persons Act would not allow for the immigration of so many children. Yet, the
synod still wished to partake in DP work. Meyer therefore promised to fund the CLWR
program only “with the understanding that Missouri Synod take over complete chaplaincy
work” of escorting the DPs to their new homes.368 In this way, the synod could still
actively participate in DP work even if their government did not permit it. Restrictive
immigration policy coupled with the enormity of the DP crisis in Europe prevented both
the CLWR and EPC from operating effectively. However, combining their resources in
order to help their fellow Germans and Lutherans overseas provided an effective solution
to an otherwise insurmountable problem. The EPC and CLWR ignored their national
differences in favour of combining their resources to help their fellow German Lutherans
abroad.
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This transnational relationship continued in the CLWR’s early years. The
American government did not pass legislation allowing DPs to enter the United States
until the summer of 1948. It also failed to match the high hopes of the Missouri Synod.
The EPC continued to use the CLWR as a type of surrogate to meet their desire to help
DPs, despite their government’s restrictive attitude. In 1947, the EPC worked with other
American Lutherans to donate a total of fifty thousand dollars to the CLWR to act “as a
revolving fund for the movement to Canada of refugees of German ethnic origin” in
1947.369 This early financial involvement provided the CLWR with the necessary funds to
carry out its primary goal of encouraging German and Lutheran immigration while
providing the Missouri Synod with a sense that they too could help German DPs even if
its government would not.
By late 1946, Canadian immigration policy allowed citizens to sponsor their
parents, siblings, or children to migrate to Canada. This policy included people living in
Europe’s DP camps, and as a result created a possible avenue for the CLWR to bring DPs
to Canada.370 CLWR officials encouraged its laypeople to participate in this “close
relatives scheme” because it allowed their German-Canadian laity to reconnect with
family members under a policy already approved by the federal government. In this
sense, Canadian immigration policy worked in concert with the CLWR’s ethnic goals.
Canada Synod members wished to bring family members to Canada to escape Germany’s
poverty, and the Canadian government’s policy allowed this to happen.
However, the government failed to make it clear that not all Europeans in
displaced persons camps were eligible for migration. The International Refugee
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Organization (IRO), an agency of the United Nations, did not permit the movement of all
DPs. The IRO barred any DPs with German citizenship from migrating. While DPs with
Latvian or Estonian citizenship could migrate, DPs with German citizenship could not.
DPs with German citizenship were often referred to as Volksdeutsche, a term used to
denote people of German ethnic heritage who were not born in Germany.371 Because
these Volksdeutsche had German citizenship, the IRO considered them “the enemy” and
regarded these DPs as Germany’s responsibility.372 While the Volksdeutsche were indeed
of German ethnic heritage, the majority did not live in Germany during the Second World
War. They lived in territories like Czechoslovakia and other countries later annexed by
the Nazis. When the Nazis invaded, the Volksdeutsche received German citizenship as a
result of their ethnic heritage. These subtle nuances, however, meant little to the IRO.
When the CLWR tried to bring their Volksdeutsche relatives to Canada, they found that
the IRO denied their applications. Approximately one-third of the initial requests to bring
relatives to Canada were rejected because they asked to sponsor Volksdeutsche
relatives.373 Without IRO support, German Canadians could not bring their German
relatives to Canada.
The so-called “Volksdeutsche problem” presented a practical and moral dilemma
to the CLWR. The IRO’s decision meant that the CLWR and their German-Canadian
members could not help German DPs escape poverty and homelessness in Europe.
Despite their success in establishing and financing the CLWR, their project of helping
Germany collapsed due to the IRO’s decision. Morally, the plight of the Volksdeutsche
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resonated deeply with members of the CLWR. After all, as people of German heritage,
they too could be considered Volksdeutsche in the most liberal sense of the word. If they
happened to live in Europe instead of Canada, the Nazis would have just as easily granted
them German citizenship, either willingly or unwillingly. The CLWR remained
determined to help the Volksdeutsche as their fellow Germans, even though the IRO
sought to punish them on these same grounds.
Members of the CLWR soon discovered that other German religious groups in
Canada also resented the IRO’s strict Volksdeutsche policy. German-Canadian Catholics,
Baptists, and Mennonites relied on the government’s “close relative scheme” to bring
their German relatives to Canada, but found their efforts thwarted due to the IRO’s
policy. The CLWR collaborated with these other religious groups to form the Canadian
Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR) to operate outside the
mandate of the IRO in June 1947. Although the Volksdeutsche could not legally migrate
via international programs like the IRO’s, they seemingly conformed to Canada’s preexisting immigration policy that favoured family reunification. Thus, the CCCRR
petitioned the Canadian government that their organization could essentially fulfill the
same role as the IRO, but for Volksdeutsche instead of general DPs. The CCCRR
promised to pay for their passage from Europe’s DP camps to Canada, and promised to
work in cooperation with the government to help find DPs who could meet Canada’s
labour shortage.374 In doing so, the CCCRR circumnavigated the IRO’s authority and
succeeded in bringing Volksdeutsche to Canada.
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The CCCRR’s success in facilitating Volksdeutsche immigration allowed the
CLWR to create specific programs to encourage Lutheran immigration. In 1948, the
CLWR created a project that later became known as the “Lutheran Labour Scheme” in
conjunction with the Missouri Synod and the Department of Labour.375 The Lutheran
Labour Scheme occurred at an opportune moment. In the mid to late 1940s, Canadian
cities and farms alike suffered from labour shortages that DP workers could easily fill.
Employers proved willing to take on otherwise undesirable and oftentimes unilingual DP
workers as a result of these shortages. High employment rates in skilled jobs across
Canada furthermore lessened the chance that Canadian workers would see the unskilled
DPs as threats to their own economic stability.376 The scheme suited the needs of both
Lutherans and the Canadian government. The Canadian government received its
necessary labourers, and the CLWR and Missouri Synod could facilitate the entry of
Volksdeutsche immigrants.
The Lutheran Labour Scheme once again drew on the transnational connections
between the CLWR and St. Louis in order to meet their shared goal of helping fellow
Germans. Herzer and Meyer collaborated over the Lutheran Labour Scheme with the
intention of using it as a “Seed Movement,” or Musterknaben. The so-called seed
movement involved “bringing over of Baltic Lutherans, who have no relatives in Canada”
with the intention that they would then initiate the legal proceedings under the close
relative scheme to bring their family members to Canada.377 Although the Department of
Labour placed a priority on finding DPs with agricultural experience, the CLWR had its
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own priorities for Volksdeutsche labourers. “The Seed Movement idea will be the guiding
policy in making selections,” the two men decided.378 The CLWR therefore prioritized
Volksdeutsche that did not already have family in Canada, since they could migrate to
Canada through other means. The goal, after all, was not simply to bring any DP to
Canada. The CLWR and Missouri Synod specifically wanted Volksdeutsche immigrants
so that they could encourage as much immigration from Germany as possible. Eydt made
it clear to members of the Canada Synod that the “Lutheran Labour Scheme is intended
primarily for the assistance of Volksdeutsche who have no relatives in Canada and are
thus otherwise ineligible for admission.”379 Volksdeutsche with relatives in Canada should
work with their families, not the CLWR, for assistance. The title “Lutheran Labour
Scheme” was therefore rather dubious, given the actual motivations behind the plan.
Herzer and Meyer were not concerned about meeting the Canadian government’s labour
shortages, but rather saw the scheme as a way to fulfill their ethnic vision of encouraging
German migration to Canada.
Connections to St. Louis remained important for the CLWR in order to operate the
Lutheran Labour Scheme. Because the very notion of the seed movement involved the
constant application and movement of people, it was a costly endeavor in constant need
of financing. Herzer routinely visited St. Louis throughout 1949 and 1950 to demonstrate
to Meyer, Sieck, and the EPC the continual need to fund the Labour Scheme.380 During
his visits, Herzer made sure to emphasize how the program succeeded in accomplishing
their shared goal of encouraging Volksdeutsche migration. “After a thorough investigation
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on the ground,” Herzer told Meyer, “I am more convinced that our Lutheran Labour
Scheme is one of the most effective methods of dealing with many compassionate cases
of the refugees in Germany.”381 Sieck and Meyer echoed Herzer’s message when the EPC
met to discuss relief work. The two men “reported that Canada had rescinded many of its
immigration restrictions which makes it possible for the immigration of many more
refugees.”382 The EPC passed a resolution granting the CLWR twenty-five thousand
dollars to continue its work. With the EPC’s moral and financial support once again, the
transnational connection between the EPC and CLWR allowed for the Lutheran Labour
Scheme’s success.
Despite the program’s early accomplishment, the CLWR soon found its work
again hampered by the “Volksdeutsche issue.” By 1950, the CLWR received multiple
reports stating that the majority of Volksdeutsche faced considerable difficulties gaining
acceptance to the Lutheran Labour Scheme overseas. Although the program had many
applicants, the Canadian government’s immigration agents overseas accepted
comparatively few applicants.
Some [Volksdeutsche] were eliminated by the medical examination, some few by the security
man, but by far the largest number were rejected because they had acquired German citizenship
somewhere in the course of the years 1939 to 1945…This difficulty which is applicable to the
greatest majority is threatening to undermine and even bring to a standstill the entire program
because of its moral implications…It is a truth that during the course of the war years virtually all
Volksdeutsche were repatriated in German occupied territories and in most cases naturalized
whether they desired citizenship or not.383

Although the CCCRR circumnavigated the IRO, it appeared they could not avoid
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CCCRR programs. If the program did not fulfill their yearly quota of securing seven
hundred labourers for government programs, the government could legally cancel the
CCCRR’s funding.384 The high rejection rate offered a further moral dilemma for the
CLWR. Stewart Herman, a member of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) described
how the Volksdeutsche were “virtually forced to lie in order to pass the Canadian
requirements” or face rejection.385 Although they could not condone liars, they also could
not condone the policies of Nazi Germany that they saw as unfairly punishing the German
people. Herman described the Volksdeutsche who received German citizenship as similar
to “hords (sic) of cattle branded without consideration of individual desires.”386 The
German ethnicities of CLWR employees made them predisposed towards adopting a
sympathetic attitude towards the Volksdeutsche. Unlike Canadian immigration officials,
they gave Volksdeutsche the benefit of the doubt. They refused to believe that the
Volksdeutsche willingly accepted German citizenship by the Nazis, and thus chose to
believe this status was forced upon them. This sympathetic attitude prompted the CCCRR
and CLWR officials to argue that the federal government needed to lift restrictions facing
the Volksdeutsche. Because it was unwillingly forced upon the Volksdeutsche, they
argued that German citizenship should not prevent their admittance to Canada.387 Their
German ethnicity compelled CLWR leaders to continue looking for a solution the
Volksdeutsche problem, even if it meant challenging and petitioning the federal
government.
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Race, Religion, and Confronting the Volksdeutsche Problem

The CCCRR and CLWR started to lobby the government to permit the entry of
Volksdeutsche with German citizenship in the late 1940s. Although Canada was no longer
actively at war with Germany, perceptions of Germans as “the enemy” proved difficult to
overcome. Canadian politicians did not prioritize accepting more German immigrants to
Canada. A 1946 Gallup poll found that thirty-four percent of Canadians supported
banning future immigration from Germany.388 Politicians had very little to gain from
supporting this cause, particularly when approximately one-third of their constituents
opposed it. The CLWR and CCCRR had to overcome the stigma that the Volksdeutsche
were enemies or Nazis. Both organizations succeeded in doing so by relying on tactics
they developed during the war. German-Canadian Lutherans once again offset the
difficulties their ethnicity posed by cultivating alliances with local political elites and
appealing to Canada’s Christian and white character.
Regional ties between political elites and Waterloo County Lutherans once again
laid the groundwork for collaboration between government officials and Lutheran
interests. Specifically, Waterloo County members of the CLWR and CCCRR used their
regional connections to Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and Senator
William Euler, a fellow Lutheran and former Kitchener mayor, to lobby for changes in
Canada’s immigration policy. Euler took a particular interest in the CLWR’s work and
frequently attended Lutheran meetings in Waterloo County to eavesdrop on their
immigration plans. Although he requested his name be kept out of their minutes, Euler
used these interactions with the CLWR to keep abreast of their plans to bring
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Volksdeutsche to Ontario. This relationship benefitted the CLWR, as Euler subsequently
urged Mackenzie King and his fellow senators to study Canada’s immigration policy in
greater detail throughout the late 1940s.389
CLWR members from Waterloo County also travelled to Ottawa to meet with
King, who approved of their mission based on their Christian principals and his own
nostalgia of living in Waterloo County. The night prior to a February 1947 meeting with
the CCCRR, King had a dream wherein he briefly found himself on streets that resembled
“one leading to Waterloo in old Berlin…During the morning, I thought of it when one of
the delegates who was present was a Minister now in Kitchener.” King later recounted
that the dream seemed “a sort of vision which seemed symbolical in a way.”390 The
CCCRR, consisting of “representatives of persons from European countries” asked him if
“the door might be opened a little wider for refugees.” Although not generally
sympathetic to immigration reform, King conceded that “the pleas made by these man
(sic) was very strong. I was again touched by the regard which they seemed to express
toward myself for action I had taken, evidencing friendship for the underprivileged etc.”
More significantly, the Christian character of the CCCRR gained King’s sympathies.
Although King recognized that the CCCRR was German (or “European”) in background,
the CCCRR presented itself as a primarily Christian institution. The Christian and
humanitarian aspect to the CCCRR’s work of feeding and clothing the needy appealed to
King’s Christian convictions. He later reflected that the CCCRR’s actions demonstrated
that “Christian influence was making itself felt more strongly in the world.”391 The
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CCCRR’s collective lobbying and international emphasis served to confirm King’s bias
in that regard. By appealing to King as a likeminded Christian, the CCCRR’s liberal
position on immigration reform received a warm welcome when it would have otherwise
faced scorn.392
Highlighting the religious, rather than ethnic, aspects of the CCCRR proved a
common strategy for the organization and its political allies. The CCCRR made a
conscious choice to highlight the organization’s common Christianity, rather than their
shared German ethnicity. By emphasizing the humanitarian elements of their work, the
CCCRR avoided accusations that they were a pro-German group.393 Although its
members recognized that their purpose was to facilitate Volksdeutsche immigration in the
privacy of their meetings, they tried to portray their work as based on Christian and
humanitarian needs in public periodicals and correspondence. One article reiterated the
fact that the CCCRR and CLWR had a higher purpose than simply supplying “the labor
market with brawn.” Instead, their “Christian business” was to help “homeless people to
find new homes…good Christians homes” throughout Canada.394 Walter Tucker, one of
Herzer’s political connections from Western Canada, repeated this language when he
advocated for the CCCRR in the House of Commons. Tucker emphasized the Christian,
rather than ethnic character, when he stated that the Volksdeutsche already in Canada
“never went to bed at night without getting down on their knees and thanking God that
they had the privilege to come to this free country.”395 The DPs in Tucker’s speech were
not ex-Nazis or German citizens, but rather devout Christians. The CCCRR and Tucker
King’s conservative positions on immigration are detailed in Kelley and Trebilcock, The Making of the
Mosaic, 316-317.
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hoped that cultivating a pious image would allow members in the House of Commons to
relate to, and perhaps even sympathize with, the Volksdeutsche. Although they may not
wish to help members of a former enemy nation, the CCCRR and their allies hoped
politicians would want to help fellow Christians.
German-Canadian requests to change Volksdeutsche policy occurred during a time
in which the Canadian federal government debated the country’s future immigration
policy. At the end of the Second World War, the federal government did not yet have a
department to specifically oversee immigration. Instead the Senate Standing Committee
on Immigration and Labour in 1946 examined the nation’s immigration policies. The
committee consisted of an eclectic mix of government officials that met with other
branches of the government and the IRO to ultimately determine policy and establish
immigration quotas.396 Despite the international emphasis on helping DPs for
humanitarian reasons, the Canadian government continued to see immigration as a
process that should benefit Canada instead of the DPs. King provided one of the clearest
articulations of Canada’s postwar immigration policy in a 1947 speech. “I wish to make it
quite clear,” King stated, “that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the
person whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a ‘fundamental human right’
of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege.”397 Immigration was not an exclusively
humanitarian endeavor, nor did King conceptualize immigration as process that
inherently benefitted them. Immigrants would only be accepted if it suited Canadian
interests and conformed to the values they looked for in “desirable future citizens.”
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Canadian politicians put forward several different approaches to immigration in
the late 1940s.398 For some members of Parliament, these debates provoked a fear that
Canada was losing its British character. Lawrence Skey and Thomas Kidd, two
Conservative MPs from Ontario, believed that any discussion of Canada’s immigration
policy needed to include British immigrants. Skey told the House of Commons that many
Britons wished to leave the United Kingdom and that Canada “must now be ready to
receive the torch from these people.”399 If Canada needed to encourage immigration from
any country, Kidd argued, it should obviously be the United Kingdom. Kidd mentioned
that his constituents “are greatly disturbed because of the coldness of the government
toward British immigration. The citizens of the British isles (sic) have been brought up to
believe in the same ideals and the same type of constitutional government as we have.
Our soldiers fought side by side for the same way of life.”400 Canada’s history as a white
and British nation provided the basis of Kidd’s argument. “England spent millions of
dollars in finding homes in Canada for the United Empire Loyalists…Just as those men
had the pioneer spirit,” Kidd argued, “so have many of the young men in the United
Kingdom who are desirous of living within the empire.”401 Anglophiles such as Skey and
Kidd tried to convince their peers of the relevance of British immigration and history in
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Canada. “Let us continue to perpetuate British traditions….Let us keep Canada British,”
he concluded.402
While certainly not their intention, Skey and Kidd’s emphasis on keeping Canada
“British” opened a door for proponents of Volksdeutsche migration to make their own
case. Although Skey and Kidd applied their emphasis on the “pioneer spirit” with his
“love of freedom” to potential British immigrants, Anglo-Canadians associated these
values broadly with the white race. As cultural theorist Richard Dyer notes, decades of
European imperial rule perpetuated popular racial thinking that portrayed whites as
inherently suited to nation building and governance. They alone, supposedly, had the
genetic stock necessary to pioneer a functioning society.403 Because Skey and Kidd’s
comments employed a coded language to describe broadly the quality of white settlers,
advocates for Volksdeutsche immigration used the opportunity to demonstrate how
Volksdeutsche could also embody the same “pioneer spirit” as British settlers due to their
whiteness. MPs in favour of Volksdeutsche reform used Kidd’s language to demonstrate
that the Volksdeutsche could conform to the British model of immigration Kidd
described. Tucker mimicked Kidd’s argument by stating “our finest immigrants have
been those who came to us from the various countries of Europe, who are of German
ethnic origin. We have in Canada literally hundreds of thousands of people who are of
that descent.”404 As whites, Germans embodied Kidd’s “pioneer spirit” and conform to
so-called “Canadian” values. J.A. MacKinnon, the Minister of Mines and Resources,
expressed sympathy for the Volksdeutsche based on these common cultural
understandings of Germans as white and therefore good settlers:
402
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“I was brought up in the county of Bruce, Ontario, whose early settlers consisted of highland Scots
and people of German origin. We did not know those people as anything but Canadians….In every
way they were the best possible settlers and the best people we could have. They have made a
great contribution to this country not only in western Ontario but all across Canada. I am very
sympathetic to the suggestion that carefully selected people with that background should be
allowed into Canada as soon as possible.”405

Whiteness allowed German immigrants to historically conform to Canadian standards and
would allow the Volksdeutsche to continue to do so as well.
The notion of Germans as “good” settlers proved to be a powerful discursive tool
in which to combat the anti-German or anti-European sentiments of other MPs. During a
1949 debate in the House of Commons, Lewis Cardiff, a Conservative MP, suggested that
the government’s current labour schemes involving DPs “is absolutely wrong. If you are
going to bring d.p.’s out here as farm labour, then we want farmers, not people who
merely call themselves agriculturalists and stay on farms for just as short a time as they
possible can until they can find themselves a job elsewhere.”406 Other MPs quickly rallied
to the defense of the government’s labour schemes, and the DPs in particular. MPs from
across Canada vouched that farmers in their constituencies were overall satisfied with the
quality of the DPs that worked on their farms. Wilbert Thatcher stated that “if there is one
feature of any governmental policy that I can agree with, it has been their bringing in of
these farm workers.” In fact, Thatcher wished “they would extend this program a little
further and allow our Canadians of German descent to bring in their relatives from
Germany.” Like others before him, Thatcher drew upon Canadian society’s shared
understanding of equating whiteness with agricultural suitably. “In the past, Canada’s
experience has been that the German people usually have made the best possible settlers,”
he argued. “They have made good agriculturalists. I think we are missing a bet if we do
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not take advantage of the huge pool of manpower in Germany at present time.”407 Of
course, Thatcher recognized that any potential Volksdeutsche immigrants “will have to be
screened” so that they did not admit any Nazis into Canada. With this caveat aside,
Thatcher reminded his colleagues that “we are in the process of building a nation, and the
manpower that we choose today is going to determine, to some extent at least, the kind of
nation we shall have in the future…There are many reasons why we should change our
present policy towards Germans.”408 If immigrants determined Canada’s future,
Thatcher’s speech made it clear that Canada’s future needed to consist of white
immigrants who could politically and culturally conform to Canada while contributing to
it through their hard work. The cultural characteristics prescribed to the white race
allowed the Volksdeutsche to appear as ideal immigrants and overcome any associations
with their Nazi past.
The frequent associations between the Volksdeutsche and white qualities such as
pioneering, settlement, and agriculture, eventually paid off for the CCCRR and their
political allies. In March 1950, the Canadian government issued PC 1606 which granted
the CCCRR’s request that Volksdeutsche with German citizenship could now migrate to
Canada. A few months later, the government expanded the order by no longer classifying
German nationals as “enemy aliens.”409 The CCCRR interpreted PC 1606 as an important
victory for their organization.410 The CCCRR’s persistence, as well as Canada’s desire to
establish positive relations with West Germany, played an important role in achieving PC
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1606.411 Yet whiteness proved an equally important, if at times invisible, factor in
ensuring Volksdeutsche admission. While the Volksdeutsche were not ideal immigrants,
their whiteness gave them enough cultural currency to overcome the political stigma
attached to their character.

Gender Relations and Immigration Work

If race played an important yet subtle role in framing the Volksdeutsche debate in
the public sphere, gender played a significant role in shaping the internal dynamics of the
Canada and Missouri Synod’s immigration work. The large-scale relief campaigns
required that all members of Lutheran congregations in St. Louis and Waterloo County
needed to participate if they had any hope of alleviating suffering in postwar Germany.
Patriarchal gender relations within Lutheran communities dictated how congregations
could participate in this process. As relief fell under the branch of charity, local pastors
assumed that German Lutheran women and youth would collectively work towards
meeting their fundraising goals. Pastors and synod leaders, in contrast, did not need to do
this work themselves. As male leaders, they only needed to inspire others to complete
these tasks and to demonstrate their importance through their sermons and newsletters.
While relief work therefore involved Lutheran men and women, only men received
official recognition for their work. Pastors often commended one another for conducting
relief and immigration work, which served to reinforce themselves as the authority
figures within their community. Even though it was mainly Lutheran women who
actually completed the tasks associated with relief work, gendered notions of “good”
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women as inherently subservient and uninterested in leadership roles ensured that pastors
took credit for their accomplishments denied them the respect and praise they deserved.
German Lutheran women accomplished the vast majority of relief work for
postwar Europe. When the CLWR started its campaign to send food overseas, its leaders
recommended that women and youth initiate campaigns at their local congregations. They
suggested that each congregation “form a committee representative of the Ladies Aid,
Church Council, Young People Society, to promote this programme, or some particular
society such as the Ladies should take the lead.”412 As natural caregivers, it seemed
obvious to the CLWR’s male leadership that women would extend their other charity
work to include food and clothing campaigns in Germany. Their previous experience with
fundraising for their churches would help the postwar relief campaign run smoothly. The
CLWR’s male leaders believed “the Ladies…are especially able and efficient when it
comes to the practical aspects of organizing the gathering, the processing and the sharing
of food.” They argued that “the success of this programme depends, above all, on the
whole-hearted support of our Ladies!”413 The postwar relief campaign resembled other
Lutheran fundraising efforts from previous years. Although the food and clothing
campaigns operated on a larger scale than other charities, they involved the same
principled skills of purchasing, canning, and preserving food and clothing. Regardless,
these campaigns made heavy demands on the women and youth willing to participate.
During the early months of the Missouri Synod’s clothing campaign, German Lutheran
women and youth in the Walther League gathered at the Concordia Publishing House in
St. Louis four nights a week. They worked long hours sorting and packaging acceptable
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clothing, often until after nine o’clock at night. This labour, of course, was unpaid.414 The
synod’s women and youth did the actual work required to send relief to Germany, while
Lutheran men more often than not simply wrote about it.
Participating in relief work often became a family affair. Although German
Lutheran men rarely discussed the important roles their wives played in relief work,
circumstances forced them to tacitly acknowledge their wives’ authority. If a particular
CLWR executive happened to be unavailable or away on business, those who wished to
reach him would often turn to his wife for assistance instead. In 1954, for instance, Hugh
Whitteker needed to reach Arthur Mehlenbacher to discuss the CLWR’s relief program.
Away on business in Western Canada, however, he turned to his wife Ruby
Mehlenbacher for help instead. After discussing the program’s future, he told Ruby that
“in reading this letter over I find that I have set up a sort of puzzle that will occupy some
of your lonesome hours while you are alone.” Whitteker referred to the fact that his letter
made such frequent use of the pronoun “you,” Ruby would have to determine which “of
the pronouns ‘you’ on the preceding page are directed to yourself and which to Arthur.”
However, Whitteker recognized that their work “has developed into a sort of family cooperative affair you might just decide that they belong to both.”415 Arthur’s absence
forced Whitteker, somewhat unwillingly, to recognize that Ruby was just as capable as
carrying out relief work as her fully ordained husband. Arthur later recognized Ruby’s
involvement in their work, but only in the context of a shared error. In the mid-1950s,
Ruby and Arthur volunteered to compile statistics for the CLWR’s relief campaign. To
their horror, they realized they forgot to include the name of a Canada Synod pastor in
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their statistics. “This missed statistician Stockmann and our own triple checking,” Arthur
wrote. “My wife says she is going to skip to Mexico now,” he later joked.416 Although
this comment was made in jest, it suggests the precarious nature of women’s involvement
in work that the synod gendered as masculine. Although a minor detail, pastors involved
with Lutheran organizations often took the accurate compiling of statistics seriously, and
often took offense when any errors were replicated.417 As Arthur’s wife, Ruby knew that
any bruised egos would direct their criticisms towards her involvement.
Outside of conducting the daily tasks necessary to carry out relief programs,
German Lutheran women who worked as secretaries in the Canada and Missouri Synod
often emerged as de facto sources of information on immigration policy. Unable to
contact any of the Missouri Synod’s leadership, one layman reached out to Olivia Scott,
Lawrence Meyer’s secretary, asking for advice on sponsoring DPs. The layman hoped for
a more liberal policy that would allow his relatives to come to the United States. He asked
Scott about the typical procedures, and who in the government he should contact for more
information. “Please look into this for us, since we want action,” he asked.418 Secretaries
similar to Scott knew just as much about relief work and immigration policy as their
pastor-employers, as they carried out the daily business or organizing and replying to
correspondence. Through their important bureaucratic role in the synod, women also
became involved in the political aspects of DP work.
The Missouri and Canada Synod maintained traditional gender roles that
prioritized men’s work over women’s labour, and only celebrated women’s involvement
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in synod affairs when it related to their role as caregivers. Bloedel, for instance,
repeatedly diminished the varied contributions women made to St. Louis’s food and
clothing campaign by only praising their charity efforts to help German children. In his
retrospective of St. Louis’s relief campaign, Bloedel wrote that providing food and
clothes to children “appealed especially to the women, and helping orphans and orphan
homes became the particular province of the Luther Women’s Missionary League.”419
Bloedel did not need to include why precisely the LWML felt invested in German
orphanages. His readers knew too well that, as women, Lutheran women should be
predisposed to helping children over the more masculine pursuits of rebuilding churches
and theological seminaries. The tendency of synod leaders to write in the passive voice
further divested women of any action or authority. In 1947, the Lutheran Women’s
Missionary League conducted a fundraising campaign throughout Missouri and Illinois to
raise money for Lawrence Meyer to travel to Germany and personally distribute food and
clothing to Germany’s needy. Although they conducted one of the synod’s most
profitable fundraisers, the synod leadership denied the LWML official recognition.
Bloedel later recounted the campaign by stating the local “district has placed at [Meyer’s]
disposal the sum of $20,000 for the purchase of orphanage equipment.”420 Bloedel’s
seemingly neutral account of the campaign embodied the synod’s strong patriarchal
assumptions about women’s work. First, Bloedel’s use of the passive voice managed to
ensure that he stripped the LWML from their role as the primary actors in the campaign.
Instead, he situated Meyer as the one spending and conducting relief work overseas. He
portrayed Meyer as the individual taking action and coming to Germany’s aid, not the
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LWML. Second, Bloedel made the assumption that the LWML money would be used on
orphanages in Germany. Meyer’s account of his 1947 trip to Germany demonstrates that
he used this money on a variety of different projects, and not solely on orphanages. 421
Bloedel’s assumption that the LWML would express interest in only children’s work,
however, prevented him for providing a more nuanced understanding of the variety of
charitable work Lutheran women conducted. The patriarchal assumptions by the synod’s
male officials wrote Lutheran women out of their contemporary and retrospective
writings of the synod’s relief campaign. Dismissing women’s contributions allowed
pastors to once again portray themselves in positions of leadership and authority. As both
men and pastors in their community, they were used to thinking of themselves as leaders
with agency and control, despite the evidence suggesting women took on these roles as
well.
Gendered use of religious language further separated the experiences of Lutheran
men and women who participated in relief work. Since German Lutherans in both St.
Louis and Waterloo County felt compelled to help DPs on religious grounds, they often
used religious language during their relief campaigns. These sentiments often contained
gendered language and implications that reinforced patriarchal gender norms within the
church. Although both men and women saw their work as a religious calling, they
expressed their relationship with God in very different terms. German Lutheran men often
compared themselves directly to God or Jesus Christ and believed that the two directly
influenced their work. Their roles as leaders allowed them to exhibit Christ-like traits and
attributes. Bloedel, for instance, described the EPC’s programs as “glorious, Christ-like
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and God-pleasing work of mercy.”422 Bloedel’s description is tame when compared to
hyperbolic comparisons other pastors used to describe their participation in relief work.
Other pastors claimed that God almost moved through them in order to complete His will.
They continually reiterated that they had God’s blessings and authority to conduct relief
work among Europe’s poor. Recounting a 1950 trip to Germany, Herzer told his male
peers how “the objective of this trip was to remove, with the Lord’s help, various
impediments and difficulties which had bogged down our refugee work in Germany and
Austria.” Herzer stated that this was no easy task, but “the knowledge that I was
proceeded and accompanied by the prayers of thousands of Christians in Canada not only
gave me courage, but accounted largely for the success of my mission.”423 By expressing
his faith that both God and Canadian Lutherans prayed for him, Herzer reaffirmed his
position as an ethnic elite within the CLWR and CCCRR. God and Christ acted as
functional metaphors for Lutheran men to use to reaffirm their natural and “God-given”
right to lead their institutions and churches.
Men drew upon their perceived commonalities with Christ as a common tactic to
encourage and inspire one another to accomplish more work for the church. If “good”
Lutheran women were expected to accomplish relief work, it was the duty of a “good”
male pastor to inspire his followers to meet their monthly fundraising goals. Responding
to the lackluster relief campaigns in the early 1950s, Eric Reble took his fellow pastors to
task for not leading by Christ’s example. In a Canada Lutheran article, Eric described
how congregations stopped contributing to the CLWR and Lutheran World Action
(LWA) charities as frequently as they did immediately following the war. “The
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enthusiasm has gone. The L.W.A. quota is just another burdensome chore to be met by
the congregation year after year,” he wrote. “But we know that’s not true. We know that
L.W.A. is still an opportunity for us to become Christs to our neighours.”424 By making
financial contributions, Eric encouraged other men to demonstrate that they could
embody the values of giving like Christ. He told laymen to listen more consciously to
their pastors’ attempts to fundraise. He scolded laymen by telling them that Christ
certainly would not complain about being asked to feed the hungry or heal the sick. “No,
you’re right, that’s not the kind of a Christ we have, is it?” he asked rhetorically. “Nor do
I think that you and I have any business saying, ‘Oh, no, not again!’ when Christ comes
calling to us for our help. Church Member, you look at the cross of Christ and then decide
what you want to do about L.W.A.”425 Eric’s article placed the failure of the early 1950s
relief campaigns on the shoulders of laymen who did not rise to the level of Christ’s
example. Further still, his analogy affirmed the connection between the local pastor as the
voice of Christ. Eric’s comparison encouraged congregants not to see their pastor as an
adversary nagging them for more money, but hoped that laymen would hear Christ
speaking through their pastors. By making this comparison, Eric and other pastors
conformed to masculine standards in the church that expected male pastors to lead
effectively by meeting synod and congregational goals.
In contrast, German Lutheran women expressed a more passive relationship with
God. Women believed they laboured for God rather than the male emphasis on working
through God. Strict gender norms within the church prevented women from speaking
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about God and Christ in such exaggerated ways. While men put their actions on equal
footing as the charity of Christ and will of God, Lutheran women portrayed their actions
as showing subservience to God. This is particularly true of Irma Lehmann and Katrine
Petersons,426 two Lutheran women that the CLWR hired as “port workers” in Halifax and
Montreal respectively. As port workers, Lehmann and Petersons greeted newly arrived
Lutheran DPs in Halifax and Montreal each week. They had far greater contact with a
larger number of DPs than most of the male pastors who championed their own Christlike behaviour. Yet, Lehmann and Peterson’s language adopted a far more subdued tone
than their male counterparts. In their monthly reports submitted to the Canada Synod,
Lehmann and Petersons often stressed their subservient position to God and Christ. “I
submit this report with a deep sense of gratitude to our Lord and to those in authority over
me for having been given the opportunity of reaching out a helping hand to the
newcomers,” Lehmann wrote in one report. “I pray for continued strength and guidance
in my work ahead.”427 Unlike her male colleagues, Lehmann hoped for God’s guidance
and expressed no certainty that God blessed her work unconditionally. Her uncertainty
often dominated her reflections on her own labour. “The outlook on immigration for 1954
is very bright as God willing another 16,000 newcomers are expected and we believe that
there shall be a good number of Lutherans among them. We are praying for God’s
guidance in our work,” she later wrote.428 Petersons’s language in her reports matched
Lehmann’s emphasis on subordination and uncertainty. Even after receiving the praise of
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her male peers, Petersons diminished her own contributions to the church. After receiving
accolades, she wrote that “the trust and confidence of the LWF NCC shown to the Port
worker is…gratefully acknowledged, with a willing heart and mind to do the best in
serving our Lutheran brethren, which is a Service of our Church and our Lord.”429
Lehmann and Petersons’s personal writing therefore reflected broader trends in
gender relations within the Lutheran community, and within North American culture
more broadly. While the synod’s male leaders acted confidently on God’s authority,
Lehmann and Petersons expressed doubt. Biblical and theological texts in both the
Missouri and Canada Synod stressed the subservience of women to men. Discussion of
gender relations within Lutheran communities throughout the twentieth century inevitably
involved at least one pastor citing St. Paul’s assertion that he did not “permit a woman to
teach or to assume authority over a man; she must be quiet.”430 Pastors, as community
leaders, routinely praised subservience and some Lutheran women came to adopt and
enforce these values in their congregations as well. Women’s groups at Lutheran
congregations routinely incorporated the theme of servitude into their conferences and
meetings. The LWML advertised its 1947 convention around the slogan “serve the Lord
with gladness” to stress servitude as not only a positive quality, but also a God-pleasing
one.431 On other occasions, the two port workers directly referenced Biblical passages on
gender relations. Petersons wrote that “we pray that the Almighty may continue to bless
us and to give us strength for this work in which so much satisfaction and profound
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happiness can be found.”432 The culture surrounding women’s secondary role in the
church shaped their immigration reports to the synod’s male leaders. Their
professionalism and knowledge often lay hidden beneath the subservient tone contained
in their monthly reports.
The synod’s patriarchal and paternalistic nature shaped relations between the
synod’s male leaders and its port workers. Despite their important status in DP work and
professionalism, the male leadership routinely diminished their status through comments
on their gender. After meeting Petersons for the first time, Hugh Whitteker wrote to a
colleague that he was “very favourably impressed with Miss Petersons. She is a girl with
a great deal of personality, pleasant mannerisms, attractive, easy to talk to and I am sure
she will be easy to work with. She speaks several languages (7 someone told me) and she
likes her work very much.”433 Evidently, Whitteker’s need to affirm his status as a
qualified community leader led him to focus disproportionately on Petersons’s
appearance and personality rather than her credentials, which surpassed his own. Despite
her many qualifications, Whitteker saw Petersons as a woman first, and a social worker
second. Jokes about the “girls” circulated within the synod, particularly when Petersons
and Lehmann requested greater rights for themselves in their jobs as port workers. Both
port workers had a verbal agreement with the synod that they would be allowed to take
several weeks of vacation during the year. Lehmann, in particular, valued this time so that
she could return to Germany to visit her ailing mother. When Petersons and Lehmann
insisted that the synod uphold its promise of vacation time through a written contract,
Mehlenbacher joked to Whitteker that “I’m in the stew again as always.” He told
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Whitteker that his “two girl friends in Halifax and Montreal want to know about vacation.
I must ask for a little information. Had you ever intimated any plan of vacation for these
workers?”434 Far from a trivial concern, the synod issued a questionnaire to prominent
pastors asking their thoughts on allowing Lehmann and Petersons to take a vacation. The
pastors responded favourably, but debated whether a month was too long or too short and
other aspects of their request. Even though pastors took annual vacations without facing
any bureaucratic hurdles, pastors scrutinized Petersons’s and Lehmann’s request for a
vacation from their work.435 Pastors rarely faced the same level of paternalism and
regulation the two port workers encountered over such a simple request. Although
Lehmann and Petersons rivaled, and often surpassed, the linguistic ability and daily
workload of male pastors, their gender allowed the synod’s leadership to place their
requests under greater scrutiny than would otherwise be normal.
Bloedel’s management of the Missouri Synod’s campaign for food relief in St.
Louis embodies how women’s important role in relief work was undermined by German
Lutheran masculinity. Like relief programs carried out at the congregational level,
Bloedel relied upon the knowledge of German Lutheran women to help him run food
relief program. “Housewives,” he wrote in a later report, “were questioned about food
selections. Information was secured about packing techniques.”436 One of the so-called
housewives Bloedel consulted was Margaret Graebner, the daughter of Concordia
Seminary professor Theodore Graebner. As a woman, Graebner could not obtain a highranking position in the synod’s relief program. She therefore sought a position with the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration as a dietitian as it did not have
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the synod’s same qualms about hiring women. Before Bloedel sent out the list of
acceptable food to the synod, he submitted his list of proposed food items to Graebner to
ensure that it met UN approval. “To our great surprise,” Bloedel wrote, “she approved the
entire list.” Rather than commend Graebner for her inside knowledge of the UN’s relief
program, Bloedel used the opportunity to congratulate himself. “This compliment,
coming from a member of the fair sex, schooled and skilled in the art of selecting and
preparing food, flattered us – a mere man – and richly rewarded us for our efforts.
However, since this may seem to be self-praise, we shall pass over the matter in
silence.”437 Aside from Bloedel’s ironic use of “silence,” his interaction with Graebner
highlights the practice of Lutheran men dismissing the role of Lutheran women from
relief work inaction. Their tendency to dismiss Lutheran women while comparing
themselves to God or Christ helped Lutheran men to solidify their leadership positions as
ethnic elites within the church. Although the amount of work Lutheran women conducted
for the postwar relief campaigns surpassed those of Lutheran men, patriarchal gender
norms ensured that public discussion of relief work highlighted male achievement over
the consistent work conducted by German Lutheran women.

Old and New Directions in Immigration, 1951-1960
The CCCRR and CLWR’s victory passing PC 1606 did not end their struggles
admitting Volksdeutsche to Canada. Although a shared whiteness proved effective in
mitigating political concerns for most MPs, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
still believed certain Volksdeutsche immigrants posed a security threat. William Kelly, an
RCMP officer in charge of admitting visas to Europeans, sponsored a directive that
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refused to admit any Volksdeutsche involved with the Nazi Party’s most essential military
and intelligence communities. This directive encompassed Nazi organizations such as the
Waffen-SS or concentration camp guards.438 Thus, another, albeit smaller, group of
Volksdeutsche found themselves barred from entering Canada just as the CCCRR
assumed that the door had finally swung open. Although PC 1606 helped ease restrictions
on the Volksdeutsche with German citizenship, Herzer realized that “now, many in our
camp are being rejected [on] account [of] membership in the Nazi party.”439 The RCMP’s
decision to bar even a segment of the Volksdeutsche population disappointed the CLWR.
The German ethnicities of those involved with the CLWR clouded their ability to see the
RCMP’s decision as anything other than anti-German. Their sympathetic attitudes
towards the Volksdeutsche prevented them from believing that any German would
willingly serve in Hitler’s army. This blanket support for Volksdeutsche innocence meant
the CLWR maintained that they should not be punished simply for being German,
regardless of their associations with Nazism.440 The RCMP’s influence of government
policy made it clear to the CLWR that the fight for Volksdeutsche rights was clearly not
yet over. Accordingly, the CLWR reaffirmed its dedication to remain a member of the
CCCRR in January 1951. They decided that they would continue their membership in the
interfaith organization “until the end of the emergency, i.e. as long as Volksdeutsche need
our assistance.”441 While the government’s resistance to unreserved Volksdeutsche
immigration tested their patience, pastors in the CLWR recognized the CCCRR’s
necessity as long as their fellow Germans needed assistance.
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The CLWR’s difficult relationship with the Canadian government over the
Volksdeutsche issue soured relations between the two groups. It seemed that they would
never be able to admit their Volksdeutsche brethren without stipulations, regardless of
how many changes in immigration policy they helped prompt. As a result, the CLWR
altered its focus in the early 1950s back to its original aims. A series of meetings in 1951
allowed the CLWR leaders to voice several concerns with the Lutheran Labour Scheme’s
future and their relationship with the Canadian government. They noted that the scheme’s
collaboration with the government often resulted in the obligation to help non-Lutheran
families to appease the federal government. These concessions generated a great deal of
cost that the CLWR no longer wished to finance. Paying for labourers that the
government wished to help obviously did not fit with the CLWR’s goal of helping their
fellow Germans, and CLWR officials grew to resent their obligation to provide a service
they believed the government should offer. Furthermore, these non-Lutheran labourers
“seem to assume an air of independence” and expected the CLWR to help them with
other problems in which the CLWR had no interest.442 Their charitable attitudes did not
extend to all people fleeing Europe, especially when they felt that these individuals
simply used the CLWR “as an avenue” to come to Canada. Close collaboration with the
government and its disappointing results prompted the CLWR executives to wonder
whether they were “losing sight of the fact that ours is a ‘seed movement’” meant for
Volksdeutsche immigrants.443 The CLWR could not hope to, and did not wish to, solve
Europe’s many issues regarding homelessness, starvation, and displaced people. They
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wished only to help German DPs and started to realize that their relationship with the
government pulled them away from their ultimate objective.
The CLWR decided that they needed to begin the year 1952 with a stronger sense
of their priorities. They needed to return to their original aims of helping the
Volksdeutsche, rather than cooperating with the Canadian government. They placed their
emphasis on “re-uniting of families where we have already brought a single man or a
single girl to this country” through the Lutheran Labour Scheme and finding “single men
and single girls, chiefly domestics, who are genuinely interested to act as a ‘seed’ to bring
their parents and immediate family to Canada.”444 Solidifying their firmly pro-German
and anti-government direction, Reble passed a motion affirming that the “C.L.W.R. is not
in a position to be of assistance financially at the present time” to non-Lutheran labourers
that the government wished to sponsor.445 If the Canadian government wished to
prioritize their own labourers over the Volksdeutsche, the CLWR decided that they could
pay for them on their own. As a German and Lutheran institution, the CLWR affirmed it
would only help other members of their ethnic and religious group.
The constant advocacy work on behalf of the Volksdeutsche caused some CLWR
members to express disillusionment with the Canadian government. Although they gave
the appearance of a cooperative spirit, CLWR members privately criticized the
government and its immigration policy. “The humanitarian aspect of immigration is gone
and has been replaced by Labour needs and specifications,” Herzer lamented.446 Clifton
Monk, another CLWR executive, shared these views. “Mass Government immigration
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does not always lend itself to the humanitarian approach,” he believed.447 In their eyes,
the government seemed to treat German and Volksdeutsche immigration as secondary or
incidental in their policy planning. While they felt motivated to help DPs due to their
shared ethnicity, the government seemed motivated only by labour regulations. Statistics
presented at the 1953 CLWR meeting seemed to confirm their cynical perspective. They
noted that, despite their best efforts, immigration from Britain consisted of over 32,000
immigrants whereas German immigration sat around 25,000. “Apparently Canada’s
immigration policy is to maintain British immigration the first place,” Monk derisively
stated.448 The constant problem surrounding Volksdeutsche immigration even made Eydt
question whether the CLWR should “get out of immigration work gradually.”449 Monk
conceded that Germany’s improved economic situation by 1954 might provide “an
appropriate time to ease graciously out of the field of church-sponsored immigration.”450
However, the desire to continue to help their German brethren ultimately convinced
members of the CLWR to continue advocating for Volksdeutsche and assisting their
immigration. As long as the Volksdeutsche required assistance, Monk believed that “it
would be wrong for us to step out of the overseas field.”451 The government could not be
trusted to adequately care for the Volksdeutsche and other German DPs. As long the
government continued to embody this attitude, they believed the CLWR served a purpose.
Their German brethren would not go unrepresented as long as the CLWR remained
vigilant.
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Although the CLWR continued its work with the Volksdeutsche, the
organization’s scope broadened considerably starting in the mid-1950s. Germany’s
improved economic conditions meant that the organization’s work no longer appeared as
immediate and catastrophic as the 1940s. Immigration from Germany continued, but
without the pressure and urgency that characterized the previous years. Furthermore, the
West German government seemed less interested in promoting immigration, prompting
the CLWR to question in 1954 whether “this may be the last big year for migration from
Germany.”452 Germany’s slight recovery allowed the CLWR to begin looking elsewhere
to send its relief. By the early 1950s, the CLWR discussed allocating a portion of their
relief work to the needy in Korea, Syria, and Palestine.453 Relief work in Germany
became so routine by 1953 that it barely warranted discussion among the CLWR
executive. While the executive started to earnestly discuss providing clothing to other
nations around the globe, the program for German relief largely ran itself. In the
organization’s minutes that year, the secretary simply recorded “this matter is selfexplanatory” under the section for Germany.454 By 1953, the clothing and food campaigns
for Germany proved well established and in little need of heavy monitoring. The CLWR
felt comfortable with their decision to prioritize other nations starting in the mid-1950s
largely because their American peers “continued to ship foodstuffs in quantities
amounting to thousands of tons” to Germany.455 With their American peers now helping,
they could turn their attention elsewhere.
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The Missouri Synod also surrendered its involvement in immigration work to the
NLC during the mid-1950s. Their withdrawal from DP work, however, was motivated
primarily by theological differences. The Missouri Synod promised to pay for a portion of
the NLC’s immigration work, but slowly started to claw back its financial commitments
throughout the 1950s. By 1955, Meyer threatened to completely pull the synod’s funding.
Although he officially claimed that DP work was simply too expensive for the synod to
continue, the synod’s traditional stance on letting individual congregations conduct DP
work lay at the heart of his reasoning.456 He argued that congregations would be better
suited to determine budgets and run DP work than national organizations like the NLC.457
Although the synod continued to contribute to DP work financially, their moral
investment in the cooperative NLC cause started to wane after 1955.
The CLWR’s slow withdrawal from German DP work strained the previously
positive transnational connections between North American Lutherans. With Germany
showing signs of recovery, the various groups of North American Lutherans had less
reason to cooperate as urgently as before. The internal dynamics of the CLWR also
weakened the relationship between American and Canadian Lutherans. Since its
inception, the CLWR represented a shaky alliance between Lutherans in Western Canada
and Ontario. Pastors in Western Canada interpreted the CLWR as the creation of a united
group of Canadian Lutherans that would prioritize Canadian Lutheran affairs and
eliminate competition between Lutheran synods. They believed that the CLWR would
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grant them a national platform to exercise a political agenda along the same lines as other
Protestant denominations in Canada, such as the Anglican or United churches. In contrast,
members of the Canada Synod saw the CLWR as the first step to cooperating with other
global Lutheran bodies.458 Pastors from the Canada Synod advocated for cooperation with
American Lutherans due to their historic relationships with the ULCA and Missouri
Synod. Transnational ties were the norm for both groups, and they hoped to continue
working with American Lutherans and international Lutheran institutions like the
Lutheran World Federation (LWF). Western Canada pastors saw the CLWR’s creation as
a national moment, whereas the Canada Synod saw it through a global lens.
The competing perspectives between CLWR members in the West and in Ontario
often led to passive aggressive arguments that motivated both sides to try and claim as
many leadership positions within the organization as possible.459 By the 1950s, however,
it became clear to both sides the CLWR’s leadership primarily consisted of pastors from
Western Canada. Herzer, alongside his peers Earl Treusch and Clifton Monk, dominated
CLWR affairs. Their vision of the CLWR as an independent and nationalist body often
came at the expense of American cooperation by the late 1950s. With the actual
admission of DPs slowing in the late 1950s, Monk believed that the CLWR needed to
transition from encouraging immigration to providing social services for DPs in Canada.
Finding housing, employment, and improving language skills were all services that the
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CLWR could theoretically provide. Monk, somewhat enviously, noted that the Canada
Synod already sponsored several “immigration service centers” in Ontario cities that
provided these services. Monk proposed that the CLWR create several of these centers in
Western Canadian cities with large DP populations as well. As the CLWR’s future lay in
providing social services, he proposed that the CLWR sponsor the creation of these
centers while also assuming control of the Canada Synod’s immigration centers. The
CLWR would become integral to DP work in Canada at a national level and continue to
help German immigrants once they arrived in Canada.
Monk did not have a vision of this future beyond these vague plans of expansion.
He did little to account for the Canada Synod’s relationship with the ULCA, which
helped them finance these immigration centers. Bengt Hoffman, who had positions in
both the ULCA and LWF, doubted the feasibility of Monk’s plan. He told Monk that he
assumed “that the ULCA will agree to CLWR taking over their centres…But this
approach will not solve the larger question of over-all co-ordination.”460 Monk’s
imprecise plans did not clarify whether the CLWR would continue a partnership with the
American ULCA or terminate this relationship in the name of Canadian nationalism and
CLWR independence. Monk contacted Earl Treusch, another ecumenically-minded pastor
in Western Canada, in the following weeks in order to devise a budget for the proposed
immigration centers. The two men estimated that a $50,000 loan would help them fulfill
their vision of opening and maintaining new centers for DPs. They subsequently put
forward a proposal requesting funds “for Canadian Missions for the purpose of reclaiming
new Canadian Lutherans for the Lutheran Church.”461 Rather than addressing Hoffman’s
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concerns, the proposal sat uneasily between CLWR idealism and reality. Monk and
Treusch wanted the immigration centers to strengthen Canadian control over Canadian
Lutheran affairs, while simultaneously requesting money from global and American
Lutheran organizations to do so.
American Lutherans resented the CLWR’s request for money couched in the
language of Canadian nationalism. Paul Empie, one of the NLC’s executives, commented
that the proposal was “a little peculiar” that the CLWR would ask them to “subsidize
work in Canada which was the regular responsibility of the churches which operate
there.”462 Empie suspected that Monk and Treusch did not inquire as to whether the
Canada Synod and ULCA approved of such a request that would, after all, take away
their authority over immigration centers. “I would feel very uneasy in considering a
request of this magnitude and significance which had not come before us with the
knowledge and approval of the proper officials of church bodies concerned,” Empie later
commented.463 The LWF ultimately postponed ruling on the Canadian request for more
money. They passed a resolution stating that “since these projects would still have to be
discussed between Canadian and US church leaders no action could be taken at this
time.”464
The LWF’s decision wounded Monk and Treusch’s egos and emboldened the
proposals’ American and Canada Synod’s critics. The latter two groups both felt as
though Treusch and Monk overstepped their authority in submitting the proposal prior to
receiving proper consent from them. Albert Jacobi, then the president of the Canada
Synod, kept careful watch of the whole affair. Jacobi wrote to Treusch to let him know
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that he “was never too enthusiastic about the ‘Brief” which was to have been submitted to
the Lutheran World Service, for obvious reasons.”465 He urged Treusch and Monk to
continue working with American Lutherans towards their goals instead of their
nationalistic tendency to put Canada first.
“Why not point out to the parent bodies the tremendous needs and responsibilities confronting us
in Home Missions etc., advising them that to adequately meet these needs demands more than can
be accomplished by the individual church but calls for all bodies to work together. It would be our
responsibility to spell out how this could and should be done and it goes without saying that we
must give very careful thought to what we submit. In other words Earl [Treusch] I’m suggesting
that we discuss this matter…”466

Jacobi recognized that cooperating with the Americans could be difficult yet ultimately
necessary if they wished to adequately meet the needs of DPs.
Jacobi’s conciliatory tone did little to quell Monk’s temper. Monk took particular
offense to the suggestion that Canadian Lutherans needed to work with their American
counterparts if they wished to receive “subsidies” from the LWF. “I do not look upon any
money received by the CLWR from the LWF, Geneva, as a subsidy,” Monk wrote. “In
reality LWF is really contributing money for services rendered.”467 Monk’s attitude tested
the generally patient American Lutheran leadership. Hoffman replied that “I know that
the Lutheran churches in Canada would by and large like to be independent in all
respects. However, as long as they are not, I see no other solution to the question of new
migration projects than clearance with the American Lutheran churches.”468 The control
exerted by Western Canadian pastors tested the previous transnational relationship
between Canadian and American Lutherans. While the DP crisis of the mid-1940s
provided the impetus for Canadian and American Lutherans to work side by side to help
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their fellow Germans, the Western Canadian attitudes towards immigration work
demonstrated that nationality, over ethnicity, became a larger factor by the late 1950s.
By the end of the 1950s, both the CLWR and the Missouri Synod started to
reassess their financial commitments to immigration work. The Missouri Synod, for
instance, opened its 1958 meeting with the frank declaration that its work for the year
1958 “will probably not be spectacular.”469 Not coincidentally, the ULCA substantially
decreased their financial support for immigration work in Canada starting in 1958. They
reduced their budget for Canadian immigration by fifty percent in the years 1958 and
1959, causing the CLWR to reconsider its future work as well.470 “In a sense we are now
at the cross-roads in the life of C.L.W.R.,” Monk noted. “For a number of years our
immigration and resettlement program was operating at full-throttle. Now we are coasting
along.”471 Although organizations like the CLWR continued to operate with renewed
interest in relief and refugees from Asia, the structures they put in place for German and
Lutheran DPs largely started to fade away by the late 1950s and early 1960s.472

Conclusion

Publicity material distributed by the Missouri and Canada Synods often relied on
Biblical passages in order to motivate their laypeople to donate charitably to their many
fundraising campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s. Both synods quoted frequently from
Matthew 25:35: “For I was hungry, and you gave me something to eat. I was thirsty, and
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you gave me something to drink. I was a stranger, and you took me in.” The passage aptly
represents the charitable spirit pastors wished to instill in their followers and encouraged
them to assist a German or Lutheran stranger they had likely never met. Yet, “stranger”
does not fully capture how German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans
conceptualized needy Germans and Lutheran DPs following the war, either. German
Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County freely gave their time, money, and resources
to help German Lutherans in Europe due to a sense of ethnic and religious solidarity. The
postwar climate was not inherently friendly to the German people, nor could other
religious groups be trusted to help Lutherans DPs with the same understanding and
compassion that those in St. Louis and Waterloo County believed they could. Through
their involvements with organizations like the CLWR, pastors took leading roles in acting
as the voice of the Volksdeutsche overseas. As ethnic elites, they showed compassion to
German Lutherans when they felt certain that no others in Canadian or American society
would.
Despite the tensions and clashes competing identities posed, the German Lutheran
communities in St. Louis and Waterloo County successfully met their goals of providing
relief overseas and bringing Lutheran DPs to North America. Theology and gender
determined how Lutherans completed this work, but the transnational relationships and
white privilege in both Lutheran communities ensured it was successful. Uniting behind
their shared ethnicity and faith, organizations like the CLWR managed to fulfill their
mandate thanks to their transnational connections with St. Louis. As German-American
Lutherans in St. Louis could not help their brethren as easily due to slow-moving
immigration policy, they were able to meet their goals by helping DPs find passage to
Canada. This transnational relationship allowed both parties to fulfill their goals when
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their respective nation states seemed to place them in doubt. Furthermore, organizations
like the CLWR and the Volksdeutsche alike benefitted from appealing to Canadian
politicians as Christians and members of the white race. Lutherans eschewed the religious
parochialism government officials resented in order to present a common Christian
identity that resonated with Anglo-Canadian MPs and their core values of providing
humanitarian relief and charity. The Volksdeutsche benefited enormously from the
immigration debates of the late 1940s that stoked white Canadian fears that broad
immigration reform would diminish Canada’s white character. Canadian politicians
willingly looked past the Nazi backgrounds of the Volksdeutsche due to their shared
whiteness as a result. The transnational connections between Canadian and American
Lutherans made German and Lutheran immigration to North America a practical reality,
while their race and religion justified it at an ideological level.
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Chapter 4: Returning to the Land of Luther: The Campaign to Rebuild West
Germany, 1945-1960
“Europe calls for aid!” was a popular phrase within German Lutheran circles in St.
Louis and Waterloo County during the 1940s and 1950s. Newsletters and synod-produced
material frequently featured photos of West German cities destroyed by the Allied
bombing campaign and starving German civilians living in the rubble of their former
homes. As presidents of the Missouri and Canada synods, John Behnken and John Reble
publicized Germany’s dire political, social, and spiritual conditions after six years of war
and thirteen years of Nazi rule. Beginning in 1945, Behnken and Reble mobilized support
within their communities to raise money, food, and clothing, to help Germany recover
from the devastation of the war. Germany was in a desperate state, and the two Lutheran
leaders believed that it was their duty as fellow Germans and Lutherans to return to
Germany and help the “land of Luther” recover.
Lutheran efforts to help rebuild Germany from the war did not simply end with
raising money and shipping goods overseas. Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, pastors
travelled to West Germany to distribute aid and assess the needs of the Lutheran church
in Germany. While the previous chapter examined how German Lutherans mobilized
support to send aid overseas and alter immigration laws, this chapter details two synodsponsored programs that brought the Missouri and Canada Synods into direct contact with
Lutherans in West Germany. First, the Missouri Synod embarked on an ambitious plan to
help rebuild conservative Lutheranism in Europe. The war severely damaged Lutheran
churches and many pastors had been killed or went missing as a result. Under Behnken’s
leadership, the synod created an informal missionary program in which Missouri Synod
pastors travelled to West Germany to “educate” German Lutherans about the synod’s
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conservative theology. Second, Reble initiated a “chaplaincy program” in the mid-1950s
that sent several Canada Synod pastors overseas to accompany German displaced persons
from Germany to Canada. Reble’s program was a logical extension of the Canada
Synod’s effort to promote Volksdeutsche immigration to Canada after their legislative
successes.
This chapter examines how both programs highlighted the ways in which pastors
continued to enforce their roles as cultural brokers. Efforts to rebuild West Germany
caused pastors to use their knowledge of the German language and culture to try to
promote positive relations between German civilians and the Allied military governments
that controlled West Germany throughout the 1940s and 1950s. As both Germans and
Canadians/Americans, pastors believed they had a unique obligation to turn former
enemies into new allies. This chapter details several theological conferences known as
“Bad Bolls” organized by the Missouri Synod to help “explain” and “educate” West
Germans about American democracy and North American Lutheranism. It examines how
Reble and Behnken brought West German pastors on trips to Canada and the United
States as part of the West’s emphasis on promoting democracy during the Cold War. This
chapter also describes the deeply personal, ethnic journeys that North American
Lutherans experience as they completed missionary work in West Germany. While
working in West Germany, pastors revitalized or “reinvented” their ethnic German
identities. During the Second World War, pastors had downplayed their ethnic heritage or
centered it within the ethnic boundary zone of the Lutheran church. Postwar engagement
with Germany created the opportunity for their ethnicity to once again become associated
with the German “homeland.” Indeed, both Reble and Behnken started to value pastors
that had an intimate knowledge of the German language, culture, and history. Trips to
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Germany functioned as more than mere humanitarian or bureaucratic visits. Members of
the Missouri and Canada Synod expected to be welcomed “home” as fellow Germans and
coreligionists when they arrived in West Germany.
Missionary activity in West Germany, however, did not lead ethnic elites to once
again craft an ethnicity centered around their German homeland, as with nineteenth
century immigrants.473 By examining the relationship between Missouri and Canada
Synod missionaries and West Germans, this chapter argues that while missionaries
believed they were “true Germans,” the West Germans they encountered treated them
strictly as “Amerikaners.” West Germans used the Missouri and Canada Synod for their
financial and physical aid, but showed no interest in their imagined ties of ethnic
solidarity. After fighting two world wars against Canada and the United States, West
Germans had difficulty looking beyond the national identities of their Lutheran
coreligionists. Attempts to “educate” Germans on American and Lutheran ways appeared
as yet another American attempt to “conquer” and “control” aspects of German life. The
lukewarm reception pastors received ensured that the idea of a German homeland was an
unsustainable and temporary portion of their constructed ethnicity. Behnken and Reble’s
efforts to rebuild Germany once again questions the traditional assumption that Germans
in North America ceased practicing an ethnic identity during the first half of the twentieth
century. Their renewed relationship with Germany during the 1940s and 1950s
demonstrates that a German ethnic identity continued to exist in St. Louis and Waterloo
County well into the postwar period, even if it was not reciprocated by their West German
See for example Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Ethnicity as Festive Culture: German-America on Parade,” in
The Invention of Ethnicity, ed. Werner Sollors (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Barbara
Lorenzkowski, “Germania in Canada – Nation and Ethnicity at the German Peace Jubilees of 1871,” in
Beyond the Nation?: Immigrants’ Local Lives in Transnational Cultures, ed. Alexander Freund (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2012).
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peers. Ultimately, these trips abroad highlighted the competing ethnic, religious, and
national identities of members of Canada and Missouri Synods. While a common ethnic
and shared religion created the conditions in which North American Lutherans could
create a transnational relationship with West Germans, their nationality prevented this
vision from taking root.

Creating a Policy for Providing Relief to West Germany

Members of the Missouri Synod began to discuss Germany’s postwar condition
after the successful Allied invasion of Europe in June 1944. By combining various media
accounts and knowledge of Germany prior to the war, synod officials concluded that
Germany’s Lutheran churches experienced persecution under Nazi rule. They estimated
that many of the country’s leading seminaries and churches were “bombed out of
existence” as a result of the Allied bombing campaign. Synod leaders also worried that
the Nazis conscripted Lutheran pastors to fight in the German army, thereby leaving the
Lutheran church leaderless.474 Pastors also knew that Lutheranism in Germany was
divided primarily into two groups. The first group, the Landeskirche or “State Churches,”
included a loose fellowship of Lutheran, Reformed, and United churches combined under
one governing body. These churches placed little importance on doctrinal unity and
treated theological issues more liberally than the Missouri Synod. Shortly after the war,
this group organized a formal union called the Evangelical Church in Germany,
commonly referred to as EKiD. The second group consisted of the Freikirche, or “Free
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Churches.” In an effort to remain conservatively Lutheran, the Free Churches refused to
enter into fellowship with liberal Lutherans and declined to join EKiD. Their conservative
nature made them natural allies of the Missouri Synod, who even provided them with
small amounts of funding before the war began.475
Synod leaders worried that West Germans would lose their Lutheran faith after the
devastation of the war. Germany’s Lutherans no longer had the basic infrastructure that
pastors, seminaries, and churches provided. The Free Church’s conservative theology
ensured that the synod placed its “primary concern” with helping to rebuild the Free
Church seminaries and churches.476 However, initial planning at a 1944 synod convention
emphasized that the synod would “not confine its postwar relief to the Freikirche.” The
synod agreed to also provide aid for the State Churches to help them recover in the
aftermath of the war as a “labour of love to the fellow members of the body of Christ.”477
West German Lutherans may have been unable to help themselves, but American wealth
could help the Lutheran church abroad recover. Synod leaders hoped that “our Church,
blessed as it is spiritually and physically” could help Lutheranism in Germany thrive once
more. “The Lutheran Church of Europe is in serious danger of disintegration unless it
receives help from the Lutheran churches of America,” they concluded.478
Ethnic elites in St. Louis believed they needed to provide Germans with physical
and spiritual relief on the basis of their shared religious and ethnic ties. One pastor
commented that “we, as Lutherans and children of the Reformation, believe we have a
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special postwar obligation to fulfill not only in Europe at large, but especially in the land
which gave birth to the Reformation.”479 Lawrence Meyer, who later travelled to West
Germany to distribute aid, became one of the synod’s most vocal proponents for helping
Germany. In a public appeal in the Lutheran Witness, Meyer argued that “the Lutheran
Churches of America are the children of the Lutheran Church of Europe. Our heritage
came from Europe. We must help to preserve Lutheranism in Europe.”480 Pastors often
relied on the symbol of Germany as the “birthplace” or “parent” of North American
Lutheranism to argue for the synod’s obligation to help. One pastor believed that the
German people would also understand this relationship. He imagined the German people
calling out to “bring us the Gospel as once our forefathers brought it unto you.”481 These
calls to arms on the basis of a shared ethnic and religious heritage made it clear to synod
members why they needed to help Germany. Pastors felt a clear need to help Germany
recover from the war’s devastation as the descendants of German Lutheranism.
Declarations of ethnic and religious fellowship, however, did not produce a
tangible strategy on how to provide physical and spiritual aid to Germany. In order to
solidify a plan, Behnken travelled to West Germany in October 1945 to meet with civic
and religious leaders. Aside from the various Missouri Synod chaplains in the military, he
was the first representative of the Missouri Synod to visit Germany since war began in
1939. Behnken’s two-month visit made the synod leader realize just how dramatically the
war had altered Germany’s religious landscape. From October to December 1945,
Behnken met with various State and Free Church pastors and learned that the two groups
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had radically different theological positions as a result of their experiences during the
Second World War. Behnken discovered that prominent European theologians Karl Barth
and Martin Niemoeller had seized control of EKiD and intended to unite all Protestants in
Europe within its organization. Unlike the relatively minor theological differences
amongst North American synods, Barth and Niemoeller advocated for an extreme and
liberal Lutheranism that opposed some of the Missouri Synod’s most important beliefs.
Barth, Niemoeller, and their EKiD allies believed that Germany’s Lutherans were
responsible for Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. Niemoeller in particular cited Martin
Luther’s belief in the “two kingdoms” or Romans 13 as an example of problematic
Lutheran theology that allowed Hitler to control Nazi Germany. Just as Romans 13 stated
that church and state must be kept separate, Niemoeller suggested that Lutherans
passively accepted Hitler and his reign of terror as it was a state, and not religious, affair.
He believed that Lutherans needed to believe that state and church should cooperate in
order to resist future authoritarian regimes. Conservative Lutheran theology, Niemoeller
surmised, helped perpetrate the Holocaust and Hitler’s brutal war.482 Originally from
Sweden, Barth was even more critical of Germany’s Lutheran population. Barth believed
that Hitler’s hatred of the Jewish people could be traced back to Luther’s anti-Semitic
comments and beliefs. Since conservative Lutherans supposedly accepted Luther’s words
as unchallenged fact, Barth believed modern Lutherans turned a blind eye towards
Hitler’s anti-Semitic crimes due to their own racism justified through faith.483 Thus, Barth
and Niemoeller believed EKiD needed to unite Germany’s Protestants into one single
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body that would work cooperatively with the state to ensure another dictator like Hitler
never rose to power again.
Barth and Niemoeller’s comments placed them in opposition to the Missouri
Synod’s conservative Lutheran doctrine. The violation of Romans 13 jeopardized,
according to conservative Lutherans, their ability to practice Lehre or “pure doctrine.” If
Lutherans started blurring the line between church and state as EKiD’s members
suggested, the government could begin to influence Lutheran interpretations of the Bible.
Any attempts by the state to alter the conservative Lutherans interpretation that the Bible
was inerrant and the final authority of God would essentially jeopardize the purity of their
faith.484 Free Church pastors believed EKiD wished to dilute their conservative doctrine
and resented Barth’s anti-German sentiments. After meeting with these concerned Free
Church Lutherans during his trip, Behnken concluded that “Lutheranism in Germany
faces a fight for its very existence.” He feared that “decades of liberalism, higher
criticism, rationalism at the theological schools” in Germany influenced EKiD, and could
even foreshadow “the death-knell of the Lutheran Church in this country.”485 Behnken
realized that he could not support EKiD when its leaders so clearly violated Missouri’s
theology. As a result, Behnken developed close ties with Free Church pastors in an effort
to help them stave off the influence of EKiD’s liberalism during his two-month visit.
Theological meetings with Free Church pastors occupied the majority of
Behnken’s trip to West Germany. However, Behnken could not ignore the overwhelming
poverty facing many civilians and refugees as he met with Lutheran pastors. Witnessing
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the war’s devastating impact on German civilians left a deep emotional impact on
Behnken. He often relayed the personal stories of individual Germans he met during his
visit and included details of their suffering in his letters home. Orphaned children and
homeless families featured prominently in his correspondence. Behnken could not escape
witnessing these horrors daily, and German suffering continued to haunt him at night:
The cruel specters of rubble and debris, of demolished homes and business houses rise up before
your eyes like ghosts in the night. These horrible sights haunt you. You lie awake and think of the
millions whose properties were utterly destroyed, the hundreds of thousands who lost their lives or
were wounded and crippled. You see the streams of homeless and hopeless refugees roaming around
for some place to sleep or perhaps to die.486

Behnken decried the lack of state support available to refugees and noticed that they “are
not welcome anywhere.” He believed that if their situation was not remedied soon, that
“millions will die this winter because of undernourishment or lack of clothing.”487 He
concluded that “Europe’s greatest and most urgent need today is the feeding and clothing
and housing of more than ten million refugees.”488
Behnken bore witness to Germany’s refugee plight as well as EKiD’s movement
against conservative Lutheranism during his visit abroad. Both factors shaped how he
believed the Missouri Synod should address its campaign to help rebuild Germany
spiritually and physically. Behnken reconsidered the synod’s previous policy of providing
aid to both the Free and State churches. His meetings with Free Church pastors led to an
informal policy of providing aid primarily to churches that supported conservative
Lutheranism. For instance, after two Free Church pastors vigorously condemned
Niemoeller and EKiD, Behnken declared that these “men are ready to fight and die for
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Lutheranism.” In return for their support, Behnken arranged subsequent meetings with
them to discuss how the Missouri Synod could meet “their present physical needs” and
discuss “the doctrine of God’s Word.”489 Behnken continued to conflate doctrinal
agreement and relief when he met with more Free Church congregations. He opened a
meeting with Free Church Lutherans in the small town of Gross-Oesingen in November
1945 by using expressions of familial solidarity. The Missouri Synod would provide them
with both spiritual and physical aid. Behnken told his audience of Free Church Germans
that “we come to you as brethren meeting brethren. We are ready to help you in your
temporal and spiritual needs wherever you require our assistance.” He told his audience
of pastors and refugees that “the Missouri Synod is prepared to support the weak and,
above all, to back up the Lutheran Church in the homeland of the Reformation. It will aid
the Free Churches in their fight” against liberal Lutheranism and the earthly battle against
starvation.490 Physical aid and theological agreement became increasingly intertwined as
Behnken aimed to help his fellow Germans. His concern for the survival of conservative
Lutheranism and the German people alike shaped a policy that emphasized physical relief
to the spiritually conservative.
A personal connection with German refugees on the basis of his ethnicity and a
religious connection to conservative Lutheranism shaped Behnken’s attitude when he
returned to the United States in December 1945. He believed that both the German people
and conservative Lutheranism could face extinction if the Missouri Synod did not spring
to action. The degree to which German Americans came to Germany’s aid, he stated,
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“will mean either triumph or defeat for the Lutheran cause” in all of Europe.491 Behnken
immediately started to collaborate with Meyer and other St. Louis pastors to convince the
synod’s laypeople to send money, clothing, and food to Germany. In his articles and
speeches, Behnken drew on the synod’s German heritage to motivate laypeople to send
aid to Germany. Behnken reminded his audience that “the refugees are people of German
extraction” who were incidentally “citizens of Poland, Latvia, Austria, etc.”492 In
emphasizing the ethnicity of the refugees, Behnken articulated his own understanding of
the relationship between ethnicity and nationality. He viewed the nationality of these
refugees as secondary to their ethnic identities. Behnken hoped members of the Missouri
Synod would ignore both the European nationalities of the refugees, as well as their own
American nationality, in order to help their fellow Germans. Cultivating a common
identity as ethnic Germans was the most likely way to gain aid for ailing refugees.
As practitioners of the liberal Lutheranism that the Missouri Synod opposed, the
Canada Synod felt little need to help Germany theologically after the war. EKiD’s
success in uniting European Lutherans into one organizing body ensured that they did not
need the Canada Synod’s aid for theological assistance. However, members of the Canada
Synod participated in the process of renewing ties to Germany by participating directly in
humanitarian efforts to help German civilians and DPs. In 1953, Reble retired as
president of the Canada Synod and moved to Bremen, West Germany, in order to
dedicate himself to conducting charitable work among German DPs. While overseas,
Reble developed a concern that the many DPs travelling from West Germany to Canada
lacked spiritual care during their voyage to North America. He worried that the trip
491
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caused DPs undue stress and that their journey could be made less burdensome if a
Lutheran pastor accompanied them. In the mid-1950s, Reble devised a plan he called the
“chaplaincy program” as a result.493 The program sought to help DPs by hiring German
and Canada Synod pastors to accompany synod-sponsored ships carrying German
refugees to Canada. Pastors could preach to the DPs as well as offering more practical
advice on life in Canada. While Reble’s plan for postwar Germany did not involve the
same theological components as Behnken’s, he nonetheless devised a plan that would
strengthen ties between his synod and German Lutherans abroad.

Missionary Work as an Ethnic Experience

Behnken and Reble’s plans to assist West Germany directly influenced how ethnic
elites in both synods engaged with their German ethnic identities. Their plans involved
sending “missionaries” (or “chaplains”) overseas to Germany to implement their
respective relief campaigns. The pastors selected by Behnken and Reble highlight that the
two men understood relief work in Germany as a way to reignite the German heritage of
their synods. The Missouri Synod’s Board of European Affairs, the committee in charge
of overseeing the synod’s relief program, sent Walter Daib and Frank Mayer to West
Germany to act as permanent representatives of the Missouri Synod overseas in 1946. As
“missionaries,” the Board tasked Daib and Mayer with fostering goodwill between the
Missouri Synod and the Free Churches, while trying to convince State Churches to
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remain independent of EKiD.494 Behnken carefully considered and selected missionaries
such as Daib and Mayer due to their familiarity with German culture. By selecting first
and second-generation German immigrants like himself, Behnken prioritized pastors with
a strong knowledge of the German language, theology, and who often had firsthand
experience living in Germany. Reble used a similar criterion for selecting his chaplains.
He handpicked pastors that had a similar background to him, especially favouring those
from Waterloo County. For example, Reble advocated that the synod accept Otto
Stockmann as a candidate for a chaplaincy position. Just like Reble, Stockmann was born
in Germany and attended Kropp Seminary before immigrating to Canada in the early
twentieth century. Reble favoured Stockmann and pastors of their generation because
they were both familiar with the German language and with the immigrant experience. 495
Reble underscored that those selected “must command the German language” so that he
could both preach to the immigrants as well as converse with them about Canada.496 As
former immigrants, Reble believed those of his generation would be inherently
sympathetic towards the DPs. By selecting first-generation immigrants, Reble also
ensured that chaplains would have the unique ability to act as authorities on both Canada
and Germany. Their experience living in both countries ensured that they could council
the incoming DPs with knowledge of both nations.497 The selected missionaries and
chaplains viewed their positions through a similar ethnic lens. One chaplain reported that
“having been in Canada for more than thirty years, I feel I should be able to orientate” the

494

Reports and Memorials: Synodical Centennial Convention, 20-29 July 1947, p.277.
LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Reuben Baetz, 29 April 1955.
496
LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Ferdinand Howald, 29 November 1955.
497
LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Baetz, 29 April 1955.
495

207
new immigrants to Canadian life.498 He accepted Reble’s offer after “realizing that such a
trip to Germany would give me the opportunity of seeing relatives whom I have not seen
since 1930.”499 Whereas first and second-generation pastors like Behnken, Reble and
Stockmann had to mediate their German ethnicity during the Second World War, their
ethnicity became an asset that could help foster a stronger community among North
Americans, Germans, and new immigrants.
Missionary work in West Germany, however, was more than simply a religious
endeavor. It also provided a way for missionaries to reconnect with their ethnic identities
as Germans. For many pastors, Germany was literally ‘the land of their fathers.’
Missionaries took the opportunity to visit family members or visit sites of familial
importance while working overseas. During his 1946 visit, Mayer drove over sixty miles
in order to visit his “tante.” He travelled to her home in Muenster where he updated her
on “all the happenings in our family since the outbreak of the war.” The visit renewed
Mayer’s spirits and he hoped “to be able to see her again” before he had to return to the
United States.500 Similarly, Herman Harms, Vice-President of the Missouri Synod, took
time out of his work schedule to visit relatives that he had not seen since his last visit to
Germany in 1908. He visited his mother’s hometown where his four siblings still lived.
During these “hometown” visits, Mayer and Harms visited the Lutheran churches where
their grandfathers, also Lutheran pastors, preached when they lived in Germany.501 Mayer
toured the church cemetery and paid his respects at his grandfather’s grave.502 Unlike
first-generation immigrants who had tangible and existing connections to Germany,
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second-generation pastors often did not have living relatives in Germany with whom they
remained in contact. Yet, second-generation pastors such as J.T. Mueller also made trips
to the hometowns and Lutheran congregations of their parents. During his 1949 trip
overseas, Mueller hoped for a break in missionary work so that he could travel to “a little
town called Haina, Hesse, from which my father came” so that he could “consult the
church records” to find information on his father’s life prior to his immigration.503
Visits with relatives and pilgrimages to churches of familial importance
functioned as more than mere personal journeys. These men saw their connection with
Germany as important for all North American Lutherans to acknowledge. Reble spent
several days touring the small town of Kropp in northern Germany while he lived
overseas. Like Stockmann and several other Canada Synod pastors, Reble studied to
become a pastor at the Kropp Seminary as a young man before immigrating to Canada in
the early twentieth century. Visiting the town prompted Reble to question “where would
our Church in Canada be today” if Kropp Seminary had not supplied so many pastors to
North America. He believed that if the leadership at Kropp had not sent missionaries to
North America beginning in the 1880s, North America “would have suffered even
heavier losses among the German speaking Lutherans.” Yet, thanks to Kropp’s training,
he and other Canada Synod pastors maintained Lutheranism in Canada decades after their
arrival. In his mind, Kropp provided the origin and the growth for Lutheranism in “the
Midwest States” and Canada.504
Visits “home” to Germany allowed pastors from St. Louis and Waterloo County
to reconnect with their German roots. Most of these trips occurred shortly after the
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Second World War, a time in which pastors had to downplay their German heritage for
fear of facing government internment or discrimination. After at least six years of viewing
their German ethnicity as a source of anxiety, pastors felt relieved to be able to once again
openly connect with their birthplace or that of their parents. As Kathleen Neils Conzen
and others have made clear, examining ethnicity as a social construct allows for ethnic
identities to wax and wane as social circumstances change.505 Although pastors may have
temporarily stopped publicly identifying as Germans during the war, travelling to
Germany after the war’s conclusion allowed them to reclaim that identity with pride. As
first and second-generation pastors sought to rebuild Germany from the ruins of war, so
too did they start to rebuild their German ethnicities by connecting with the “land of
Luther.”

Ethnicity, Nationality, and Denazification at the Bad Boll Conferences

The Missouri and Canada Synod programs coincided with Allied attempts to
dismantle the Nazi state and eliminate Nazis from all levels of German government. This
process, commonly referred to as “denazification,” began in early 1947 as a result of
increasing tensions in the Cold War. American politicians initially favoured punishing
Germany for its crimes and subscribed to the idea of “collective guilt” that blamed all
Germans for willfully participating in another world war. By 1947, however, American
elites worried that severely punishing Germany would turn its citizens towards radical
political philosophies like communism instead of embracing democracy. They realized
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that West Germany could become a powerful propaganda tool in which to demonstrate to
the world the benefits of democracy in contrast to the Soviet Union’s communism. Lucius
Clay, the general responsible for overseeing civil affairs during the American occupation
of West Germany, gradually became convinced that Germany could become a
democracy. Americans, however, could not simply declare West Germany a democracy
overnight. They needed to teach democratic values and encourage Germans to study and
practice democratic beliefs. This philosophy made Clay an early proponent of German
elections and trying to rehabilitate German political culture to mirror America’s.506 The
introduction of the Marshall Plan in 1948 signified that the United States was more
interested in turning West Germany into an economically stable democracy than
punishing its citizens for the war. A recovered German economy, American politicians
hoped, would help stave off the influence of Soviet communism.507
The Missouri and Canada Synods naturally favoured this more paternalistic and
benevolent attitude towards West German recovery. Formal denazification, as opposed to
collective punishment, resonated with North American Lutherans that believed the
Second World War represented the wishes of a Nazi minority rather than the majority of
the German people. Missionaries eagerly embraced denazification as it resonated with
their roles as cultural brokers. As ethnic elites, Missouri and Canada Synod pastors
believed they had a unique role to play in fostering a better understanding between the
United States, Canada, and West Germany. Several Lutheran initiatives in late 1940s
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attempted to “reeducate” West German pastors after living under Nazi rule. Meyer, for
example, suggested that the synod establish a series of scholarships to Valparaiso
University specifically intended for German pastors. “The quicker we institute an
exchange of students,” Meyer reasoned, “the quicker Germany will be taught how the rest
of the world lives and what it thinks.”508 The program, formally implemented in 1947,
involved German pastors enrolling in courses at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis. They
took several courses in conservative theology “in order to condition them to come back to
Germany and introduce these subjects in the theological departments at the
universities.”509 Meyer also sought to bring prominent Free Church advocates to St.
Louis in order for them to gain “first hand insight into our system of separation of Church
and State.” This, he hoped, would show more forcefully the benefits of conservative
Lutheranism and would give them greater confidence in preaching such doctrines back
home in Germany.510 The Canada Synod initiated a similar program under Reble’s
leadership. Reble arranged for West German pastors to visit prominent Canada Synod
congregations in Montreal, Kitchener, and Winnipeg so these pastors could “renew old
friendships and establish new contacts” in Canada.511 In these instances denazification
and the Missouri and Canada Synods’ goals worked in tandem. Anglo-Americans wanted
to educate West Germans about American democracy, and ethnic elites hoped to
reconnect St. Louis and Waterloo County with their German homelands.
The Missouri Synod in particular successfully combined the American process of
denazification with efforts to rebuild conservative Lutheranism in West Germany. In
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order to increase their influence over Free Church congregations, Missouri’s missionaries
started to host interdenominational theological conferences in 1947. These conferences,
colloquially known as “Bad Boll” conferences as they took place in a municipality of the
same name, brought together Missouri, Free, and State Church pastors in order to discuss
the theological problems confronting Lutheranism in postwar Europe. In practice, the
conferences functioned as a way for Missouri Synod missionaries to demonstrate the
strength of the Missouri Synod’s conservative theology. Meyer explained the motivations
for these conferences by emphasizing the threat EKiD posed to conservative Lutheranism.
He believed that “there is great danger of Barth’s becoming the religious dictator of
Lutheranism in Germany. While there are many staunch Lutherans…the great bulk of
Lutheran clergy are not well enough founded to immediately recognize the pitfalls of
Barth’s” liberal theology.512 Members of the Missouri Synod hoped the Bad Boll
conferences would convert German pastors to conservative Lutheranism. “This is by far
the most important and the largest project undertaken by any American Church body in
Germany,” Meyer noted.513 Meyer and other missionaries justified expending resources to
host Bad Boll conferences in the language of denazification. They drew upon their ethnic
identities as Germans to argue why they could “educate” Germans more effectively than
their Anglo-American counterparts that occupied West Germany through military and
political force. After several years of American occupation, pastors believed that West
Germans would benefit from being around those “who would treat Germans as fellow
humans and not as second class” citizens or ex-Nazis. Unlike other Americans that
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Germans encountered, pastors promised not to “act like the troops of occupation.”514 As
both Germans and Americans, Missouri Synod pastors believed they could connect with
West Germans in ways their Anglo-American peers could not.
In fact, the culture surrounding the Bad Boll conferences in the late 1940s often
functioned as yet another way for missionaries to connect with their ethnic identities.
Missouri Synod attendees used their free evenings to celebrate the German portion of
their identity by engaging in “German traditions.” At one conference, Meyer packed a
Volkswagen full of barrels of German beer for the nightly festivities where Missouri and
German pastors alike indulged in a healthy dose of the provisions. Perhaps as a result, the
Missouri pastors began to sing “traditional” German songs in hopes their German
brethren would participate as well. Behnken reportedly spent the night giving improvised
speeches on the similarities he noticed between the German-American communities and
Bavaria.515
German pastors, did not see their German-American colleagues as distant ethnic
cousins.
Although missionaries performed their German identities while abroad, West Germans
saw them through a national lens and always reminded their guests that they were
Americans, not Germans. In particular, the Missouri Synod’s tendency to discuss relief
alongside theological issues caused the Free and State Churches to doubt their sincerity.
Pastors in both the State and Free Churches often expressed their unease over the
tendency to blur these two issues. Mayer knew this and frequently responded to the
criticism that the Missouri Synod only provided relief for congregations that aligned with
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its theological positions. He stressed that theology and relief were unrelated during his
many meetings with German pastors. For instance, several German pastors expressed
disdain towards the Free Churches that allied themselves with the Missouri Synod during
Behnken’s 1945 visit. They noted that these congregations consequently received
substantial relief packages as a result of their union with Missouri. Mayer responded to
this charge by claiming this was merely coincidence. He described that certain Free
Churches and the Missouri Synod united on the basis of theological unity, rather than any
meddling on Behnken’s behalf or attempts to gain aid.516
Behnken’s subsequent directions to the missionaries, however, lent credibility to
the Free and State Churches’ accusations. Behnken warned Missouri Synod
representatives that they “must not commit [themselves] as though there were actual
fellowship” when meeting with the State Churches. Instead, they must “support every
effort toward” promoting “sounder Lutheranism” among their congregations. Behnken
instructed missionaries to give the State Churches “our moral as well as financial support.
The latter is true especially if they show actual interest for the cause of Lutheranism.”517
Of course, Behnken’s Lutheran “cause” meant doctrinal alignment with the Missouri
Synod and a rejection of EKiD. Essentially, they would grant relief “especially unto
Them Who are of the Household of Faith.”518 Although Behnken and the Missouri Synod
officially lent aid and relief to all German Lutherans, the level and volume of this relief
depended on theological alignment.
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Certain Lutheran congregations in Germany knew that accepting the Missouri
Synod’s aid would place pressure on them to accept conservative doctrine. While some of
the Free Churches were willing to make this deal, the majority of State Churches outright
rejected Missouri’s offers. In a meeting with several State Church leaders, Mayer saw that
there was “considerable opposition to Missouri Synod’s help” among these men. They
stated that they did “not want American help” and tended to agree with Barth’s position
on uniting the Protestant churches of Europe.519 Attempts to sway their position with the
possibility of aid did not work.
State and Free Churches rejected Missouri’s aid because of their staunch antiAmerican attitudes. Although Daib and Mayer expected to be greeted as ethnic cousins
and fellow coreligionists in the “land of Luther,” Germans viewed them through a
national, not ethnic, lens. As the official representatives of the Missouri Synod in
Germany, Mayer and Daib confronted the anti-American attitudes of German pastors
most frequently. In the summer of 1946, Mayer hosted a conference with the intent to
unite the Missouri Synod with some of the Free Churches that remained independent of
any synod. A Free Church pastor gave a strong speech that attacked the Missouri Synod
and its American attitudes. This pastor rejected union with other Free Churches since to
do so was “tantamount to a union with Missouri” and its “American ideals.” The pastor
continued to warn others not to trust the Missouri Synod’s promises. “The failure to carry
out Wilson’s 14 points” and America’s “record in two wars” showed that Americans
could not be counted as allies to the German people. He worried that any association with
the Missouri Synod “will estrange their people” from “German” Lutheranism.520 Mayer
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argued with the indignant pastor that such national distinctions were irrelevant when
theological unity could be achieved. In Mayer’s opinion, “there is no such thing as a
German or Indian Christian,” they were all simply Lutherans. When the Free Church
pastor again criticized the Missouri Synod for not being truly “German,” Mayer explained
that their Lutheranism was German “in the sense that it uses German language, methods,
etc.”521 Mayer’s argument drew on Behnken’s original appeal to German Americans to
help refugees on the basis of their ethnicity first, and their nationality second. In an
attempt to bring the Free Churches into fellowship with the Missouri Synod, Mayer
similarly downplayed nationality in favor of a common religious identity based on
German culture, not citizenship. True to the synod’s hybrid identity, Mayer believed that
being Lutheran meant you were inherently German and vice-versa. Yet, the German
pastor remained unconvinced. The Missouri Synod was simply too American to be
accepted among West German congregants.
American nationality hampered Daib’s ability to convince Free and State Church
pastors to join the Missouri Synod as well. During a July 1946 conference, a Free Church
pastor unaffiliated with the Missouri Synod spoke of the dangers they faced in uniting
with the Missouri Synod. He argued that Lutheranism in Germany “must be built within
the framework of the German people and their ideas” and not the “American importation”
that would dilute their religion. He believed that “Missouri has the intention of impressing
its own particular type of theology upon the other Free Churches” that was inherently
“foreign” to the conditions that Germany faced. Daib emphasized Mayer’s earlier point
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that the Free Church should not believe “that there was a specific type of Christianity for
Germans, another type for Americans, etc.”522
The antagonistic meetings between the Missouri Synod and German churches
considerably weakened Mayer and Daib’s morale. By the late summer of 1946, the two
men started to express doubt in their mission. Thus, when they met with the same group
of German pastors in late August, Mayer asked the Germans frankly “whether our help
was welcome.” The German pastors gave a diplomatic reply. They once again expressed
their fears that “all Missouri’s activity in its world-wide tasks has but one aim; to create
Missourian replicas of itself all over the world.” They made it clear that if the Missouri
Synod came to Germany “to Americanize…then [their] help was not welcome.”
However, one pastor acknowledged that if the Missouri Synod was “here to help in the
right way, then [Missouri’s] help will be gladly and gratefully received.”523 Of course, the
“right way” to help included using the Missouri Synod for its material power to gain
relief and aid to German civilians and refugees. In the interest of maintaining a
relationship with the Free Churches, Mayer was forced to concede and ask
“whether…there was something we could do from America that would be helpful” to the
Free Churches. The Free Church pastors responded with a list of material demands, which
ranged from providing food for their congregations to obtaining cars for themselves.524
Daib and Mayer’s interactions with the Free Churches demonstrate that German
pastors entered these meetings with objectives that differed and conflicted with those of
the Missouri Synod. Daib and Mayer assumed that their German ancestry and
Lutheranism would grant them authority among the Free Churches, because Germany
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was the homeland of both their relatives and religion. In their minds, these transnational
ties overrode their nationality and identities as Americans. The lukewarm reception
Germans gave Daib and Mayer, however, indicates that Germans viewed these
interactions in the reverse. Daib and Mayer were not Germans, but rather yet another
example of Americans intervening in German affairs. Speaking German and sharing the
same religion did not convince German critics that the Missouri Synod had their best
interests at heart. The very real local concerns of providing food and clothing to a starving
population influenced the Free Churches pastors far more than the theological concerns of
the Missouri Synod. The local and national experiences of Free Church Germans colored
their interactions far more than any imagined ethnic and transnational ties.

Gendering Missionary Work

Behnken and Reble expected all members of their synods to participate in relief
work for Germany. They did not, however, expect them to participate in the same
manner. Gender dictated how German-Canadian and German-American men and women
participated in renewing their ties with Germany. Male pastors could serve as
missionaries abroad, whereas women had to carry out the synod’s relief program in their
homes and churches. Synod leaders expected both groups to conform to established
gender norms in the church. Missionaries, for instance, needed to embody a respectable
Lutheran masculinity. Behnken and Reble conceptualized a good Lutheran pastor as a
man who inspired, but did not succumb to, strong displays of emotion. This belief
informed how pastors moderated their relationship with their congregations and
leadership style. Theodore Graebner, a former professor at Concordia Seminary and
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Lutheran Witness editor, believed “a professor of philosophy should not admit any such
weakness” by showing emotion to his audience.525 Pastors saw humility, a strong
understanding of theological issues, and an awareness of their German heritage as
essential markers of Lutheran masculinity.
In contrast, male synod leaders enforced patriarchal gender norms that
conceptualized women’s role in the church as confined primarily to charity work. While
pastors could participate in rebuilding Germany by traveling abroad, they expected
women to carry out the fundraising, packaging, and shipping work necessary to send
relief packages to Germany. Meyer stated that the “vast program” of providing relief was
the task of “the Lutheran women of America.”526 This work easily conformed to Lutheran
gender norms, as women typically carried out the majority of charity work within
Lutheran churches. It embodied the values of servitude and dedication that Lutheran men
expected women to exhibit.527 Behnken, Reble, and other pastors saw themselves as the
leaders of the efforts to rebuild Germany, with women playing secondary roles.
These gender norms informed how Lutheran men and women conducted their
missionary work in West Germany. Male missionaries in Germany, for example, faced
frequent surveillance from synod leaders and their fellow pastors. Pastors routinely
commented on the psychological and physical health of their peers in order to make sure
they conformed to the synod’s rigid masculinity. According to Behnken and his
colleagues, such scrutiny seemed warranted and contained practical purpose. In order to
encourage the Free Church to remain independent of EKiD, missionaries needed a strong
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command of the German language to express their theological convictions. These
convictions needed to be clearly and confidently explained. If missionaries did a poor job
explaining Missouri’s theology, they risked losing Free Church congregations to the more
persuasive EKiD campaign to unite European Lutheranism under one banner. Thus,
missionaries deemed it necessary to ensure that they all upheld masculine norms lest it
endanger their mission to rebuild conservative Lutheranism.
Synod leadership believed a strong understanding of German helped them
communicate effectively with Free Church Germans at both a theological and personal
level. Karl Arndt, the synod’s representative with the American Military Government in
Germany, noted that the Missouri’ Synod’s “delegation in general, is making itself felt
more because of the fact that it handles the German language better” than other American
groups.528 As Meyer and Behnken selected candidates to work in Germany, they
highlighted their ability to speak German. One man, Meyer noted, “understands German
very well” while another candidate was selected for being “well versed in the German
language, both in speaking and writing.” Meyer also noted that this pastor “boldly
expressed a sympathetic attitude for Germany.”529 Arndt recommended the synod sponsor
Alfred Rehwinkel to attend the 1949 Bad Boll because his “knowledge of history and
German literature” gave him “a very good background for this program.” His “unusual
ability to reply to discussions without special preparation” made him a particularly viable
candidate to debate other German theologians.530 As such, Rehwinkel embodied the proGerman and theologically conservative traits Arndt deemed respectable. Behnken and
other missionaries ridiculed their colleagues who had a poor grasp of the German
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language. Graebner noted that Daib’s “German is very awkward indeed” and that “he
certainly would be at a serious disadvantage” if called upon to meet with German
theologians. However, Daib’s organizational efficiency and leadership remained
unparalleled, and therefore his poor language skills were not enough to recall him back to
St. Louis.531
Missionaries fluent in the German language, however, still faced criticism from
the synod’s leadership. Missionaries had to have the correct “physical, spiritual, and
mental make-up” to debate “German thinkers without suffering a breakdown.”532
Behnken and Meyer frequently evaluated the mental and physical health of their peers
during their visits to West Germany. During a 1946 visit, Behnken and Meyer found one
of their missionaries, Fritz Mueller, in a “pathetic condition.” His “nervousness” when
discussing theology with Free Church pastors seemed evident to the two men and “had a
very depressing effect upon” Behnken.533 Mueller was hardly alone in feeling anxious
debating German theologians. The Bad Boll conferences in particular proved trying for
Missouri Synod missionaries who not only engaged in theological debates with Free and
State pastors, but also had their performances evaluated by their German-American peers.
Arndt reported that “two of the representatives of Missouri Synod upon their return to the
United States suffered serious heart attacks” after the 1948 Bad Boll. “The physical toll
which Bad Boll has taken of the entire Missouri Synod delegation,” Arndt believed,
“reflects the intense seriousness with which theologians in Germany” debated theological

531

CHI, LMC, Box 87, Theo. Graebner Folder, Graebner to Meyer, 28 August 1949.
CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 21, Arndt to Behnken, 16 October 1948.
533
CHI, European Affairs Collection (hereafter EUA), Supplement 1, Box 3, Behnken J.W. Folder,
Behnken to Bobzin, 27 March 1946.
532

222
issues.534 Mueller’s anxiety and the subsequent heart attacks cast doubt on whether or not
these pastors were strong and manly enough to withstand debating German pastors.
Behnken wanted men who could confidently demonstrate the validity of conservative
Lutheranism, and not succumb to the anxiety and pressures of debate.
The 1949 Bad Boll proved even more strenuous for Missouri’s missionaries.
Meyer and Behnken did not attend the conference that year and instead told Arndt and
Harms to organize the proceedings. Arndt confessed to Meyer that his main burden in
organizing that year’s conference was the poor quality of men the synod sent to Germany.
“Frankly,” he reported, “Harms is not capable of handling this situation…Graebner is so
disinterested in the conferences that he leaves meetings to take his wife out on drives
through the country-side, and Praeses Harms does not have the stamina to hold his men
together.”535 Missionaries at the 1949 Bad Boll simply did not conform to the masculine
standards set by Behnken in the previous years. Arndt commented that the “Bad Boll this
year lacks that spirit which made it such a remarkable success last year. The BehnkenMeyer team has not been replaced” in adequate form.536 Furthermore, the conferences
attendees that year lacked the humility that Lutheran pastors were supposed to embody.
Arndt frequently complained about Concordia Seminary professor J.T. Mueller and his
arrogance. “I need not stress the obvious fact that J.T. [Mueller] is an ass,” Arndt told
Meyer. His arrogance proved unpopular with the Free Church pastors who resented being
condescended to at the conference. Arndt worried that if the Free Church pastors
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discovered that Mueller edited the synod’s theological texts they would likely throw them
away.537
German-American and German-Canadian women faced social barriers that
prevented them from participating in relief work overseas alongside their male
counterparts. Reble and Behnken conceptualized missionary work abroad as a
theological, and therefore male, activity. Lutheran women faced greater scrutiny than
male pastors. Although both Missouri’s fight for conservative Lutheranism and Reble’s
chaplaincy program privileged male pastors, women also wanted to renew ties with
Germany or reconnect with their German roots. The Missouri and Canada Synod’s maledominated programs, however, meant that German-American and German-Canadian
Lutheran women had to travel to Germany through different means. Pastors deemed
charity and educational work as acceptable for Lutheran women as both jobs emphasized
female servitude and motherhood. Working with children or serving the needy fit both
roles.538 Thus, some women found that volunteering with the Red Cross was one of the
few ways they could travel overseas to Germany on their own. Aside from charity work,
the wives of Missouri and Canada Synod pastors occasionally accompanied their
husbands as they worked in Germany. Regardless, most women found their visits to
Germany disappointing. Unlike their male counterparts, women often found their
experiences in Germany limited by male pastors or soldiers who continued to regulate
their behaviour overseas.
Ruth Renick was one of the first German-American women from St. Louis to visit
postwar Germany due to her work with the Red Cross. Renick spent most of 1945
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working in France in the hopes that the Red Cross would later transfer her to Germany.
Much like German-American men, Renick volunteered to serve overseas in part because
it would allow her to travel Germany and connect with her German heritage. She noted
that she “would like very much to take the trip down around Salzburg, Munich, Bremen
Pass and over into Austria and Czechoslovakia” if the Red Cross approved her vacation
time.539 In late 1945 Renick received her wish and the Red Cross transferred her to work
north of Frankfurt.
Renick’s time in West Germany proved to be a disappointing experience. She
noted that American soldiers enjoyed “seeing the American girls and eating the donuts
and drinking the coffee, but we aren’t receiving the satisfaction we need to keep us
going.” This was in part because of the frequent derogatory remarks American soldiers
made about her. She told her family that American soldiers often referred to her as
fräulein, which she considered to be a disparaging comment referring to her marital
status and ancestry.540 She also shared the Missouri Synod’s criticism of American
attempts to govern Germany. She discussed the “general mess of confusion” that occurred
whenever she had to deal with American or Red Cross officials.541 After several months
of unfulfilling service, Renick told relatives that her “morale is about as low as the
men’s” and she often longed to return to St. Louis.542 “There is only one way I could
return to the states now,” she told her family, “and that is to have my boyfriend (one I
don’t have) write a letter to me asking me to return to the states to be married. That letter
would be my ticket home. But I don’t have a boyfriend to marry and I don’t think I want
539
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to marry right now so unless you can give me some good advice, I’ll be over here another
year.”543 She even joked that perhaps her cousin could write a letter pretending to be her
boyfriend in order to secure her passage back to St. Louis: “If worse come to worse he
can write that proposal letter to me, and when I get back I won’t hold him to it! How
about that!”544 Renick tried to forget her dissatisfaction by reminding herself of the
reasons she initially signed up for the Red Cross. She noted optimistically that “I could
come home now if I really wanted to, but there’s a bit of the country I want to see first
and I think by next July I will be able to see every thing I want to see.”545
Elite German Lutheran women had greater success conforming to Lutheran
gender norms than younger women such as Renick. The wives of prominent synod
officials, including Meyer and Graebner’s wives, accompanied their husbands overseas.
Both women spoke “German fluently” and were allowed to accompany their husbands
because they exercised “great influence in the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod, and
have done a great deal for the cause of relief in Germany.” Both women planned on
meeting with other groups of German Lutheran women to discuss relief and aid.546
Reble’s wife, Gertrud, also accompanied him overseas and participated in distributing aid
and relief in West Germany. However, she was only allowed to do so among other
women. She held classes where she lectured to German women on Lutheranism in
Canada and the differences between church life in Germany and Canada. By speaking
solely to women, Gertrud ensured that she did not violate Lutheran doctrine of holding
authority over a man. She also never spoke directly on theological issues, but instead
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focused her lectures on charity work and social activities. These topics, deemed safe by
the synod leadership, therefore never threatened the authority of the male pastor.
Lutheran men continued to devalue Lutheran women’s labour even when they did
conform to acceptable feminine standards. Reble, for example, did not value his wife’s
work as equally important to his own contributions in the field of theology and relief in
Germany. The Canada Lutheran frequently published Reble’s reports from Germany, but
never published articles on Gertrud’s work. Reble was equally dismissive of his wife’s
work. He paid brief attention to Gertrud’s work in his columns and reports. He listed her
work among German women at the end of his columns under the miscellaneous heading
of “Here and There.”547 His wife’s work took a secondary role compared to his own
efforts to help rebuild Germany.
Although men devalued their work, Lutheran women managed to push for their
own agendas, even in their limited spheres of authority. Eddie Arndt accompanied her
husband Karl overseas to West Germany and spent her time raising money and aid for
several German orphanages. Karl approved of her work, because it focused on charity and
children. However, Eddie’s work still faced scrutiny by the synod’s male leaders. In a
1947 meeting, Meyer expressed shock that her budget for an orphanage included six
towels per child. He rejected her budget on the basis that “in my home in St. Louis we did
not have 6 towels per person.” Eddie refused to budge on the issue. She told Meyer that
six towels per person was the norm in Germany prior to the war. She pointed out that the
synod’s goal was to help Germany recovery from the war’s losses, and that her budget
seemed justified in this light. Her act of disobedience prompted Meyer to “explode.” For
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the rest of the meeting he refused to listen to what Eddie had to say. Instead, he called
upon his authority as a pastor and “simply told them” what he believed should be done.548
Meyer received the final say, and he changed Eddie’s budget to reflect his own priorities.
Meyer’s reaction reveals that even women who conformed to synod-sanctioned
definitions of feminine respectability were under surveillance. Regardless of where they
worked, the synod’s male leadership still had the final authority.
Anna Brauer was one of the few young women the Missouri Synod sponsored to
travel to West Germany in 1949. Young and educated with a Masters degree, Brauer
represented the synod’s future as a middle-class and educated institution instead of its
rural and working class roots. Brauer was part of a broader movement in North American
Lutheranism that increasingly saw young professional women appointed to oversee the
synod’s bureaucratic and social work.549 Synod leaders tasked Brauer with developing
parochial schools among Free Churches so as to better train Lutheran youth in
conservative Lutheranism. As the program inevitably involved knowledge of and working
with children, the synod had little issue delegating this task to a woman in the synod.
As one of the few educated Lutheran women stationed in West Germany, the
synod relied on Brauer to oversee humanitarian aid involving German children. Shortly
after her arrival, the Society of Girls Homes in Stuttgart wrote to the synod asking for
clothes and food to help assist their orphan girls. Meyer originally rejected their plea for
aid. He explained to the organization that it was synod policy to only distribute aid
through the German organization Hilfswerk, an organization in Germany that worked
closely with the Free Churches and Missouri Synod. Since the orphanage was not a
548
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religious institution, it did not qualify for aid. However, Meyer recognized that the
orphanage was still in need. He contacted Brauer and asked her to try and assist the
orphanage herself in a personal capacity.550 Unlike other German-Canadian and GermanAmerican women overseas, the synod placed considerable trust in Brauer’s work due to
her professional and educational background. As long as Brauer continued to work in the
fields of charity and children, the synod had no problem with her putting her training into
practice.
However, Brauer did not always abide by the restrictions the synod placed upon
her. She pushed the boundaries of her job and the limitations the synod’s male leadership
placed on her. When Brauer arrived in Germany, she met with Eugene Gerstenmaier, the
leader of the Hlifswerk. Gerstenmaier was also a Lutheran pastor and worked closely with
Behnken and Meyer to ensure that the Missouri Synod’s aid reached conservative Free
Church Lutherans. Although the Hilfswerk theoretically distributed charity among all
West German Lutherans, Gerstenamier and his employees often tried to influence
Lutheran politics and participated in the battle between Free Church pastors and EKiD.
Like their Missouri Synod counterparts, the Hilfswerk promoted conservative
Lutheranism by responding quickly to aid requests from churches unaffiliated with EKiD.
Gerstenmaier’s work with the Hilfswerk was therefore inherently political and
theological, and could not involve Lutheran women without violating the Missouri
Synod’s strict gender norms. Brauer excused her meetings with Gerstenmaier as
accidental and by chance. Meyer was not convinced, and told her that her meeting with
Gerstenmaier was rather “fishy.” Meyer investigated the matter more deeply and received
word from Arndt that Brauer had in fact deliberately met with Gerstenmaier. Arndt,
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continuing to spread gossip throughout the synod as usual, reported that Brauer likely
arranged the meeting in order to secure more money for herself. Meyer disapproved of
Brauer’s attempt to gain financial independence outside of the synod, particularly when it
meant Brauer became involved in theological aspects of the Hilfswerk’s work. Meyer
warned her to “watch her step” and told her that working with the Hilfswerk “will
definitely reflect on you and your job unfavorably.”551 Meyer continued to discourage
Brauer’s ambitions throughout her stay in Germany. When she wished to attend and
volunteer her help at the 1952 Bad Boll conference, Meyer told her that she was surely
capable, but would offer nothing substantial to the conference.552 The Ball Boll would
remain a male-dominated space due to the theological nature of the conference. Despite
her best efforts, Meyer’s intervention ensured that Brauer’s work remained confined to
the church’s traditional emphasis on women’s work involving charity and children.
Attempts to push the boundaries of acceptable Lutheran femininity resulted in
condemnation of her behaviour.

A New Strategy

By the early 1950s, any sentiment of ethnic and religious solidarity between
German and Missouri’s pastors started to fade. The numerous reports that missionaries
sent to St. Louis convinced synod leaders that their current approach towards German
recovery prompted the local population to view them as “Americans,” and not as fellow
Lutherans and Germans. They realized that they needed to recognize the Free Churches as
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equals if they wanted to rebuild conservative Lutheranism in Germany. Synod leadership
understood that they had to alter their missionary efforts to adjust “to European
conditions and under the leadership of a locally trained national ministry” if they hoped to
succeed.553 These sentiments became official at the 1950 Missouri Synod convention. The
synod passed a resolution solidifying that “long-distance direction of the work in Europe
is unsatisfactory.” Instead of trying to enforce Missouri’s conservative Lutheranism
abroad, they recognized that synod policy needed to make its “objective to build an
indigenous Church also in Europe which will be self-supporting, self-governing, and selfpropagating.”554 The resolution offered the first indication that calls on the basis of a
shared ethnicity and religion were not sufficient in convincing Free State churches to
work harmoniously with St. Louis.
The 1950s witnessed a departure in Missouri Synod policy concerning Germany.
The first step in completing the synod’s goal of creating an “indigenous Church” in
Germany consisted of providing the necessary infrastructure. A theological seminary
where Germans could attend and learn conservative Lutheran theology seemed an
obvious first step to help the Free Churches cultivate their own leaders rather than relying
on the Missouri Synod. The synod sponsored the creation of a seminary located just
outside of Frankfurt. After just three years of operation, synod representatives noticed that
the seminary created a strong change of attitude within the Free Churches. Newly
graduated pastors from the Frankfurt seminary took an interest in promoting the
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conservative Lutheran cause.555 In a departure from their previous attitude, the Missouri
Synod did not use its status as benefactor to exert authority over the Free Church pastors
who worked at the seminary. When the 1954 budget proved inadequate to pay the entire
seminary staff, the synod dismissed a Missouri Synod pastor rather than a member of the
Free Church. Although contradictory to his original plans for a strong Missouri presence
in Germany, Behnken did not override or interfere with this decision.556
The Missouri Synod’s shift in policy resonated with the Free Church pastors who
felt their autonomy and local concerns were, for once, clearly recognized. Yet not all
members of the Missouri Synod unanimously supported the synod’s new direction. In
1955, the Board for European Affairs submitted a report to the Missouri Synod that
outlined its dissatisfaction with its relationship with Lutherans in Germany. With the
Missouri Synod’s new hands-off approach, the Board explained it now lacked a sense of
direction. Daib subsequently recommended that the Board be dissolved.557 Behnken
rejected the idea that the Board for European Affairs no longer had a purpose. He
explained that “co-ordination between various agencies of Synod is not assured and no
machinery exists to make it possible.” The Board therefore still had a purpose in acting as
an intermediary between the German Free Churches and the Missouri Synod. Daib and
the other Board members remained unconvinced. They dissolved the board in 1955 after
Behnken conceded that “it was not my purpose to persuade them to continue as a Board.
If they serve with feelings as they expressed it will not be good.”558 The dissolution of the
Board for European Affairs marked the end of the Missouri Synod’s attempts to exert its
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authority over the German Free Churches and initiated a new relationship that placed
each group on an equal footing.
Reble’s chaplaincy program faced a similar fate as Behnken’s campaign for
conservative Lutheranism. Rather than facing challenge from Free Church pastors,
however, Reble encountered internal disputes between himself and a younger generation
of German-Canadian pastors in the National Lutheran Council (NLC). In particular,
members of the NLC from Western Canada objected to Reble’s commanding position
overseas. Western Canadian pastors like Clifford Monk and Traugott Herzer interpreted
Reble’s program as yet another example of the Canada Synod dominating Lutheran
affairs at the expense of their own authority. Monk and Herzer, in particular, objected to
what they perceived as Reble “meddling” in immigration affairs overseas.559 The issue
became a regional power struggle, and they particularly disliked Reble’s preference for
recruiting chaplains from Waterloo County to serve the immigrants. Albert Jacobi,
Reble’s successor as the Canada Synod’s president, confronted Reble about striving for
greater regional balance in order to quiet the Western Canadian pastors. Reble quietly
admitted that he “might favor the East” and promised to work towards greater regional
representation.560
However, Reble also tried to use this compromise as a way to gain more
privileges for German pastors in Canada. In return for participating in the chaplaincy
program, Reble wanted Western Canadian congregations to invite visiting German
pastors to tour their congregations and cities on the Prairies.561 In order to implement this
plan, Reble submitted a request to the NLC for the necessary funds to facilitate travel to
559
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and from Western Canada for both Canadian and German pastors. This proved
particularly problematic given that it was largely Western Canadian leadership, such as
Monk and Herzer, who controlled the NLC and its budget. Their lack of faith in Reble’s
program made it easy to reject his request for financial assistance.562
Reble continued his chaplaincy efforts despite not gaining approval from the
NLC’s Western pastors. His insistence of allowing Canadian chaplains to travel to
Germany and vice-versa eventually poisoned his relationship with the pastors in the West.
In the summer of 1956, the NLC’s Earl Treusch confronted Reble about his maintenance
of the program. He expressed concern that despite passing a resolution to offer no funding
to the chaplaincy program, German pastors continued to send receipts for reimbursement
to the synod. Treusch, emboldened by Monk and Herzer’s outrage, disapproved of how
the German pastors behaved in Canada. Treusch resented the German pastors for using
their opportunity to visit the country as little more than a way to ask the congregations
they visited for greater relief. Monk expressed indignation that one pastor visiting
Winnipeg had the confidence to even tell members of the congregation to not send food
and clothing to the Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR), but directly to his
congregation in Germany.563 Unsurprisingly, the action of these German pastors largely
conforms to their interactions with the Missouri Synod. German pastors used their
meetings with Canadians as a way to lobby for more aid for their congregations. They had
little use for Behnken and Reble’s idealistic aim of promoting connections between North
American and West German Lutherans. Reble remained unapologetic and confident that
the chaplaincy program still had value for the German and Canadian Lutherans. He
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believed that, while unfortunate, the behaviour of these German pastors could be
corrected “with the proper amount of coaching” before they travelled to Canada.
Speaking on Reble’s behalf, one Waterloo County pastor insisted they were “convinced
in the continuing need for ships chaplains, both German and Canadian.”564
Reble’s position with the CLWR expired in the fall of 1956 and he returned to
Canada. Free from Reble’s influence, Treusch saw this as an opportunity to place the
chaplaincy program under review.565 Unsurprisingly, Treusch condemned the program as
expensive, unrealistic, and a bureaucratic headache. Most significantly, Treusch believed
that Reble gave the German pastors the impression that they were “guests” of the
Canadian Lutherans when this was certainly not the case. Treusch recounted several
instances where Canadian congregations were unaware that they had to host a visiting
German pastor and were unsure of the purpose of the visit. Other members of the NLC
agreed with Treusch’s assessment. They believed that if German or Canadian pastors
wished to visit either of the two countries, that they had best carry it out individually and
at their own expense. They suggested that if the chaplaincy program continued,
administering to the spiritual needs of the immigrants should be their primary concern.
Thus, they would return immediately to Canada upon arriving in Germany rather than the
previous tradition of traveling Germany afterwards.566 However, Treusch realized the
limitations to this plan. He understood that such a plan significantly diminished the
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Canadian appeal of serving as a chaplain. If they could not travel throughout Germany,
Treusch admitted “it will be practically impossible for me to find men to serve.”567
The chaplaincy program continued in this diluted form for the next three years
before being formally discontinued in 1960.568 Reble responded to this decision with a
resigned attitude and inquired as to why the program was cancelled. Treusch responded
that “this program had almost passed out of existence by itself” and that it was not worth
the “problems” associated with the program to continue to offer it in such a limited
form.569 Of course, Treusch and the other synod leaders made very little effort to keeping
the program alive. The same NLC pastors that shifted they synod’s power away from
Waterloo County after the war similarly contested and ultimately ended Reble’s attempt
to promote greater interaction between Germany and Waterloo County. Without Reble’s
vision, the program faltered and died.

Conclusion

Lawrence Meyer’s experiences in June 1948 highlight the conflict between
ethnicity and nationality that missionaries and chaplains encountered in Germany. After
frequent meetings with American military officials, Meyer decided that he did not believe
the “American personnel here in Germany can really render a service. Most Americans
are merely here to fill a job and to put in time.” He believed that “the great majority of
them have no conception” of what rebuilding postwar Germany entailed, and that he
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“almost despairs to think” that Germans formed their opinion of American democracy
based on their interactions with the military. Meyer drew on his own self-identification as
a German in order to critique how the American military interacted with German
civilians. He criticized Americans for having “little understanding of the language,
culture, and background of Germany,” in contrast to his own authority as a German
American. Yet Meyer’s interactions with German civilians that same month proved that
although he thought of himself as German, the German people perceived him as an
American. He remarked that most “Germans look upon us as conquerors, and it is the
exceptional American who enjoys the confidence of the Germans.” Meyer’s interactions
highlight the ambiguous hyphenated identities that he and other missionaries encountered
in Germany. They felt German when interacting with Anglo-Americans, but felt
American when they interacted with German civilians. While this gave them
opportunities to engage with both communities, it also meant that they were not fully
accepted as insiders in either group.570
The experiences of Behnken, Reble, and their colleagues continues to complicate
the traditional narrative of identity loss present in the scholarship on German immigrants.
These pastors self-identified as Germans and articulated an ethnic identity while renewing
their ties with Germany. They displayed their ethnicity through trips to places of familial
importance, sympathies with their “fellow” Germans over the war, and through their
efforts to help rebuild Germany. Yet, the fact that these men never felt embraced by
Germans civilians offers more evidence that a hybrid identity emerged during the Second
World War and continued into the postwar period. German Americans and Canadians did
not abandon their ethnic identity. Instead, they adopted a hyphenated “German570
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American” or “German-Canadian” identity that placed them simultaneously in both
“German” and “American/Canadian” worlds, yet firmly in neither.
Their experiences in Germany provide a compelling argument that, while a
shared ethnic heritage and transnational ties linked Germany with the Missouri and
Canada Synods, local conditions in Germany and their nationality prevented these bonds
from taking root. In the decades since Reble and others left Germany for North America,
the country fought two large wars that pitted them against North American “conquerors.”
Germans developed their own theological stances on Lutheranism and rejected what they
saw as yet another attempt of American takeover. These local conditions in Germany
were stronger than the transnational ties Behnken and Reble believed existed between the
two peoples, and Germans could not help but see the Americans as members of a
different nation, instead of ethnic cousins. Behnken and Reble’s attempts to renew ties
with Germany demonstrates a German ethnic identity continued to exist in St. Louis and
Waterloo County, even if their attempts to solidify connections with a German
“homeland” failed.

238
Chapter 5: German Space as White Space: Race and Ethnicity during the “Ethnic
Reverie” of the 1950s and 1960s

German displaced persons and refugees started to arrive in St. Louis and Waterloo
County by the late 1940s. Their arrival dramatically increased the size of the Missouri
and Canada Synods, as well as their local congregations. Germans constituted the largest
group of refugees to settle in Missouri in the postwar decades. By 1960, over 360,000
German refugees arrived in Missouri with over 80,000 of them choosing to live in St.
Louis. From 1950 to 1960, the Canada Synod’s population grew from approximately
38,000 to 64,000 due to increased immigration. These numbers continued to increase
until the mid-1960s when immigration from Germany began to decline.571
The influx of refugees and DPs in the postwar decades prompted national
conversations on how “foreigners” would adapt to their new North American homes. The
transformation from “DP” to “citizen” was by no means a passive experience. Historian
Franca Iacovetta’s scholarship describes the number of middle class Anglo-Canadians
and institutions that monitored immigrant behaviour in Canada’s urban centers. Iacovetta
labels such individuals and institutions as “gatekeepers.” Although the term “gatekeeper”
typically refers to immigration officials and “those who determine admission
requirements and regulations for a country or institution,” Iacovetta broadens this term as
a useful shorthand to include the “wide array of reception, citizenship, and regulatory
activities” that immigrants faced after they arrived in Canada. She argues that AngloCanadian social workers, educators, journalists, and health professionals all worked to
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assimilate newcomers into a hegemonic Canadian culture based on British and
“respectable” middle class values. Gatekeepers monitored immigrant behavior, ranging
from their language, parenting style, clothing, food, and mental and physical health, in an
effort to coerce them to conform to Canadian cultural norms. These preoccupations
reflected Cold War-era concerns. They stressed the need for immigrant newcomers to
embrace North America’s liberal democracy in contrast to the totalitarian and communist
governments that the DPs left behind in Europe. Gatekeepers realized many DPs
originated from communist nations or formerly fascist countries and thus needed to be
“de-programmed” from their former totalitarian governments and embrace Western
democratic values. Essentially, gatekeepers believed DPs needed to be “taught” how to
become good Canadian and American citizens.572 This chapter examines similar
gatekeeping institutions in both St. Louis and Waterloo County. Local charitable
organizations such as the International Institute of St. Louis (IISTL) and the KitchenerWaterloo Council for Friendship (KWCF) managed by Anglo-Americans and AngloCanadians tried to assimilate newcomers and encouraged them to abandon their ethnic
ties. These organizations tried to integrate newcomers through English-language classes,
citizenship tests, and generally monitored immigrant behaviour.
This chapter argues that the effective and widespread need to “integrate”
newcomers Iacovetta identifies was not as pronounced in St. Louis and Waterloo County
as other North American cities. While gatekeeper institutions such as the IISTL and
KWCF tried to integrate newcomers, local German Lutherans challenged their efforts.
572

Franca Iacovetta, Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada (Toronto: Between the
Lines, 2006), xii, 10-12, 19. For other discussions of gatekeeping in Canadian and American immigrant
history, see Erika Lee, “The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and American Gatekeeping,
1882-1924,” Journal of American Ethnic History 21, no. 3 (2002): 37-38; Vic Satzewich, Points of Entry:
How Canada’s Immigration Officers Decide Who Gets In (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015).

240
This occurred for two reasons. First, pastors performed their duties as ethnic elites and
welcomed DPs into the pre-existing ethnic traditions of their congregations rather than
trying to assimilate them. Pastors had a vested interest in German DPs maintaining their
ethnic traditions and, most importantly, speaking the German language. By encouraging
DPs to retain their German ethnicity, pastors hoped their Lutheran churches would grow
in size and power, thereby allowing them to maintain their position as ethnic elites.
Rather than encouraging DPs to adopt new North American norms as Anglo gatekeepers
did, pastors created an inclusive ethnic boundary zone in their churches by increasing the
number of German-language services and nurturing an interest in German culture.
Creating a harmonious relationship between themselves, their congregants, and new DPs
allowed pastors to remain in integral leadership roles that bolstered their authority, and
had the added side effect of limiting the power of Anglo gatekeepers in their
communities.
Second, while German immigrants may have been minorities in other North
American communities, the reputations of St. Louis and Waterloo County as German
communities helped discursively define the character of these cities. Historian Kathleen
Neils Conzen refers to this phenomenon as the “localization of immigrant cultures.” She
defines localization as
the tendency of an immigrant-constructed culture to embed and reproduce itself…in the educational
institutions, political and governmental organizations, businesses, media, and popular culture of the
broader local community. Consequently, what are initially ethnic group values come to play a strong
role in determining the local ‘rules of the game,’ in molding ‘the way we do things here,’ in shaping
non-group as well as group life on the local level. 573
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The density of German immigrants in both St. Louis and Waterloo County helped
“localize” German-American and German-Canadian culture in both communities. Local
legends such as the pioneer myth along with the number of German immigrants in both
communities complicated gatekeeper attempts to educate German DPs on how to “fit-in.”
Over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, gatekeepers realized they could not
convince DPs to fully abandon their language or culture when their German Canadian and
American neighbours had yet to do so either.
Whiteness, alongside the localization of German culture, helped Lutheran
churches remain ethnic boundary zones in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Just as in the
previous decade, German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans continued to
articulate white racial identities that inadvertently allowed their congregations to function
as both German spaces and white spaces. The Missouri Synod, in particular, grappled
with the issue of segregation and “white flight” in the 1950s. While they easily
incorporated German DPs into their congregations, this chapter describes how synod
leaders laboured to keep black Lutherans in separate and segregated congregations. In
Waterloo County, the popularity of the pioneer myth ensured that German-Canadian
Lutherans continued to cultivate a white ethnic culture inaccessible to racialized members
of their community. Lutheran churches remained ethnic boundary zones in the postwar
period, but only because German Lutherans actively worked to keep their racialized
neighbours out of their congregations.
By investigating the ways German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans in
St. Louis and Waterloo County confronted ethnic and racial diversity in the postwar
period, this chapter questions the notion of an “ethnic reverie” in the 1950s and 1960s.
This term, used notably by historian Matthew Frye Jacobson, argues that European
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immigrants and their descendants practiced an “American” or “white” identity during
these decades at the expense of their ethnic identities. European immigrants and their
descendants ignored their ethnic heritage and culture in favour of an all-American identity
that stressed inclusion in the nation. Jacobson suggests that this approach started to
change in the mid-1960s with the “white ethnic revival.” This revival witnessed white
Americans reclaim and re-identify with the ethnic identities of their grandparents or
forebears as a response to the successes of the African-American Civil Rights Movement.
As black Americans successfully demonstrated the links between Jim Crow segregation
and racial inequality with white supremacy in the United States, it was no longer
politically expedient for white Americans to identify as “whites.” Articulating an Italian
or Polish identity, for example, allowed white Americans to ignore their complicity in
perpetuating racial inequalities by identifying with their ethnic rather than racial
identity.574 American intellectuals ranging from Will Herberg and Eric Goldman, for
instance, support Jacobson’s notion of an ethnic reverie. Goldman stated that postwar
affluence caused white ethnics to be “more anxious to achieve further respectability of
unhyphenated Americanism.”575
This chapter joins other historians, such as Joshua Zeitz, in arguing that the ethnic
reverie was more complicated than the typical “view of postwar American history as a
swift trajectory from city to suburb, from working class to middle class, and, hence, from
pluralism to white homogeneity.”576 German Lutherans practiced an ethnic identity within
their congregations and resisted mainstream attempts to assimilate DPs while also
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articulating white supremacist views. Indeed, these were not unrelated events. The ethnic
elites that supported keeping their congregations segregated allowed for their churches to
remain ethnic boundary zones wherein they practiced their German culture without the
influence of other racial groups. As gatekeepers begrudgingly acknowledged St. Louis
and Waterloo County’s German heritage and culture, they also reaffirmed this culture and
their communities as white. While the “pluralism to white homogeneity” narrative of the
ethnic reverie may describe the experiences of other white ethnic groups, the Lutheran
church continued to act as an ethnic boundary zone throughout the postwar decades
wherein German Lutherans practiced their ethnic identities alongside their racial status as
white.

The Lutheran Church as an Ethnic Boundary Zone

Congregations in both St. Louis and Waterloo County increased the number of
their German-language services in the late 1940s. With the war over, Lutheran churches
once again started to reflect the hybrid identities of their inhabitants by featuring both
English and German services. Pastors and laypeople saw no contradiction in attending or
offering services in both languages. Bilingual services did not make them any less
American or Canadian, and attending services in English did not make them less German.
Holy Cross Lutheran Church in St. Louis, for example, continued to offer Germanlanguage services following the Second World War. By 1949, German remained the
dominant language of the church. The Reverend Paul Koenig preached close to two
hundred German sermons compared to one hundred and thirty English language sermons
in 1949. Attendance at both services, however, remained roughly the same.
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Approximately 66,000 congregants attended the German services as opposed to the
62,000 that attended the English services.577 St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in
Kitchener functioned in much the same manner. Although St. Peter’s church council
staunchly opposed speaking German during the war, it fully endorsed the Reverend
Albert Lotz’s motion to reintroduce German services in 1948.578 As German immigration
to Waterloo County increased in the 1950s, many German immigrants chose to join St.
Peter’s due to its frequent German language services and downtown location. In 1951
Lotz suggested that he offer German language sermons more frequently at the church, and
the church council agreed to purchase more German-language prayer books to meet the
linguistic needs of the church’s newcomers.579
Congregational life at St. Peter’s and Holy Cross did not show signs of the “ethnic
reverie” present in other ethnic communities during the 1940s and 1950s. Language and
an interest in their German “homeland” prevented Lutheran congregations from
completely conforming to mainstream Canadian and American culture. Koenig and Lotz
demonstrated a dedication to their German ethnicities, rather than accepting the
monoculture and monolinguistic norms supported by mainstream North America. Both
pastors took steps to guarantee that English and German received equal attention and
importance among their followers. They ensured that one language group would not feel
secondary or beneath the other. Holy Cross, for example, held separate clubs for its
congregants who wished to participate in church life in English or German. The
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congregation had both a “Ladies Aid Society” and a Frauenverein to support bilingual
and unilingual women. Regardless of their language of choice, the congregation remained
actively involved in German affairs. When Koenig and his wife went to Germany in
1949, the entire congregation followed their time spent abroad in Germany with great
interest. When Koenig returned in the fall, representatives from both language groups
asked him to attend their meetings and show his photos from Germany and recount his
experiences.580 No matter their language of choice, they still wished to see glimpses of
their “homeland.” Likewise, St. Peter’s guaranteed that both its English and Germanspeaking members felt welcome at the church. St. Peter’s customarily stationed several
members of their church council outside the church’s doorstep each Sunday to greet
members of the congregation as they entered the building. In 1952, Lotz realized that this
custom excluded German DPs from this weekly tradition. The church council contained
no DP representatives and instead consisted of older, prominent, Canadian-born families.
Lotz rectified the situation by asking several DP volunteers to work as greeters alongside
the church council.581 In doing so, Lotz demonstrated that recent German arrivals were
just as important as the elite members of the church council. Lotz’s effort to include
German immigrants in the “welcoming party” suggests that he wanted a “unified
congregation” that was not overtly divided along class or linguistic lines. Congregational
cohesion, however, did not mean forcing German DPs to recognize English as the
superior language. Lotz achieved internal unity in a way that empowered St. Peter’s
German DPs rather than identifying them as second-class citizens. Lotz and Koenig,
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along with their congregations, performed a careful balancing act that resulted in
churches unified by a shared respect for their German-English frameworks.
Smaller congregations also offered German-language services, and actually did so
in order to attract new DP members. By increasing German services, pastors at smaller
congregations could grow their churches by increasing their membership amongst
recently arrived DPs. Bethlehem Lutheran Church, located near downtown St. Louis,
increased the frequency of their German services with the hopes that DPs would become
members of their church. Their efforts paid off. By 1952, the number of congregants
wishing to speak German at church showed signs of increasing, thereby helping the
congregation grow as well.582 Smaller congregations in Waterloo County adopted a
similar strategy. At St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Waterloo, the Reverend
C.S. Roberts visited the homes of recently arrived German DPs in order to encourage
them to attend the church. Although St. John’s operated primarily in the English
language, Roberts still conducted monthly, and later weekly, German services that he
hoped to grow as a result of DP attendance. “Though not accustomed to attending
services regularly in their home land,” Roberts acknowledged, “many who are negligent
might become regular attendants at our German service.”583 Regardless of its popularity,
speaking German remained an important aspect of church life at these congregations.
Their pastors invested time and resources in maintaining the German language, even if
English was the dominant language of that particular congregation. Ethnic culture coexisted alongside their status as Canadians and Americans, and actually worked to
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increase the authority and importance of local pastors who could successfully balance the
German and English languages.
An ability to speak German remained important for leadership roles within St.
Louis and Waterloo County congregations during the so-called “ethnic reverie.” In 1947,
the Reverend Paul Streufert at St. Matthew’s Lutheran Church in St. Louis found he did
not have enough time to meet the demands of his congregation. Streufert volunteered his
services at several other St. Louis churches, and therefore did not always have the
attention or time necessary to preach at St. Matthew’s each Sunday. The synod responded
by allowing its students at Concordia Seminary to take turns preaching as guests at St.
Matthew’s when Streufert could not attend. Concordia Seminary still trained their
students in both the German and English languages, and the students performed bilingual
services at St. Matthew’s.584 Similarly, St. Peter’s in Kitchener placed importance on the
ability to speak German when they sought to hire another secretary to help meet the
demands of the growing congregation. The church council emphasized that the first
requirement of the new job would be proficiency in both English and German. The
church council hired Mrs. Michael Gondosch, because she was “particularly suited for the
position because of her facility with both languages.”585 It was important to the church
council that those they hired to represent the congregation also embodied its hybrid
identity.
The German language remained an important part of Lutheran churches when
German DPs arrived in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Efforts on behalf of pastors such
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as Koenig and Lotz helped cultivate an atmosphere in which the German ethnicities of
newcomers did not come into conflict with their congregations or fellow German
Lutherans. Just as in decades past, German Lutherans continued to balance their ethnic,
religious, and national identities in their churches. They did not slip into an ethnic reverie
following the war, but maintained their German-English framework and solidified the
model throughout the upper echelons of their congregations.

Gatekeeping in German Lutheran Communities

Lutheran congregations in St. Louis and Waterloo County provided spaces for
German DPs to continue to speak and worship in German. Outside of the closed confines
of the church, however, German DPs encountered secular institutions that sought to
integrate them into North American life. Just like other urban cities in North America, St.
Louis and Waterloo County had charitable organizations that aimed to provide DPs with
services such as English-language classes and advice on finding jobs and permanent
housing. The Kitchener-Waterloo Council for Friendship (KWCF) and the International
Institute of Metropolitan St. Louis (IISTL) interacted with German DPs alongside the
Missouri and Canada Synods. Unlike the two synods, which provided a space for German
DPs to preserve their ethnicity and language, the KWCF and IISTL aimed to eliminate
the German language and integrate German DPs into mainstream North American
culture.
Both institutions had similar origins to other gatekeeping organizations in North
America. The IISTL started as one of the YWCA’s many “international institutes” in
1919 to promote charitable work among American immigrants. The IISTL helped
newcomers with medical issues, unemployment, and language training, while also
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assisting immigrants with naturalization papers, deportation, and other legal matters.586
Harriette F. Ryan, the IISTL’s director during the mid-twentieth century, was a secondgeneration Irish immigrant and devoted much of her life to ensuring that immigrants and
their children had an advocate in the IISTL. The KWCF started in a very similar fashion.
Muriel Clement, a member of Waterloo County’s English community and the wife of
former Kitchener mayor William Clement, founded the KWCF at the local YWCA in
1937 as an “international club” for other middle-class women in Waterloo County.587 The
club originally functioned as a way for elite women to discuss culture “relating to the new
and old world – music, travelogues, films and stunts.” In the postwar period, the
organization broadened its scope to include philanthropic work among “newcomers with
problems of employment, housing, obtaining furniture, giving advice, [and finding] their
new way of life in Canada.”588 The KWCF and IISTL conducted similar events typical of
other gatekeeping institutions in North America. They hosted English-language classes,
offered cooking lessons, and sponsored different “folk” or “multicultural” events where
newcomers could showcase dancing, music, and food from Europe.589 At their core, both
institutions and its employees had the ultimate goal of assimilating DPs into mainstream
Canadian and American culture. Although assimilation is rarely linear and more often
reflects a process of adaptation and integration, the gatekeepers in charge of both
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institutions did not see assimilation in such a nuanced manner.590 Clement made her
mandate clear to all DPs that participated in KWCF events: “We are a melting pot, and
privileged to be part of it.” The KWCF wished to “assimilate not merely integrate.”591
Ryan similarly acknowledged that the IISTL “is primarily an assimilation, integration or
Americanization agency.”592 Both institutions sought to undermine the German ethnicities
of newcomers in favour of a common American or Canadian identity.
The KWCF and IISTL initially did not provide a tolerant atmosphere for German
DPs. The strict immigration quotas in place following the Second World War ensured that
most immigrants arriving to St. Louis were the wives of returning American soldiers.
These “war brides” consisted mainly of women from the United Kingdom. Providing the
war brides legal aid and helping them find employment occupied the majority of the
IISTL’s time in the years following the war. The IISTL started a War Brides Club shortly
after the war in an effort to help provide a social space for newcomers to overcome the
isolation and loneliness that moving to a new country inevitably entailed. The club
succeeded in bringing together British war brides to socialize, but proved alienating for
the newcomers who did not fit their American and British culture. Although the majority
of war brides were British, American servicemen also married women from a variety of
different countries. These marriages were lesson common, but war brides from Italy,
Germany, and Japan also accompanied their husbands to St. Louis after the war. At the
second meeting of the War Brides Club, the brides discussed whether they should allow
Germans into the group. The decision was a unanimous “no.” The IISTL employee who
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supervised the club meeting later wrote that she was not surprised over this decision
“since the majority of the war brides are English.”593 Negative associations with Germans
as “the enemy” dictated the exclusionary attitudes of the war brides. Even though the
IISTL sought to provide a space for all immigrants, German women faced rejection as a
result of wartime wounds not yet healed. The British background of the war brides
allowed them to adapt easily to American cultural norms, which just so happened to
include the discriminatory attitudes of other middle-class Americans. As members of
former “enemy nations,” German war brides did not yet have a place at the IISTL.
English-language and citizenship classes sponsored by the KWCF and IISTL
made it clear that each group expected German DPs to adopt English as their primary
language, thereby facilitating their integration into Canadian and American culture.
Although both gatekeeper institutions employed a mix of men and women, men taught
English and citizenship classes more often than women. Male teachers tended to push a
narrower definition of what constituted an American or Canadian, and they explicitly
pursued the gatekeeper agenda of assimilation. Cold War anxieties intrinsically shaped
the “gatekeeper-newcomer” relationship, because gatekeepers saw their role as not only
creating productive Canadian/American citizens, but also “de-programming” DPs from
their former communist backgrounds.594 Stuart Moore frequently taught English-language
classes at the IISTL throughout the 1950s and imbedded his lessons with patriotic
messages that stressed “American values” in opposition to what he perceived as the
communist backgrounds of his DP students. Moore’s curriculum focused on providing
immigrants with the vocabulary they would need to interact with other Americans on a
593
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daily basis. He divided his lessons into several different categories, including vocabulary
relating to transportation, work, home, and recreation.595 These lessons, however,
contained clear political messages. Once DPs became familiar with a basic vocabulary,
Moore used their newfound language skills to promote mainstream American values. For
example, after learning English words relating to “the church,” Moore launched into a
discussion of division between church and state in the United States compared to the
“godless” regimes of communistic countries in Europe.596 W.H. Mertens at the KWCF
likewise pushed immigrants to use their English-language skills to also increase their
fluency in civic affairs. In 1957, Mertens encouraged Clement to support a social hour
called the “Canadian Affairs Discussion Group.” He envisioned the group as a place to
discuss current and global events to help turn newcomers into informed citizens. Mertens
decided that the group should play host not only to immigrants, but also to native-born
Canadians. In this sense, immigrants would improve their English and also learn the
duties of citizenship from already established Canadians, rather than only socializing with
their own ethnic group.597 “Cold Warriors” like Mertens and Moore ensured that the
KWCF and IISTL were not politically neutral spaces. Learning English functioned as
more than just a utilitarian necessity. English represented an opportunity for German DPs
to not only learn the language of North America, but also its values. Unlike the Lutheran
congregations these DPs attended on the weekend, the IISTL and KWCF placed no
importance on retaining German. English, they believed, was both a practical necessity as
well as the path to good citizenship. Unlike their Lutheran churches, German DPs found
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that gatekeeper organizations sought to dismantle their German language and culture in
favour of a single conformist culture based around the English language.
Gatekeepers, however, found their efforts to regulate German DPs complicated
compared to other North American communities. The high concentration of German DPs
in St. Louis and Waterloo County alongside the pre-existing population of German
Lutherans hindered assimilative strategies that worked well elsewhere. Gatekeepers tried
to enforce an Anglo-American and Canadian culture that did not have hegemonic status
in either St. Louis or Waterloo County. Although the KWCF and IISTL wished to
assimilate German DPs, they found their heavy-handed attempts to do so unconvincing.
The density and history of German immigration in both communities furthermore allowed
German DPs and German Canadian and German Americans alike to subvert their
gatekeeper aims. They turned the KWCF and IISTL events into spaces that represented
their own German heritage rather than the integrationist goals of the gatekeepers.
The high concentration of German DPs in St. Louis and Waterloo County
complicated gatekeeper efforts to encourage the use of the English language. Gatekeepers
believed that language “is the great stumbling block to integration,” and the large number
of German-speaking people in both communities made the transition to English very
difficult.598 The English-language teachers at the IISTL adopted a “one approach suits
all” model of teaching English to newcomers. Regardless of what language their DP
students spoke, the methods for learning English did not change. German DPs, for
instance, commonly learned English in the same classes as DPs that spoke Polish or
Italian as their first language. The IISTL’s technique, which favoured a uniform teaching
method over addressing specific individual or group needs, proved more ineffective than
598
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the instructors at the IISTL anticipated. Increased German immigration to St. Louis
altered the composition of the IISTL’s English-language classes. Rather than their
ethnically diverse student body, classes consisted solely of German DPs. The instructors
discovered that homogenous classes composed of German DPs allowed them to learn
English much more effectively. Learning alongside their fellow Germans allowed
teachers “to indicate the similarities and differences in emphasis in English words” with
their German origins, one instructor noted.599 “The overall homogeneity of the group,”
teachers noted, “has turned out to be favorable. Most of the students are from the same
language group (German)…so that demonstration through other languages is
simplified.”600 This realization surprised Moore and the other gatekeepers at the IISTL.
Gatekeepers generally worried that DPs would simply use the IISTL as a type of ethnic
club or gathering place to meet, socialize, and preserve their ethnic identity. Such
practices obviously went against the institution’s goal of assimilating newcomers.601
Gatekeepers therefore worked hard to ensure DPs did not compose a homogenous ethnic
group at the IISTL, but rather blended in with other DPs and native-born Americans as
well.602 The density of German DPs in St. Louis undermined this core desire, because
they could not prevent their English classes from consisting exclusively of German DPs.
Ultimately, the IISTL did not alter their philosophical preference of teaching multiple
ethnic groups at once. It did, however, provoke a moment of reflection wherein they
realized their general approach to DP work may was not as successful as a model
designed to meet the needs of specific ethnic communities.
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Gatekeepers found it even more difficult to discourage speaking German outside
of the IISTL and KWCF. Because DPs could speak German at their churches, clubs, and
occasionally at work, German DPs had few reasons to obtain anything other than a basic
knowledge of the English language. In the mid-1950s, the Ontario Chamber of Commerce
contacted its Kitchener branch to seek their advice on integrating DPs into Canadian
society. Kitchener, with its historic and contemporary relationship with immigration,
seemed well suited to answer the Ontario Chamber of Commerce’s questions on
immigration. The organization hoped that its Kitchener branch could help “prepare a
master plan or pilot plan on integration of newcomers to this country” that could be tested
in Ontario communities and perhaps, if successful, used across Canada.603 The chamber’s
plan proved ill-advised from the start, particularly given the KWCF’s trouble successfully
assimilating German DPs. Regardless, the chamber appointed Joseph Connell, a member
of Kitchener’s Anglo-Canadian community, as the director of the plan. In 1957, however,
Connell publicly dissolved the committee looking into DP integration as he “could not
present any plan since the city was failing in turning newcomers into Canadians.”604
Connell expressed dismay over his discovery that DPs could “barely speak English” even
“after being in Kitchener four or five years.” “A serious situation exists in Kitchener,” he
remarked. “I was amazed at how little is being done.”605
Connell’s public resignation triggered a small controversy in Waterloo County, as
members of the committee freely shared their thoughts on Kitchener’s “failure” to
assimilate DPs with the local press. Their inability to force German DPs to stop speaking
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German sat at the crux of the committee’s frustrations and failures. The committee found
that “many of the newcomers are not too anxious to speak English except under dire
necessity, and we find a distinct trend on the part of many of them to retreat to the
comfort and security of using their own language.”606 Waterloo County’s established
German-Canadian population, as well as the density of German DPs, essentially allowed
DPs to continue speaking their language that would otherwise be eroded in communities
with a larger Anglo-Canadian population. While investigating the degree to which DPs
assimilated, Connell found evidence that the German language actually thrived among
DPs. He resentfully noted that he received a request from a German ethnic club asking to
use the local YMCA to host their meetings. “We had offered them the free use of our
building, our pool, our sports facilities…but I couldn’t go for that,” Connell replied.607
Gatekeepers in Waterloo County were supposed to integrate DPs into their organizations,
and yet this request showed signs of the exact opposite. German-language groups, it
appeared, were trying to “take over” Anglo-Canadian institutions like the YMCA.
Contrary to Connell’s gatekeeping goals, the German language seemed to be growing
stronger rather than weaker.
In their condemnation of Kitchener’s German DPs, Connell and the rest of the
committee often drew direct links between the difficulties in integrating German DPs and
Waterloo County’s established German-Canadian population. G.E. Eastman, one of the
committee’s members, believed that Waterloo County’s ethnic associations needed to
“explain what their objectives were” in light of the region’s failure to “Canadianize” its
newcomers. Connell proved equally skeptical about the role of current German ethnic
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clubs in Waterloo County. Throughout his investigation, one ethnic association
approached Connell and asked him to join their association and offered to teach him
German. Connell admitted that their offer was “half in fun, half in fellowship, but is it a
trend?”608 The gatekeepers worried that Waterloo County was actually becoming more
German as a result of the DPs. The committee generally hoped that the Canadian
education system would solve the question of DP assimilation, even if they could not. By
speaking English at school, the committee hoped the children of DPs would become
fluent in English and stop speaking German. However, one committee member noted
pessimistically that Waterloo County’s current German-Canadian population proved that
this was not true. He described how “older people, born in this country, who live in rural
areas and still talk with a strong accent” proved that the community had more generally
failed at assimilating current and previous generations of immigrants.609
The Canada Synod was partially to blame for this trend. Connell divided Waterloo
County’s DPs into two categories. The first group consisted “of people who chose to
come to this country,” like the Hungarian refugees of 1956. This group, he believed,
showed positive signs of adopting Anglo-Canadian cultural norms. The second group,
however, consisted of DPs “who came because of war, because they were induced to
come, because of relatives. They seem to feel as long as they have a roof over their heads
and eat that is their only concern.”610 This latter category of course referenced the
programs sponsored by the Canada Synod, such as the Lutheran Labour Scheme or Close
Relative Scheme. These DPs arrived through schemes that Waterloo County’s Lutherans
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used to bring their fellow Germans overseas and, in Connell’s mind, served to strengthen
German culture in the area. The resiliency of the German language led Connell to believe
that “it may be best to follow the English idea of handling immigrants.” He suggested that
when “large groups” of immigrants arrived, the government “put them into camps and
teach them English for three or four months. Then when they’ve learned the language,
and been clothed and fed well, let them out.”611 Connell’s vision represented a coercive
Canadian nationalism that went contrary to Waterloo County’s German-Canadian values
of ethnic diversity. Connell wanted to forcibly stamp out the German language through
imprisonment, whereas the Canada Synod worked to maintain a healthy balance of
German and English in their congregations. Connell’s views represented those of an
Anglo-Canadian outsider who ignored the localization of German culture in Waterloo
County.
German Canadians responded to Connell’s report and public airing of grievances
with equal passion. The German Canadians who shared their views with the press refuted
Connell’s assertion that Waterloo County somehow failed at assimilating their DPs. One
letter to The Kitchener-Waterloo Record questioned Connell’s conclusion. “Has the plan
really failed or has it failed only in the opinion of those who presented it to the Kitchener
Chamber of Commerce directors?”612 One letter drew, much to Connell’s chagrin, on
Waterloo County’s localized German culture to contest the committee’s findings. “New
Canadians of years ago who chose Kitchener for their place of residence helped make our
community the envy of many other cities. I am sure those who have arrived in the past
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five or six years will do likewise.”613 Clement also rejected the committee’s conclusions.
As the KWCF’s leader, she took personal offense to his assertion that they failed to
assimilate immigrants. She therefore defended herself and the KWCF by drawing on the
discourses of postwar democratic values that gatekeepers elsewhere commonly expressed.
“Our government presents Canada to Europeans as a land of opportunities where they will be
welcomed, be free and enjoy the benefits of free enterprise among people who want them and are
anxious to integrate them. We cannot think that Canadians would expect them to live in camps and
be ‘let out’ when they have learned the language. This is absolutely incompatible with our idea of
democracy and individual freedom to think and speak as we please within the bounds of law and
morals.”614

Despite her personal goal of assimilating German DPs, Waterloo County’s localized
German culture made it difficult for gatekeepers like Clement to uniformly reject the
desire on behalf of DPs to continue speaking German. Clement wrote that trying to
eliminate German “presents a real challenge to us,” particularly without disrespecting
“the Pennsylvania Dutch immigrants who helped make this the admirable community it
has become, and whose descendants’ German, to which we do not object.”615 While she
and Connell agreed in principal that integration was desirable, the pluralistic discourses in
Waterloo County prevented her from embracing Connell’s hardline approach.
Gatekeeping organizations like the ISSTL and KWCF moreover diverged from
their sister organizations by eventually including local German Canadians and Americans
into leadership roles at their clubs. As Conzen argues, communities with a strong
localized immigrant culture often feature immigrants in leadership positions amongst the
community’s charitable and educational institutions.616 Prominent German-Canadian
families started volunteering at the KWCF in the early 1960s as a result of the
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organization’s university scholarship program. In an effort to promote assimilation among
younger DPs, the KWCF created a series of university scholarships for DP students
currently in high school. University-level education, the KWCF believed, promoted
assimilation as it reinforced the English language and promoted economic mobility. DP
students could qualify for the award if they attended a Waterloo County high school and
promised to attend university in Ontario. They deliberately distributed the awards to
students who had a strong knowledge of the English language, which conveyed to the
KWCF their desire to assimilate. The scholarship requirements stipulated that the DP
student submit several essays in English to the scholarship committee if they lived in
Canada for less than five years. If they expressed a fluent knowledge of English, they
remained in the applicant pool and had an opportunity to win a KWCF scholarship.617
The KWCF intended their scholarships to reward young DP students for their
willingness to adopt Canadian social norms. Ironically, the awards simultaneously created
bonds between Waterloo County’s established German-Canadian community and German
DP newcomers. The KWCF scholarships required extensive fundraising campaigns in
order to raise enough money to offer a variety of scholarships to numerous DP students
each year. Thus, KWCF members contacted some of Waterloo County’s elite families
and businesses in an attempt to secure finances for their scholarships. These community
leaders, however, often happened to be members of successful German-Canadian
families. For instance, the prominent Kaufman family donated enough money to create a
new scholarship titled the “Mrs. A.R. Kaufman Scholarship.” This money sponsored Ute
Lischke, a German DP, to study modern languages at the University of Waterloo.
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Similarly, the Schwaben Sick Benefit Society sponsored Waltraut Schork to study
modern languages at the University of Toronto.618 Although the KWCF intended these
scholarships to promote assimilation, they generated contact between Waterloo County’s
German-Canadian population and recent German DPs. The KWCF, and gatekeeper
organizations more generally, feared that immigrants would use their institutions to
promote ethnic culture. By asking prominent German-Canadians for funds to help
German DP students, the KWCF inadvertently caused their scholarship program to
facilitate bonds between two generations of Germans.
Because the KWCF and IISTL operated on a largely volunteer basis, some of their
volunteers happened to overlap with members of the local German Lutheran community.
In an effort to increase attendance at their English classes, the KWCF began to advertise
its classes on German radio stations and at Lutheran churches with large German DP
populations. The advertisement campaigned worked. Not only did enrollment in the
KWCF’s English classes increase, but it also generated interest in the program among the
community’s German-Canadian population. As enrollment in English classes grew, so did
the number of children the KWCF had to watch while their mothers took English classes.
In 1962, “ladies from the different Lutheran parishes” started to assist the KWCF’s
daycare program. Most notably, Gertrud Reble, John Reble’s wife, started to volunteer
and look after the children.619 Reble’s involvement with the KWCF increased in the
following years after her introduction to the organization in early 1962. Her role in the
organization soon expanded outside of looking after children and she became involved in
the KWCF’s English classes more generally. She joined the organization’s network of
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women who helped prepare food for the organization’s celebrations, such as Christmas
parties and graduation ceremonies for the English classes. By 1965, Reble personally
registered German DPs for KWCF English classes at the different Lutheran congregations
in Waterloo County.620
By participating in the KWCF, Reble and the other Lutheran volunteers managed
to make the organization an extension of life at the church. They functioned as important
intermediaries between DPs and their new host society, whether it was through attending
German-language services together at St. Peter’s or by helping DPs learn basic English.
Such actions served to undermine the essential goal of most gatekeepers: the explicit
assimilation of a single homogenous ethnic group into mainstream society. With a large
number of DPs and extensive interaction with established German-Canadian and
American communities, gatekeepers found it difficult to break the ethnic bonds that
existed between established Germans and DP newcomers.

Upholding White Privilege and Supremacy

Gatekeepers found it difficult to completely assimilate DPs not only at practical
levels like English classes, but also at an ideological level. As a group of DPs who arrived
in North America with very poor English skills, little money, and possible Nazi or
“enemy” ties, DPs did not “belong” in a North American society that stressed Anglo and
American conformity. They were clearly “outsiders.” However the localization of
German culture in both St. Louis and Waterloo County created a unique situation that
allowed German DPs to eschew this outsider status. As the DPs were both German and
white, they could access popular myths in St. Louis and Waterloo County that helped
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include them in the community. Local legends such as Waterloo County’s “pioneer myth”
allowed German DPs to situate themselves in the long German histories of these
communities that privileged their German ethnicities and mimicked the racialized
discourses on pioneering and nation-building recognized by Canadians and Americans as
acceptable historical narratives. Although appealing to these local myths took on a more
ephemeral process than disrupting English language classes, the German DP ability to
conform to St. Louis and Waterloo County’s localized culture at an ideological level also
helped complicate gatekeeper efforts to assimilate them. As literary critic Daniel Coleman
notes, myths and stories in settler societies often took on a sense of urgency found less
commonly in other nations. As settlers established nations later than those in Europe, they
often relied upon constructed myths and legends to claim authority and “indigeneity” with
greater speed and intensity. They used these myths of pioneering and colonization to
claim a sense of legitimacy to their new homes.621 DPs could also access these myths,
since they essentially allowed settlers to quickly legitimize their presence in a foreign
land. As whites, German DPs could share in local myths that inadvertently argued for
belonging in North America while still acknowledging their German identities. Localized
German culture in St. Louis and Waterloo County complicated gatekeeper efforts to fully
assimilate German DPs as gatekeepers repeated local mythologies that directly allowed
the white German DPs to benefit from the sense of belonging these myths provided.
Local narratives that celebrated German culture gave DPs an opportunity to acknowledge
both their German past and Canadian/American present and offered an alternative to the
conformity emphasized by the gatekeepers.
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The pioneer myth in Waterloo County provided a cultural understanding for
gatekeepers to “place” recent DPs. Through their different language, culture, and desire to
remain in ethnic communities, DPs threatened the gatekeeper goals of encouraging
Anglo-Canadian conformity. The pioneer myth provided an important reminder that
Germans historically contributed to Canadian national life after the initial period of
settlement. The myth remained so pronounced that even the community’s AngloCanadian population referenced it throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In 1957, Andrew E.
Thompson, a member of the Department of Citizenship, tried to combat the antiimmigrant sentiment in Ontario by drawing on the province’s Loyalist history. He
encouraged Ontarians to stop associating all European immigrants with “displaced
persons” that could pose a threat to their job security. Instead, Thompson advocated that
Ontarians view DPs as “the same as the United Empire Loyalists. They came here under
political pressure,” just like the DPs that fled communism from Europe. He furthermore
noted the irony that Ontarians felt some discomfort over the number of European
immigrants, but that “we feel secure about the British, Irish or Scottish newcomer…yet
they are all newcomers aren’t they?”622 Clement capitalized on Thompson’s remarks and
modified them for her local Waterloo County audience. The Loyalists or the “Irish”
meant very little to Waterloo County’s predominantly English, Scottish, and German
population. Clement therefore repeated Thompson’s remarks but broadened them to
reference Waterloo County’s German and “Pennsylvania Dutch” history. She noted, for
instance, that “these new citizens have had enough faith in Canada to decide to make their
homes here – as did our ancestors from Germany, England, Scotland, Switzerland, etc.
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These are the people who will help fulfill our destiny as a nation.”623 While Thompson
addressed a general Ontario audience, Clement’s remarks could not ignore Waterloo
County’s German past. As a resident of Waterloo County, she had to acknowledge the
reality of the community’s German past. Accordingly, Clement had to grant Waterloo
County’s German forebears the same status bestowed on other white settlers in Ontario.
Clement’s remarks not only recognized the ethnic component of Waterloo
County’s history, but also its racialized one. Like many other Canadians, Clement spoke
of immigration in nation-building terms. Politicians and Canadians more generally
discussed immigration as a nation-building process, wherein immigrants would “build”
the nation economically as well as through their contribution to its “character” through
changing, or solidifying, the nation’s demographics. While other Anglo-Canadians spoke
of racialized immigrants, such as the Chinese, as undesirable and contrary to Canada’s
“character,” Clement spoke of German DPs as contributing positively to Canada’s
nationhood.624 German DPs could access these positive attributes due to common
perceptions of the white race as natural “nation-builders.” Cultural theorist Richard Dyer
argues that white people often associated their whiteness with particular ephemeral
qualities that other races did not possess. Whiteness, Dyer suggests, contained the
promise of “enterprise” that allowed white civilization to thrive in the areas of science,
discovery, leadership, and governance. Decades of imperial and colonial rule convinced
whites that they had a special inclination towards building and ruling nations.625 As
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whites, German DPs found themselves the beneficiaries of this racial thinking. Clement
could easily describe German DPs as “nation builders” since this was a perceived trait of
the white race. German Loyalists once contributed to building the Canadian nation and
German DPs, as a result of their whiteness, could do the same. Although men like
Thompson generally applied this racialized logic to the British and English-speaking
world, Waterloo County’s tradition of broadening Anglo-Canadian myths to its German
inhabitants forced Clement to recognize German DPs as racially acceptable “nation
builders.”
Although German-American Lutherans in St. Louis did not have a popular pioneer
myth comparable to their coreligionists in Waterloo County, they too profited from St.
Louis’s localized immigrant culture. As director of the IISTL for most of the 1940s and
1950s, St. Louis’s immigrant population benefitted from Harriette Ryan’s progressive
views of ethnicity and tolerance. Ryan, a second-generation Irish immigrant, achieved
middle class respectability while still gaining particular insight into the experiences of
immigrants and their children. Ryan contested the American emphasis on the “melting
pot” theory as an inadequate metaphor to explain immigration to the United States since
the early 1930s. Ryan believed that Americans wrongly conflated the melting pot theory
with democratic values. Americans spoke too often of vague notions of liberty and too
little of the inequalities American immigrants faced. While an emphasis on “liberty”
offered a noble goal, Ryan argued it is was much harder to “put into practical operation
those democratic principles and methods about which so much is said and all too little
accomplished.”626 She described how the melting pot theory evoked images of a hot steel
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factory that boiled up iron and other materials. She asked her audiences to imagine this
process and to visualize putting people in a factory where “their individuality [would be]
obliterated.” She wanted nothing to do with the “awful concept” that erased immigrant
individuality.627
Instead, Ryan vouched for her own model of American diversity that she titled
“the shuttle.” Rather than relying on the melting pot metaphor, Ryan preferred to think of
American diversity as a shuttle “going into a tapestry or a beautiful design” that Ryan and
the IISTL would help “weave.” This design had many different threads composed of
many different ethnicities into one singular unit.628 Ryan did not pressure immigrants to
lose their ethnic identity “as quickly as possible as [others] would have it.” She hoped
immigrants would instead adjust to American life “constructively and with as little loss of
values as possible.” Acculturation to the United States was a dialogue between American
and ethnic cultures, a “two-way” process, and not a linear pattern of assimilation.629
Accordingly, Ryan believed that Americanization was a project that immigrants and
Americans alike could shape.
Ryan conceived the shuttle model in part due to her belief that the “melting pot
theory has not been successful with the Second Generation” of immigrants, like herself.
Ryan proposed that the melting pot theory “encouraged [them] to cut loose from their
own ancestral history and culture” which went on to create “an attitude of antagonism
toward their own culture and their parents.” Yet, Ryan remarked that these immigrants
lacked the same history and context as native-born Americans and therefore did not
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belong in the “normal” American world either.630 She recognized the process of hybridity
many Americans experienced. Her shuttle model, therefore, emphasized providing
immigrants with a bit of “their own history and culture” and combined it with how it has
“contributed to American life.” She hoped that recognizing second generation immigrants
as the beneficiaries of both “ethnic” and “American” worlds would therefore mitigate any
sense of inferiority and distrust, be it on the part of American society or within ethnic
communities.631
As fellow first or second-generation immigrants, members of St. Louis’s German
Lutheran community embraced a model of diversity that aligned more closely with
Ryan’s shuttle metaphor than the standard melting pot theory. Louis Sieck, a Concordia
Seminary professor and St. Louis pastor, drew a direct connection between the DPs and
former immigrants seeking refuge in the United States. “The immigrants to be
admitted…have this in common with earlier immigrants to this country: their potential
contribution to our national life and economy has been considered of sufficient value,” he
wrote. “Always in the past immigrants have shared in local community resources along
with other residents, just as they have contributed to community life.”632 Sieck understood
that German DPs had the potential to participate in “nation building.” Their whiteness
conferred a certain understanding that German DPs would be economically and morally
“of sufficient value.” Other St. Louis Lutherans went further in their comparison and
directly related the incoming Lutheran DPs to their own nineteenth and early twentieth
century ancestors. Publicity material distributed by the synod made it clear that DPs
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would gradually adjust to life in the United States. One synod-produced pamphlet
described how “Lutheran people from Europe found American governmental and cultural
patterns quite unfamiliar, but they felt an identification with the Lutheran churches
already established here. This continuity of their religious ties sustained and enriched the
lives of many of them as they sought new homes in America.”633 Ryan’s emphasis on
balancing old and new world cultures found an ideological companion with the Missouri
Synod’s desire to maintain a hybrid German-American identity in their churches. “No one
can be expected to strip himself of his past or the behavior developed by this past just
because he is in another environment,” one St. Louis pastor wrote. “Nor, for that matter,
would it be wise for the newcomer to try to forget all old patterns and attitudes. Some of
them will become valuable contributions to our American culture.”634 German-American
Lutherans saw their congregations playing an important role in facilitating this process.
“Formerly and now, whenever local congregations and pastors have reached out to
welcome them, many of these newcomers have found their places in American church
life….The Church has contributed much to make possible the integration of the old and
the new.”635 Lutheran churches consciously took on the role of helping to facilitate this
process for DPs as an extension of their ability to balance ethnic and national identities.
Ryan’s shuttle philosophy and the Missouri Synod’s construction of ethnicity stressed
hybridity over American conformity.
The shuttle philosophy and St. Louis’s localized German culture, however,
reinforced a racial hierarchy that placed white citizens at the top. Their celebrations of
633
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ethnic diversity did not necessarily lead to declarations of racial equality. The inherent
whiteness of both models became strikingly evident at IISTL events that implemented
these philosophies at a practical level. Although the IISTL’s immigrants embraced Ryan’s
shuttle philosophy, they did not intend on applying it to all St. Louis residents. Ryan tried
to desegregate the IISTL’s social clubs by inviting more black and Japanese residents to
the IISTL, but found her efforts met with ambiguous or outright hostile responses. Ryan
suggested in early 1946 that the IISTL’s Women’s Discussion Group invite “a small
group of Negro women” to their subsequent meetings. Several immigrant women
objected on the grounds that there “was no use entertaining for one meeting people whom
they would not care to have more often.”636 The IISTL also tried to desegregate some of
its social clubs in the early 1950s. They noted in particular that the Japanese war brides
associated with the IISTL seemed isolated compared to the rest of their white members.
They invited Japanese war brides to some of the organization’s social events, but its
immigrant and DP members expressed reservations about their attendance. They told
IISTL employees that their lack of English and unfamiliarity with American cooking
acted as barriers to group cohesion.637 Ryan felt as though her efforts to desegregate St.
Louis were limited by the “climate of opinion” in the city. She admitted that she was
prepared to “go much further than perhaps Board members or St. Louisians generally”
were prepared to go.638 Immigrants at the IISTL embraced Ryan’s notion of ethnic
diversity while still maintaining racial exclusion. Tolerance, it seemed, was a quality only
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extended towards their fellow white ethnics. While the IISTL’s racism excluded
racialized members of St. Louis, it inevitably included German DPs thanks to their
whiteness.
The KWCF did not voice explicit racial prejudice as frequently as the IISTL.
Without the large presence of a racialized other, the KWCF did not have to confront
racial inequalities or their own racism as directly as the IISTL’s employees. Even so, the
KWCF also faced intermittent difficulties including racialized immigrants in their
organization. Although nonwhite students did receive the KWCF’s scholarships, they
generally tended to go to students of European backgrounds. Race did, occasionally,
factor into who received these scholarships. Although initially nominated for a
scholarship, the organization later decided not to award a scholarship to one “Dutch East
Indies student” when her principal suggested that the scholarship go to a white student
instead.639 Such instances contradict and demonstrate the limits of the KWCF’s
declarations of tolerance. While the organization proudly boasted that its membership
included “people from all national groups, community groups, service clubs and women’s
organizations,” Clement simultaneously stated that “newcomers from Europe are
especially welcome” within the KWCF.640 Such sentiments capture the way whiteness
functioned in postwar Waterloo County. The lack of a strong nonwhite presence ensured
that explicit racist sentiments did not need to be expressed by the KWCF’s AngloCanadian leaders, as the European and British character of Waterloo County was never in
jeopardy in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, racist sentiment was expressed more subtly by
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favouring Waterloo County’s German traditions and an explicit presence granted to
white, European immigrants.

White Flight and Segregation in the Missouri Synod

White flight and Jim Crow segregation in St. Louis also contributed to Lutheran
churches functioning as ethnic boundary zones. St. Louis, like other American cities,
participated in the process of “white flight” in the postwar decades. The term “white
flight” refers to the exodus of white middle-class Americans from urban areas to newly
constructed suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s. In response to American attempts to
dismantle segregation, white Americans fled to suburban homes in order to live among
other affluent whites rather than confront racial integration. Through direct and indirect
actions by real estate agents, bankers, and construction companies, American cities
managed to uphold de facto segregation with white Americans living predominantly in
the suburbs and Black Americans confined to urban or impoverished areas.641 This
process occurred in St. Louis shortly after the end of the Second World War. The
manufacturing boom the city experienced as a result of the war quickly vanished, leaving
many workers jobless or underemployed as deindustrialization shaped the downtown
core. By August 1945, over 100,000 St. Louis workers had lost their jobs.642 Provisions in
the G.I Bill, a piece of legislation designed to provide benefits to returning American
veterans, however, provided white veterans with the financial means to secure education
and housing at low costs. Without a job in the quickly deindustrializing downtown core,

641

For local studies on white flight, see Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight:
Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
642
Betty Burnett, St. Louis at War (St. Louis: Patrice Press, 1987), 145-148.

273
many white families used economic support from the G.I. Bill to move to recently
constructed suburbs in St. Louis County.643 Promotional material for the newly
constructed suburbs openly advertised its large neighbourhoods free from the presence of
black Americans.644 By controlling rental and housing prices, local real estate agents
helped wealthy whites flee downtown St. Louis to all-white suburbs. This process of
white flight created an unspoken rule that housed the white residents of St. Louis south of
Delmar Boulevard while Black Americans lived downtown and north of the “Delmar
Divide.”645
White flight in St. Louis proved particularly problematic for the Missouri Synod’s
congregations located in downtown St. Louis. Prior to the 1920s, St. Louis’s downtown
area housed the city’s working-class German immigrant population. Accordingly, the
Missouri Synod had many of its oldest congregations founded in the nineteenth century
located in the downtown core.646 Local pastors realized that their congregations suffered
from decreased attendance as a result of their white congregants fleeing downtown St.
Louis to live in affluent suburban neighbourhoods. Questions surrounding race therefore
posed greater problems than ethnicity and language in these congregations. Originally
established in 1849, Bethlehem Lutheran Church continued to offer German and English
services in the postwar period. Bethlehem’s pastor, the Reverend L.E. Eifert, continued to
preach bilingual sermons throughout the 1950s and easily maintained the congregation’s
hybrid traditions. Eifert’s main concern throughout the decade proved to be the church’s
643
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“scattered membership” and “the problem of a changing neighborhood.” White flight
posed a real challenge for the church, as Eifert noticed that “the movement of members
out of the area and into the county” adversely affected attendance. He encouraged the
congregation “to do our best to maintain and preserve” the members that the congregation
currently had.647 This proved easier said than done. Eifert collaborated with other St.
Louis pastors in an effort to try and solve the problems white flight posed, but to little
avail. In a desperate attempt to keep his congregation together, Eifert even proposed that
he move the entire congregation from downtown to a suburb in the county. The cost of
this venture, however, ultimately dissuaded the church council from adopting Eifert’s
proposal.648
Eifert and Bethlehem more generally showed no desire to desegregate their
church, even if it would solve the problem of decreased church attendance. They were
hardly alone in this regard, as desegregation rarely emerged as a solution to the problem
of church membership. Pastors often saw the solution to white flight as merely attracting
new white members, rather than desegregating their downtown churches. In 1956, a
conference of St. Louis pastors met and essentially confirmed their commitment to
segregation through their inaction. They concluded that the solution to dwindling church
attendance was to increase their “evangelical” preaching techniques that appealed to all
Christians, rather than just their Lutheran base. They hoped energetic preaching would
draw in new white members to replace those who fled to the suburbs.649 This solution
showed no attempt to integrate the synod’s German-English congregations with the few
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black congregations in St. Louis. Effectively, pastors prioritized keeping their churches
white, and therefore German, spaces instead of creating new multiracial congregations.
White flight and the problem of ministering to black congregations in St. Louis
took place within the broader context of debates over desegregation within the Missouri
Synod. Racial tensions within the synod became fully apparent in 1955 as a result of the
controversy surrounding the annual Lutheran Women’s Missionary League (LWML)
convention. Lillian Preisinger, the president of the LWML, decided to hold the LMWL’s
biennial convention at the Hotel Roosevelt in New Orleans. The convention’s location in
the south aptly suited the LWML’s mandate as a group dedicated to mission outreach.
Traditionally, the LWML hosted their conventions in Midwestern cities due to the high
concentration of Lutherans in the Midwest. In the 1950s, however, they decided to shift
hosting their conventions in cities that promised greater Lutheran growth outside of their
Midwestern core. Missouri Synod Lutheranism was at its weakest in the western and
southern United States, and therefore it seemed appropriate to hold LWML conventions
in regions that would receive a strong institutional boost due to the convention’s presence.
New Orleans seemed a fitting southern city in which to accomplish this goal.
Preisinger, however, later discovered that the Hotel Roosevelt still enforced
segregation. This posed obvious problems for the growing number of black Lutherans
that the LWML assisted through its missionary efforts. Preisinger contacted John
Behnken and H.A. Mayer, the synod’s secretary of missions, for assistance on how to
approach the problem. Both men took no issue with holding a convention in a city that
still enforced segregation. In fact, the anti-black racism of both men guaranteed that the
LWML found ready allies in the synod leadership. “I can readily understand that the
Roosevelt Hotel would not want to house any Colored people,” Mayer privately told the
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LWML convention organizers.650 Behnken also offered his moral support. Although
Behnken moved to St. Louis as a teenager, his childhood in Texas and subsequent work
as a pastor there in the 1920s continued to shape his views on race. Behnken identified as
a “proud Southerner” during his youth and expressed an admiration and boyhood
fascination with Confederate general Robert E. Lee.651 In early February of 1955,
Behnken wrote to the LWML leadership in order to let them know that “as one who was
born in the South and also as one who served in the ministry in Houston, Texas, for about
28 years, I am inclined to believe that I can understand your problem and your
difficulty.”652 The strong support for segregation among the synod’s St. Louis leadership
ensured that they stood firmly behind the LWML’s decision to host their convention in
New Orleans. As a synod composed largely of white German-Americans, its leadership
upheld current power relations by complying with segregation laws. By confirming New
Orleans as the location of choice, Missouri Synod leaders privileged their white GermanAmerican laity over black members of their church.
The synod’s leadership, however, knew that their implicit support for segregation
could create a public relations controversy for the church should civil rights groups
discover their decision. Behnken worried that if “Negro delegates” attended the
convention they “might create a scene which would give our church very unfavorable
publicity. We know how eager some news agencies would exploit and exaggerate such an
occurrence.”653 Mayer agreed, and expressed concern over the negative attention that the
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conference could bring the Missouri Synod. “It would be most unfortunate if newspapers
would pick up an innocent incident and plaster it across their front pages,” he confided.654
Behnken and Mayer knew their support for segregation was controversial, but did little to
challenge it. They felt little need to modify their behaviour and gladly participated in Jim
Crow segregation. The politics of black exclusion did not trouble either man, but the
possibility of negative media attention certainly did. In order to avoid a possible
controversy, Behnken and Preisinger agreed that the LWML organizers should notify the
various LWML branches that only white delegates should attend the convention. They
sent out a notice to each LWML branch that the convention would not be “permitted to
entertain delegates of the Negro race in the same manner as the others, or even allow
them to attend Convention sessions” as a result of segregation policies throughout the
city.
“We are sure this would prove a humiliating and heartbreaking experience to the fine Christian
women who would represent our LWML. We, therefore, urge that all Negro leagues and those
leagues having Negro membership be advised of this situation, and that they be urged for their own
sakes not to make plans to attend the Convention in New Orleans.” 655

Unsurprisingly, Behnken and the LWML opted to keep their convention a purely white
affair when faced with the opposition to desegregate. They privileged protecting their
own image rather than confronting racial inequalities within their church.
The LWML played on Lutheran gender roles in an effort to ensure that others
respected their decision. Conservative Americans often couched their anti-black politics
in the language of “respectability” in order to avoid alienating moderate or sympathetic
whites from their discriminatory views. In contrast to the outlandish costumes of the Ku
Klux Klan, conservatives cultivated a “respectable” tone of concerned citizens to express
654
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their support of segregation. They encouraged other whites to “protect” their community
and its “integrity” from encroaching black Americans. This discourse successfully
permeated the language of middle class whites who did not want others to see their
segregationist politics as divisive or contentious.656 For members of the Missouri Synod,
respectability often meant conforming to the synod’s gender norms, of humble male
pastors exerting their authority over docile and submissive Lutheran women. The LWML
organizers therefore took care to demonstrate that their decision to hold the convention in
New Orleans was made in cooperation with the synod’s male leadership. “This entire
problem has been discussed with the national officers, pastoral advisors, and Dr. J.W.
Behnken,” they made clear. “This letter is an outgrowth of these deliberations and our
committee meetings.”657 In appealing to the patriarchal nature of the Missouri Synod, the
LWML hoped to avoid critique. After all, they merely followed the orders of Behnken
and other male leaders. Male members of the Missouri Synod supported Behnken’s
paternalistic oversight of the LWML. One man agreed that Behnken “should be in a
position to exert an influence” over the LWML since any “stigma would certainly rest
upon the Church rather than upon the organization of women.”658 The LWML organizing
committee hoped that including Behnken’s involvement as an important caveat would
help preempt any gender-based criticisms of their choice.
The LMWL’s gamble failed. Their decision to host only white delegates at the
New Orleans convention ignited a series of protests that engulfed the entire synod. The
issue exposed clear regional tensions within the Missouri Synod. Districts and
congregations in the northern states generally criticized the LWML for their support of
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segregation, while the southern and Midwestern states remained quietly supportive.659
Pastors in Philadelphia issued a collective statement calling the LWML’s decision to host
the convention in New Orleans an “un-Christian, discriminatory act, contrary to the law
of love. The Conference deplores the fact that this procedure will be tolerated.”660 They
subsequently requested that the convention be cancelled entirely, for “it is our firm
conviction that, under existing plans, no blessing of God could be forthcoming upon a
group dedicated to the service of Christ in the cause of Missions.”661 Meanwhile,
Lutherans in the Midwest and South continued to support the decision to host the
convention in a city that supported segregation. R.T. Eissfeldt, a pastor based in the
Midwest, tried to confront his critics by noting “we personally have worked with our
colored sisters at retreats, rallies, etc. in our northern states...However, the situation down
south is entirely different.”662 Eissfeldt argued that they would support desegregation in
the north, but allow racial inequality in the south to persist. Segregation was a “southern
problem” that the church could do little to change. Moreover, proponents of the
convention continually reminded their critics of the importance of holding the convention
in New Orleans to help encourage the growth of Lutheranism in the southern states.
Behnken believed that cancelling the convention would be “very unfair to the people of
New Orleans” and did not seriously consider this suggestion from the northern critics.663
Eissfeldt agreed. “This will be the first convention in the south and would be quite a
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spiritual ‘shot in the arm’ for our Lutheran People and the cause of Christ in that section
of the country.”664 Unlike their brethren in the northern states, the synod’s Midwestern
leadership privileged the growth of Lutheranism among white Americans over racial
equality.
Critics and proponents of the convention in New Orleans both drew on theology
to bolster their position. One critic wrote to Mayer to prompt him to “wonder what St.
Paul would have said about such procedure…I know what St. James said too about the
disadvantaged brother how he should not be treated, no matter what social pressures of
the time may have been.”665 Proponents of desegregation within the synod frequently
referenced St. Paul’s assertion that God did not see anyone as a stranger or foreigner. One
Lutheran woman wrote to Behnken to tell that “we can, as Christians, point out the
injustice of such laws, as God does not discriminate as to color or race.”666 In contrast,
supporters of the convention portrayed their opponents as either secularists or as violating
Lutheran theology. Sadie Fulk Roehrs, a former resident of St. Louis and president of the
LWML, wrote that “if the minority group of whites (clergy and laymen) had spent one
tenth of the time they spent sending telegrams and letters and adding fuel to the flame had
spent time on their knees” addressing God they would have realized how wrong they
were to oppose the convention.667 According to Fulk Roehrs, God placed a greater
importance on expanding Lutheranism in New Orleans than achieving racial equality.
Behnken took a more formal approach by couching his theological objections in the
language of Romans 13. He stated that in “the deep South…there are the laws and
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regulations of the state and of the city to be taken into consideration.”668 In a reversal
from his more liberal interpretation of Romans 13 during the Second World War,
Behnken now used the doctrine in order to excuse the church from contesting state
politics. Behnken’s use of Romans 13 held little weight, among critics and proponents of
the convention alike. James D. Brasch, a New York pastor, mocked Behnken’s strict
position on adhering to local laws. He refuted the implicit argument in Behnken’s
interpretation that “the laws of a few men may take precedence over the precepts of
God.”669 Even some of Behnken’s conservative supporters in the synod acknowledged
that the synod may need to recognize desegregation legislation in the United States. “I
share your concern for the preservation of sound doctrine,” one pastor told Behnken. “Yet
I wonder whether we are not straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel when
we…ignore the basic law of Christian love in our dealings with fellow human beings.”670
As usual, pastors drew on their own theological inclinations to support their pre-existing
social views. Although each side tried to portray themselves as adopting the correct
Christian or theological approach, segregation was a social issue that divided the synod
along regional lines.
The LWML seemed to move ahead with their plan until a last minute effort by
James Brasch stopped the convention from taking place. One week before the convention,
Brasch told Behnken that he planned on reporting the synod’s support for segregation to
the media if the LWML decided to go through with the convention. “I think that I am
duty-bound bound to notify the large metropolitan press associations,” Brasch warned.671
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Behnken subsequently met with the LWML leadership and pastors in New Orleans about
cancelling the convention. Eventually, he and the LWML leadership agreed that
rescinding the invitation to New Orleans was the most diplomatic way to no longer hold
the LWML meeting.
Behnken’s so-called “compromise” did not stop the flurry of letters expressing
outrage over the convention’s cancellation. Their outrage highlights just how entitled
Behnken and his supporters felt to maintain their convention as an all white affair. They
resented having to cancel the convention and believed that Missouri Synod Lutherans had
somehow violated their rights in the process of forcing their hand. Historian Kevin M.
Kruse notes how Southern whites often thought of public spaces such as parks, buses, and
other sites as “theirs” due to legalized segregation. Thus, they often viewed attempts to
desegregate these spaces as a “loss” that violated their rights.672 Accustomed to feeling
entitled to public space due to their whiteness, Behnken and Fulk Roehrs saw the
convention’s cancellation as a minority part of the synod exerting “mob rule” over the
rest of the synod. “The minority groups…think nothing of offending thousands – our
fellow Lutheran Christians in the South,” Fulk Roehrs angrily wrote to Behnken. “I am
shocked and disillusioned at the action taken.”673 Behnken agreed, and continued to voice
his support for segregation. “I, too, am shocked and disillusioned that there was so much
agitation, and this instigated by whites who thought to make an issue of the matter,”
Behnken replied to her. “I certainly do not like the idea of pressure which some exerted. I
did not think that it was possible that any minority group could act like that.”674 Behnken
genuinely perceived the LWML as the persecuted group, and not the black Lutherans
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more significantly impacted by New Orleans’s segregation laws. By forcing Behnken and
his supporters to confront their complicity in a manner that made them uncomfortable,
Behnken portrayed himself as the real victim of the entire affair. “I cannot understand
why some of our fellow-Lutherans insist on tolerance in the race question can themselves
become so terribly intolerant. They surely permit their emotions to run away with better
judgment,” he wrote to a group of pastors in New Orleans.675 Accustomed to enjoying the
privileges their whiteness granted them, Behnken and other Missouri Synod supporters of
segregation interpreted any movement towards racial equality as a loss for them.
Although the debate around the convention exposed clear regional tensions within
the Missouri Synod, Behnken and the LWML’s eventual “compromise” bore distinct
Midwestern qualities. In his analysis of race relations in St. Louis and broader Midwest,
historian Clarence Lang found that the somewhat artificial binary distinguishing the
North’s liberal position on race relations versus the racist South could not adequately
characterize the struggle for black freedom in the Midwest. Lang proposed that race
relations in St. Louis functioned as a type of border South,” wherein race relations
functioned as a compromise between northern and southern approaches.676 Lang
describes that white elites in St. Louis responded to race relations not through “massive
resistance” to desegregation, but rather “massive redevelopment.” This strategy involved
maintaining de facto segregation by continuing black subordination through “white
paternal authority under the guise of cooperation.”677 Behnken and the LWML embodied
St. Louis’s racial politics by attempting to portray the 1955 convention’s cancellation as a
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compromise between Lutherans of different locations and race. Free of its respectable
veneer, however, Behnken’s compromise proved nothing more than another way for the
synod to continue its policy of segregation and exclusion of black Lutherans. The LWML
and Behnken pursued policies that favoured their white German-American membership
over respect for black Lutherans. Keeping their congregations German spaces, then, was
not a passive act free of racial implications. In preserving the synod as a German space,
they preserved it as a white institution through supporting segregation.

German Ethnicity at the Core and on the Peripheries

The localization of German culture remained pronounced in St. Louis and
Waterloo County in the 1950s and 1960s. Race proved a provocative and divisive issue,
but not their ethnic heritage. However, the German language generated greater
controversy in Lutheran congregations throughout Ontario and Missouri than in the St.
Louis and Waterloo County cores. Other Lutheran congregations also practiced German
traditions, but they did not always go unchallenged. Pastors and congregations alike
throughout Missouri and Ontario had different expectations of how their German
ethnicity would function than their coreligionists in St. Louis and Waterloo County.
These misunderstandings produced debates about the nature of ethnicity in the Lutheran
church that did not occur in St. Louis and Waterloo County. This proved particularly true
at congregations founded in the mid-twentieth century, such as those in Toronto or rural
Missouri.
The German language generated significant controversy in the 1950s at Trinity
Lutheran Church, a Missouri Synod congregation in Toronto. Originally founded as a
German language congregation in 1935, the Missouri Synod created Trinity with the
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intention that it would eventually switch to the English language as the congregation
grew. Compared to other urban areas like St. Louis or Kitchener, Toronto did not have a
large number of German Lutheran immigrants that could support Trinity as an exclusively
German church for the foreseeable future. Synod leaders expected that Trinity, as a
“mission church,” would inevitably grow to attract English-speaking Canadians
regardless of their ethnic heritage. Trinity eventually switched to English during the
Second World War when “English was forced upon” the congregation. However, “the
original members always hoped to get back to the German again.”678 Thankfully for
Trinity’s founding members, the number of German DPs that settled in postwar Toronto
proved sufficient that their German-language services grew in the late 1940s. Attendance
to the English-language services dwindled, and it initially appeared as though Trinity
would remain a German church.
The arrival of Trinity’s new pastor, the Reverend Albert Pollex, in 1949 upset the
congregation’s functional German-English framework. When Pollex arrived, the number
of congregants who wished to speak German far outnumbered those who wanted to their
services in English, and the number German DPs outweighed Canadian-born members.
Regardless, Pollex followed the Missouri Synod’s original intent of creating an English
congregation to appeal to as many Canadians in Toronto as possible. Recruiting more
Canadians to the church would help the church achieve financial stability and transition
away from being a “mission church” that relied on the Missouri Synod for financial
assistance. Pollex “feared that the English group would lose out” to the German
congregants and thus started to discourage attendance to German-language services at
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Trinity. Pollex preached a German language service early Sunday morning and preached
an English sermon during the more popular mid-morning time slot. His detractors
accused Pollex of fudging the numbers and outright lying about the “poorly attended”
German-language services.679 “This,” wrote one observer from Waterloo County,
“offended many of the German people, not only the newcomers but especially the older
members.”680 Initially, the aggrieved congregants complained to Leo Kostizen, the
assistant pastor at Trinity and a recent DP. Kostizen tried to vouch for his fellow DPs, but
Pollex refused to change his policy of trying to create an English-only congregation. After
several disappointing confrontations, Kostizen left Trinity to preach at another
congregation in Toronto where he offered German and Lithuanian services. Pollex
therefore replaced him with another DP pastor, William Goegginger, to oversee Trinity’s
German-language work.681
Initially, Goegginger and Pollex worked harmoniously among Trinity’s German
and English populations. However, the German segment quickly convinced Goegginger
to push for greater representation within Trinity. They successfully argued that Pollex
upset the congregation’s German-English framework and that they needed to return the
congregation to its original roots. In order to accomplish this goal, they had to empower
the congregation’s German DPs and weaken Pollex’s power and stature as Trinity’s
pastor. Goegginger proposed increasing the number of eligible voters by confirming more
German DPs as full members of the congregation. In July 1952, Goegginger put forward
the names of several German DPs for voting membership. However, these men did not
679
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attend the congregational meeting and therefore could not be received and confirmed as
voting members. The German congregants blamed Pollex for deliberately not notifying
the DPs that they needed to be present at the meeting in order to be recognized. Privately,
Pollex expressed concern about nominating so many German DPs for voting rights. He
believed he needed first to “ascertain whether their beliefs were truly Lutheran.”682 Pollex
feared that the frequency with which German DPs lobbied for language rights signified
that they wished to use the Lutheran church solely as a means to maintain their ethnic
traditions. He worried that the German newcomers attended church to socialize with their
fellow DPs rather than for the purpose of worship.683 Enfranchising German DPs
essentially gave DPs the ability to influence congregational practices. Thus, Pollex
opposed their movement as it threatened his ability to lead Trinity towards an Englishspeaking future.
Goegginger and the German DPs did not make the same mistake at the next
congregational meeting in October 1952. Goegginger attended the congregational
meeting with over twenty new German DPs eligible to become voting members at
Trinity. Their attendance represented nothing short of a coup. Trinity’s German-Canadian
members recognized the voting rights of the German DPs, even though Pollex did not
approve of them for membership prior to the meeting. Bolstered by the increase in
German voters, a spokesman from Trinity’s German-Canadian group immediately
presented a motion requesting that the German portion of Trinity unite and separate from
Pollex. They wished to form a Dreieinigkeitsgemeinde of their own, with Goegginger as
682
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their pastor and German-language services granted the authority and frequency that
Pollex so often denied them. Pollex and the English-speaking members of the church
council would be dismantled and replaced with a German-speaking administration. Pollex
and the English members of Trinity rejected the proposal. Their rejection caused around
thirty German-speaking congregants to immediately leave the meeting in protest,
demonstrating that they would no longer be associated with Pollex’s vision of Trinity one
way or another.684
Trinity’s German members followed their protest by sending a petition asking to
form their congregation to the Missouri Synod’s Ontario District headquarters, located in
Waterloo County. The debacle at Trinity confused the Waterloo County pastors, who in
contrast managed to maintain a balance between the German and English languages. The
Reverend C.T. Wetzstein could not see how Pollex, Goegginger, and Trinity’s English
and German speakers could not worship peacefully together. Privately, Wetzstein blamed
Pollex for creating trouble at Trinity. Unlike their own congregations, Pollex seemed to
be creating controversy by meddling with the German-English traditions that produced
harmonious congregations in Waterloo County. Wetzstein personally visited Trinity in an
effort to promote reconciliation and decrease animosity between the two sides. In his
address, he promoted the vision of linguistic tolerance practiced by his congregation in
Waterloo County. He told Trinity’s English congregants “that a Christian should not be
concerned too much about language but that we should be ready to serve people in every
language and should make it possible that all people, no matter what their language is,
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might be able to hear the gospel.”685 Wetzstein created a “compromise” wherein Trinity
had to remain as a single congregation, but had to grant its German congregants greater
rights. They agreed to give Trinity’s German population its own treasury and to move
German language services from the early morning to the more popular 11:00 time slot.
Henceforth, they agreed that Pollex would preach the English language service at 9:30,
and Goegginger would preach a German language service at 11:00.686 This decision was
ratified at a November congregational meeting and received the congregation’s
overwhelming support. Thanks to Goegginger’s efforts in the previous meetings, the
voting membership of Trinity now consisted primarily of German-speaking congregants.
Although Pollex and other English congregants voted against the motion, they were
overwhelmed by the German voters.687
The compromise clearly favoured Trinity’s German congregants at the expense of
Pollex’s authority. Pollex sought to overturn Wetzstein’s decision by appealing directly to
the Missouri Synod’s leadership in St. Louis. He wrote to Frank Streufert, of the synod’s
missionary board, in December 1952 sarcastically thanking him for the money the synod
provided his congregation to work with German DPs. He rhetorically asked Streufert
whether this money was “given to ‘take in’ the D.P’s or was it given to ‘have the D.P’s
take over’?”688 The attitude of the synod, Pollex believed, showed that there were certain
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“strings attached” to this money that suggested he had to obey the directions of the synod,
even if they undermined his authority.
The debate over language at Trinity encompassed the entire congregation. As the
dispute intensified, laypeople became embroiled in the controversy as well. After Pollex
failed to accomplish his goal through the church’s traditional channels of voting and
congregation meetings, he conspired with his wife to try to gain a favourable policy
through other means. In December 1952, Gertrude Pollex travelled to St. Louis to utilize
her kinship ties in an effort to gain St. Louis’s support to challenge the Erdman-Wetzstein
decision. Officially, Gertrude visited St. Louis under the guise of visiting her ailing
mother.689 However, her actions in St. Louis prove she visited with the intent of helping
her husband and Trinity’s English-speaking congregants. Gertrude stayed with her
brother, Walter Buszin, who worked as a professor at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis.
Once in St. Louis, Gertrude began pushing her brother to convince his peers and
colleagues among the Missouri Synod’s leadership to take greater action in the Trinity
case. Her presence convinced Buszin to write to Frank Streufert and Mayer, two of the
synod’s leaders in missionary work, and offer his opinion on the “embarrassing” issue
currently occurring at Trinity. He echoed Gertrude’s stance which lamented the fact that
Trinity’s English congregants now have “practically no jurisdiction over its own
property” and congregation.690 Once in St. Louis, Gertrude arranged a meeting with
Streufert and Mayer. She told the two men Pollex’s correspondence with them did not do
enough to underscore the tensions at Trinity. She articulated the viewpoints of Trinity’s

689

CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work
Folder, Pollex to Streufert and Mayer, 29 December 1952.
690
CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work
Folder, Buszin to Mayer, 4 January 1953.

291
English members and the importance of speaking English if the congregation had any
hopes of growing once the influx of postwar immigrants ceased. She worried that
speaking German would simply serve to alienate the congregation from the rest of the
community. “We are going twenty years or more back in time if this situation continues,”
she argued.691
Gertrude remained in St. Louis throughout January and continued to lobby for
Pollex and Trinity. While her brother entered the discussion on Trinity as an interested
third party, by mid-January he emerged fully on Pollex’s side due to Gertrude’s
advocacy. Buszin’s correspondence with the synod’s leadership suggest that she knew
precisely how to prompt him to advocate for Trinity’s English congregants. While in St.
Louis, she told Buszin how Goegginger “turns up his nose at our theologians, our
Seminary, etc.” As a theologian and professor at Concordia Seminary, such statements
naturally provoked Buszin. He told Mayer that he wondered whether Goegginger “and his
people have any interest in us outside of our money and subsidies.”692
Laymen also became increasingly involved in the debate and petitioned St. Louis
for assistance when Pollex and Ontario District seemed to fail them. In December 1952,
Adam Ulrich, a laymen associated with Trinity, wrote to Mayer and Streufert about his
experiences attending a Christmas service among the DPs. On Christmas, Ulrich attended
a service offered by Leo Kostizen at his new congregation in Toronto. Upon his arrival,
Kostizen reportedly “stopped me and told me that I was spying on them.” He accused
Ulrich of attending the service simply to “count how many people attend church and
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control there (sic) money” and relay this information back to the synod. The interaction
convinced Ulrich that, despite only wanting “peace and unity” between Kostizen and
Pollex, Trinity’s problem began because of Kostizen’s poor attitude. He decried the DPs
for their implicit belief that “the government supports them like it did in the Old
Country.” In contrast, he praised the Canadian-born members of Trinity like himself for
sacrificing their own finances to better the church.693 Mayer responded to Ulrich’s letter,
albeit dismissively. He told Ulrich “difficulties are bound to occur” when so many
ethnicities live in close proximity. However, he told Ulrich “among Christian people all
difficulties should always be ironed out in a God pleasing manner” and mentioned he
should take the issue up with Wetzstein.694 Mayer expected a “God pleasing” solution to
Toronto’s DP problem, though evidently he did not feel obliged to find one. In this sense,
Mayer displayed the same attitude that Wetzstein did. Both men lived and preached in St.
Louis or Waterloo County where the German-English framework functioned smoothly
and without controversy. Leadership in the St. Louis and Waterloo County cores both
seemed to expect that the congregations on the periphery needed to handle their own
disputes internally until they could balance their ethnic and national congregations just as
well as those in the Lutheran core.
Language debates also occurred more frequently in Missouri due to the Missouri
Synod’s stance on segregation. White flight in St. Louis led to the creation of several new
congregations in St. Louis County’s suburbs and less urban areas of Missouri. This
exodus brought German-American Lutherans into contact with other white Americans
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who participated in white flight from St. Louis. Anglo-Americans occasionally joined
their German-American Lutheran neighbors at newly established Lutheran churches and
created more heterogeneous congregations than most German-American Lutherans and
their pastors were accustomed to in St. Louis. Occasionally, Americans joined Lutheran
churches because it was the only church in their new suburb. These Americans joined
Lutheran churches to enjoy the social benefits of organized religion, rather than out of a
strict loyalty to Lutheran theology or their German heritage.695 Regardless of their
motivation, synod leaders saw their expansion to the suburbs as an opportunity to grow
their church. They hoped that their new suburban congregations might thrive and grow,
thereby recouping the losses their downtown congregations experienced due to white
flight.
However, recent Anglo-American converts quickly came to challenge the German
traditions and conservative theological beliefs of Missouri Synod pastors. Christ
Memorial Lutheran Church, established in the late 1940s in southern St. Louis County,
was one of the first of several Missouri congregations to witness a debate between its
liberal American members and conservative German-American pastors. The congregation
started as a church primarily composed of St. Louis residents that fled the city to the
suburbs.696 The church was built “where there are thousands of new homes and...it is
reasonable to expect that in due time there will be many more homes.”697 The synod’s
decision paid off. By the early 1950s, the congregation consisted of more AngloAmerican members than its original German-American membership from St. Louis.
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The rise in American membership at Christ Memorial also increased tensions
within the congregation between its “modern” congregants and “traditional” pastor.
Members of Christ Memorial started to complain about their pastor, the Reverend Karl
Schweder, in the early 1950s. Americans congregants, unaccustomed to the Missouri
Synod’s strong emphasis on a literal interpretation of scripture, found Schweder
extremely conservative. Schweder’s sermons privileged theological lessons instead of the
more moral and socially oriented nature of other Protestant denominations. This emphasis
provided the exact opposite of what Christ Memorial’s American congregants wanted
from a religious service. These congregants wanted a broader discussion of Christianity
and how it applied to their day-to-day lives with an emphasis on charity and cooperation.
This trend was by no means isolated to Christ Memorial, as American Protestants more
generally placed a greater emphasis on interdenominational cooperation during the 1950s
and 1960s. The general American public started to see theological differences between
different Protestant faiths as insignificant. Theological disputes, they believed, should not
prevent unity and brotherhood among Christians. Essentially, Protestants saw religion as
a “spiritual marketplace” in which they could “shop” for a church to suit their social, as
well as religious, values. American Protestants started to see “personal happiness” and
instruction on how to live virtuous lives as the primary reason for attending church, and
placed less of an emphasis on theological instruction.698 Schweder, with his emphasis on
conservative Lutheran doctrine, proved ill-equipped to meet these modern “American”
standards.
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Martin Schaeffer, the pastor in charge of overseeing mission work in Missouri,
soon started hearing complaints from these congregants as a result of Schweder’s
preaching. Schaeffer noted that the Americans “haven’t liked his ways. They think he has
been a little legalistic.”699 In Missouri Synod parlance, “legalistic” often referred to a
pastor who stuck exceedingly close to a literal interpretation of the Bible, with very little
room for creative or practical license. Although some pastors prided themselves on their
legalistic emphasis, most Lutherans generally used this a slur. The congregation’s critique
contained more than just a theological criticism. They attributed Schweder’s conservative
Lutheranism as a product of his German heritage. Schaeffer noted that the congregation
felt uncomfortable with the degree to which Schweder maintained “the traditions of our
fathers.”700 Schaeffer tried to intervene on Schweder’s behalf, but proved unsuccessful.
Schaeffer subsequently reassigned Schweder to a different congregation and began the
process of looking for his replacement. Schweder was simply “too German” or “old
fashioned” for Christ Memorial’s new American membership.
Unlike Schweder’s traditional theology, Christ Memorial’s congregants wanted a
pastor that reflected their forward-thinking point of view. The congregation listed some of
its most important qualities in their new pastor and, in doing so, reflected their
background as a mission congregation that sought to engage in American life. They
stressed that their replacement pastor must be “devoted to caring for and shepherding the
souls of the congregation” and demonstrate a “consecrated and zealous” attitude “in the
work of the Lord, capable of drawing the unchurched to God’s soul-saving grace.” They
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wanted “a man who will be on excellent terms with the Community.”701 W.T. Rossnagel
eventually accepted the call to minister to Christ Memorial. He did so with the knowledge
that part of his job as pastor would be “the welding together of people with various
church backgrounds” alongside making “people from various large St. Louis churches
into a working team.”702 These mission churches could not function like their
counterparts in St. Louis. They did not have a localized German culture, thereby granting
recently converted American Lutherans more power over determining church affairs.
This division between pastors and their congregations occurred at other mission
churches in areas where the population consisted primarily of Anglo-Americans. The
synod selected Warrensburg, a smaller city in western Missouri, as another opportunity to
build a congregation and grow the Lutheran presence in that region. They described
Warrensburg as “a good ‘American’ town, with less people of German extraction than
many other towns of that size.”703 While this presented the possibility for growth among
Americans, it also inevitably brought Missouri Synod pastors into conflict with these
Americans. The Reverend J.V. Kimpel confessed that “several members have been
dropping derogatory remarks about the ‘old School’ among the clergy ever since” he
arrived in Warrensburg.704 Kimpel worked hard the next month to convince his
congregation that he could fulfill their evangelistic desires and recruit more AngloAmerican members. The following month he proudly reported recruiting three new
families to the congregation, which did a great deal to quell the congregation’s critiques.
“Let’s be glad for the Word of God taught purely in our midst, and for the mission work
701
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being done by our pastor,” one congregant reported.705 The postwar emphasis on
expansion and recruiting Americans undermined Kimpel’s education. Kimpel’s training
in St. Louis emphasized that preaching German and English sermons centered on the
Bible would be enough to satisfy his congregation. His training, however, did not account
for preaching to a general American audience that did not value his German heritage or
conservative Lutheranism.
The congregation continued to criticize Kimpel, despite some limited success
attracting new members. Kimpel reported that he and “the elders who stick with me”
continued to be plagued by the feeling that nothing they did pleased the American
contingent in the congregation. “I can not satisfy some of the members here…I have
heard too much deprecating of things ‘Missouri Synod’ and things which are good old
Lutheran customs as mere ‘old-fashioned Germanisms’.”706 Kimpel’s fears proved well
founded. In the following months the American contingent continued to make
“disparaging remarks, sometimes downright wild against Mo. Syn. Clergy and
practice.”707 These divides, along with several personality conflicts, forced Kimpel to
leave the congregation shortly thereafter. Schaefer recognized that Warrensburg needed a
“good, faithful pastor who is willing to work, who has tact and good judgment, who is
cordial and sympathetic, who is willing to go out and win the unchurched for Christ and
the congregation.” Such a pastor “ought not only find his work in Warrensburg pleasant,
but also ought to meet with constant success.”708 Essentially, Americans in Warrensburg
wanted a pastor who was not German. They wanted a pastor that reflected their
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“American” background, and not someone steeped in a German and Lutheran tradition
that seemed out of step with modern evangelical practices. Much like the infighting at
Christ Memorial, balancing a hybrid German-American identity proved an insufficient
model to implement in Warrensburg.
As the pastor in charge of expansion in Missouri, Schaeffer continually tried to
solve congregational disputes by appeasing the synod’s new American members over
their German pastors. This often involved hiring younger and more mission minded
pastors at these congregations who shared their congregation’s desire to recruit
Americans to their church. This, however, proved harder than either Schaeffer or his
pastors realized. The Missouri Synod’s reputation as a German church acted as a barrier
in many cases that dissuaded Americans from joining their congregations. One pastor
wrote in frustration that his efforts to reach Americans in Missouri often failed. “We were
on the wrong side of the tracks, known as the ‘little Dutch church’; few in numbers,” he
believed.709 At other times the German-American members of these congregations
challenged the time and focus their pastors placed on recruiting Americans who did not
share their Lutheran faith or German ethnicity. The Reverend Robert Harms at Trinity
Lutheran Church in Lebanon, Missouri, found that German-American members of his
church council looked down on his efforts to appeal to potential American recruits.
Harms lamented the “lack of cooperation” from the “founding fathers” of the church. He
noticed that unchurched newcomers were practically excluded from the church unless
they were directly related to prominent German-American families from St. Louis. “This
point however, is gradually losing weight as new blood comes in, and when the ‘old
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timers’ no longer can swing the votes negatively,” he continued. “Obviously the ‘old
timers’ resent that, and have mentioned it in just about so many words.”710
This generation of “old timers” and their disciples guarded their authority within
their communities and continued to prize their German ethnicity. Despite criticisms from
new American congregants throughout Missouri, synod president John Behnken
continued to prioritize a theologically conservative ministry steeped in their German
culture. Behnken encouraged Missouri pastors at a 1951 gathering to increase their
“Christ centered, Christ motivated, and winning preaching.” Behnken criticized the
emerging generation of younger pastors so desired by American congregations for their
more liberally minded theology in contrast to his generation’s strict emphasis on
conservative Lutheranism. He blamed their liberal emphasis primarily on the growing
tendency to prioritize English-speaking services within their congregations. He
encouraged Missouri pastors to again consult classic German-language texts like Gesetz
und Evangelium written by the synod’s founder in the nineteenth century to better
acquaint themselves with both the German language and conservative Lutheran
principals.711 Although new American members stressed conformity and evangelism,
Behnken continued to prioritize the synod’s German and conservative Lutheranism within
the St. Louis core.
Canada Synod pastors like John Reble and Otto Stockmann also saw themselves
as continuing their own German and Lutheran principals for a new generation. In the late
1950s, the German National Committee of the Lutheran World Federation offered
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“assistance to the Canadian churches in the ministry to the immigrants.”712 The Canada
Synod graciously declined their offer. After all, they did not need help from Germany to
preach to German DPs when pastors like Reble and Stockmann could accomplish this
task easily on their own. By 1957, Stockmann, a “veteran of the cross,” retired from his
position as Trinity’s pastor and started to travel throughout Northern Ontario to preach to
small groups of German DPs.713 Retirement similarly could not stop Reble from
continuing to work among German-language congregations in Waterloo County.
Although he retired from his position as the Canada Synod’s president in 1953, he started
to offer his services as a guest preacher at St. Peter’s.714
In contrast to the contentious relationship between Pollex and German DPs at
Trinity, or the debates between American congregations and Missouri Synod pastors,
minor debates did not lead to extensive congregational breakdown in Waterloo County.
Lotz and his German-Canadian church council prevented any dissenters from mobilizing
too much support at St. Peter’s because of their support for bilingual services. At St.
Peter’s annual congregation meeting in 1957, one congregant voiced his concern that “a
greater effort should be made to encourage more of the German members to make use of
the English Services.” Lotz rejected the layman’s position and stated that the German
immigrants had ample opportunity to partake in English life at the church if they so
chose. He replied that “the two groups get along harmoniously and that every effort
should be made to appraise the situation objectively.”715 A few congregants occasionally
expressed their uncertainty over St. Peter’s willingness to continue its German-English
712
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model. Peeter Vanker, a young seminary student, voiced his concern about German DPs
at a 1967 congregation meeting. Vanker was a member of what one pastor once referred
to as Waterloo Lutheran Seminary’s “rebellious generation” of seminary students. Vanker
and his fellow students in the late 1960s developed a reputation for questioning the
synod’s ethnic traditions in favour of their more “modern” and evangelical approaches to
preaching. They particularly criticized the insistence of pastors like Lotz and Reble who
encouraged German-language services, and instead favoured English-language services
so that their churches would appeal to “all” Canadians.716 After listening to various
members of St. Peter’s praise its work among German DPs, Vanker requested that the
church council authorize a special committee in order to discern whether the church’s
leadership “should contribute more towards the English segment of the congregation.” He
believed that the church should place a greater emphasis on integration so that the
Germans “might proceed unitedly (sic) in the total congregation.”717 Vanker was clearly
an outlier at the meeting, as his motion did not receive endorsement from the
congregation. Unlike Trinity in Toronto, Lotz’s refusal to indulge any of the
congregation’s critiques of its German congregants cultivated an atmosphere of tolerance
rather than doubt. By the late 1960s, the German-English framework of the congregation
could not be seriously criticized, even by younger members of the congregation like
Vanker.
St. Peter’s German-Canadian and DP members continued to balance their German
and Canadian identities even without Lotz’s insistence. When Lotz retired from St.
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Peter’s to assume leadership of the Canada Synod in 1961, the church council had to find
a replacement pastor. They created a list of desirable traits that they wanted their new
pastor to embody. At the top of the list, they stated their new pastor had to speak fluent
German. They disqualified several promising candidates with important family lineages
in the Canada Synod. The church council rejected Fred Little, the son of seminarian and
St. Peter’s congregant C.H. Little, from the position even though he had completed intern
work at St. Peter’s during his time as a seminary student. The church council cited his
weak understanding of the German language as the primary reason they rejected him.
Instead, the majority of the church council voted to offer the job of pastor to Otto Reble,
John Reble’s son, who was bilingual and even completed graduate work in Germany.718
Otto declined the position and the congregation subsequently offered the job to Henry
Opperman in 1961.719 Because Opperman was born in Waterloo County and spoke fluent
German, he seemed the perfect fit for St. Peter’s. Opperman accepted the call and looked
forward to return to “the city of my birth and early life.”720 In selecting Opperman, the
congregation ensured that they had a pastor that would continue both German and English
traditions.
Opperman’s arrival at St. Peter’s coincided with an internal debate about the
congregation’s future. St. Peter’s grew considerably in size after the end of the Second
World War due to the arrival of so many German DPs to Kitchener’s downtown core. The
church council frequently commented on the church’s cramped quarters as a result of the
congregation’s steady growth. Shortly after Opperman’s arrival, the church council
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started to consult with the congregation about whether it should construct a new larger
church building, or perhaps split into two separate English and German-language
congregations. In 1963, the congregation decided to remain as one single congregation
that would keep its German heritage and customs an essential part of the church.
Opperman ensured the congregation continued its hybrid traditions while the new church
building moved towards completion. In June 1963 the church council unanimously voiced
their dedication to “work harmoniously toward the ultimate objective, set out by the
church Council, of a total congregational life and attitude” based on its shared German
and English traditions.721
Congregational cohesion at St. Peter’s represented a model for other Canada
Synod congregations to follow. By the early 1960s, the Canadian Lutheran World Relief
(CLWR) continued to remind its congregations that they “must continue to be the backbone of all our efforts to make our migrants feel at home.” Reble agreed and proudly told
his audience at St. Peter’s that their “policy and method…in this respect is well known
throughout the Church. It is with St. Peter’s an act concerned love and not by law,” that
they welcomed German newcomers into their church. He maintained that the GermanEnglish model at St. Peter’s continued to be a shining example throughout the synod.722
The new St. Peter’s church building was completed by 1967-1968 and allowed the
congregation to continue its German-English framework in less cramped quarters. Reble
continued to conduct German-language services for the congregation into the late 1960s,
and even reported that attendance to his services increased now that the congregation was
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in the new church. “We can justly and humbly be proud of our new building in the heart
of the city,” he told the congregation in 1968.723

Conclusion
The two decades following the Second World War did not constitute an “ethnic
reverie” for the German Lutheran communities of St. Louis and Waterloo County.
Gatekeepers certainly tried to eliminate the German language from each community and
unsuccessfully attempted to break the ethnic bonds that existed between German DPs and
local German Canadians and Americans. The localization of German culture provided a
strong discursive tool for ethnic elites to combat pressures to integrate while pastors also
worked to ensure that a harmonious relationship existed at the congregational level.
Pastors continued to support and work towards maintaining hybrid congregations that
balanced both languages through sermons, clubs, and respect for both DPs and nativeborn congregants. Although congregations in rural Missouri and urban Ontario had a
more difficult time reconciling the English and German portions of their congregations,
ethnicity nevertheless continued to determine church life during decades previously
thought to be a period of conformity. The importance of the Lutheran church as an ethnic
boundary zone ensured that German Canadians and Americans earnestly welcomed
German DPs into their congregations.
Cultivating a respect for their German heritage did not, however, make German
Lutherans immune from also maintaining strong racial views. German Lutherans
participated in both direct and indirect acts of white supremacy throughout the 1950s and
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1960s. While the localization of German culture provided a welcome atmosphere for
German DPs in St. Louis and Waterloo County, so did the inherent whiteness embodied
in cultural myths in both communities. German DPs found themselves welcomed at local
congregations because they were not only German spaces, but also white spaces.
Gatekeepers and Lutheran leaders alike drew on histories of St. Louis and Waterloo
County that valorized their white settler ancestors and continued to see white ethnic
culture as compatible with Canadian and American life. The Canada Synod and KWCF
kept their community white largely through ideological practices, whereas the Missouri
Synod directly confronted race through policies of segregation and white flight. In St.
Louis, keeping their churches German also meant keeping their churches white. Lutheran
churches in the 1950s and 1960s therefore not only remained ethnic boundary zones, but
they also remained white spaces due to the historic and contemporary cultures that upheld
traditions of white supremacy in both communities.
The ethnic-racial binary so frequently used in historical examinations of whiteness
does not match these two communities of German Lutherans. They practiced ethnic
identities at their churches, and also maintained strong views on race that kept their
churches simultaneously German and white spaces. German Lutherans easily maintained
their hybrid identities while conforming to North America’s white supremacist standards.
The ethnic reverie narrative does not fully capture the complexities of the multiple
identities German Lutherans juggled throughout the postwar decades. While it is tempting
to reduce them to simply one category of “German” or “American/Canadian” or “white,”
German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County actually practiced all of these
identities simultaneously. There was no ethnic reverie during the 1950s and 1960s in
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these communities. Instead, ethnic diversity worked acceptably within the confines of
white supremacy in St. Louis and Waterloo County.
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Chapter 6: A Church of Many Nations: The Arrival of Lutheran Displaced Persons,
1948-1965
Lutheran efforts to assist refugees and displaced persons included campaigns to
admit Latvian, Estonian, and other eastern European Lutherans following the Second
World War. Although the Missouri and Canada Synods were primarily interested in
helping German Lutheran DPs, programs such as the Lutheran Labour Scheme also
assisted DPs of other ethnic and national backgrounds. While the previous chapter
examined how St. Louis and Waterloo County’s pre-existing German communities
responded to German DPs, this chapter addresses how they engaged with Latvian,
Estonian, and Finnish newcomers throughout the late 1940s to the mid-1960s.
Unlike the harmonious relationship between local Lutherans and German DPs, the
influx of Latvians, Estonians, and Finns in Canada and Missouri Synod congregations
directly challenged the authority of ethnic elites in St. Louis and Waterloo County.
Initially, ethnic leaders like John Reble and John Behnken showed an interest in
maintaining harmonious relations with the various DP groups that populated their
congregations. Incorporating Latvian, Estonian, and other DPs into their congregations
would help ethnic elites grow their churches and increase their influence in the Lutheran
community. However, newly arrived DP pastors did not passively accept their role as
subordinates within the synod. Rather, they sought to exert their influence and become
ethnic elites within their own DP communities. Latvian DPs, and their self-proclaimed
leader Alfred Skrodelis in particular, frequently challenged synod leaders by organizing
Latvian congregations and synods independent of the Missouri and Canada Synods.
Latvians wished to speak their own language at church and tried to maintain a political
connection to the Latvian state. Finnish DPs similarly tried to form their own
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congregations where they would not have to attend German or English services. They
tried to obtain pastors from Finland to preach to their congregants rather than relying on
those provided by the Missouri and Canada Synods. German-Canadian and GermanAmerican pastors responded by limiting the influence of DP pastors and undermining
their efforts to form independent congregations. They saw little need for DPs to form
their own congregations when they could attend German or English services at
established congregations.
This chapter argues that competing notions of ethnicity led local ethnic elites and
DPs to disagree over how to best incorporate DPs into the church. DPs articulated an
ethnicity firmly rooted in citizenship or nationality, alongside allegiance to their former
European homelands. DPs did not consider themselves “Americans” or “Canadians” like
their German Lutheran neighbours, but rather conceptualized themselves as communities
“in exile.” As a result, DPs tried to form their own congregations, speak their own
language, and retain a direct political connection with their homeland in the hopes that
they would one day return. Their desire to establish congregations rooted in their specific
Latvian or Estonian identities represented a political decision, rather than a theological
choice. In contrast, German-American and German-Canadian Lutherans in St. Louis and
Waterloo County practiced hybrid identities that sought to balance their ethnic, religious,
and national identities. German Lutherans justified the ethnic tradition of speaking
German at church by citing theological and spiritual tenants that argued for the links
between language and faith. Speaking German in church did not represent a political
connection to Germany, nor did it suggest that they did not belong as Americans or
Canadians. Despite their status as first or second-generation immigrants, they recognized
St. Louis and Waterloo County as their homes. These fundamental different definitions of
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ethnicity pitted German-Canadian and German-American pastors against recently arrived
DPs and help explain the tensions that resulted from trying to incorporate DPs into North
American synods.
The subsequent clash between German-Canadian and German-Americans and
Lutheran DPs demonstrates the saliency and importance of ethnicity in St. Louis and
Waterloo County following the Second World War. While American historians have
emphasized that the 1940s and 1950s constituted an “ethnic reverie,” the efforts of Baltic
and Scandinavian immigrants to maintain their own ethnic identities in opposition to
synod policies demonstrates the centrality of ethnicity in North American Lutheranism
during these decades.724 The Missouri and Canada Synods consciously maintained their
churches as German spaces and rejected attempts to make them “Latvian” or “Estonian”
spaces as well. Although tolerant towards their fellow Germans, the Missouri and Canada
Synods proved more hostile hosts to those who advocated different ethnic identities than
their own. Ethnicity continued to play an important role in Lutheran congregations in St.
Louis and Waterloo County prior to the “ethnic revival” of the 1960s.

The “New Canadian” and “DP” Problems

The Missouri and Canada Synods’ attitude towards DPs was shaped by several
trends in postwar North American society. Demographic data suggests that Lutherans,
like other North Americans, contributed to the “baby boom” of the 1950s and 1960s.
Lutherans also followed the national trend of moving from rural and urban communities
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to newly created suburbs following the end of the war.725 These broad developments in
postwar society caused synod leaders to place a greater emphasis on what they called
“home missions.” Although mission work typically referred to attempts to convert nonLutherans overseas, “home missions” placed an emphasis on converting North Americans
to Lutheranism in their local communities and retaining existing members. Some of the
most prominent pastors in each synod served on boards organized explicitly to deal with
home missions. John Reble and Albert Lotz both sat on the Canada Synod’s Home
Missions Committee (HMC). Likewise, Frank Streufert and H.A. Mayer both sat on the
Missouri Synod’s Home Missions Board (HMB). Both the HMC and HMB became
increasingly occupied with addressing the issue of home missions in the postwar era.
The population boom of the 1950s and 1960s helped prompt the interest in home
missions in both St. Louis and Waterloo County. With the increased size of Lutheran
families, one Canada Synod commenter noted that the synod could not afford to
“overlook the fact that our babies constitute a mission challenge.”726 If the synods hoped
to retain its members for the future, they needed to pay close attention to ensure that these
children attended church. This proved difficult, however, due to the population shift from
rural and urban areas to the suburbs where no Lutheran churches often existed. Norman
Berner, assistant to the Canada Synod’s president, commented on this “new condition in
our national life.” “Once upon a time Canadians stayed where they were. Families lived
in the same house for generation after generation. Those days are gone forever,” he
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argued. “Today, practically everybody moves two or three times in his life.”727 As a
result, the two synods needed to ensure that these people continued to attend a Lutheran
church after they moved. In situations where no Lutheran churches existed in the suburbs,
the HMC and HMB attempted to conduct synod-wide fundraisers in which to build new
churches in these areas. Finances and a congregation’s ability to be economically “selfsufficient” became increasingly important to synod leaders and their home missions
organizations.728
The new emphasis on home missions in the postwar period represented a break
with the past for the Missouri and Canada Synods. Previously, their mission work within
North America focused on reaching out to newly arrived German immigrants.729
However, their attention to the suburbs led synod leaders to focus equal attention on
recruiting “unchurched” Canadians and Americans who had no religious affiliation.
Berner, for instance, believed that the synod should not “confine our home mission work
to the ‘Lutherans.’ The Gospel is for all and we must minster to all that we can reach.”730
Many new neighborhoods in North America’s urban communities did not yet have
established churches, thereby opening up the possibility of recruiting “unchurched”
Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-Americans into their Lutheran churches. Synod leaders
turned their attention to the growth and future of their church, and realized that their
ability to continue to grow depended on meeting the challenges of urban and suburban
life.731
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The arrival of Lutheran DPs heightened the Missouri and Canada Synod’s ability
to achieve their goal of postwar growth while simultaneously placing it in jeopardy. On
one hand, the influx of DPs would theoretically increase church attendance and provide
the two synods with more laypeople in which to help their fundraising efforts. “Each
newcomer,” Berner commented, “is a challenge to us to preserve the Gospel in him, and
him in the Gospel.”732 However, synod leaders had several financial and cultural concerns
about the DPs that also challenged their ultimate goal of postwar expansion. Although
nominally Lutheran, DPs arrived in North America with religious and cultural customs
that differed from the Missouri and Canada Synods. These prescribed traits and qualities
subsequently became known as the “new Canadian” or “DP problem” among synod
leaders in Waterloo and St. Louis and placed their goal of postwar growth in jeopardy.
Synod leaders believed that Lutheran DPs from Baltic and Scandinavian countries
had a poor record of church attendance that would ultimately hinder their plans for
postwar growth. They believed that Finnish Lutherans, for instance, more commonly met
in “meeting-houses” and other “homelike gatherings” to practice their religion. This
tradition stood in contrast to their own North American emphasis of practicing their
religion overwhelmingly in the church.733 Lutheran DPs, it seemed, did not really know
how to “behave” as proper North American Lutherans and did not understand the
responsibilities that went along with joining a congregation. Horace Erdman, a Missouri
Synod pastor from Waterloo County, believed that pastors needed to explain that “church
membership does not consist primarily in having their names recorded on the membership
roll of a congregation.” They needed to understand that church membership meant
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participating in “congregational activity, especially attendance at divine services.”734
Other synod leaders took an even more pessimistic view. “The DP’s, as a rule, never
learned to go to church regularly,” argued Frank Streufert, of the Missouri Synod’s HMB.
“To many the church is on the same level with the social organization.”735 The casual
attitude that DPs exhibited towards church attendance placed synod goals of
congregational expansion in jeopardy and constituted a chief concern of the “new
Canadian” or “DP” problem.
Increased immigration further complicated the push for postwar growth due to the
perception that DPs did not contribute to the church financially. Synod leaders noted that
Lutheran churches in Europe received state support in order to continue to function. This
negated the need for European congregations to rely upon their congregants for
fundraisers and acts of charity to fund their churches. DPs arrived from a context in which
their local church made very few economic demands on them. The North American
emphasis on charitable donations therefore surprised newcomers, and their North
American pastors resented DPs for not giving as greatly as their native-born
congregants.736 The reluctance of DPs to contribute to the church financially was in
opposition to the goals of the synod leadership, which placed a great deal of importance
on laypeople to contribute to the synod’s growth. In essence, synod leaders accused
newly arrived DPs of bringing a “lazy Lutheranism” to North America.737 Synod leaders
worried that they would not attend church and would not contribute to the synod
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financially. Both qualities stood in opposition to the synod’s goals of postwar growth of
retaining church membership and remaining financially self-sufficient. While new
members could theoretically help fill new congregations and donate their money to the
synod, the European background of the DPs caused synod leaders to question whether the
arrival of so many DPs would help or hinder their goals.

The Arrival of DP Pastors, 1947-1950

Although discourses surrounding the “new Canadian” or “DP” problem shaped
the general fears and anxieties of synod leaders, they also had to confront the more
practical challenge of ministering to such an ethnically diverse group of immigrants. The
1947-1950 period witnessed synod leaders actively debating how best to meet their
obligations to the DPs. Synod leaders and pastors alike had few ways to communicate to
DPs from Baltic and Scandinavian countries. While pastors could speak German and
English, the Latvian, Estonian, and Finnish languages were unknown to them. If they
wished to interact with recent arrivals, they needed to find European-born pastors who
could speak these other languages until the DPs learned German or English, and
integrated into their congregations. Synods depended upon these “DP Pastors” during the
late 1940s to help them address newly arrived DPs and recruit them to their
congregations.
The two synods relied upon several DPs to work as pastors preaching to the small
communities of immigrants that started to form throughout Ontario, Quebec, and large
American cities in 1947. These initial pastors often had theological training from when
they lived in Europe, but simultaneously worked secular jobs in North America as the
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Missouri and Canada Synods did not yet recognize them as properly ordained pastors.
Adolf Gaudins, for instance, arrived in Canada in 1948 as a Latvian DP and worked
fulltime in an Ontario hydro plant. On weekends, Gaudins travelled throughout Ontario
and Quebec preaching to other Latvian DPs. Karl Raudsepp and Rudolf Kiviranna, two
Lutheran pastors from Estonia, did much the same for Estonian DPs in Ontario, Quebec,
and New York.738 These men initially worked for the Missouri and Canada Synods in the
hopes that they would be incorporated into the synods as officially recognized ordained
pastors.
Working as itinerant pastors was not a financially viable long-term situation for
these men.739 As a result of their meager wages, the first wave of immigrant pastors
became some of the early advocates for ministering to DPs within the synods. They wrote
to synod leaders extolling their own personal virtues and how their services as full-time
ordained ministers might benefit the two synods. Members of the Canada Synod’s HMC
and the Missouri Synod’s HMB needed to be convinced that the DP pastors could become
full members of their synods. Fears about the “DP problem” ensured synod officials did
not necessarily trust them to share the same goals, and saw little use for the Estonian or
Latvian languages in their German-English church. DP pastors therefore specifically
emphasized their European heritage and fluency in several different languages as positive
attributes. Kiviranna told synod leaders that “the Estonian language is closely akin to the
Finnish, and many [Estonian] pastors could be used to do missionary work among
738
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unchurched Finns” as well as Estonian DPs.740 Oskar Puhm, another Estonian DP pastor,
petitioned the HMB to hire Estonian pastors on the basis that “the same pastor could
preach to the Finns as well…and there are many Estonian pastors who would be able to
serve in different languages.”741 They encouraged synod leaders to conduct missionary
work among the DPs in an effort to elevate their own status as fully recognized and
ordained pastors within the Missouri and Canada Synods. In doing so, they tried to
demonstrate how their unique skills could help the church meet its postwar goal of
expanding home missions.
Synod leaders, however, had a difficult time imagining DP pastors as equal
members of their communities. They did not conform to their linguistic traditions, nor
were DPs easily integrated into St. Louis and Waterloo County’s localized German
culture. The issue of language sat at the crux of synod leaders’ concerns. Latvian and
Estonian immigrants had varying degrees of competency in conversational German or
English, but they rarely had the fluency in these languages to preach to a German or
English congregation. While their Estonian or Latvian language skills might be useful in
“DP work,” synod leaders could not envision these pastors preaching to their English and
German congregations. This, after all, was the synod’s “real” daily work and an ability to
speak English remained instrumental to their plans to reach unchurched North Americans.
While Kiviranna and Puhm envisioned conducting a broad range of missionary activity
among Baltic and Scandinavian Lutherans, the synod officials struggled to see a place for
DP work in their German-English synods. In fact, pastors conceptualized work in the
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Latvian, Estonian, and Finnish languages to be European, not North American, work.
Streufert believed their poor English-language skills made them unsuitable for work in
the United States. He believed that they should instead focus their efforts on helping
impoverished Lutherans in Europe recover from the war’s devastation. DP pastors, he
stated, should “be advised not to forsake their homeland at a time when their own country
and their own people are so desperately in need of faithful pastors” instead of trying to
find work in North America.742 They did not see a future for these pastors in their synods
until they learned enough German or English to preach services regularly. Synod leaders
found it difficult to advocate for permanent employment for pastors that did not speak
fluent English and German. New arrivals needed to demonstrate that they could become a
part of the synod, as well as performing DP work.
Synod leaders instead believed that Estonian and Latvian pastors should have
minor roles within the synod that rarely included missionary work. When a Latvian pastor
wrote to the Missouri Synod looking for work, Lawrence Meyer replied that the only job
he could possibly secure for him was to work at the synod’s radio station in St. Louis
translating English scripts into European languages for broadcast overseas. Meyer hoped
that he could find “some niche” for the DP pastor to work in.743 DP pastors tried to
dissuade men like Streufert and Meyer from thinking along the synod’s German-English
model, albeit unsuccessfully. Kiviranna, for instance, reminded synod leaders that he
preached to Estonians “in many places on this continent” and that the synod conducted
mission work among “American Estonians” for the last fifty years. “It is natural,”
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Kiviranna concluded, “that we look at this problem as a problem of our Synod.”744 As
they did not participate in the English or German life of the synod, the leadership
relegated them to “niche” work rather an authoritative place within the synod.
DP Pastors did, however, employ several effective strategies in order to gain some
limited financial and moral support for their work. Most notably, they gained support
when they exploited the HMC and HMB’s anxieties about postwar growth and
competition with other religious bodies. Specifically, both synods resented the frequent
attempts made by other Protestant religions to recruit Lutheran DPs to their churches
instead of directing them to Lutheran churches. One Missouri Synod pastor expressed
disdain for the tactics of the “the United and Anglican church(es)” for using “teas, dances,
folk festivals” to lure Lutheran DPs into their congregations. “We must continue to be
concerned about the soul and the salvation of these people,” he believed.745 Albert Jacobi,
a pastor from Kitchener, noted that these DPs should be members of the Canada Synod,
because they were fellow Lutherans. “But when [DPs] come to Toronto,” Jacobi
observed, they “find ULCA Lutheranism playing second fiddle to another Church.”746 DP
pastors used knowledge of religious competition between the Protestant churches to their
advantage. Kiviranna told Streufert that if he granted “the funds for calling [Estonian]
pastors” he could guarantee that “the Estonian Lutherans will not be split among various
Lutheran bodies in this country, but become members in our Synod.”747 Puhm also played
on the HMB’s same fears for financial gain. He requested five hundred dollars from
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Streufert in order to help sponsor more Estonian DPs to North America, noting that it
would be “very good propaganda and would draw thousands to our Synod.”748 In 1949,
Gaudins and Raudsepp successfully used this fear to become recognized as fulltime
pastors in the Canada Synod. The two men sent the Canada Synod HMC field reports that
emphasized the Missouri Synod’s activity among Toronto’s Latvian population. They
described how the Missouri Synod recently hired a Latvian DP pastor as a fulltime pastor
to preach to the city’s Latvians.749 The HMC worried that they were falling behind the
Missouri Synod in reaching DPs in Toronto and hired Gaudins and Raudsepp as a
result.750
Hiring Gaudins and Raudsepp marked an important first step in the Canada
Synod’s attempt to solve the DP problem. Gaudins and Raudsepp benefited from the
HMC’s concern that the Missouri Synod had greater success in reaching DPs than the
Canada Synod. In an effort to make their synod seem more attractive than Missouri, the
HMC drafted a resolution to allow DPs to form their own congregations and allow DP
pastors such as Gaudins and Raudsepp to preach services in Latvian and Estonian. In
February 1949, the HMC met with the Board of American Missions (BAM), the
committee responsible for overseeing mission work in the United Lutheran Church of
America, of which the Canada Synod was a member. Reble and Lotz attempted to
convince Karl Henry, the BAM representative, that their model of DP autonomy should
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receive BAM support. If they adopted a more restrictive approach, they believed, the
Canada Synod risked losing DPs to other churches.751 While sympathetic to the religious
competition over DPs, Henry disagreed with the Canada Synod’s approach. Henry and
BAM believed that successfully integrating DPs into the traditions of North American
Lutheranism would be the best way to ensure that they retained DP membership.
Allowing DPs to form their own congregations, Henry believed, would only foster their
less desirable traits such as not attending church or donating to the church financially.752
Thus, Henry vetoed the HMC’s desire to let the DPs form their own congregations. While
he agreed that DPs could initially receive religious services in their own language, he did
so with the understanding that the DPs would be “absorbed into local congregations” that
would eventually facilitate their assimilation into North American society.753
Nevertheless, the HMC did manage to gain BAM financing to hire Gaudins and
Raudsepp as fulltime pastors. The conditions of their employment, however, reflected
BAM’s emphasis on integration into the synod’s existing German and English practices.
Henry approved funding for the DP pastors only on the condition that they complete a
six-month internship with Canada Synod pastors to learn North American Lutheran
customs.754 These pastors had very little say in the matter. Raudsepp consented to the sixmonth “apprenticeship,” but requested he get to spend it in Montreal where he currently
lived, rather than relocating to Toronto. Henry ignored Raudsepp’s subsequent protests to
remain in Montreal and informed him that he needed to live in Toronto if he wished to
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continue to work for BAM.755 Raudsepp had little choice but to agree. Henry later
assigned all incoming DP pastors to German-Canadian pastors living in Toronto,
Montreal, Kitchener, or Hamilton. These cities in Ontario and Quebec absorbed the bulk
of central Canada’s DPs and therefore acted as appropriate training grounds for the
incoming DP pastors.
The Missouri Synod’s leadership remained equally skeptical that the incoming
pastors could acclimatize to their North American Lutheran traditions. The Missouri
Synod’s adherence to conservative Lutheranism ensured that they shared even less
common ground with these pastors than BAM and the Canada Synod. Consequently, the
HMB decided that all Estonian and Latvian pastors needed proper mentorship and
training before they could assume the full responsibilities and respect of preaching in the
Missouri Synod. Generally, HMB members suggested that recent immigrants enhance
their theological training at the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis before preaching in the
Missouri Synod. Yet even this did not guarantee full acceptance into the synod. In 1950,
for example, Streufert received notice from a Latvian DP pastor who wished to join the
synod. After other pastors pushed him to clarify his doctrinal position, it became clear
that he actually did not hold the same theological positions as the Missouri Synod.
Streufert was unsurprised. “We cannot be too careful with many of the D.P.’s that came
to the shores of our country,” he concluded.756
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Although synod officials monitored their theological convictions, language
remained the most difficult barrier for the DP pastors to overcome. Pastors could
therefore gain “a great advantage” with men like Streufert if they had some knowledge of
English or German.757 In 1950, an Estonian pastor, Mihkel Soovik, neared graduation
from the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, prompting Streufert to begin to consider a
placement for him within the synod. One of Soovik’s mentors vouched for his
employment in the synod by telling Streufert that he “speaks English quite well and
German very well.”758 These qualifications ensured that Streufert and the HMB took his
candidacy and future within the synod seriously. Yet Soovik still faced suspicion over his
qualifications due to his status as an Estonian DP. One pastor commented that Soovik
needed to be discouraged from serving “his own people” now that he graduated. He
believed that Soovik should serve as an assistant pastor in a congregation that consisted
mainly of German Americans with a small Estonian population. Soovik could use his
German language skills while ensuring the Estonians could “be assimilated into said
congregation.”759 Streufert agreed with this assessment. He stated that “the sooner the
foreign language groups are assimilated into our American way of life…the better it will
be for them and their children.”760 Although Soovik’s willingness to preach in German
and English helped guarantee his employment in the synod, it did not exempt him from
becoming the target of the HMB’s fears about the DP problem.
Such instances highlight the ways synod leaders privileged their German ethnicity
over the other European ethnicities practiced by the DPs. The localized German culture
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embedded into most congregations did not include welcoming other ethnic identities into
their congregations. Soovik’s mentor, for instance, noted that immigrants should be
encouraged to adjust to their new congregations “despite their nostalgic longing for things
Estonian and Latvian.”761 The irony of this statement escaped Streufert and the other
synod leaders. While the Missouri Synod’s German-American leadership portrayed DPs
wishing to speak their native tongue as “nostalgic,” they saw their own tradition of
speaking German as continually relevant. Since the synod maintained its German
language services since its inception in the nineteenth century, they viewed the continued
relevance and utilitarian use of the German language in ways that they did not understand
the European languages of the DPs. Synod leaders spoke German because it was an
integral part of their Lutheranism. Speaking Latvian or Estonian, on the other hand, did
not have the same spiritual necessity. As a result, it appeared that DP pastors encouraged
speaking their own languages for nationalistic reasons rather than spiritual ones. While
the Lutheran church as an ethnic boundary zone benefitted German DPs and their
German-Canadian and German-American membership, it inevitably led to the
marginalization of the Baltic DPs.
Synod leaders pursued a policy of assimilation when confronted with large
numbers of Lutheran DPs. In November 1948, approximately ninety Latvian DPs arrived
in Tate County, Mississippi, to work in the area’s cotton farms. The large number of
Latvians in a single concentrated area meant that the Missouri Synod could, theoretically,
undertake efforts to organize a congregation in the area. Yet the Latvian background of
these DPs caused considerable hesitancy among synod officials. Aside from expressing
concern for their material wellbeing, synod leaders believed that “the foremost problem”
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in missionary work “seems to be how these foreigners can be served with the Word of
God.” Streufert noted sadly that the synod had “no pastors able to speak the Latvian
language.” As a result, he believed “we cannot do anything about this situation.” He
encouraged nearby German-English congregations “to get in touch with [the Latvians]
and do the best they can,” but noted that they would have no official help from the
Missouri Synod.762 As the HMB did not believe the Latvians spoke English or German,
they did not see a place for them within the Missouri Synod.
The Missouri Synod revised their initial stance on what became colloquially
known as the “Mississippi Latvians” in the summer of 1949. By June, the Missouri
Synod’s leadership realized that none of their pastors made any efforts to address the
needs of the Mississippi Latvians. Yet Latvian DPs continued to arrive to Tate County in
great numbers. In fact, the number of Latvian DPs living in northern Mississippi swelled
from ninety to nearly nine hundred in the span of several months. Mayer visited northern
Mississippi throughout the summer of 1949 in order to assess the situation. Synod
members noted two things throughout these visits that made them advocate for greater
mission work among the Mississippi Latvians. First, contact with the Mississippi Latvians
made synod officials aware that members of other religious bodies had visited the area in
the previous months. Mayer discovered that a pastor from a rival Lutheran synod made
several visits to the Latvians, as did Baptist and Presbyterian officials. Mayer learned that
“two of the Latvian families in that area are Baptists and told us that there was no need
for our Church to come in. The Presbyterian pastor in Senatobia is planning to visit all of
the homes and offer his service.” He concluded that “some definite action should be taken
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regarding serving these people lest they become a prey of the various sectarians about
them...Unless all of these people are to be lost to the Lutheran Church, something must be
done for them now.”763 Second, these visits made the Missouri Synod realize that the
language barrier between the synod and Latvian DPs was not as wide as previously
assumed. Synod officials were surprised to discover that nearly all of the Mississippi
Latvians spoke German. This significantly increased the feasibility of providing them
with a pastor. One visitor commented that any of the synod’s “German speaking pastors
can go into that field and start to serve these neglected people” now that the two groups
shared a common knowledge of German.764 Only through appealing to the synod’s ethnic
culture could DPs hope to receive attention from the Missouri Synod.

The Skrodelis Controversy, 1949-1950

The growing number of DP pastors in the late summer and early fall of 1949
shifted discussion of the DP problem from abstract to reality. Waterloo County pastors
such as Reble and Lotz maintained their belief that the spiritual care of DPs needed to be
understood as the most important issue when discussing immigration. They believed
certain linguistic and cultural concessions should be made to the DPs in order to prevent
them from joining the Missouri Synod or other Protestant bodies. While not an ideal
situation, these concessions would allow ethnic elites like Reble to maintain their control
over the DPs and increase the size of the Lutheran church. The DP pastors shared many
of these same goals, and therefore maintained a pragmatic alliance with Reble and Lotz in
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these early years. However, BAM officials and pastors outside of Waterloo County did
not always hold the same sympathetic approaches as Reble and Lotz. Local disputes in
cities such Hamilton and Toronto inevitably involved the Canada Synod’s leadership in
Waterloo County as Lutherans looked to them to help mediate their disagreements.
Congregational arguments typically focused on clashes between DPs intent on
maintaining their ethnic identities and the German-Canadian pastors who hoped they
would adopt the German-English culture of their church. These disputes forced Reble and
Lotz to realize that the DP pastors they previously championed conceptualized their
ethnicity as a secular and nationalistic identity that contradicted their own ethnicity. By
the end of 1950, early advocates for DP pastors came to favour BAM’s more hardline
integrationist approach. The “Skrodelis controversy” of 1949-1950 represents both a
concrete example of the DP problem as well as demonstrating the ways in which GermanCanadian Lutherans in Waterloo County conceptualized ethnicity differently than the
recently arrived DPs.
Alfred Skrodelis, a Latvian DP pastor, arrived in Canada in September 1949. Prior
to his arrival, Skrodelis ministered to a Lutheran congregation in Latvia before fleeing the
country from Soviet persecution in 1944. He and his family fled to Marbug, Germany,
where he spent the next several years acting as a pastor for other Latvian refugees who
fled to Germany.765 Skrodelis was one of the first DP pastors to be accepted into the
Canada Synod under the condition that he complete BAM’s mandated six-month
internship program at a Canada Synod congregation. In the fall of 1949, BAM assigned
Skrodelis to St. Paul’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Hamilton, Ontario, because of the
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congregation’s growing Latvian population. The German language played a less
important role at St. Paul’s than it did in congregations in Waterloo County. The
congregation mostly spoke English by the 1940s and its membership roll shows a greater
heterogeneity of German, Scottish, and English members than the predominantly German
membership of Waterloo County congregations. The Reverend Fred Mueller, the pastor at
St. Paul’s, similarly had greater involvement with secular and Anglo-Canadian groups
and charities in Hamilton than his contemporaries in Waterloo County.766 Influenced by
these secular connections, Mueller initially embraced the idea that he should help
Skrodelis and his Latvian followers integrate with greater fervor than Reble, Lotz, and the
other Waterloo County pastors.767 Prior to Skrodelis’s arrival, BAM officials made it
clear to Mueller that the goal of his mentorship was to “absorb” Skrodelis and the Latvian
DPs into the North American church structure and society. “We want [Skrodelis] to be
impressed, however, with the importance of looking forward not to the establishment of a
Latvian church,” they told Mueller, “but to their integration into a non-national church
like yours. His chief purpose should be to minister the Gospel to the people in the way
they best can be reached with the idea of fitting them for the church life of their new
land.”768 They stressed that Skrodelis should communicate in English whenever possible
and learn “our principles and methods of exercising stewardship so that he will see how
churches attain and maintain self support.” BAM wanted the DPs to realize that they
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could not rely on financial support from the state as they did in Europe. If DPs and their
pastors wanted to practice their religion, they needed to do so by financing themselves.769
Skrodelis, however, did not quietly conform to Mueller and BAM’s expectations.
Rather than encouraging the assimilation of Latvian DPs in Hamilton, Skrodelis actively
worked towards creating an infrastructure that would allow their Latvian ethnicities to
thrive. Skrodelis made very little effort to encourage St. Paul’s Latvian DPs to integrate
into the congregation. Instead, Skrodelis began to canvass throughout Hamilton to
encourage Latvian DPs to attend St. Paul’s. He visited other churches in Hamilton and
told their Latvian DPs that they should start to attend St. Paul’s where he would preach to
them in Latvian.770 Skrodelis regularly preached in Latvian and even requested that the
congregation offer a Latvian-language Sunday School in which to educate the
congregation’s youth. Mueller interpreted Skrodelis’s actions as an attempt to operate
within BAM’s restrictive framework by de facto organizing a Latvian congregation
within St. Paul’s. Skrodelis stated as much in December 1949. He believed that the
Latvian DPs should continue to worship at St. Paul’s, but only if they received greater
rights within the congregation.771 Skrodelis’s insistence on implementing Latvianlanguage services at St. Paul’s challenged BAM and Mueller’s authority. He essentially
sought to replicate Latvian and European traditions and languages when BAM stressed
complete integration into the German-English framework at St. Paul’s. In doing so,
Skrodelis made a bid at becoming an ethnic elite in the Latvian DP community at the
expense of Mueller’s leadership.
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While Reble sympathetically tried to moderate Skrodelis’s behaviour in Hamilton,
Mueller and BAM saw Skrodelis as the embodiment of their fears about DP pastors.
Mueller “stated that the work was not progressing as it should…Skrodelis insists on a
Latvian Sunday School, which we are against.”772 Mueller believed that Skrodelis was an
“extreme nationalist” who continued to remind the Latvian DPs about their homeland
rather than encouraging their integration into Canadian life.773 Skrodelis rejected
Mueller’s attempt to “re-educate” him and viewed his assimilationist policies as an
“insult” to both himself and St. Paul’s Latvian DP congregants.774 According to Skrodelis
and his congregants, Mueller and BAM members acted as though they wanted him “to
give up everything Latvian.”775 Mueller’s hostility prompted Skrodelis to inquire
skeptically as to whether the Canada Synod’s goal was actually to serve the religious
needs of the Latvian DPs, or whether the synod wanted to simply recruit enough DPs to
“pay the church tax.”776 Skrodelis warned Reble that this attitude showed the Canada
Synod worked “against them” and that “the Canadian church will remain strange to many
of them” if the synod did not “take more into consideration the wants of the Latvian
souls.”777 Mueller worried that Skrodelis’s passionate “nationalism” for the Latvian cause
would slowly weaken his grip on the congregation. He confided to Reble that “soon, if
not already, we have more Latvian members belonging to the congregation” than St.
Paul’s Canadian-born populace.778 Accustomed to maintaining complete control of his
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congregation, Mueller recognized that Skrodelis jeopardized his status as a pastor and
ethnic elite.
The tensions between Latvian DPs and St. Paul’s congregants became so
contentious that Mueller called an emergency meeting to discuss how to solve their
“Latvian problem” in April 1950. Mueller proposed that the congregation vote on
whether the Latvians should form a “separate and independent Latvian congregation in
Hamilton” or “stay in St. Paul’s congregation,” and continue as a single congregation.
Mueller intended the vote to be somewhat rhetorical. By putting this question to a
democratic vote, Mueller hoped to gain the authority to stop Skrodelis’s constant
lobbying for a separate congregation. In order to ensure the congregation overwhelmingly
voted to “remain,” Mueller placed strict regulations on which Latvian members of the
congregation could vote. He decided that only the Latvians who attended services
regularly and made financial donations to the congregation could vote at the meeting.779
Skrodelis rejected such an obvious ploy to disenfranchise the majority of St. Paul’s
Latvian members. Skrodelis pointed out that Mueller knew many of the Latvian DPs had
sporadic church attendance and did not make financial contributions due to their refugee
status.780 The strict regulations Mueller placed on voting convinced Skrodelis that the
only way to ensure the Canada Synod would respect Latvian DPs was to “found real
Latvian congregations” where Latvians could receive services in their mother tongue.
“Nobody here asks for our opinion,” Skrodelis stated.781 He told both the HMC and his
Latvian followers alike that he “shall not be neutral any more” and that he planned on
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uniting the Latvians in Hamilton into a single congregation. This, he hoped, would help
them “defend against the undeserved offenses” that Mueller and his policies created.782
Mueller subsequently mailed out voting cards to just over three hundred Latvian
DPs associated with St. Paul’s. Skrodelis urged the Latvians not to fill out these voting
cards in an effort to arrange a larger meeting where they could debate the issue of
congregational autonomy. Regardless, out of the three hundred Latvians who received
voting cards, approximately half replied. Out of those that replied, one hundred and
twenty voted to stay with St. Paul’s. Mueller interpreted the results as a clear indication
the Latvian DPs wished to remain with St. Paul’s, while Skrodelis was quick to point out
that those who abstained from voting did so out of his own urging. Skrodelis also
believed that the vote did not fully represent Latvian feeling in Hamilton. He argued that
the voting cards should also have been mailed to Latvian members of the Missouri Synod,
for they would likely join an independent Latvian congregation associated with the
Canada Synod if one were to form. Thus, Skrodelis viewed Mueller’s victory as
illegitimate.783 Skrodelis accused Mueller of trying to “swallow” the Latvian DPs into St.
Paul’s rather than letting them form their own congregation. At the height of the
controversy, Skrodelis went so far as to criticize the Canada Synod for acting “intolerant
against the national groups” of Europe.784 Skrodelis’s decision to protest the vote ensured
ethnicity and language remained a contentious issue at St. Paul’s, despite Mueller’s best
efforts.
On 30 June 1950, Reble and Lotz travelled from Waterloo County to Hamilton to
meet with the Latvians associated with St. Paul’s. Prior to attending the meeting, BAM
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officials told the HMC that they should continue to discourage DPs from forming their
own congregations. After all, “the D.P.’s are not in exile, but are resettled from exile” and
therefore should not maintain their own national churches.785 Approximately fifty
Latvians attended the meeting and listened to Reble explain to them why “the best plan
for St. Paul’s, Hamilton under present conditions, is, for the new Canadians holding
membership in St. Paul’s to remain members there.”786 Reble explained to the Latvian
DPs “the full importance and financial responsibility” of establishing their own
congregation in order to persuade them to remain at St. Paul’s.787 Skrodelis attended the
meeting and continued to threaten to form a separate congregation, despite Reble’s
advice. He claimed that he controlled a “Latvian Association” that was prepared to form a
separate Latvian congregation in Hamilton. This proved false, however, as the so-called
“Latvian Association” consisted of Latvian DPs of various religious backgrounds that had
no interest getting involved in a strictly Lutheran matter. After Skrodelis’s outburst,
Mueller and St. Paul’s church council declared that they wanted “no further dealings”
with him and informed him that he had “no status whatsoever as far as the affairs of St.
Paul’s Lutheran Church are concerned.”788 The HMC responded by transferring Skrodelis
to Montreal to work among the city’s Latvians, and called a young Latvian DP pastor
from Kitchener to work among the Latvians in Hamilton.789
The June meeting further soured relations between the Skrodelis-Latvian and
Mueller-Canada Synod factions. Previously, Skrodelis believed that only Mueller and St.
Paul’s church council wished to assimilate the Latvians. After Reble’s intervention,
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however, he started to see Reble and the HMC as agents of assimilation as well. In a letter
following the meeting, he accused Reble of trying “to take away at once everything
latvian (sic), to deny it…I get the impression that you and the HMC would by any means
achieve” Latvian assimilation at St. Paul’s.790 Reble left the meeting disillusioned with
the whole “Latvian problem” as well. He confided to BAM officials that he believed
“sooner or later separate congregations in Hamilton, Toronto and Montreal will be the
best solution. They simply refuse to lose their identity. And we cannot force a group of
400, 500 and even 800 into assimilation.”791 Reble’s exasperated response marked a
decided shift from his earlier accommodating attitudes towards the DPs. The controversy
over Skrodelis demonstrated to Reble that the Latvians at St. Paul’s continued to privilege
their Latvian identity over their shared identity as Lutherans. By continuing to advocate
for services based in the Latvian language, Skrodelis proved to the Canada Synod that his
primary interest was preserving a Latvian identity at the expense of Lutheran unity.
Reble’s concerns proved correct. Latvian DPs continued to advocate for their own
congregation throughout 1950, even though the HMC relocated Skrodelis to a
congregation in Montreal. One Latvian DP wrote to Reble in order to demonstrate that the
controversy at St. Paul’s was “not a personal quarrel between two Lutheran Pastors in
Hamilton.” Instead, it was a fundamental misunderstanding between the Latvian DPs and
members of the Canada Synod. He explained that Latvians did not “belong to the
category of ordinary emigrants” but needed to be thought of as DPs. “An emigrant,” he
explained” “has voluntarily left ones native country in order to go to some other land.”
On the other hand, DPs “have either been expulsed forcibly from their country or they
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have been forced to leave it because of war or political terror in order to save themselves
and their families from imminent death. They have not sought for better conditions of life
but only for temporary refuge in an alien country.”792 Thus, Mueller’s emphasis on
integration made little sense to the Latvians who still conceptualized themselves as living
in “exile” rather than living in Canada permanently. Such sentiments made even less
sense to Reble. Although a first generation immigrant as well, Reble saw himself as a
German Canadian, and not a German immigrant living in exile. His German ethnicity
remained an important part of his Lutheranism, and did not have the same political or
nationalistic connotations that the Latvians placed on their language. The DP appeals to
their former Latvian citizenship as a reason for rights within the Canada Synod held little
weight with Reble and the HMC.
By September 1950, nearly two hundred Latvian members at St. Paul’s petitioned
the HMC to establish their own congregation in Hamilton.793 Their insistence slowly but
surely drained St. Paul’s church council of any previous resolve about remaining as a
single congregation. Reble visited St. Paul’s in October in an effort to boost their morale
and reaffirm his position that the Latvian DPs and St. Paul’s remain in a single
congregation. His speech had little impact, however, and the church council voted
unanimously in favour of letting the Latvians form their own congregation without any
financial support from St. Paul’s.794 The Latvian DPs also succeeded in forming the
Canadian Latvian Federation (CLF) just a few months later. They elected Skrodelis “as
leader of the spiritual care for all the Latvians in Canada” and hoped to work with the
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Canadian Lutheran World Relief to provide advice on Latvian immigration to Canada.
Upon hearing this news, Reble immediately wrote to BAM to describe how “uneasy
about the whole Latvian situation in Canada” he had become. He worried about what
powers Skrodelis believed he had, even though the Canada Synod had yet to recognize
the CLF in any meaningful way.795 Reble believed the creation of the council, and
Skrodelis’s election to a place of prominence, demonstrated the level of concern Latvian
leaders had for the DPs, as well as their intent to control how the Canada Synod managed
them. Despite their best efforts, Skrodelis managed to position himself as an ethnic elite
who could challenge the Canada Synod’s authority. Reble stated that Skrodelis’s
promotion “reveals that they do not, by far, understand and comprehend the position and
situation in which they find themselves as new Canadians. Their attitude is rather
assuming. They need to and must be advised and directed; but whether they will accept
advice and direction remains to be seen.” Reble agreed to take Latvian advice on
resettling DP families, but rejected their application to join the CLWR. He noted that only
organized church bodies could participate in the CLWR, not ethnic associations.796 While
Reble’s initial stance in 1948 favoured creating DP congregations, he became
increasingly disillusioned by the nationalistic attitudes of Skrodelis and the other Latvian
DPs by the end of 1950. The “Skrodelis controversy” demonstrated to BAM and Canada
Synod leaders alike that the Latvian DPs offered a conception of ethnicity that differed
greatly from their own.
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Jacobi’s Finnish Experiment

Lutheran DPs and immigrants continued to arrive in even greater numbers
throughout the 1950s. Their numerical strength, along with precedents established by the
Latvians at St. Paul’s, ensured that Missouri and Canada Synod leaders often conceded
greater rights to DPs throughout the 1950s.797 Despite the growing rise of “DP
congregations” during the 1950s, leaders in both synods still expressed concern over the
challenges recent immigrants posed to their synods. They remained skeptical as to
whether DPs truly practiced Lutheranism or whether they just used synod resources to
help maintain their ethnic communities. Synod leaders accepted German DPs as they
easily conformed to the German-English culture of their churches, but other European
DPs proved harder to accept. Rather than try to directly force and constrain the DPs as
they had done in cases like St. Paul’s, synod leaders considered a new solution to address
immigrant integration. Instead of looking towards Europe or DP pastors to meet
immigrant needs, synod leaders started to promote young Canadian and American-born
pastors who advocated similarly hybrid conceptions of ethnicity. In doing so, they
avoided relying too heavily on DP pastors who sought to maintain ethnic identities for
nationalistic rather than religious reasons. Synod leaders looked to this new generation of
pastors to help them solve the “new Canadian” and “DP problem” in the 1950s and
1960s.
The Latvian victory at St. Paul’s succeeded in creating a precedent for DPs to
argue for their own congregations moving into the 1950s. In early 1951, the Canada
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Synod and BAM created two distinct Latvian congregations. The Latvians of St. Paul’s
succeeded in gaining their congregation, as did the Latvian DPs in Montreal, led by
Gaudins.798 By the spring of 1951, the HMC started receiving petitions from Latvian and
Estonian groups in other Ontario cities petitioning for their own congregations as well.
Raudsepp, emboldened by the Latvian victories, told synod officials that they must
continue to let Latvian and Estonian DPs form their own congregations. Nothing,
Raudsepp argued, could guarantee DP church attendance “except a service in [their]
mother tongue.”799 Regardless, the Missouri and Canada Synods still expressed
uncertainty about the rise in DP congregations and preferred DPs to instead integrate into
their English or German churches. “While we are eager to serve these people,” Mayer
stated, “it is not our intention to establish foreign-tongue congregations but rather to serve
them in their own tongue until they may be integrated into our existing congregations.”800
Yet, DP congregations enjoyed greater rights in the 1950s, however reluctantly.
The financial concerns surrounding the new Canadian or DP problem continued to
shape how the Missouri and Canada Synods interacted with the new DP congregations.
Rather than forming separate Latvian and Estonian congregations, the HMC and HMB
tried to encourage these separate DP groups to worship together in newly purchased
churches.801 In 1953, for instance, Mayer rejected funding for a DP congregation in
Montreal in favour of making the various Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian DPs worship
in a single church. In doing so, Mayer believed “your district will have a freer hand in the
establishment of a congregation with real Canadians later on when you are ready to
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launch upon that program.”802 After all, Mayer believed strongly that “our greatest
opportunities, however, do not lie with the foreign element but with the real Canadians.
We are just now beginning to make our influence felt. This is the time to become
aggressively active.”803 Only by incorporating DPs into Canada’s English-speaking
congregations, he argued, could the synod “build solidly for the future.”804 The HMC
closely monitored DP activity and permitted DPs “to organize into a separate and distinct
parish” on the condition that they did not abuse their “aid from the Canada Synod, or the
Board.” When approving a joint Latvian-Estonian congregation in Toronto, HMC and
BAM members made it clear that they were not responsible for “uncontrollable
problems” such as “national, economic depression, the return of the members of the
congregations” to Europe or other movements.805 In fact, economic uncertainty and
mistrust was the very reason why the HMC recommended “that the two congregations be
incorporated” into one joint Latvian-Estonian congregation.806 Synod leadership also
maintained the right to monitor languages in which these new congregations offered
services. They reminded the Latvian and Estonian congregations that they needed to offer
German-language services if German DPs subsequently joined their churches.807 Thus,
synod leaders tried to maintain some control over shaping the German-English culture of
DP congregations, even as DPs increasingly gained more rights within each synod.
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The creation of new DP congregations provoked a strong backlash within each
synod that largely lay dormant in the 1940s. Critics of DP congregations continued to
condemn the alternative model of ethnicity that DPs practiced that seemed to place
citizenship and nationalism above Lutheranism. Streufert, for instance wondered whether
the DPs who requested funds from the Missouri Synod were actually concerned with
“spiritual care” among their people. He confessed that “I fear after the ‘fish and loaves’
are distributed ‘the holy desire’ with the majority has vanished.”808 Skeptical pastors
worried that DPs wanted to maintain their language for “nationalistic rather than
spiritualistic” reasons.809 Thus, when DPs petitioned the Missouri and Canada Synods to
form their own congregations, pastors often “tried to impress upon this delegation that we
are not interested in their cultural aspirations nor would we be inclined to serve them
merely as a language group, but if they were genuinely interested in establishing a
congregation that are interested in receiving ministrations of the Word and Sacrament,
then we would stand behind them.”810 While not directly opposed to the DPs maintaining
ethnic identities outside of the church, these pastors worried that DPs were using the
church to fulfill ethnic rather than spiritual aspirations. “By all means let them keep the
national festivals of their homeland and preserve their traditions,” an editor of the Canada
Lutheran wrote, “but let the cause of Christ come first, let the faith take precedence to
nationalism.”811 DPs imbedded language with nationalistic meaning, and ignored the
spiritual reasons that members of the Missouri and Canada Synods continued to speak
German.
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The hostility in which some German-Canadian and German-American members
of the synods treated DPs contributed to Latvian and Estonian pastors often feeling
unwelcome in their new home. DP pastors that expressed interest in working within their
ethnic group continued to face criticism from synod leaders throughout the 1950s. Upon
graduating from Concordia Seminary, one Latvian pastor hoped that he would be sent to
South America rather than remain in the United States. He believed “that there is little
opportunity that he would be employed because it is our practice to integrate the other
language groups into existing congregations.”812 Missouri’s efforts to integrate DP
pastors into German-English work forced particularly “nationalistic” pastors to look
outside the United States for support. Even those who continued to work within the
synods faced close scrutiny. Reble, for instance, insisted on “fact checking” every article
that Skrodelis attempted to publish in order to ensure that he did not continue to advocate
for an independent Latvian church in Canada. Skrodelis took offense at such attempts to
“censor” him and subsequently refused to publish any more articles with the Canada
Synod until “I am looked at as a christian (sic) brother and trusted by full confidence.”813
DP pastors could only gain the confidence of synod leaders once they showed concern for
Lutheranism outside of their own immediate ethnic group. Erdman, for instance,
complimented the “very good development” among two DP pastors in Toronto because
they showed signs “that they are thinking more and more along the line of Lutheranism as
a whole in Toronto” rather than just showing concern for their particular ethnic group.814
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If Latvian and Estonian pastors could not be relied upon to advance the interests
of the synod, synod leaders needed to find a new solution as to who would minister to
recent immigrants. Instead of promoting the work of DP pastors who defined their
ethnicity by attachments to their country of origin, synod leaders started to promote North
American-born members of their synod who had other connections to Europe. Albert
Jacobi, who succeeded Reble as the Canada Synod’s president in 1953, first proposed the
synod to undertake a new “experiment” in DP work by altering their approach to
ministering to Finnish Lutheran immigrants. Rather than relying exclusively upon Finnish
itinerant pastors, Jacobi proposed that the synod continue to supply a minimal number of
itinerant Finnish pastors while increasing their number of Canadian-born pastors. Thus,
Finns would be exposed to both the Finnish and English languages simultaneously.815
Few pastors in the Canada Synod, however, spoke enough Finnish for this experiment to
be carried out with any success. The Canada Synod’s leadership therefore called upon
young members of Finnish congregations to attend the Waterloo Lutheran Seminary to
receive a proper Lutheran education that could allow them to return to these
congregations as pastors.816 Canada Synod pastors rallied behind Jacobi’s approach and
encouraged “our Finnish brethren to send some of their fine young men to our Seminary
for training for full-time service in the Church. This is a must if the work is to survive.”817
“Bi-lingual men,” Jacobi argued, “are our only hope” if the Canada Synod wanted to
retain the loyalty of Finnish immigrants without inspiring the same sort of DP revolt that
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Skrodelis started at St. Paul’s.818 Jacobi essentially hoped to apply the synod’s hybrid
model of ethnic elites to solve the linguistic and ethnic difficulties of DP work. Promoting
pastors with a similar conception of ethnicity, Jacobi hoped, would help DPs reconcile
their ethnicity, nationality, and language in ways that no longer generated difficulties in
the synod.
The Reverend Alex Koski’s brief career in the Canada Synod conveyed the hopes
synod leaders placed on pastors who mimicked their own roles as ethnic elites. Koski
conformed to the Canada Synod’s German-English model but with a Finnish, rather than
German, perspective. Born in Michigan to Finnish parents, Koski spoke fluent English
and Finnish. Throughout the early 1950s, Koski worked as a pastor in Timmins, Ontario,
and fulfilled Jacobi’s “experiment” by preaching in both Finnish and English to the area’s
Lutheran population. Unlike other DP pastors, Koski’s status as a second-generation
immigrant ensured that he never attempted to organize a congregation outside of the
Canada Synod’s jurisdiction. While Koski therefore seemed to successfully implement
Jacobi’s vision for DP work, he left Timmins in 1956 to pursue work as pastor in
Minnesota. Jacobi lamented the Canada Synod’s loss publicly. “Pastor Koski though
always conscious of the need for a Finish (sic) ministry among the Finns of Ontario was
not unmindful of the equally important need of an English ministry among the Canadian
born Finns. He was a champion of the Gospel in Finnish for those whose language was
Finnish…He believed every Church was for all Christians regardless of national
background.”819 Jacobi went on to praise Koski as he “deplored nationalism in all its petty

818
819

LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Jacobi to Anttila, 15 March 1957.
Albert Jacobi, “From the President’s Office,” Canada Lutheran, March 1956, p. 6

343
forms.”820 Although never expressed outright, Jacobi hinted that some of Koski’s DP
congregants resented his insistence that he conducted bilingual instead of exclusively
Finnish sermons. “For this deep rooted conviction,” Jacobi concluded, “he was not
always understood or accepted by the very people he was seeking to serve.”821 Unlike
Skrodelis’s positive relationship with Latvian DPs at St. Paul’s, Koski’s adherence to the
Canada Synod’s model of ethnicity inevitably alienated his DP congregants who wished
to use the church for primarily national reasons.
Jacobi continued to favour pastors born in North America when he looked for
Koski’s replacement. He subsequently hired John Wetzel, an American, to fill Koski’s
vacancy. Wetzel was born and educated in the United States and could speak English,
German, and Finnish as a result of his mixed German-Finnish heritage. Wetzel therefore
grew-up speaking all three languages, and even discussed possibly doing graduate work
in Helsinki, Finland, to become even more proficient in the Finnish language.822 “I
believe you to be the kind of person we seek for the Finnish parishes,” Jacobi informed
him. “So often we have to depend upon Finland for pastors for these fields with the result
that little progress is realized in implementing the kind of ministry a Canadian Parish
should have.”823 Wetzel’s fluency in both North American, German, and Finnish cultures
made him an ideal candidate to enforce Jacobi’s model of ethnicity that emphasized the
spiritual utility of other languages rather than the “nationalistic” reasons of the DPs.
Jacobi firmly believed that hiring pastors who balanced their ethnicity, religion, and
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nationality in the same manner German-Canadian pastors did would help solve the
contentious DP problem.
Although Jacobi’s experiment seemed to offer a solution to the new Canadian and
DP problem, language continued to challenge the synod’s German-English framework
throughout the 1950s. In 1956, Irma Lehmann, the synod’s port worker in Halifax,
realized the synod’s emphasis on speaking English and German alienated Lutheran DPs
from other ethnic backgrounds. Upon their arrival in Halifax, Lehmann distributed
various promotional literature to encourage Lutheran DPs to attend Canada Synod
congregations. Part of the synod’s “welcome package” included what became
colloquially known as the “little blue sheets.” These small leaflets, written in the German
language, provided a list of Lutheran churches that DPs could attend. Other material
included handbooks and welcome brochures that introduced the immigrants to Canada,
also published exclusively in English and German. However, as immigration from Baltic
and Scandinavian countries increased, Lehmann encountered more Lutheran DPs who did
not speak either of these languages. Lehmann noted that some DPs “seem to object to the
German print” on the synod’s promotional material which therefore proved useless to
them.824 The fact that the “blue sheets” listing Lutheran congregations were printed in
German demonstrates the synod leadership’s assumption that incoming DPs would fit
easily into their German-English framework. Berner, now working as Jacobi’s assistant,
skeptically agreed to print the blue sheets in English as well, but proved slightly more
accommodating with the general promotional material. He suggested that the synod print
the word “Welcome” in various European languages on the front, with the remainder of
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the material in English.825 Berner’s solution was not to include more European languages,
therefore, but to increase the number of English-language materials. German and English
would remain the languages of the church, and immigrants were expected to select one of
the two beyond their token welcome.
Synod leaders continued to monitor the linguistic habits of DPs once they entered
their congregations. In 1959, a newly formed Finnish-language congregation in Toronto
printed its constitution in simple colloquial Finnish. The congregation’s pastor intended to
rewrite the constitution in formal Finnish, but encountered resistance from the synod
leadership. Jacobi prevented the pastor from writing the constitution in formal Finnish
due to the “danger that the real meaning of the English version is not conveyed in a
Finnish translation.” He therefore suggested keeping the constitution as is, lest it depart
“from the real meaning of the English” copy.826 While Jacobi therefore supported letting
the Finnish congregation have a copy in Finnish, the synod only recognized the English
constitution as the “final authority.”827
Jacobi’s model of hybridity continued to gain currency among Canada Synod
pastors into the 1960s. In 1961, Berner noted that the numerous languages spoken by
Canada Synod members constituted a “constant problem besetting the synod.” Yet the
Canada Synod’s hybridity prevented critical members of the synod like Berner from fully
condemning the DP’s insistence that they maintain their languages. Berner recognized
that the DP desire to speak their language mirrored the Canada Synod’s “predecessors in

825

LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.16.6, Berner to Earl Treusch, 11 May 1956.
LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Hakkinen to Jacobi, 17 March 1959; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Jacobi
to Hakkinen, 20 March 1959.
827
LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Leslie Lurvey to Albert Lotz, 18 June 1964.
826

346
the earlier decades” as well.828 Herbert Hartig, another young pastor in Waterloo County,
similarly recognized that many “Canadian-born” members of the synod “have come
through situations of ethnic loneliness such as [the DPs] may be facing.”829 The
importance synod leaders placed on speaking whatever language was necessary in order
to promote Lutheranism ensured that even critical members of the synod like Berner
recognized that “the synod nevertheless seeks to minister in the languages that will best
‘preserve and extend the Gospel’ for all.”830 While pastors could sympathize with the
tensions that accompanied speaking several languages in Canada, they ultimately
recognized that this desire could not come at the expense of their spirituality. DPs could
maintain an ethnic identity if they so wished, but they needed to identify themselves as
Lutherans first and foremost. “The new Canadian,” Hartig argued, must be “properly
welcomed into the fold…an ethnic group shall not be regarded as a ‘foreign breed!’ We
are one by faith even when heritage and culture differ.”831 Such declarations offered an
idealistic view of how the DPs conceptualized themselves.832 While DP congregations
throughout the synod still fought to preserve their languages, pastors like Hartig hoped
they would one day embrace their Lutheran faith over their ethnic culture.
The attachment certain DP congregations displayed towards their homelands
continued to pose problems for the Canada Synod into the 1960s. Most notably, the
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland remained active in trying to maintain a
relationship with Finnish congregations in North America. Unlike the Latvian or Estonian
national churches, Finnish Lutherans had a strong organizational presence in North
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America starting in the mid-nineteenth century. Their churches and seminaries
maintained financial, cultural, and theological connections to Finland throughout the
resulting decades that tied their pastors and churches much more closely to Finland than
other North American Lutheran bodies. While the Missouri Synod developed its own
theological texts, for instance, Finnish Lutherans still looked to Finland for spiritual
guidance.833 Consequently, Finnish DPs and church leaders from Finland alike were in a
stronger position to protest the Canada Synod’s dominance over Lutheran affairs in
Ontario than their Latvian or Estonian counterparts. Although the Canada Synod
preferred to work with pastors like Wetzel who conceptualized ethnicity the same way
they did, the Church of Finland continued to place pressure on the Canada Synod to
accept more itinerant pastors from Finland. Finnish representatives also hoped that their
work in Canada would result in more Finnish DP congregations affiliating with the
Church of Finland rather than a North American Lutheran body.
In 1965, the leaders of the Canada Synod and the Church of Finland reached a
tentative agreement that they hoped would clarify any ambiguities about whether Finnish
congregations fell under the jurisdiction of the Canada Synod or the Church of Finland.
The final agreement stated that the Church of Finland would allow Finnish congregations
to join the Canada Synod and grant the “ecclesiastical and shepherding functions” of the
church firmly to the Canada Synod.834 In return, however, the Canada Synod conceded
that the Church of Finland could sponsor guest speakers and festivals, send pastors to
work in Canada, and publish Finnish language Bibles and newsletters. Finnish pastors,
while welcome to periodically perform Finnish-language services in Canada, could only
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do so on the condition that pastors spend “at least two semesters of study” in North
America and spoke English proficiently.835 Although the agreement awarded more power
to the Finns and DPs than the Canada Synod leaders wished, it did grant them control
over Finnish congregations in Canada Synod territory. More importantly, it allowed the
synod’s German-English structure to continue relatively unchallenged. The stipulations of
the 1965 agreement confined Finnish-language activities to the strictly theological,
thereby solidifying the connection between ethnicity and religion Canada Synod leaders
felt most comfortable with.
The 1965 agreement received its first real test in late 1966 at the behest of the
Reverend Leslie Lurvey. Lurvey worked at Toronto’s Agricola Lutheran Church, a
Finnish-language congregation composed primarily of Finnish immigrants. As Lurvey
was born in the United States to Finnish parents, he spoke Finnish fluently and received
training at the Finnish-language Suomi Seminary in Michigan. He practiced the Canada
Synod’s model of ethnicity, albeit with emphasis on preserving Lutheranism’s Finnish
instead of German traditions. In December of 1966, Lurvey informed the various synod
leaders in Canada that he planned on sponsoring Urpo Vainio, a longtime Finnish
itinerant pastor, to do several weeks of mission work among Finns that did not have a
regular pastor.836 Lurvey’s proposal provoked a backlash from the Canadian Lutheran
leadership that highlighted the tenuous nature of the 1965 agreement. Otto Olson Jr., the
president of the Central Canada Synod, replied that he appreciated Lurvey’s “Christian
concern” for the Finnish DPs, but believed sending an itinerant pastor would be
“unrealistic, and that it is poor stewardship of God’s money to try to reach them with the
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Gospel in this manner.”837 His past experience work with Finnish DPs suggested that
itinerant pastors had very little success in organizing dispersed populations into stable
congregations which, in his mind, should continue to be the goal of the Canada Synod’s
work. Olson furthermore believed that many Finns in Western Canada had a strong
knowledge of the English language, negating any need for a Finnish-speaking itinerant
pastor. Sponsoring Vainio, he believed, would only give “the impression…that they are
still a part of the Lutheran Church in Finland.”838 John Zimmerman, the President of the
Western Canada Synod, concurred. He confessed that he “was somewhat perturbed and
uncertain” about Lurvey’s proposal. Zimmerman believed that the plan seemed “slightly
presumptuous, rather like a neighbouring pastor announcing that he is going to start
calling in your parish.” If Vainio actually did conduct a missionary tour, Zimmerman
promised that he would examine his report “with a critical eye and no request will go to
the Church of Finland from our Synod for an itinerant pastor unless there is ample
evidence of the need” for one.839 Regardless of the 1965 agreement, Canadian-born
pastors continued to see itinerant or DP pastors as a threat to their jurisdiction and
authority. They represented a continued link with a European homeland rather than an
effort to identify as Lutherans alongside their Canadian brethren.
Lurvey responded to his colleagues’ criticism by advocating for Vainio’s work in
the language of ethnicity that members of the Canada Synod were comfortable with.
Lurvey readily admitted that “these people could very well be served in English.”
However, he urged his peers to understand the situation of first generation Finnish DPs.
“Imagine if you will the feeling of the immigrant hearing an English sermon when all his
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life he has heard the Gospel preached in Finnish. There is a certain theological vocabulary
that must first be learned before the message breaks through….We who have ‘the gift of
tongues’ feel that we have something to offer these people not only basically for their
spiritual well-being but also for their mental well-being. To speak another language is a
gift of the Spirit, not to be regarded lightly. Its use, too, is a stewardship.”840 Like other
Canada Synod pastors who supported German-language services as a part of their ethnic
traditions, Lurvey reminded his peers that “our Lutheran church has made its beginnings
in the New World in the many languages of immigrants.” “Seminaries and colleges that
now serve millions with great blessings were begun in these languages,” he continued. “I
cannot forget the fact that I found my Savior in a college founded by Finns. Our request
to help the Western Finns comes in the same spirit, although in a much later setting.”841
Just as his German-Canadian colleagues drew on their own immigrant pasts to advocate
assisting German DPs, Lurvey drew on his own Finnish roots to help recently arrived
Finns. A Finnish representative also attempted to qualm the Canadian Lutherans’ fears.
He reminded all the parties involved that financing future mission work among the Finns
would be decided by “sociological data gathered in a reliable manner” by Vainio.
National sentiment, he promised, would not guide the relationship between Lutherans in
Canada and Finland.842 Although the 1965 agreement gave the appearance of religious
cooperation, ethnic animosities still strongly governed the feelings of both Canadian and
Finnish Lutherans.
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Conclusion

The influx of Lutheran DPs in the postwar period made it easy for Jacobi to
recognize the Canada Synod as a “Church of Many Nations” by 1960.843 Jacobi’s
celebratory tone, however, masked the controversies that accompanied confronting the
DP problem. Synod leaders and pastors expected Baltic and Scandinavian immigrants to
conform to the hybrid German-English traditions of their churches and adopt an approach
towards their ethnic identities that mirrored their own. Yet, DPs and their pastors defied
these expectations and staunchly advocated for greater linguistic and congregational
rights within the Missouri and Canada Synods despite their minority status. They did not
do so out of a desire to maintain their faith, but rather out of a political desire to remain
associated with their European homes and an unwillingness to recognize their American
and Canadian circumstances. The secular and nationalistic nature of their ethnic identities
as well as their dismissive attitudes towards their new North American community
ensured that their German-American and German-Canadian coreligionists opposed their
desire to maintain this form of ethnicity.
In articulating their opposition to DP pastors like Skrodelis, members of the
Missouri and Canada Synods simultaneously gave voice to their own conceptions of
ethnicity. Unlike DP advocates, they saw their German ethnicity as an identity that did
not conflict with their Canadian and American nationalities. They continued to speak
German as a religious calling that helped them remain true to their Lutheran teachings
and reach their synods’ German membership. Their German ethnicities did not fade
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during the war or the postwar period, but rather continued to find expression in opposition
to the “nationalistic” ethnic traditions of a new generation of Baltic and Scandinavian
DPs. The contentious relationship between German-American and German-Canadian
Lutherans and Baltic and Scandinavian DPs illustrates the enduring role ethnicity played
in shaping the Missouri and Canada Synods in the decades following the Second World
War. For German-American and German-Canadian Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo
County, the 1940s and 1950s did not represent a deterioration of their ethnic identities.
Rather, ethnicity and language remained dominant factors in who did and did not belong
in the Missouri and Canada Synods.
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Chapter 7: Pioneers and Prophets: German Lutheran Participation in Cultural and
Commemorative Events in the Postwar Era
Postwar immigration and relief work in Germany created avenues for the German
Lutheran communities St. Louis and Waterloo County to mend the wounds from the
Second World War. Cultural and commemorative events were yet another opportunity for
German Lutheran communities to find common ground after wartime controversies. As
historian Frances Swyripa argues, commemorative acts allowed immigrants to “explain
and justify who they were but also to argue for their uniqueness and importance.”844 This
chapter studies several cultural acts as yet another opportunity to examine how German
Lutherans constructed and articulated their ethnic identities. It details several war
memorials constructed by German Lutherans following the war, as well as the Missouri
Synod’s centennial anniversary in 1947. Throughout these and other events, German
Lutherans valorized their nineteenth century ancestors as symbols of their German
ethnicity. They commemorated their ethnic past by recounting North American moments
in history, rather than events associated with their German homeland. They did not
commemorate nineteenth century German military victories or politicians as previous
generations of German immigrants did, but rather engaged in commemorative activities
that paid homage to their immigrant ancestors in North America.845 As a result, this
chapter argues that German Lutheran commemorative acts were based on their hybrid
German-Canadian and German-American identities. Their commemorative events
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followed North American histories by placing an emphasis on “loyal pioneers” and their
participation in the Second World War. Unlike their Anglo-Canadian and AngloAmerican neighbours, however, they did not participate in these events as an expression
of mainstream Canadian and American nationalism. Their commemorative acts focused
on specifically German and Lutheran figures in order to address wartime tensions in their
communities and as a way to reinforce their ethnic and religious identities. Thus, German
Lutherans engaged in commemorative activities that highlighted their hybrid identities by
balancing distinctly ethnic and religious events within a narrative of pioneering familiar
to most Anglo-Canadians and Anglo-Americans.
Whiteness informed how German Lutherans celebrated their past. As whites,
German Lutherans could participate in broader settler colonial narratives advanced by
Anglo-Canadians and Americans that commemorated European explorers, nineteenth
century pioneers, and the modern nation state.846 German Canadians, for instance,
participated in Expo 67, a national celebration that commemorated Canadian
Confederation. Throughout the 1960s Canada Synod members capitalized on funding
from Expo 67 to commemorate European explorers Jens Munk and Rasmus Jensen as the
first Lutherans to touch North American soil. Members of the Missouri Synod meanwhile
began to commemorate German Americans in Missouri that fought for the Union during
the Civil War. These broad stories were completely inaccessible to racialized people.
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Japanese Americans and Canadians, for instance, could not claim the title of “pioneer” or
trace their community’s origin back to a seventeenth century European explorer. Thus,
German Lutherans did not celebrate an ethnic culture that was anti-racist, nor did their
cultural acts seek to address the inequalities other racial groups encountered. Their ethnic
culture worked comfortably within the exclusionary Canadian and American nationalism
of the postwar era due to their whiteness.

Addressing Ethnic Divisions and Anti-War Sentiment

Although the immediate threats of internment and nativist discrimination ended
with the war’s conclusion in 1945, negative perceptions of Germans as disloyal or
unpatriotic remained. Synod leaders in particular resented the public perception that
German Lutherans shirked their wartime duties and did not enlist in the armed forces as
frequently as other ethnic groups.847 The wartime project of emphasizing loyalty to
Canada and the United States did not simply fade away overnight. Missouri Synod
president John Behnken devised one of the synod’s first postwar commemorative events
in the summer of 1945, shortly after the United States made peace with Germany.
Behnken devised what he called a “Peace Thankoffering” drive to fundraise money to
celebrate the war’s end and fund the synod’s future projects. Tensions between pastors
and congregants continued to linger after the war concluded, and Behnken hoped a large
fundraising endeavor through the Peace Thankoffering would help heal these wounds. He
expected that this fundraising drive would resonate with the synod’s laity, as it celebrated
peace instead of war. Paul Koenig, president of the Western District that oversaw
847
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Lutheran affairs in the state of Missouri, embraced Behnken’s plan. “We shall need much
money for postwar work in the mission fields and for building up our educational
institutions,” Koenig believed. He had confidence “that all congregations and members
will leave nothing undone to complete the task” to help the synod meet its fundraising
goals.848 In the following months, Behnken and Koenig continued to use national and
patriotic events as a way to inspire their followers. They hoped to capitalize on the
postwar optimism that greeted the war’s conclusion. Peace with Germany and Japan
became yet another excuse for synod leaders to try and collect money from their
laypeople, as well as more somber occasions like President Roosevelt’s 1945 funeral.
They hoped these national events would inspire Lutherans across the country to
demonstrate their cooperative spirit and raise money for the synod’s future.
The Peace Thankoffering campaign failed to resonate among the synod’s
laypeople. After four years of war, congregants had little to desire to continue giving the
synod money for patriotic reasons. The majority of pastors in St. Louis also rejected
another fundraising drive occupying their time and resources. Without the same fear of
internment or discrimination so pervasive during the war, pastors no longer needed to
voice pro-government opinions and they rejected the Peace Thankoffering campaign.
Reversing their wartime stance on Romans 13, pastors now joined their congregations in
rebuffing the synod’s patriotic V-Day celebrations and their participation in Roosevelt’s
funeral. Rudolph Meyer, Old Trinity’s pastor, questioned “whether such participation was
justifiable and if so, on what grounds. Is this not a departure from Synodical tradition and
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sound Lutheran practice?”849 Now that they had no need to stress their patriotism, Meyer
had no qualms about protesting a Lutheran presence at what was clearly a state function.
The Peace Thankoffering therefore failed to even meet Behnken’s modest fundraising
goals.
Community leaders in the Canada Synod had greater success healing wartime
divisions as they, unlike Behnken, addressed the ethnic identities of their congregants in
their commemorative acts. While the majority of Lutheran churches in Waterloo County
chose not to commemorate or reflect upon the war, congregations that felt particularly
discriminated against during the war did erect war memorials as a way to overcome
negative memories of ethnic discrimination. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, for
example, faced more than the typical wartime debates over German-language services.
The congregation faced further strife over the death of Francis Weitzel, a member of their
congregation, during the Battle of Normandy in July 1944. Allegedly Weitzel died single
handedly eliminating two Nazi machine-gun posts that stalled his company from
completing their objective.850 His regiment posthumously nominated him for the Victoria
Cross, the highest award that a Commonwealth soldier could receive for bravery on the
battlefield. This news brought a great deal of pride to Trinity, even if it was short-lived.
Weitzel did not receive the award, and was rejected on the grounds that there were not
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sufficient witnesses to confirm that he had in fact completed his task alone.851 Trinity, as
well as Weitzel’s regiment, rejected the “official record” pronounced by the British and
Canadian military. They could not help but feel Weitzel was denied the Victoria Cross as
a result of his German heritage, rather than any legal stipulations. They labeled Weitzel’s
rejection a “political” decision and that “due to politics alone” Weitzel did not receive the
Victoria Cross.852 The decision seemed to imply that the Victoria Cross, an important
British symbol, could not be awarded to a German.
Trinity’s resentment and grief over Weitzel’s death prompted its pastor, the
Reverend Otto Stockmann, to take action to try and heal the perceived slight against the
congregation’s ethnicity. In an unprecedented display of congregational unity, an
overwhelming majority of the congregation attended Stockmann’s funeral service for
Weitzel. The church quickly filled and those who did not arrive early had to listen to
Stockmann’s eulogy outside in the church parking lot.853 The service did not put the
rumor to rest, however. In March 1945, Stockman collaborated with the church council to
pass a resolution to erect a small memorial for Weitzel and the other two members of
Trinity who died fighting overseas. They decided to plant three maple trees in the
churchyard, one for each of Trinity’s soldiers killed in action, and erect a small plaque at
their base.854 This small act, Stockmann and the church council hoped, would assuage
some of the grief and anger the congregation felt over Weitzel’s loss.

851

Snowie, Bloody Buron, 92.
William Powell, Oxford Heroes: Lost But Not Forgotten (n.s., 2010); “The farmhand at war:
Remembering the greatest hero of bloody Buron,” The Record, 11 November 2010; “Veteran challenges
nation,” Tavistock Gazette, November 2005; Snowie, 92.
853
“Memorial Service For Cpl. Weitzel,” Tavistock Gazette, 9 August 1944.
854
LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 19 March 1945; LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel
4, Church Council Minutes, 31 May 1948.
852

359
This small commemorative act helped Stockmann accomplish two contradictory
goals. First, the memorial gave Trinity’s Anglo-Canadian neighbours no reason to suspect
the congregation of harboring resentment towards the military or prompt suspicions of
disloyalty. At first glance, the memorial conformed to other Anglo-Canadian
commemorative acts through its use of Canadian maple trees and a simple marker listing
the names of Trinity’s war dead.855 Furthermore, Stockmann and the church council
decided to erect the memorial in the so-called “old cemetery” where the pioneers and
founding members of the church were buried.856 Like other churches, Trinity grouped its
headstones and burial plots by different decades, and it therefore made most sense to
place the memorial in the 1940s section of the cemetery behind the church. By placing it
in the “old cemetery,” however, Stockmann met his goal of appearing loyal to the AngloCanadian public. Trinity’s old cemetery was located at the front of the churchyard,
directly beside the entrance of the church, and was viewable from the road running south
into the town core. Viewable to all who passed, the war memorial acted as a testament to
the dedication of Trinity’s congregation during the Second World War. Trinity’s loyalty
could not be questioned with a clear marker demonstrating men from the congregation
served and died overseas. Any Anglo-Canadians passing by the memorial would not
associate the memorial with ethnic grievances.
Second, the memorial’s placement met Stockmann’s goal of addressing his
congregation’s ethnic grievances. Placed in the old cemetery alongside the congregation’s
founders, Stockmann conveyed the impression that Weitzel deserved to be remembered
along the same lines as the “pioneers” who established Trinity. Evoking similar themes to
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the pioneer myth, Stockmann’s placement suggests he wished to address members of the
congregation who needed to see a fellow German Lutheran acknowledged as “loyal” or as
a “nation-builder,” after being rejected for the Victoria Cross. If the military refused to
recognize his heroism, then Stockmann’s small act helped elevate Weitzel’s life and
memory to a place of prestige within Trinity’s community. Just as Trinity’s “pioneering”
founders helped establish the community, so did Weitzel through his act of loyalty by
dying overseas. Stockmann succeeded in crafting a landscape of loyalty that therefore met
the demands of both his congregation and the surrounding Anglo-Canadian community. It
successfully embodied the hybrid German-Canadian framework familiar to Trinity by
presenting a vision of their ethnicity that did not overtly challenge or oppose mainstream
Canadian nationalism.
The pioneer myth continued to function as an effective way to counter AngloCanadian hostility towards German Canadians that masqueraded as patriotism. Although
the war had ended, certain Anglo-Canadians still had a negative perception of German
Canadians due to their associations with “the enemy.” In 1956, University of Western
Ontario professor Hartley Munro Thomas published a history of the university’s wartime
activities. As Waterloo Lutheran Seminary and Waterloo College were both then
affiliated with Western, Thomas inevitably included them in his history. In contrast to the
favourable presentation of Western and its other colleges, like the Anglican Huron
College, Thomas critiqued Waterloo College’s patriotism on the basis of their German
ethnicity and Lutheran faith. Like Western’s other affiliates, Waterloo College
participated in Western’s Canadian Officers’ Training Corps (COTC) program that
allowed students to enroll in a military training program alongside their other academic
classes during the war. Successful applicants also took military courses that would assist
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them in obtaining officer positions within the armed forces. Thomas included a single
chapter on the Waterloo branch of the COTC, focusing largely on its few non-Lutheran
members. Instead of following the general accounts of heroic deeds as per the book’s
other chapters, Thomas continually reminded readers that Waterloo College’s soldiers
were outsiders, both at Western and in the army more broadly. He stated that “Waterloo
officers never felt quite at home” likely due to the fact that their unit was “never
commanded by a Lutheran.”857 Anglo-Canadians serving with Waterloo College felt
equally out of place, he argued. According to Thomas, Anglo-Canadians soldiers reported
being much happier once they transferred to a different unit with less Lutherans. 858
Thomas did include heroic details, but only about these Anglo-Canadian officers. He
concluded that Waterloo College was privileged to have an “effective leader…of the most
influential popular and scholarly of the staff: an English Anglican to represent and
develop before the world the German Canadian patriotism of Waterloo.”859
Thomas’s comments made him an enemy of Waterloo College officials such as
Carl Klinck, a professor and former director of the COTC program during the war. His
history not only disrespected members of their community, but also demonstrated that
their efforts to appear loyal during the war were not enough to convince skeptics like
Thomas. Following the war, Western’s COTC officers dissolved the program and sent its
remaining money to the various colleges to erect war memorials honouring those who
participated in the program. Klinck used this opportunity to refute Thomas’s negative
portrayal of Waterloo College by emphasizing German Lutheran loyalty. Klinck felt that
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Thomas had “not done justice to the Waterloo College unit” and sought to rectify this
through the proposed COTC memorial.860 In order to highlight Waterloo College’s
loyalty and success, Klinck composed a long list of those he believed should be included
on the COTC plaque. Many of Klinck’s suggestions had little to no relationship with the
actual COTC program. Klinck included Waterloo College students who did not enlist
with the COTC, as well as the names of several of the Canada Synod’s pastors who
served in the armed forced as chaplains. By including a wide range of community
members, Klinck simultaneously was able to give recognition to the many German
Lutherans who served in the war while also “padding” the list of names to make Waterloo
College’s achievements in the COTC program appeared greater than they actually were.
Western professors that formerly served in the COTC took notice of Klinck’s
creative liberties. Western’s faculty intended the COTC memorial to pay respect to
members of a Western organization, funded by the program’s directors, and expressed
shock that Klinck seemed determined to use their resources to build a community
memorial.861 Several faculty members inquired about these additional names to Ross
Dunford, a member Waterloo College’s Board of Governors, who just so happened to be
one of the suspicious names that appeared on the proposed memorial. Dunford rather
ambiguously defended his name on the plaque by stating he believed he “signed up for a
course or two” in the COTC and that he suspected several other Waterloo College
Lutherans “joined up” under similar terms.862 Klinck subsequently admitted that he
allowed some of the “outside people” to be included on the COTC Memorial. Through
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including “outsiders” on the monument, Klinck tried to give voice to the “extra-ordinary
record for efficiently and gallantry” of Waterloo College during the war effort.863 J.M.
Clark, a member of Western’s English Department, felt little need to hide his
disappointment. The COTC memorial, complete with small Lutheran symbols and a
dubious list of names, proved so contrary to the original committee’s hopes that he
wondered whether the memorial was “worth the effort of so much preparation.”864 He
questioned whether he and other Western professors should even attend the unveiling
ceremony of the now perhaps incorrectly titled COTC Memorial.865 Those who did attend
the unveiling ceremony certainly did feel out of place. Klinck made the ceremony a
public affair that involved many diverse members of Waterloo County’s German
Lutheran community. While he invited local political officials and former COTC
members, Klinck also made sure to invite several prominent local families whose names
could be traced back to Waterloo County’s nineteenth-century founding. Klinck invited
the Eby and Shantz families, two family lines that had strong associations with the
pioneer myth because of their ancestors. Although not necessarily Lutheran, Klinck
invited these families to further enhance the image of loyalty that Stockmann also relied
upon at Trinity. Though the COTC Memorial began as a monument meant to honour
Western’s wartime achievement, Klinck’s skillful maneuvering shifted the focus on the
monument to become a Lutheran monument that paid respects to his German-Canadian
Lutheran community.
Stockmann and Klinck’s commemorative events helped unify their communities
because they directly addressed the ethnic needs of their followers. Behnken and his
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Peace Thankoffering failed to realize that restoring unity needed to address the German
portion of the Missouri Synod’s German-American identity. Stockmann recognized the
necessity of relating directly to Trinity’s German ethnicity. His congregation did not
interpret Weitzel’s rejection as a colonial Canadian slighted by the British, but rather
because he was a “German.” It was the German portion of their hyphenated identity that
Weitzel’s rejection disrespected and therefore any commemorative events needed to
address the congregation’s German ethnicity. Likewise, Klinck crafted a memorial to
provide a patriotic counter narrative to Thomas’s condescending history. Behnken’s
fundraising plan only accounted for the Missouri Synod’s American identity, and
completely ignored how they interpreted wartime related patriotism through an ethnic
lens. Stockmann succeeded by recognizing, albeit through a carefully curated public
image, his congregation’s ethnic identity whereas Behnken failed because he did not. In
this sense, cultural and commemorative events following the war did not diminish the
German-Canadian and German-American identity, but actually served to showcase it.

Theology and Rewriting the Past

Theology inevitably shaped how German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo
County commemorated their ethnic past in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1947, the Missouri
Synod celebrated its centennial anniversary of its founding in 1847 by the “Saxon
Lutheran” immigrant C.F.W. Walther. The centennial provided Behnken and other St.
Louis Lutheran elites with a platform to revisit their synod’s history and offer new
directions on its future. They used the anniversary as a way to address the recent
theological divisions that the war created over issues such as Romans 13 and the divisions
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between liberal and conservative Lutherans within the synod. As Behnken and other
synod leaders supported a conservative Lutheran doctrine, they used the centennial as a
way to highlight how the Missouri Synod traditionally acted as a beacon of “true”
conservative Lutheranism and discredit their liberal competitors. In contrast, the more
liberal Canada Synod also found its previous emphasis on the pioneer myth waning as a
result of ecumenical cooperative ventures like the Canadian Lutheran World Relief and
various synodical mergers. As Waterloo County Lutherans engaged with their
coreligionists throughout the country, they increasingly found that other Lutherans had
their own foundational myths that stressed a Canadian, rather than ethnic German, past.
Behnken learned his lesson from the failed attempt to mobilize the Missouri
Synod with American patriotism during the Peace Thankoffering. The Missouri Synod’s
centennial anniversary in 1947 provided Behnken with another opportunity to unite the
synod and begin to heal some of the wounds that emerged during the war. Unlike the
Peace Thankoffering, the synod’s centennial offered laypeople a chance to celebrate their
German and Lutheran identities. Behnken needed to address both of these identities, as
ethnic and theological tensions born from the war still plagued his administration. Most
notably, Behnken’s vision of a conservative Lutheranism faced criticism late in the war
from a group of professors from Concordia Seminary and district presidents that referred
to themselves as the “Forty-Four.” In 1945, the Forty-Four released A Statement, a
collection of resolutions that condemned Behnken’s leadership for his wartime stance on
unionism. They felt that the Missouri Synod needed to cooperate with other Lutherans
during the war and that Behnken’s policies were “unevangelical
techniques…unsympathetic legalistic practices, a self-complacent and separatistic
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narrowness, and an utter disregard for the fundamental law of Christian love.”866 The
synod’s insistence that there could be no union without theological unity, they argued,
was antiquated, overly strict, and prevented the growth and power of Lutherans in North
America. The Forty-Four mailed a copy of A Statement to every pastor in the Missouri
Synod and published it in an edition of The Lutheran Witness. The active attempts of the
“Forty-four” to spread A Statement demonstrated that this was not a theological debate
limited to a few intellectuals, but a movement to drastically alter the Missouri Synod’s
conservative policy on unionism. Conservative leaders of the synod went so far as to label
the Forty-four “revolutionaries” with A Statement acting as their official “manifesto.”867
Behnken organized a series of conferences between the Forty-Four and conservative
leaders of the synod. After several meetings throughout 1946 and 1947, the Forty-four
still refused to recant A Statement, but agreed to stop actively promoting its message. This
compromise pleased few people. Both sides recognized the need to move forward, but
bitter tensions remained. The conservative faction felt that Behnken should have punished
the Forty-Four, while the Forty-Four felt bitter that their critiques essentially went
unheard.868
The 1947 centennial therefore provided Behnken with an opportunity to shift
popular discussion within the synod away from theological controversy. The theological
challenges posed by A Statement prompted Behnken and his colleagues to craft a singular
narrative of the synod’s history that stressed the validity of conservative Lutheranism
over liberal interpretations of God’s word. The 1947 centennial focused largely on C.F.W
866
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Walther, the synod’s original founder, and the critical role he played in bringing
conservative Lutheranism to North America. In his public retelling of the synod’s history,
Behnken emphasized the many “trials and bitter experiences” Walther and the original
Saxon Lutherans endured at the hands of liberal Protestants in Europe. “Their experiences
made them very cautious about safeguarding Biblical doctrine and Scriptural practice,” he
told readers in the Lutheran Witness. Walther’s careful meditations on the Bible, Behnken
argued, demonstrated that the Bible must be understood as the “Word of God” in order to
practice as a true Lutheran.869 By focusing disproportionately on Walther, Behnken
helped cultivate the notion that the synod’s history was the story of brave figures
preserving conservative Lutheranism in the face of liberal Lutheran foes. Behnken ended
his centennial history of the synod by calling on laypeople to “study the Word of God and
the Lutheran Confessions.” As a synod, they must “become all the more deeply
convinced that our fathers laid the only correct scriptural foundation.”870 Behnken used
the 1947 centennial not only as a way to convey Walther’s importance in Lutheran
history, but also as a way to refute the liberal Lutherans that sought to undermine his
administration.
Behnken’s emphasis on Walther as a heroic prophet prompted several St. Louis
congregations to associate their church with Walther and the synod’s early history.
Bethlehem Lutheran Church, celebrating its centennial anniversary in 1949, proudly
noted that Walther preached the first sermon at their church, while Immanuel Lutheran
Church similarly emphasized Walther’s role in creating their church in 1847.871 The
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emphasis Behnken placed on Walther and the Saxon Lutherans during the 1947
centennial continued to echo in local commemorative events into the 1950s. In 1954, Old
Trinity celebrated its one-hundredth and fifteenth anniversary and recounted their history
in terms similar to Behnken’s 1947 outline. Walther, the “champion of sound and
conservative Lutheranism,” turned Trinity “into a model congregation and became a
blessing to thousands and thousands of Lutherans of our city and our whole country to
this day.”872 The anniversary booklet went even further, however, by arguing for Old
Trinity’s near-mythical importance in the history of Missouri Synod Lutheranism. The
booklet concluded with a discussion to preserve the church’s slowly deteriorating
building as “the mother church of true Lutheranism in St. Louis, as a shrine, that is, a
sacred place of historical value.”873 Local Lutherans also gave importance to historic
objects Walther used during his lifetime. Old Trinity still contained Walther’s pulpit that
he, and subsequent pastors from Trinity, preached from: “To us this pulpit is a memorial
and a symbol – a memorial since from it have spoken all the pastors who have served
Trinity Congregation since the time of Dr. C.F.W. Walther…What an unbroken stream of
doctrine, admonition, comfort…and pastoral guidance has proceeded from this pulpit!”874
Walther’s newfound prominence in the synod following the 1947 centennial
helped St. Louis Lutherans identify with their nineteenth century German heritage. While
congregations consisted of German immigrants from different generations, many of the
churches in the city could trace their origins back to Walther and the Saxon Lutheran
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immigrants. Bethany Lutheran Church, celebrating its seventy-fifth anniversary in 1949,
wrote in their anniversary booklet that their “branch of Lutheranism was established in St.
Louis with the advent of the Saxon Immigrants.”875 Numerous commemorative histories
from the late 1940s endeavored to apply Behnken’s emphasis on a long unbroken history
of conservative Lutheranism to their congregation and its founders. Bethany’s
anniversary booklet concluded with a eulogy for the Saxon Lutherans who created their
congregation. “Of those who were instrumental in the founding of our Congregation, not
one remains. All such has passed on into eternity. But their descendants may readily be
traced in our present membership,” they noted proudly.876 Immanuel went even further in
their deification of their Saxon Lutheran founders. Their 1947 pamphlet featured a photo
of an infant, Paul Weinhold, and described him as a “sixth generation of Saxon descent
on his mother’s side and the descendant of Saxons who organized the Perry County
Lutheran Churches in 1839 on his father’s side.”877
The theological controversies in the Missouri Synod led Behnken and other St.
Louis Lutherans to associate their conservative Lutheranism with their German founders.
Theological debates in the mid-twentieth century therefore had the unintended impact of
popularizing the synod’s identity as both German and conservative. Walther, as a figure
of conservative Lutheranism, continued to find resonance in a synod where conservative
Lutheranism was starting to lose its firm grasp. By elevating Walther and his Saxon
Lutheran peers, Behnken and others also simultaneously reaffirmed their synod as a
German organization. Theology, in this instance, served to reify a certain degree of
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belonging for the synod’s German membership by conflating the issues of conservative
doctrine with their German immigrant origins. As long as synod and congregational
leaders identified as conservative Lutherans, they would also identify as German.
The Canada Synod also found its ethnic traditions shaped by liberal Lutheranism.
As liberal Lutherans, the Canada Synod members had few qualms about interfaith
cooperation and paid little attention to concerns over “unionism.” Cooperative ventures
like CLWR brought Waterloo County Lutherans into greater contact with Lutherans
across Canada. Annual meetings and conferences, typically held in Kitchener-Waterloo,
now occurred in Winnipeg, Saskatoon, and other Lutheran centers in Western Canada.
The joint organizations saw pastors from the Canada Synod and their prairie counterparts
struggle and compete for various leadership positions, typically with the pastors from
Western Canada emerging victorious. Furthermore, the Canada Synod collaborated with
Lutheran churches in the Quebec and the Maritime provinces to form the Eastern Canada
Synod in 1962. These changes essentially served to undermine the once central and
authoritative center of Waterloo County in Lutheran affairs. While the pioneer myth once
functioned as essentially the stand-in story for all of Canadian Lutherans, increased
interactions with Lutherans elsewhere saw the rise of new origin myths that weakened the
significance of Waterloo County’s pioneer myth.
As Waterloo County encountered Western Canadian Lutherans at meetings and
conferences across the country, they realized that other synods had foundational stories of
their own. Western Canadian Lutherans did not trace their origins back to Loyalists, but
rather to the Danish-Norwegian Lutheran explorer Jens Munk. He navigated the Hudson’s
Bay in 1619-1620 and his Lutheran pastor, Rasmus Jensen, received credit as preaching
the first Lutheran sermon in North America. Western Canada Lutherans therefore claimed
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that Munk and Jensen demonstrated that Lutherans had a North American presence “at a
surprisingly early date.” Lutheranism in Canada did not begin with the arrival of the
Lutheran Loyalists, but rather “back to 1619 at Hudson Bay.”878 Similarly, the
cooperation with Lutherans in Nova Scotia exposed Waterloo County Lutherans to yet
another foundational myth. Lutherans in the Maritimes traced their lineage back to the
Nova Scotian community of Lunenburg, founded in the mid-eighteenth century by
German Lutherans.879 Speeches, commemorative materials, and Canada Lutheran articles
all started to mention these connections more frequently in the 1950s. Waterloo County
and its “pioneers” now had to share the spotlight with other Lutheran histories due to the
many synod mergers and organizations in the 1950s.
The rise of Western Canadian Lutherans in prominent positions challenged the
hybrid German-Canadian identity that the Canada Synod prioritized. Western Canadian
Lutherans saw the ethnic identities of their ancestors differently than the reverence often
granted their pioneer ancestors in Waterloo County. While members of the Canada Synod
continued to maintain their hybridity wherein their German, Lutheran, and Canadian
identities coexisted, Western Canadian Lutheran leaders saw their ethnic past in less
positive terms. Unlike the largely homogenous population of Lutherans in Ontario where
“Lutheran” and “German” were essentially synonymous, Lutheranism in Western Canada
had large Norwegian, Finnish, and Danish roots. When they examined their history, they
largely attributed the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Western Canadian Lutheranism as
the primary reason that prevented Lutherans from merging into one single synod or
878
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church. They often blamed the fact that Lutherans did not have a single authoritative body
until the Second World War as the reason why Lutherans had such a weak political and
national presence in Canada. Lutherans in the West saw ethnicity and language as
divisive traits that separated, rather than unified, Canadian Lutherans. Sidney Nelson, an
Albertan pastor of Norwegian heritage, commented on how during the last fifty years,
“the people and the situation” of Canadian Lutheranism “have drastically changed.” By
the late 1950s, he wrote, “English is the main language (at last!). Cooperation is now
possible, for we can understand one another!”880 Speaking English allowed Canadian
Lutherans to share their “resources, our manpower and our money into a more common
effort to reach Mr. Average Canuck.”881 Ethnicity was a relic of the past, while speaking
English offered possibilities for the future. Pastors like Nelson envisioned a centralized
body of Lutherans that attracted unchurched Canadians in the English language. In
contrast, to the Canada Synod’s German-English framework, he offered a vision of the
future that did not recognize their immigrant pasts.
The respect typically afforded to Lutheran pioneers and ancestors in Waterloo
County weakened as a result of the new emphasis on “forward thinking” Western
Canadian Lutherans. Mars Dale, from Saskatoon, described their “early pioneers” as a
hindrance to Lutheranism’s growth. Unlike the pastors in Waterloo County that drew
links between their own immigrant origins and the new waves of DPs to promote
empathy and respect, Dale believed the DPs threatened Lutheranism’s newfound
Canadian and English emphasis. “We still lack a policy of integrating Lutheran
immigrants into an emerging core of Lutheranism,” he noted with some bitterness. “Even
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to mention the problem in certain circles arouses defense mechanisms which turn
otherwise sweet personalities sour,” he said with obvious reference to the Canada Synod.
While congregations in Waterloo County promoted their German-English framework,
Dale saw any language retention as contrary to their goal of recruiting unchurched
Canadians. “We must recognize the barrier or insulation that language differences raise
between people,” he concluded.882
This vision, however, could not receive support from members from the Canada
Synod. Whereas Western Canadian Lutherans interpreted synod mergers through a
teleological lens of a destiny fulfilled, Canada Synod president Albert Jacobi subtly
worked against this notion. Speaking of their Lutheran ancestors, Jacobi believed that
more “likely than not they were practical men who sought a home where they could live
like free men and worship God according to the dictates of their conscience. So they lived
and died unmindful perhaps of the possibility of a Lutheran Church extending from sea to
sea and from the rivers to the end of the earth.”883 Contrary to the claims of Western
Canadian Lutherans, there was nothing inherently natural or virtuous about forming a
single organization. Ethnicity and language did not appear as stumbling blocks or
challenges to overcome in Jacobi’s personal interpretations of Lutheran history. Canada’s
original Lutherans “could hardly envisage the establishment of a synod of their own,
much less the creation of other groups of Lutherans of varying national backgrounds and
with diverse loyalties and doctrinal persuasions.”884 Jacobi dispelled Western Canadian
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romanticism of their Lutheran ancestors by stating skeptically that there would be no way
for them to “see visions and dream dreams of one Lutheran Church in Canada.”885
The widening and reframing of Canadian Lutheran history changed the once
prominent position of Waterloo County and the pioneer myth. Whereas the community
had once been central to the history of Canadian Lutheranism, by the mid-1960s Waterloo
County was referred to as “the heartland of Lutheranism in Eastern Canada.”886 The
Canada Synod headquarters and seminary ensured it remained the “heartland,” but not the
birthplace or national scope it once was. As threats to the Missouri Synod’s leadership
came from within the synod, Behnken and St. Louis Lutherans in contrast saw a renewed
emphasis on their generation of pioneers. Regardless, the theological changes in the
postwar period helped dictate and shape the importance German Lutheran communities
placed on their ethnic ancestors.

The Limits of the White Imagination

Race, alongside theology, shaped how German Lutherans commemorated their
pasts and discussed their ethnic identities. As members of the white community, German
Lutherans did not feel alienated by national mythologies in Canada and the United States
that stressed national stories of pioneering, settlement, and creating new nations from the
wilderness. Stories of explorers and pioneers resonated with German Lutherans, who did
not grasp that these mythologies were about colonization and the displacement of North
America’s original indigenous inhabitants. German Lutherans disagreed with portions of

885
886

LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.1., CLC Minutes, 17 November 1960.
LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.1., CLC Annual Meeting Minutes, 28 January 1965.

375
these narratives, but not their inherent racial implications. Their whiteness allowed them
to modify national mythologies to include immigrants, rather than upset them by pointing
out the historic injustices the state committed against its racialized people. German
Lutherans did not mean to challenge Canadian and American nationalism, but merely
sought to find ways to incorporate themselves within its patriotic folds.
Nils Willison, the first graduate of Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, wrote several
newspaper articles throughout the 1950s that argued Canadians needed an inclusive
national anthem. In a 1952 article, Willison suggested that Canadians needed their own
national songs independent of Great Britain. “In so far as we in Canada are concerned I
think we may be well content with the music of ‘o Canada!’” he wrote. However, his own
immigrant background prevented him from embracing the future anthem wholeheartedly: “Multitudes of people in Canada cannot sing of their country as their ‘native
land’.”887 Willison clarified his views in a subsequent letter to Prime Minister John
Diefenbaker. “It is the word ‘Native’ in the first line. As immigrants they were not born in
in Canada and therefore, without any fault of theirs, Canada is not their ‘native’ land.” In
its place, Willison suggested including the phrase “Our home by birth or choice” or “Our
home and honored land.”888
The ironies embedded in Willison’s statement are hard to miss. While contesting
that he and his German Lutherans peers could not sing “O Canada!” because its emphasis
on native-born Canadians, he completely missed that Canada’s Indigenous peoples may
also take umbrage with the national anthem for erasing their presence. Willison’s
message did not seek to change or even challenge Anglo-Canadian dominance and
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mainstream Canadian patriotism. His request fell very much in line with literary critic
Lily Cho’s criticisms of Canadian multiculturalism and its adherents. Rather than viewing
Canada’s multicultural status as truly representing and respecting the voices of
marginalized Canadians, Cho argues that Canada’s liberal multiculturalism includes the
“presence of otherness” that “enhances rather than disturbs the liberal state…[it] enhances
dominant culture’s sense of its own inclusive superiority.”889 Willison’s idea never gained
traction, but it also proved unlikely to generate a great deal of opposition. His changes
would have worked in tandem with the liberal state’s goals of making some of its white
immigrant communities feel accepted and embraced. However, such sentiments
cultivated an image of the state as benevolent and welcoming, despite the many
limitations the federal government placed on racialized immigrants.890 Whiteness allowed
Willison to ignore the state’s role in displacing indigenous people and excluding
racialized immigrants, thereby prompting him to advocate for a vision of Canada that
seemed welcoming.
Willison’s comments did not intentionally erase Canada’s racist past, although
other German Lutheran commemorative events deliberately sought to do so. By the
1960s, St. Louis congregations could no longer ignore their decreasing membership as a
result of white flight. Several anniversary booklets commemorating St. Louis churches
commented on how empty their churches seemed compared to previous decades. Holy
Cross’s booklet mentioned that they, “like other inner-city churches, [have] transferred
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many members to sister churches in the county and elsewhere.”891 Mount Calvary hinted
at white flight in much the same manner. Their 1957 booklet described confronting the
“heavy loss of the many members who were transferring their membership to sister
congregations.”892 Despite these acknowledgements, St. Louis churches rarely explicitly
articulated or made reference to the increased Black membership in their churches at the
expense of white members. Nor did they give voice to the many tensions desegregation
caused within their churches. Instead, anniversary booklets continued to reify the
importance of their German pioneer forebears and tied their history to C.F.W. Walther.
Zion Lutheran Church, for instance, staged a pageant in order to honour their centennial
anniversary in 1960. Although unorthodox, the pageant followed the familiar script of
most congregational histories. The first act was devoted to the congregation’s German or
“Saxon” origins. It showcased C.F.W. Walther and the Saxon Lutherans leaving Europe
for St. Louis. The second act detailed the life of Zion’s early pastors while the last two
acts emphasized the growing church and its current emphasis on evangelical
recruitment.893 While this last portion of the play theoretically offered an opportunity to
include black voices and perspectives, the play instead focused on its white “missionary”
workers and did not include any black actors. St. Paul’s 1963 anniversary acknowledged
that its demographics changed from its original 1863 founding, but did little to
incorporate Black perspectives or histories into the booklet. Instead, the booklet
continued to reify the place of its German congregants. They included the list of their
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founding members, and placed italics around the names of “persons whose descendants
still hold membership in the congregation.”894
Other histories deliberately tried to excuse the synod’s longstanding and ongoing
debates about segregation by emphasizing common myths about nineteenth century
German-Americans. In 1964, Old Trinity in St. Louis celebrated its one hundred and
twenty-fifth anniversary with a commemorative booklet by Walter Umbach, a descendant
of one of the original Saxon Lutheran immigrants.895 Umbach situated Old Trinity’s
history in the broader context of American history and included discussion of the
congregation’s involvement in national events like the Civil War. In doing so, Umbach
repeated the popular refrain in German-American circles that “to the predominantly high
German population…slavery was repugnant.” When Lincoln called upon Missouri for
volunteers, “many companies of volunteers were formed in St. Louis, especially among
the numerous German populace….Trinity, Immanuel, Holy Cross, and Zion contributed
manpower.”896 During a period where St. Louis congregations struggled to accept Black
congregants, Umbach’s history tried to emphasize the congregation’s anti-racist German
roots. Umbach’s interpretation differed from the historical reality wherein the Missouri
Synod by no means held an anti-slavery position throughout the nineteenth century. The
famed Walther, for instance, cited several instances where the Bible supported slavery
and did not explicitly condemn slave-owners.897 Despite this inconvenient truth,
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Umbach’s history attempted to minimize the synod’s racism by fabling an allegedly antiracist past. with its racist present.
In these instances, anniversaries and commemorations served to enhance the
image of these congregations as both white and German. While Willison’s stance on the
Canadian anthem operated as a covert nod to his own whiteness, the St. Louis anniversary
booklets deliberately politicized their German ancestors in an effort to exclude their
congregation’s black members. Such commemorative anniversaries conveyed a clear
message that only white Americans of German heritage belonged in their congregations.
Umbach’s attempts to address racial issues in the synod says more about his own
whiteness than it does about the reality of race relations in St. Louis. He addressed racial
tensions not by acknowledging Old Trinity’s black congregants, but rather by claiming
Walther and their ancestors fought on the correct side of racial justice. His example of
Walther’s supposed anti-racism intended to alleviate the guilt or racial tension current
white congregants felt in the midst of civil rights protests, and did little to comfort black
Lutherans facing modern racism within the synod. Although these commemorative efforts
in the 1950s and 1960s were ethnic histories written for a distinct ethnic group, so too
were they white histories meant for a white audience.

Expo 67 and Engagement with Mainstream Nationalisms

Umbach’s history of Old Trinity was the first of many projects in the 1960s and
early 1970s that involved German Lutherans trying to integrate their histories into the
broader American and Canadian publics. Lutherans started to pitch their histories and
commemorative events outside of strictly religious circles in part because of the changing
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demographics in both synods. Appeals to unchurched Americans and Canadians led to an
increase in members who had interests in their community’s history outside the strict
confines of the church. Moreover, the increased emphasis on the ecumenical movement
within the Canada Synod brought Lutherans into greater contact with their Anglican,
Baptist, and United Church neighbors, who proved more interested in engaging with
national histories. Moments of national celebration functioned as important opportunities
for German Lutherans to showcase their “Canadian” and “American” qualities, and be
recognized as such. Despite this newfound drive to celebrate a Lutheran and German
history alongside Anglo-Canadians and Americans, Lutherans failed to convince
outsiders that their history deserved equal celebration. The inherent ethnic and religious
focus of stories surrounding their Lutheran ancestors made them of little interest to the
Canadian and American mainstream public. However, their whiteness ensured that their
histories had a minor place amidst national celebrations in the 1960s and 1970s.
Canadian nationalism in the 1960s represented something of a paradox. On one
hand, Anglo-Canadians became increasingly nationalistic as they sought to craft an
identity separate from Great Britain. Under the Liberal governments of Lester Pearson
and Pierre Trudeau, Anglo-Canadians sang a new national anthem, waved a distinctly
Canadian flag, and participated in national moments of celebration. The centennial of
Canadian Confederation in 1967, commonly referred to as Expo ’67, embodied this
newfound civic nationalism as state actors put forward a vision of Canada as a mature,
independent, country.898 Simultaneously, however, many Anglo-Canadians retained a
close personal connection to Britain and Canada’s British past. Public celebrations of
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Canada’s history, for example, continued to venerate symbols of Canada’s colonial past,
such as nominally English explorer John Cabot, or its connection to the British Empire
during the two world wars.899 Canadian nationalists in the 1960s articulated a new sense
of Canadian nationhood while also venerating a British colonial past.
German-Canadian Lutherans participated in the newfound spirit of Canadian
nationalism during popular events like Expo ’67 in ways that differed from their previous
emphasis on the pioneer myth.900 Expo 67’s national scope prompted Canadian Lutherans
to frame their history through this national lens. The Loyalist pioneers of Waterloo
County had very little importance amidst the national breadth of Canada’s past.
Commemorative events needed to somehow relate to Canada’s broad mythology that
placed an emphasis on “exploration,” national development, and historic “firsts.” Thus,
the story of the Munk expedition and the Lunenburg settlement shifted from marginal
stories to the central story of Canadian Lutheranism during the 1967 events.901 Unlike
other Anglo-Canadian groups that showcased their history, however, these
commemorative events provided Canadian Lutherans with an opportunity to integrate
their unique stories of faith and migration into the Canadian narrative. While other
Canadians celebrated broad ideas of their nation, German Lutherans once again used
these commemorative events to make the case to mainstream society that they too
belonged in Canada.
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One of the most important centennial events Canadian Lutherans participated in
was the celebration surrounding the first Lutheran church in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia.
Affectionately referred to as the “Old Dutch” or “Little Dutch” church, synod leaders
discovered that the building was still in use by an Anglican congregation. Initially, the
Canadian Lutheran Council (CLC), spearheaded by Earl Treusch, tried to purchase the
church but the Anglicans refused. They therefore reached a compromise where “the
denominations might work together to preserve the church.”902 The CLC decided to erect
a plaque on the church’s exterior making note that it was “the first Lutheran Church in
Canada.”903 Treusch unveiled the plaque alongside the Anglican Bishop of Nova Scotia in
a public ceremony in March 1967. Marking the church, even with a small plaque,
represented an important point for Treusch and other members of the CLC that wanted
Lutherans recognized in the annals of Canadian history. In an announcement to the press,
Treusch stated that his interest in the Old Church “arises primarily for the fact that this is
the first church building erected in Canada by Lutherans and that it was constructed
during a very interesting phase of Canada’s early history.”904 The fact that German
Lutherans founded Lunenburg shortly after the Seven Years War proved important to the
broader Lutheran goal of demonstrating that they too belonged in Canada. As Daniel
Coleman suggests, settlers often emphasized what they perceived as their long lineages
and histories in the land they now occupy in an effort to appear “indigenous” to the land
itself.905 Although then occupied by Anglicans, the small plaque on the old church
conveyed the impression that the church historically belonged to Lutherans. By
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emphasizing the impact of their ancestors on the past, Treusch and the CLC made an
argument for their belonging in the present.
The CLC embarked on several commemorative efforts to honour the Munk
expedition and convince Anglo-Canadians of its importance. Many of these projects,
however, failed. The CLC unsuccessfully tried to convince the Canadian Broadcasting
Company (CBC) to invest in “a good TV drama” about the Munk expedition, and also
failed to convince Canada Post to issue a commemorative stamp in his honour.906 These
setbacks did not deter the CLC from pursuing their campaign to see Munk and Jensen
recognized as two of Canada’s important explorers alongside John Cabot, Jacques
Cartier, and Samuel de Champlain.907 In 1965, the CLC decided to pursue “the erection of
a suitable memorial to Pastor Rasmus Jensen” near Churchill, Manitoba.908 Very few
others shared their passion, however. They contacted Canada’s Historic Sites and
Monuments Board with a proposal to erect a plaque honouring Jensen for his role in
preaching the first Christian Christmas service on Canadian soil. Government officials
replied that they could not help with the effort to commemorate Jensen, as they focused
on people and places of national historic significance. Jensen, it seemed, did not quite
make the cut. A government representative suggested that they “contact the Department
of Northern Affairs as well as the Manitoba Historic Sites Board as I am sure they will be
of service to you.”909 Yet, the Department of Northern Affairs proved equally
uninterested in commemorating Lutheran history. They responded to the CLC that
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commemorating Jensen “would create a new problem for us.” They described how many
different groups petitioned them for such markers and they could not possibly meet all
these various demands. “Once our rule was broken, we would be hard put to deny the
privilege to others,” they replied.910 Government agencies simply did not see Jensen and
Munk as national figures worth celebrating alongside Canada’s roster of national heroes.
The two individuals were of importance only to Lutherans, and had little significance for
other Canadians.
Internally, the CLC sponsored several commemorative projects intended just for
Lutherans rather than a broad Canadian audience. These projects demonstrated a greater
comfort with celebrating their ethnic and religious heritage than the bland efforts to create
Jensen and Munk in the same image as other Canadian explorers. In 1966, the CLC
sponsored a hymn-writing contest. The winner would be their official hymn for Canada’s
centennial. Ulrich Leupold, a professor at Waterloo Lutheran University, judged the
contest and received sixty-one entries from pastors and laypeople. Although written in
part for Canada’s “birthday” celebration, Leupold rejected entries that praised the socalled Fathers of Confederation. He dismissed hymns that parroted the Canadian
nationalism exhibited elsewhere in Expo 67 celebrations. One rejected hymn described
John A. Macdonald and his peers as respected leaders blessed by God: “Our leaders in
Thee trusted/And never were dismayed/Thy statutes they respected/Thy righteous laws
obeyed/Thy goodness came upon them/Thou was their strength and stay.”911 Leupold had
no problem rejecting the entry. The hymn made “the founding fathers look like a bunch of
narrow Puritans,” he complained. “The tone is that of Victorian moralism. It sounds
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terribly straight-laced and self-righteous.”912 Leupold’s first choice was written by a
pastor from Zurich, Ontario, which clearly emphasized Lutheranism’s immigrant roots.
The hymn stated that Canada consisted of “men from lands both far and near” who “did
lay a firm foundation/By Thy providence.”913 The hymn matched the synod’s general
understanding of Canada as a settler colonial nation composed of white immigrants that
helped gradually turn an empty wilderness into a thriving modern nation. Leupold and his
peers rejected entries that honoured Anglo and French-Canadian statesmen in favour of
an entry that paid respects to the anonymous migrant settlers to whom they claimed their
own.
Although this entry touched on the desired themes, its clumsy wording prevented
Leupold from accepting it. The committee decided not to select a winner, as they felt no
hymn was of adequate quality. Their decision angered several of the participants, who let
the committee know they felt their decision was particularly “unchristian.”914 Yet there
was more at stake in the contest than mere prizes and prestige. C.N. Weber, a prominent
Waterloo County layman, sat on the committee and felt that the hymn needed to give
voice to the importance of Lutheranism in Canada. Promoting a poor hymn would be “an
unfavorable reflection on our Lutheran Church.” Lutherans, he argued, could not handle
any more bad publicity than they had already endured in the past decades. “I have felt
many times that as Lutherans we were satisfied to accept second and third grade
positions, whereas with our heritage, we should be in the first bracket.”915 Episodes such
as the failure to secure a commemorative event for the Munk expedition and the failed
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hymn contest proved to Lutherans like Weber their acceptance in Canada was far from
secure. They could not risk further condescension from Anglo-Canadians by releasing a
substandard hymn, even if it meant angering the contestants.
The Missouri Synod’s celebration of its 125th anniversary in 1972 also diverged
from past histories by aiming for a broader American readership. That said, it continued
to follow the typical narrative of the synod that Behnken solidified during the 1947
centennial. Like other histories sponsored by the Concordia Publishing House, it directly
acknowledged the synod’s German heritage and ongoing German ethnicity, while
deifying Walther as the synod’s moral, spiritual, and personal founder. The anniversary
book recognized that the synod’s German character would never truly leave the synod.
The book chronicled the religious conditions in Europe that drove Walther to seek refuge
in North America and portrayed the decades following the synod’s founding as an
exclusively German time period. The author recognized that the First World War caused
the synod to eliminate some visible signs of its German ethnicity because Lutherans
“were looked upon as disloyal citizens,” but recognized that the war did not eliminate
their German ethnicity. In one of the more humorous references to the synod’s hybrid
German-American character, the author reported that many Missouri Synod Lutherans
responded to the First World War with the declaration that “Ich bin ein Amerikaner.”916
Such sentiments easily captured the ironic and contradictory German-American character
within the synod.
Yet this commemorative book, The Zeal of His House, diverged from previous
histories in several important ways that recognized the changing face of Lutheranism in
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the 1970s. The Concordia Publishing House tended to commission the synod’s previous
anniversary texts from established pastors and professors based in St. Louis.
Unsurprisingly, the stories of St. Louis congregations, Walther, and the Concordia
Seminary featured prominently in what were supposed to be synod-wide histories. The
book’s author, Eldon Weisheit, was not a St. Louis pastor like his predecessors. Weisheit
was born in the Midwest but spent most of his career as a popular religious writer and
pastor in Alabama, with a brief stint as an editor for the Lutheran Witness in the 1970s.
Unlike previous authors, Weisheit wrote his anniversary retrospective in an accessible
tone rife with popular slang and informalities that would have shocked his predecessors.
While previous histories conformed to contemporary scholarly standards, Weisheit
intended his text to be read by all members of the Missouri Synod. The Zeal of His House
was not meant just for educated laymen and pastors. Weisheit wrote the text to appeal to
Lutheran men and women, and many of the synod’s recent displaced person, AngloAmerican, and black converts, not just its primary German-American readership. The first
section of the book, subtitled “Let Me Talk You into Reading the Whole Thing,”
explained Weisheit’s motivations for writing the text. He described the many “new
members” of the church who “may have little identity with denominational history”
because of their DP or American backgrounds. The booklet, for instance, is dedicated to
“those who have joined the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod as adults in appreciation of
your contributions to the heritage of the synod.”917 Weisheit acknowledged that
American, DP, and black Lutherans may feel left out of the synod’s history due to its
focus on German pioneers and prophets. “The first part of Missouri Synod history is
heavy with the German influence. If you are German but not a Saxon or Franconian (I’m
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neither), you might feel that you are on the edge of the stage. If you’re not German at all,
you might feel you missed the whole scene. But it’s not so,” he tried to reassure his
readers.918 In order to make his readers more comfortable with an alien German past,
Weisheit included lists of prominent German figures in the synod’s early history with a
simple addition of how to pronounce their names phonetically.919 He also focused a great
deal on the synod’s work among unchurched Americans, DPs, and black Lutherans in
contrast to his predecessors fascination with Walther and the Saxon Lutherans. As a
pastor who worked primarily in Alabama, Weisheit closely detailed the synod’s mission
work among black Lutherans in the south. He spent seven of the booklet’s one-hundred
and twenty pages describing the story of Rosa Young, a black Lutheran schoolteacher
from Alabama. In contrast, Walter Baepler’s 1947 centennial anniversary publication
devoted a single sentence to “Negro missions.”920 Weisheit’s history offered a new
history for a synod that had changed considerably in the previous twenty years.
Lutheran commemorative activities in the 1960s and 1970s offered a sometimes
contradictory look at their own communities. On one hand, they continued to stress the
German roots of their communities and valorize the pioneers and pastors who established
their churches in the previous centuries. They did so in a way that aligned with how
Anglo-Canadians and Americans discussed their own storied historical figures, even if
mainstream society did not always see their importance. Yet these commemorative events
highlighted the possible future directions of their communities as well. The Canada
Synod took on a secondary role in contrast the CLC and Western Canadian pastors who
increasingly dictated that their history needed to appeal to broader Canadians and placed
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less importance on local immigrant communities. While St. Louis histories begrudgingly
acknowledged the changing racial make-up of their congregations, Weisheit’s history
offered a clear indication that synod-wide histories outside of St. Louis could not simply
tell the same story of Walther and his conservative Lutheran German pioneers any longer.
Broad commemorative events, be they for national and synodical audiences, now
included the voices and perspectives of Lutherans outside of the St. Louis and Waterloo
County cores. As such, they paid attention to the different Lutheran histories throughout
North America and included information about the recently converted and newly arrived
Lutherans. Although none of the events broke firmly away from their emphasis on their
German heritage, they created the conditions for a future generation of Lutherans to see
themselves within the histories of North American Lutheranism whether or not they could
personally connect with a German past.

Conclusion

Cultural and commemorative events in postwar St. Louis and Waterloo County
demonstrate a continued engagement with their German ethnic identities.
Commemorative events continued to pay respect to their nineteenth century immigrant
forebears as a meaningful symbol of both their German heritage and as a way to address
modern challenges. The Saxon Lutherans that migrated to St. Louis continued to provide
a potent origin story for synod leaders and congregations alike. The present challenges
from liberal Lutherans within the synod heightened the respect St. Louis Lutherans paid
to their Saxon Lutheran ancestors as they practiced a “true” conservative Lutheranism.
The memory of German Lutheran pioneers in Waterloo County provided them with a way
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to combat Anglo-Canadian nationalism following the war, ensuring that their German
ethnicity continued to resonate in the community. While Lutherans elsewhere in Canada
started to revise the singular importance previously placed on the pioneer myth, Waterloo
County Lutherans continued to argue for its importance, particularly in relation to DP
work. Their German ethnicity remained an important part of postwar commemorative
activities, regardless of external and internal challenges.
Whiteness played an important role in shaping commemorative events
surrounding their immigrant ancestors. At one level, it allowed German Lutherans to
situate their histories in broader American and Canadian commemorative events and
histories. As members of the white community, they could locate their own explorers,
pioneers, and settlers, alongside other white Americans and Canadians. Their whiteness
prevented them from challenging these narratives outright. Instead, they sought to
incorporate themselves into these pre-existing narratives and argue that their own German
Lutheran ancestors could be just as important as other white British and American
historical figures. Their ethnic culture co-existed comfortably within American and
Canadian narratives of white supremacy. Furthermore, cultural events in St. Louis in the
late 1950s and 1960s deliberately marginalized their new black congregants by ignoring
their presence and valorizing their German ancestors. The message in these
commemorative booklets was quite clear: German immigrants built the church and their
white descendants continued to allow the church to thrive. In these instances, celebrations
of ethnic diversity not only benefitted from North America’s white supremacist culture,
but actively enforced it.
Postwar commemorative events continued the German Lutheran project of finding
ways to balance their ethnic, religious, and national identities. Their attempts to situate
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their ethnicity and religion in popular American and Canadian narratives should not be
seen as a loss of ethnic identity. A 1967 speech by Karl Holfeld at Waterloo Lutheran
Seminary captures how German Lutherans sought to integrate their immigrant pasts into
national mythologies. He noted that “most of the members of our churches are of other
national origins than British or French, the founding nations, but we do claim equality
with them in Canadian citizenship, concern and loyalty.” Their German heritage and
language did not somehow mean that they were not equally Canadian. German and
Lutheran “names may sound like a roster of Europeans but they think, speak and act
Canadian.”921 Such sentiments convey the hybrid German-Canadian and GermanAmerican identities that Lutherans continued to practice well into the 1960s.
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Conclusion: Welcoming Strangers
Ethnicity remained a powerful identity in the Canada Synod by the 1970s, even as
the “old guard” of ethnic elites started to retire from public life. John Reble, “a fine old
soldier of the Lord who just does not fade away,” finally retired from preaching Germanlanguage services at St. Peter’s in 1969.922 He passed away just three years later, but lived
long enough to see his son Otto Reble assume leadership of the Canada Synod. As synod
president, Otto continued the work that his father started and listened to the chorus of
German, Canadian, Latvian, and other voices in the synod. By 1974, Otto undisputedly
labeled the Canada Synod as “a synod of linguistic ministries.” Although the “new
Canadian” problem had certainly passed, mission outreach to unchurched German
immigrants and their children remained a concern for Otto and other Canada Synod
pastors. In the 1970s, Otto worked with numerous Toronto pastors in a group called the
“German Cluster” to help ensure they provided German-language services to Lutherans in
Toronto’s growing cityscape.923 Unlike his father, Otto sought the assistance of EKiD in
West Germany to meet these linguistic demands. The Waterloo Lutheran Seminary
students of the 1960s did not always have the fluency in German to help Otto and the
German Cluster reach German immigrants.924 With his father’s generation retired or
deceased, and new Canadian-born generation preferring the English language, Otto
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initiated the process of reorienting the Canada Synod’s ethnic identity towards West
Germany.
Theology and ethnicity remained intertwined in St. Louis in the 1970s as well.
Under John Behnken’s presidency, Missouri Synod pastors strongly associated the
German language with preserving their theology. Behnken’s retirement in 1962, however,
created a power vacuum within the synod’s leadership that had repercussions for the
synod’s ethnic character. Staunchly conservative pastors replaced Behnken’s more
“moderate” faction with the election of Jacob Preus in 1969. Preus’s conservatism on
theological issues, as well as cultural issues such as feminism and the Civil Rights
Movement, alienated a number of moderate members of the Missouri Synod. These
tensions climaxed in 1973-1974, when over two-hundred members of the Concordia
Seminary left to form their own seminary in protest.925 Preus and his conservative
supporters derogatorily referred to their moderate opponents as “old Germans” out of
touch with the modern American political landscape that favoured evangelism and
Republican politics instead of respect for their ethnic past.926 Future historians will no
doubt have to contend with how Preus’s rule shaped the synod’s German ethnicity.
Unlike previous studies of German immigrants that routinely end eulogizing or
hypothesizing the “end” of a German ethnicity, this study ends in the late 1960s on a
different note.927 It does not conclude that Germans lost, or started to lose, their German
ethnicity. Rather, it suggests that a new sense of hybridity may have started to emerge in
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the 1970s, largely after the generation identified in this study retired or passed away.
Future historians may wish to follow Otto Reble’s work among German-speaking
immigrants in Toronto to examine what role ethnicity played in Canadian Lutheranism
beyond the 1960s. More locally, the rise of a secular German ethnicity based on “food
and folk” customs in Waterloo County began to develop in the 1960s. Multicultural
initiatives sponsored by the federal government, for example, created popular secular
events like Oktoberfest that may have shifted the community’s localized German culture
out of the church and into the public sphere.928 Subsequent studies of the Missouri Synod
and German-Americans in St. Louis must examine their ethnicities in the context of the
rise of political and religious conservatism in the Missouri Synod. Scholars will need to
examine how Preus’s leadership altered the synod’s relationship with Lutheranism in
Germany, and how race and ethnicity became another battleground over which
conservative and moderate Lutherans fought.929 These potential research areas show that
the story of German immigrants and their ethnic identities did not end during the world
wars or even in the postwar period. It remains a field open for further inquiry.
The first objective of this dissertation was to provide an alternative to the
emphasis on assimilation found elsewhere in the literature on German immigrants. In his
work on German Canadians in Winnipeg, Hans Werner found that “the concept of
assimilation still offers explanatory power for first-generation immigrant behaviour.”930
The majority of the ethnic elites examined in this study were first or second generation
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immigrants that actively grappled with the question of assimilation, but did not succumb
to it. Ethnic elites flirted with promoting integration and assimilation during the Second
World War, but largely moved beyond such pressures once the war ended. They
maintained their positions as ethnic elites into the postwar period by building positive
relations with a new generation of first generation German refugees, while ensuring other
European ethnic groups did not challenge the hegemonic status of the German-language
in their congregations. Pressures to assimilate certainly informed the experiences of first
and second generation ethnic elites, but it not define them.
Furthermore, Russell Kazal’s writing on German Americans in Philadelphia, and
on immigrant history more broadly, places great emphasis on assimilation as “processes
that result in greater homogeneity within a society.”931 St. Louis and Waterloo County’s
German Lutherans shared fundamental differences with mainstream Canadian and
American culture that prevented a high level of homogeneity from occurring. In fact,
German Lutherans continually articulated difference in the face of exclusionary American
and Canadian nationalism. Their churches did not reinforce Canadian and American
values like other evangelical congregations, but rather functioned as ethnic boundary
zones that allowed their German laity to connect with their ethnic identities.932 They
greeted the Second World War with trepidation and fear over ethnic discrimination, not
with expressions of solidarity with the Allied armies. They became advocates for ex-Nazi
German refugees when American and Canadians largely believed these former “enemy
aliens” should be left in Europe. Rather than participating in the middle-class attempts to
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assimilate postwar newcomers, ethnic elites responded by solidifying the Lutheran church
as an ethnic boundary zone. They purchased German-language prayer books, elevated the
status of DPs, and continued to educate their followers at church and Sunday schools in
the German language. Their efforts to protect their German ethnicity within the church
ran counter to the national emphasis on homogeneity in Canadian and American society,
during both the war and the Cold War consensus that emerged afterwards.
Rather than emphasizing the ways in which German immigrants assimilated, this
dissertation examined how they maintained their ethnic identity despite pressures to
assimilate. German Lutherans constructed an ethnicity rooted in hybridity as a result of
their attempt to reconcile their immigrant heritage with their new homes in North
America. They constructed this unique ethnic identity in several ways. Language,
however, was one of the most important ways German Lutherans identified with their
ethnic heritage. By the mid-twentieth century, the German language did not have a
practical or conversational purpose. As Barbara Lorenzkowski’s earlier work on the late
nineteenth century demonstrates, most German immigrants spoke a hybrid dialect that
combined English and German words and syntax.933 While true, the German language
still remained important as a powerful symbol of ethnicity and faith. As chapter one
illustrated, German Lutherans fought to speak German on days of religious importance. In
order to properly worship and understand the word of God, German Lutherans believed
they needed to preach, speak, and pray in the language of C.F.W. Walther and Martin
Luther. This belief remained dominant in the Missouri and Canada Synods until at least
the 1960s, with synod leaders like John Behnken continually reminding their pupils that
they needed to master religious texts in the German tongue. Chapter six demonstrated this
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belief most obviously, as ethnic elites opposed speaking Latvian, Estonian, and other
European languages in their churches as they felt it did not have a spiritual necessity. For
German Lutherans, speaking German in church did not represent a connection to a
European homeland, but rather a commitment to their faith. For ethnic elites in St. Louis
and Waterloo County, strengthening the German language had personal and political
motivations as well. Chapter five demonstrated that encouraging German refugees to
speak German instead of English at church allowed pastors to grow their congregations
and, as a result, their authority within the community. Instead of losing their new German
refugee followers to English clubs and social circles, pastors kept their authority as ethnic
elites by allowing refugees a place to speak German within the ethnic boundary zone of
the church.
Yet this was not the “pure German” heard in the streets of nineteenth century St.
Louis and Waterloo County. German Lutherans heard English spoken at church just as
frequently as German, most notably during the Second World War. This does not,
however, signify their assimilation into Canadian and American society. Rather, it
highlights the careful balancing act German Lutherans performed to ensure that they
maintained both their old ethnic and new national identities. Speaking German
emboldened their ethnic and religious identities, whereas speaking English recognized
their North American circumstances. As Lorenzkowski wrote of an earlier generation of
German immigrations, “the duality of their worlds resonated in the hybrid tongue they
spoke. Their speech acts told of lives that were shaped in a series of exchanges.”934 The
exchange of English and German language heard in Lutheran congregations across St.
Louis and Waterloo County embodied their German-American and German-Canadian
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Lutheran hyphenated identities during a period in which these ideas seemed incompatible.
Lutherans justified speaking German on the grounds that it embodied their faith and thus
found a way to continue their ethnic traditions within the ethnic boundary zone of the
church while still participating in the English-speaking world of North American life.
German Lutherans moreover expressed an ethnic identity throughout the 1940s
and early 1950s when they expressed sympathies and solidarity with their brethren living
overseas in Germany. Chapters one and two detailed how German Lutherans opposed
another world war with Germany, albeit to different extents. German Lutheran women in
St. Louis worried the war bonds they purchased would be used to bomb other German
women working in the war effort, while the women in Waterloo County organized events
at their churches to advocate for peace and neutrality instead of war. Pastors like Behnken
and C.H. Little largely had to downplay their qualms with the war in favour of a patriotic
image, whereas others eventually lost faith that appeasing Anglo-Canadian and
Americans was worth ethnic and theological compromises. Certain pastors resented the
anti-German caricatures in the People Come First pamphlet that stereotyped members of
their ethnicity, while others conducted private German-language services to ensure that
they did not break decades of tradition. As chapters three and four explored, German
Lutherans maintained a vested interest in helping Germany recover from the war. While
international organizations like the United Nations largely felt German refugees were
Germany’s obligation, German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County mobilized to
alter immigration laws that would facilitate refugee passage from Europe to North
America. These were not “enemy aliens” or “Nazis,” but rather members of their ethnic
and religious community that desperately needed assistance. German Lutherans refused
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to abandon their brethren, even during a time in which most Canadians and Americans
had little interest in becoming further involved in German affairs.
Although German Lutherans sympathized with Germans abroad, they did not
construct an ethnicity rooted in diasporic sentiments or a German homeland. As chapter
four highlighted, ethnic elites in the Missouri and Canada Synods were motivated by their
German sympathies to perform missionary work in West Germany throughout the late
1940s and 1950s. While they eagerly expected to be greeted as distant cousins and fellow
Germans, West Germans saw them strictly as “Amerikaners.” First-generation
immigrants like John Reble felt a renewed connection to their German roots when visiting
Germany, but most West Germans used their new Canadian and American friends
exclusively as a way to better their material circumstances. They were not interested in
forming a diasporic connection between their West German home and St. Louis and
Waterloo County, but instead used these connections to secure financial aid for
themselves and their followers. Missionary trips to Germany seemed to confirm the
hybrid identities of the Missouri and Canada Synod’s ethnic elites. Americans and
Canadians labeled them “Germans” while they were in North America, while Germans
told them they were “American” while in Germany. .
Ethnic elites had little choice but to focus on creating an ethnicity rooted in their
St. Louis and Waterloo County homes as a result. Nineteenth century German immigrants
participated in commemorative and festive events that linked them closely with political
events in German states. They celebrated German unification, the Franco-Prussian War,
and erected humble monuments to political leaders such as Kaiser Wilhelm II.935
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Although German Lutherans in the mid-twentieth century did place some importance on
Martin Luther and the Reformation, their ethnic celebrations largely valorized the
immigrant experience in North America instead of myths and figures rooted in their
German homeland. Their celebrations placed their hybridity at the forefront. The pioneer
myth in Waterloo County and commemorative events surrounding C.F.W. Walther in St.
Louis emphasized their German and Lutheran identities while also acknowledging the
fact that these were Canadian and American stories. As several chapters made clear, the
pioneer myth took pre-existing Anglo-Canadian myths surrounding the British Loyalists
but modified them to include people of German heritage. In doing so, German Lutherans
could articulate an ethnicity without offending or challenging Anglo-Canadian
conceptions of nationhood and history. Similarly the Missouri Synod’s preoccupation
with Walther and the synod’s creation provided an important symbol for preserving their
German traditions, theology, and language, while still conforming to popular narratives of
nineteenth century settlers and pioneers. Their stories confirmed their North American
realities while still allowing room to express their ethnicity. These were not the AngloCanadian and American national mythologies that valorized British politicians and
founding fathers, nor were the events that connected German Lutherans to an imagined
German homeland. Instead, they were stories of hybridity that situated German Lutherans
firmly as an ethnic and religious community in St. Louis and Waterloo County.
German Lutheran expressions of ethnicity demonstrate a community that grappled
with demands to assimilate and integrate, but ultimately found a way to preserve portions
of their ethnicity in the face of such challenges. Although they adopted some AngloLorenzkowski, “Germania in Canada – Nation and Ethnicity at the German Peace Jubilees of 1871,” in
Beyond the Nation?: Immigrants’ Local Lives in Transnational Cultures, ed. Alexander Freund (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2012).
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Canadian and American norms, such as speaking English in public and using national
frameworks for commemorative acts, German Lutherans simultaneously maintained their
own ethnic and religious traditions. Although this generation of German Lutherans in the
mid-twentieth century may appeared assimilated compared to their nineteenth century
forerunners, this dissertation has tried to portray a more holistic definition of ethnicity
that sought to define a community of immigrants on their own terms. While German
Lutherans may have embraced their Canadian and American citizenship, these national
identities did not eclipse their established ethnic or religious traditions. War, postwar
immigration, theological disputes, and the changing demographics of the church all
provided opportunities for German Lutherans to shed their immigrant identities and
embrace their national communities. However, they chose not to do so. Ethnic elites and
laypeople fought to preserve their churches as ethnic boundary zones wherein they could
continue to articulate ethnic and religious identities that differed from mainstream society.
German Lutherans did not articulate an identity that placed them firmly in either
“German” or “Canadian/American” camps. Hybridity, and not assimilation, defined their
experiences in the mid-twentieth century.
Broadly speaking, the second goal of this dissertation was to apply developments
in whiteness studies to the experiences of German Lutherans. This dissertation argued
that “whiteness” or a white racial identity is essential for understanding how German
Lutherans constructed an ethnic identity. German Lutherans articulated a white racial
identity that served to bolster their ethnic identity in several ways. First, their whiteness
allowed them to form bonds with political leaders that helped ensure their safety during
periods of anti-German sentiment. Chapters two and three examined how ethnic elites
established working relationships with high ranking politicians like Prime Minister
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William Lyon Mackenzie King and the Office of War Information in order to advocate
for their loyalty to the Canadian and American states. Although their German ethnicity
prompted some suspicion, ethnic elites successfully courted these politicians and largely
convinced them that their immigrant communities posed little threat to national security
during and after the war. Unlike the widespread incarceration of Japanese Canadians and
Americans and the hostility expressed towards black protestors, Germans escaped acts of
systemic violence. Their whiteness allowed them to be treated as individuals rather than a
monolithic group. While government officials may have believed some “bad apples”
existed within German communities, they by and large accepted Germans as decent
citizens because of their whiteness. While racialized North Americans experienced statesanctioned discrimination on account of their race, German Lutherans could maintain
controversial ethnic allegiances due to the privileges whiteness afforded them.
Moreover, German Lutherans celebrated their ethnic past through myths,
commemorative acts, and foundational stories as a result of their white privilege. As
several chapters made clear, German Lutherans mimicked other settler colonial narratives
that normalized the presence of whites in North America. These narrative frameworks
proved particularly useful for German immigrants as they allowed white settlers to appear
“indigenous” or “entitled” to the land in which they lived. These narratives bolstered
settler regimes in North America by erasing the presence of indigenous peoples and
normalizing their marginalization while propping up German immigrants as members of
the newly-native settler class, or as the “natural” owners of the land. Racialized North
Americans simply could not access these narratives. Asian immigrants, for example, were
“temporary sojourners” or, worse still, represented a hostile attempt by China and
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Japanese to “take over” white countries.936 Celebrations of ethnic culture like the pioneer
myth persisted because the ethnic elites advancing such myths were white. Moreover,
ethnic elites occasionally advanced these narratives to directly ignore or minimize their
complicity in racial discrimination and white supremacy. Popular myths about nineteenth
century German immigrants fighting to abolish slavery helped ethnic elites in St. Louis
ignore the Missouri Synod’s pro-slavery past. During the decades in which debates about
segregation engulfed the synod, these myths helped ethnic elites portray the synod as a
benevolent and progressive institution. It masked their contemporary racism by valorizing
a historically inaccurate past. In St. Louis and Waterloo County, celebrations of ethnic
culture and white culture overlapped.
Lutheran churches moreover remained ethnic boundary zones because they were
segregated spaces. The Missouri Synod in particular actively kept their congregations
white, and therefore German, by barring black Lutherans from worshipping alongside
them. Chapter five demonstrated that Lutheran congregations impacted by white flight
made few efforts to rebuild their churches with new black members. Instead, they kept
their churches white by either relocating or replacing old members with white AngloAmerican laypeople instead. In doing so, the Missouri Synod maintained its English and
German-language traditions without including other minority groups in the church.
Although the Canada Synod never directly enforced a policy of segregation, chapter six
showcased that Ontario congregations remained German spaces only because of their
hostility towards Baltic and Scandinavian immigrants. Ethnic elites hoped to eliminate
Latvian, Estonian, and other “foreign” language services and effectively integrate DPs
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into their German-English churches. In doing so, ethnic elites acted as the gatekeepers
they otherwise resisted. The Missouri and Canada Synods kept their churches as ethnic
boundary zones by excluding their racialized neighbors and other marginalized
immigrants from their German churches.
In drawing connections between whiteness and ethnicity this dissertation engaged
with previous American historians who critiqued whiteness studies and pushed the field
in new directions. Most notably, it has provided nuance to the established narratives of an
“ethnic reverie” in postwar United States. This narrative purports that immigrants largely
adopted racial identities as whites and as Americans during the Second World War and its
resulting decades. Immigrants only reverted back to their ethnic identities in the late
1960s and early 1970s as part of the “white ethnic revival.”937 As this narrative remains
dominant in the field, historian Ronald Bayor asked future scholars to answer the
following question: “After World War II, did a white identity dominate or did the
prevalence of national identities persist and, if so, for how long?”938 This study has
addressed Bayor’s question by suggesting the ethnic reverie narrative does not adequately
capture the experiences of German Lutherans. Ethnicity continued to inform community
debates and decisions throughout the 1940s and onwards. Simply put, there was no ethnic
reverie that witnessed German Lutherans ignoring their ethnic heritage. A white identity
did not dominate among Germans in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Rather, whiteness
provided a vehicle for German Lutherans to continue their ethnic identities. Race and
ethnicity did not function as binary identities in German Lutheran communities, but rather
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worked in tandem to reinforce the other. Whiteness created the cultural and social
conditions necessary for Germans to continue an ethnic identity during the decades with a
strong anti-German bias.
This dissertation also addressed the critiques of Peter Kolchin, among others, that
have criticized the field’s forerunners for producing national histories of whiteness that
span over centuries. Due to their lack of temporal and geographic constraints, Kolchin
suggested that whiteness often appears as ahistorical, always present but never changing,
and is not properly grounded in specific communities during precise time periods.939 By
using a case study approach, this dissertation found that German Lutherans
simultaneously maintained ethnic and racial identities within their churches. Future
historians hoping to address Kolchin’s critiques and Bayor’s questions would do well to
examine how immigrants expressed their identities via religious institutions. As Kolchin
notes, many previous whiteness studies focus on immigrants in the public sphere. Yet,
within their ethnic boundary zones, this dissertation has argued that immigrants
articulated white and ethnic identities in the midst of the “ethnic reverie.”
More significantly, this dissertation is one of the first studies in Canadian history
to effectively racialize white European immigrants in the twentieth century. Many
Canadian historians of ethnicity evaluate immigrants using the “new social history”
approach of examining their subjects along the lines of class, gender, ethnicity, as well as
region and sexuality. Race, however, appears notably absent among discussions of white
immigrants. While other scholars have started to address whiteness and white supremacy
in the nineteenth century, Canadian historians of the twentieth century typically use
Peter Kolchin, “Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America,” The Journal of American
History 89, no. 1 (2002): 163; Eric Arnesen, “Whiteness and the Historians Imagination,” International
Labor and Working-Class History 60 (2001): 13.
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“white” as an adjective to describe their immigrant subjects rather than an analytical
framework employed to understand how race shaped immigrant lives. Too often
Canadian historians examine white supremacy through a legal or political lens that points
out the ways in which the Canadian desire for a white settler nation shaped anti-Asian
immigration policy, cultural genocide in residential schools, and enacted settlement
policies that favoured white migrants at the expense of indigenous peoples.940 Yet this
dissertation has demonstrated that whiteness existed outside of nativist calls for
exclusionary immigration policies or a preference towards other Commonwealth
countries.941 It also operated at cultural and ideological levels in immigrant communities
like Waterloo County’s German Lutheran population. While this community never
directly called for subjugation or exclusion of racialized peoples, they advanced a white
ethnic culture that was inherently based around their racial status as whites. In doing so,
this dissertation has addressed historian Constance Backhouse’s remark that Canadian
historians believe race “is generally understood as something that affixes itself only to
marginalized groups.”942 German Lutherans did articulate a white racial identity, even if it
remained couched in the language of ethnicity.
The German Lutheran experience demonstrates how important it is that future
historians racialize white immigrants. Recent studies on ethnic diversity, largely centered
940
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in Western Canada, have adopted a rather celebratory tone that takes pride in Canada’s
multiculturalism. In their overview of prairie immigrant history, Royden Loewen and
Gerald Friesen suggest that immigrants “shaped a distinct variation on the Canadian
model of cultural diversity” in the prairies as a result of their “hybrid cultures [and] the
vibrant ethnic networks developed by the immigrant communities.”943 In a similar vein,
historian Frances Swyripa commends the various European immigrants that settled in
Western Canada and made the prairies “a place of remarkable ethno-religious diversity,
making it unique in the history of Canada.” After surveying how immigrants came to
populate the prairie landscape with various commemorative acts including cemeteries,
churches, parades, and memorials, she concludes that prairie immigrants “bred visibility
and confidence” through their commemorative works.944 While I do not dispute the
findings of previous scholars that have unearthed examples of immigrants successfully
creating cultures of diversity, this dissertation has raised the question as to whether such
celebrations of ethnic diversity were predicated on their whiteness. Indeed, German
Lutherans helped “set the tone” in St. Louis and Waterloo County through a localized
German culture in each of these communities, but only because of the privileges
whiteness conferred upon them. The German Lutheran experience provides an important
reminder that celebrations of ethnic and religious diversity can work comfortably within a
culture that celebrates whiteness and reinforces the marginalization of racialized others.
While proponents of a German Lutheran identity in North America provided a
counterpoint to the exclusionary Anglo-Canadian and “100% American” identities
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popular in the early and mid-twentieth centuries, their identities did seek to overhaul the
inherently exclusionary basis of these nationalisms. Multiculturalism and ethnic diversity
are not necessarily anti-racist philosophies, nor can they be relied upon to challenge the
white supremacist identity that hides behind notions of nationality. These foundational
myths were vitally important to white ethnic groups. German Lutherans successfully
mobilized them to advocate for their loyalty, convince government officials to change
their refugee legislation, and helped them feel more comfortable in their communities. It
does not detract from this importance, however, to understand that this only occurred
because of their white privilege. I hope future Canadian historians are more conscientious
of whiteness as a category of historical analysis and can use it to shed light on the
country’s racial disparities, both past and present.
I titled this work “Welcoming Strangers” as it conveys how race and ethnicity
functioned in St. Louis and Waterloo County’s German Lutheran communities in the
mid-twentieth century. Their ethnicity often made them “strangers” in communities they
had long called home. The Second World War and attempts to regulate aspects of
immigrant life in the postwar period often put German Lutherans at odds with their
Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American neighbours. Yet, their whiteness simultaneously
ensured that these “strangers” were ultimately welcomed in their communities in ways
that other racialized peoples were not. Whiteness helped cultivate bonds with political
leaders that ensured they avoided large-scale internment during the war, and moreover
allowed them to create ethnic foundational myths that parroted Anglo-Canadian and
American narratives of pioneering and settlement. Whiteness helped German Lutherans
justify their at-times controversial ethnic identities and heritage. Only by looking at the
ways in which race and ethnicity interacted does it become fully clear how German
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Lutherans were able to maintain a hybrid ethnic identity and successfully negotiate the
pressures to assimilate.
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